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Abdul Karim Adenwalla v. Rahimabai

Bombay High Court
Jun 28, 1945
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Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff brought a suit seeking a declaration that a deed of wakf executed by Mahomed Moosa Adenwalla on 16 October 1928 is void and inoperative. The plaintiff asked that defendants 1, 2 and 3, who are the present trustees under that deed, be declared to hold the trust properties as trustees for the settlor's heirs other than Fatmabai and Ebrahim Haji Ahmed Moosa.

The trust (described as a wakf-alal-aulad) purported to provide: (a) that the settlor would be the first mutawalli and receive the net income of two immovable properties during his life for his absolute use; (b) on his death, after setting aside 25% of gross rents for major repairs, distribution of the balance with one-third to specified charitable objects (enumerated in four clauses) and the remaining portions to specified children and their descendants; and (c) provisions for what should happen to shares of descendants that became extinguished (to be applied to the same charitable objects).

Three administration suits relating to the settlor's estate had been filed and a consolidated consent decree showed that two persons (Fatmabai and Ebrahim Haji Ahmed Moosa) had released all their rights in the estate and under the wakf deed. The court heard submissions, made findings on the legal character of the deed and adjourned the suit for directions after consultation with the Advocate-General; the hearing was stood over to 9 July 1945. Costs were directed to come out of the trust estate, