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Chaturbhuj Vallabhdas Assessee v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax

Bombay High Court
Sep 18, 1945
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Factual and Procedural Background

This is a reference under Section 66(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, made by the Tribunal of Income-tax asking the Court to answer whether, on a true construction of clause 15 of the will of the late Gordhandas Khetsey, the income from the deceased's residuary estate is "income from property held in trust or other legal obligation, wholly for religious or charitable purposes" so as to be exempt under Section 4(3)(i) of the Income-tax Act.

Relevant facts in the statement of case: Gordhandas Khetsey made a will dated 30 April 1934 and died on 27 February 1935. Clause 15 of the will directed the trustee to "utilise my residuary property for such acts of charity as he deems proper" but allowed the trustee, if he thought fit, to give one-fourth of the residuary property to one or more daughters or to the sons of daughters. The residuary estate consisted of immovable properties in Bombay and suburbs and also securities.

Procedurally, the taxing authorities sought to tax the whole income of the residue on the ground that it did not fall under Section 4(3)(i). The Assistant Commissioner allowed exemption only for the amount actually spent for religious and charitable purposes and directed that the balance be taxed at the maximum rate. The assessee appealed; the Commissioner did not appeal the Assistant Commissioner's order. Before the Tribunal it was argued by the Commissioner that the word "charity" in clause 15 was not covered by the statutory definition of "charitable purpose" in Section 4. The Tribunal formed a view adverse to the assessee and the Tribunal referred the stated question of law to this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on a true construction of clause 15 of the will of Gordhandas Khetsey, the income from the residuary estate is income from property held in trust or other legal obligation wholly for religious or charitable purposes so as to be exempt under Section 4(3)(i) of the Income-tax Act.
  2. Whether the word "charity" used in clause 15 (without the express word "public") falls within the statutory definition of "charitable purpose" found in Section 4 of the Act.
  3. Whether, in the absence of any specific property being set apart for charity, the residuary estate can be treated as property held "wholly" for charitable purposes (Part 1 of Section 4(3)(i)), or whether exemption is limited to the portion of income actually applied for charitable purposes.

Arguments of the Parties

Arguments advanced on behalf of the Commissioner

  • The word "charity" used in clause 15 is indefinite and may include public or private charity and also benevolent or philanthropic objects, and therefore the residue should not be treated as falling within the statutory definition of "charitable purpose".
  • Reliance was placed on a Privy Council decision reported as 47 Bom. L.R 2331 to support the contention that use of the word "charity" without expressly indicating "public" does not necessarily bring the gift within the statutory definition.
  • It was also argued (relying on a Privy Council decision reported as 4 I.T.C 4865) that because no specific property is set apart exclusively for charitable purposes, the residuary estate is not property held in trust wholly for charitable purposes; accordingly, only the portion of income actually applied to charitable purposes should be exempt.

Assessee's position / Position advanced on behalf of the will/trust

  • The assessee sought to have the Tribunal's question referred to the Court; the position advanced (as reflected in the Court's consideration) was that the word "charity" in clause 15, used generally and without qualification, denotes a recognised legal charitable intention and therefore falls within the definition of "charitable purpose" in Section 4.
  • It was pointed out that clause 15 expressly directs the trustee to utilise the residuary property for acts of charity and, as a matter of construction, the testator had directed three-fourths of the residuary income for charity while leaving one-fourth discretionary; the assessee limited the question before the Court to the three-fourths portion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
47 Bom. L.R 2331 (Privy Council) The Privy Council emphasised the importance of public benefit when considering whether particular objects are charitable; attention was drawn to the statutory use of the word "public" in the definition in the Income-tax Act. The Court distinguished this case: it held that the Privy Council there was addressing particular objects and that the observation about "public" did not mean that a general use of the word "charity" without the word "public" cannot fall within the statutory definition. The Court rejected the Commissioner's reliance on this case as controlling the present construction of the word "charity" in clause 15.
66 I.A 2412 (Privy Council) [as cited in the opinion] Observed that the Court retains responsibility to determine the character of the object of a trust; that determination bears directly on its validity. The Court relied on this observation to support the proposition that if a gift to charity is held valid according to Indian law, that is a relevant factor in deciding whether it is a charitable purpose within the meaning of the Income-tax Act. The observation underpinned the Court's duty to construe clause 15 and assess the charitable character of the bequest.
66 I.A 241 (Privy Council) [as cited by Chagla, J.] Authority noting the duty of the Court to determine whether the object of expenditure or a trust is one that advances public utility (i.e., to decide the character of the object for exemption purposes). Used by Chagla, J. to reinforce the proposition that the Court must determine whether the bequest in clause 15 is a valid charitable bequest and thereby whether it attracts exemption under Section 4(3)(i).
23 Bom. 7253 and 31 Bom. 5834 Authorities showing that the word "charity," used generally, gives rise to a good bequest or gift in India. The Court cited these authorities to support the construction that the unqualified word "charity" in clause 15 is sufficient to constitute a valid charitable bequest under Indian law and thus falls within the statutory definition.
4 I.T.C 4865 (Privy Council) Held that where the trust instruments showed income applicable to a variety of objects (many not charitable), the property was not held wholly for charitable purposes; and where no part of the property was set aside exclusively for charitable or religious purposes the trustees could apply income to non-charitable purposes and exemption could not be claimed for the whole. The Commissioner relied on this case to argue that because no specific property was identified as set apart for charity, Part 1 of Section 4(3)(i) did not apply. The Court distinguished the facts: in the present will the testator explicitly directed three-fourths of the income of the residuary estate for charity, and that direction was sufficient to bring that portion within Part 1 of Section 4(3)(i).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in stages:

  1. Interpretation of the word "charity": The Court rejected the Tribunal's and Commissioner's construction that "charity" is indefinite and might include private benevolent or philanthropic objects not amounting to charitable purposes under the Income-tax Act. The Court held that "charity" used generally and without qualification has a recognised legal meaning and "necessarily connotes the use for the public." The Court noted the testator used the English word "charity" in a will originally in Gujarati, and suggested that the deliberate choice of the English term was significant.
  2. Statutory definition and public benefit: The Court analysed the argument that the statutory definition's inclusion of the word "public" requires the word "public" to be expressly used. The Court described the Commissioner's reliance on the Privy Council decision in 47 Bom. L.R. as a misreading: that decision concerned particular objects and emphasised public benefit as an important factor in context, but did not mean that a general unqualified bequest to "charity" falls outside the statutory definition. On the contrary, the Court held that an unqualified bequest to "charity" falls within the statutory definition.
  3. Reliance on authorities about validity of charitable bequests: The Court relied on precedents (including authorities reported as 23 Bom. 7253 and 31 Bom. 5834 and observations of the Privy Council in 66 I.A 2412) to support the proposition that if a gift to charity is valid in law in India, that fact is relevant in deciding whether it is a charitable purpose within the meaning of the Income-tax Act.
  4. Whether property is "held wholly" for charitable purposes: The Commissioner contended that because no specific property had been set apart for charity, Part 1 of Section 4(3)(i) did not apply and only the income actually applied to charity should be exempt. The Court distinguished the Privy Council decision in 4 I.T.C. 4865, explaining that that case involved instruments allowing trustees to apply income to both charitable and non-charitable objects without any appropriation of particular property to charity. By contrast, clause 15 of the will in this case directed the trustee to utilise the residuary property for charity and expressly directed three-fourths of the residuary income for that purpose. The Court held that a clearly defined portion of the residuary estate (three-fourths of the income) is "property" within the meaning of law and may be regarded as held wholly for charitable purposes.
  5. Conclusion of law: Applying these interpretive and factual conclusions to Section 4(3)(i), Part 1, the Court concluded that the three-fourths portion of the income of the residuary estate is held wholly for charitable purposes within the meaning of the Income-tax Act and therefore is exempt from tax. The Court limited its answer to the three-fourths portion, as the parties had agreed that the question should be so limited.
  6. Chagla, J.'s concurrence: Chagla, J. emphasised the Court's duty to determine whether the trust was valid and whether a dominant charitable intention was disclosed. He observed that even where the object is not specifically indicated, if a dominant charitable intention is disclosed the Court will not permit the charitable bequest to fail and may administer and control the trust. He agreed the bequest in clause 15 was a valid charitable bequest and fell within Section 4(3)(i).

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Answer to the reference (limited to three-fourths of the income of the residuary estate): In the affirmative.

The Court held that the portion of the residuary income equal to three-fourths is held wholly for charitable purposes within the meaning of Section 4(3)(i), Part 1, of the Income-tax Act and is therefore completely exempt from tax. The Commissioner was ordered to pay the costs of the reference. The formal record concluded: "Reference answered."

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: Three-fourths of the income of the residuary estate is exempt from income tax under Section 4(3)(i); the Court limited its determination to that portion as agreed by the parties. The remaining one-fourth (over which the trustee had discretion either to give to relatives or to apply for charity) was not adjudicated in this reference and may be subject to separate consideration under the second part of Section 4(3)(i).
  • Broader precedent: The opinion construes the unqualified term "charity" in a will as conveying a recognised charitable intention that can fall within the statutory definition of "charitable purpose." The Court relied on existing authorities in doing so; the opinion does not purport to announce an unrelated new principle beyond the interpretive conclusions applied to the facts of this will.

Reference answered.

Show all summary ...

Kania, A.C.J:— This is a reference under Section 66(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, by the Tribunal of Income-tax, inviting the Court's opinion on the following question:

“Whether in the circumstances of the case and on a true construction of cl. 15 of the will of the late Gordhandas Khetsey the income, from the deceased's residuary estate is income from property held in trust or other legal obligation, wholly for religious or charitable purposes so as to be exempt from assessment under S. 4(3)(i) of the Act?”

2. The material facts are few. Gordhandas Khetsey made his will dated 30th April, 1934, and died on 27th February, 1935. He left a large estate. Clause 15 of the will runs as follows:

“My trustee shall utilise my residuary property for such acts of charity as he deems proper. But if my trustee thinks fit, he can give a one-fourth part of my residuary property to all or one or more than one of my daughters or to the sons of my daughters.”

3. In the statement of case it is stated that the residuary estate consists of immovable properties in Bombay and its suburbs and also securities. The taxing authorities sought to tax the whole income of the residue on the ground that it did not fall under Section 4(3)(i) Income-tax Act. Before the Assistant Com-missioner it was in fact found that a certain amount was spent for religious and charitable purposes and he permitted the amount to be exempted from tax. Except for that, he directed that the balance should be taxed at the maximum rate. The assessee appealed. The Commissioner did not appeal against the order of the Assistant Commissioner. Before the Tribunal it was argued that the word “charity” used in cl. 15 of the will was not covered by the definition of “charitable purpose” found at the end of Section 4 of the Act. That definition runs as follows:

“In this sub-section ‘charitable purpose’ includes relief of the poor, education, medical relief, and the advancement of any other object of general public utility.”

4. It was contended on behalf of the Commissioner that the word ‘charity’ was indefinite and may include public or private charity, and also benevolent or philanthropic objects. Therefore, the income of the residue was not exempt from taxation under the Act. This line of reasoning is found in the judgment of the Tribunal. The assessee asked the abovementioned question of law to be referred to the Court and the matter has thus come before us. In my opinion the meaning put on the word “charity” (used in cl. 15 of the will) in the judgment of the Tribunal is incorrect. “Charity” without any further qualifications has a recognised meaning in law. It amounts to a general charitable intention for objects well recognised as charitable in law. It is to be noticed in this case that the original will is in Gujarati but the testator has deliberately used the word “charity” (an English word) in writing out cl. 15. This may be due to the fact that the Gujarati word “dharam” has been held to be void for uncertainty. We are not concerned in this case with what the Gujarati equivalent may be, or what effect can be given if a Gujarati word was used. Taking the word “charity” as used in cl. 15 I see no justification for the conclusion of the Tribunal that it would include benevolent or philanthropic objects or it may be private charity. The expression “private charity,” strictly speaking, is a misnomer. The words “charity” or “charitable purpose” or “charitable object” are defined in various sections of different Acts of the Indian Legislature. In all of them the idea of public benefit is clearly involved.

5. It was sought to be argued on behalf of the Commissioner that in the present case by the use of the word “charity” without the word “public” the use for public was not necessarily indicated. In this connection Mr. Setalvad relied on the judgment of the Privy Council in 47 Bom. L.R 2331. In that case the Court was considering whether the objects of the association were charitable or not. It must be noted that the word “charity” was not used as one of the objects of the association. Their Lordships emphasised that in the definition given in the Income-tax Act the word “public” was used and it was of importance. From that observation it was sought” to be argued on behalf of the Commissioner that unless the word “public” was used in connection with the objects mentioned in the settlement, the same was not within the meaning of “charitable purpose” as defined in the Act. In my opinion that argument is unsound. Their Lordships were only considering the particular objects of the association before them, and in considering the different objects emphasized the view that if the use was for the benefit of the public or a section of the public it was an important factor to be considered in determining whether the object was charitable or not. In my opinion it is misreading that case to say that when in a settlement the word “charity” is used without any qualifications or limitations it is not covered by the definition found in the Income-tax Act, unless the word “public” is expressly used in connection with “charity.” I would put the position in a different way. The word “charity,” if used generally, necessarily connotes the use for the public. Therefore when the word “charity” is used, there is nothing to include in it objects of private benefit only. In my opinion, the word “charity,” if used generally or without qualifications or limitations, falls within the definition of ‘charitable purpose’ found in Section 4 of the Act. One of the tests to be applied is whether the gift in question is valid in law. This argument was supported by the observations of the Privy Council in 66 I.A 2412. In the course of the judgment it was observed as follows (page 251):

“Their Lordships are in agreement with this view and see nothing in the Income-tax Act to discharge the Court of its responsibility in coming to a finding as to the character of the object of a trust—a matter which bears directly upon its validity.”

6. Therefore if a gift to charity is held valid according to the laws of India, it is ft. relevant factor to be considered in deciding if it is a charitable purpose within the meaning of the Act. 23 Bom. 7253 and 31 Bom. 5834 show that the word “charity,” used generally, gives rise to a good bequest or gift in India. In my opinion, therefore, the construction put upon that word in cl. 15 of the will by the Tribunal is not correct. The word “charity” used generally and without limitations by itself is sufficient to fall within the definition of charitable purpose given in the Income-tax Act and the argument of the Commissioner on this point must be rejected. It was next argued that in the present case by cl. 15 no specific property is set apart for charity and therefore the case is covered by the second part of S. 4(3)(i) which runs in these terms:

“4. (3) This Act shall not apply to the following classes of income:— (i) Any income derived from property held under trust or other legal obligation wholly for religious or charitable purposes, and in the case of property so held in part only for such purposes, the income applied, or finally set apart for application, thereto.”

7. It was argued that in the present case the residuary estate was not property held in trust or for other legal obligation ‘wholly’ for religious or charitable purpose. At most therefore, only such portion of the income as is proved to be applied for such purposes should be exempted from tax. Mr. Setalvad relied on the judgment of the Privy Council in 4 I.T.C 4865. In that case a property was settled on trust under a deed dated 25th August, 1917. The objects of the trust were further explained and extended by another deed dated 25th November, 1922. An examination of the documents showed clearly that the income of the trust property was applicable to purposes many of which were neither religious nor charitable. On the construction of the documents their Lordships held that the income of the property so settled was not held in trust wholly for religious or charitable purposes. There can be no doubt on that point. Their Lordships then observed as follows (p. 487):

“Nor is it suggested that any part of the property is set aside for any charitable or religions purposes, so that it can be identified as appropriated exclusively to such purposes…..”

8. Relying on that observation and the statement in the case here that the residuary estate consists of immovable properties in Bombay and its suburbs as well as securities it was argued that the assessee cannot point out any particular property which was set apart exclusively for charitable purposes, and therefore, the case was not covered by Part 1 of Section 4(3)(i) of the Act. In my opinion, this argument is unsound. What their Lordships of the Privy Council were concerned with was a case in which several objects were mentioned in a deed to which income could be applied. It was not stated in the deed what portion of the income was to be applied for the purpose set out in a particular clause. The result was that the trustees could use any portion of the income or the whole income for either charitable or non-charitable purposes. In such circumstances it was obvious that the Board had to hold that exemption could be granted only in respect of what was actually used for charitable purposes. The observation quoted above has to be read in the light of those facts. Their Lordships had under those circumstances to state that as it could not be identified that any part of the property was appropriated exclusively to charitable purposes Part 1 of cl. (i) of sub-s. (3) could not be applicable. I am unable to read that observation as meaning that the trustees must point out a particular property (i.e a house, or a security giving the number) to bring into operation Part 1 of the clause. Residuary estate is recognised as property in law. If so, a clearly defined portion of the residuary estate is equally “property” within the meaning of law. In the present case by cl. 15 the testator had directed his trustee to utilise three-fourths of the income of the residuary estate for charity. That clearly falls within Part 1 of cl. (i) of sub-s. (3) of Section 4 of the Act. As regards the remaining one-fourth part the trustee is given the option to spend it either for charity or to give the same over to one or more of the testator's daughters or the sons of his daughter. To that part the second portion of cl. (i) may be applied. We are not concerned with that point as it is agreed between the parties that the question before the Court should be limited only to three-fourths of the income of the residue. In my opinion that income is clearly covered by S. 4(3)(i), Part 1. That portion of the residue is held wholly for charitable purposes within the meaning of the Income-tax Act and is completely exempt from tax. Our answer to the question submitted for the Court's opinion (limited to the three-fourths of the income of the residuary estate) is in the affirmative. The Commissioner to pay the costs of the reference.

9. Chagla, J.:— I agree. In my opinion when an assessee claims exemption under S. 4(3)(i) on the ground that the income is derived from property held under trust or other legal obligation wholly for religious or other charitable purposes, the responsibility is cast upon the Court to determine and decide whether such trust is a valid one. In the case in 66 I.A 241, the trustees of the Tribune claimed exemption under sub-s. (3) of S. 4 on the ground that the income was spent for the advancement of an object of general public utility and their Lordships of the Privy Council there pointed out that it was the duty of the Court to determine what the character of the object was; whether in the opinion of the Court the object was such as would advance public utility. In the case before us the testator has not indicated the object of the charity. All that he has stated is that the trustee should spend the income of his residue for such acts of charity as he deemed proper. Now, in my opinion, considering the fact that this is the will of a Gujarati speaking person writing in the Gujarati language, it is clear that the intention of the testator, by using the word “charity” which is an English expression, was to indicate and disclose a dominant and overriding charitable intention which was not the case before the Privy Council, to which I have referred. Their Lordships cast a duty upon the Court to determine whether the printing of the paper was for the purpose of public advancement. Similarly it is our duty to determine whether the bequest contained in cl. 15 is a valid charitable bequest.

10. It is clear on the authorities, and I need not refer to them, that if a dominant charitable intention is disclosed although the object of the charity is not indicated the Court will not permit the charitable bequest to be defeated but if necessary may administer the trust and undertake the control of the trust. Therefore in my opinion this is a good charitable bequest, and if it is a good charitable bequest, it falls within the terms of S. 4(8)(i) and is a trust for charitable purposes. I, therefore, agree that the answer to the question referred to the Court should be in the affirmative and the Commissioner should pay the costs of the reference.

D.R/D.H

11. Reference answered.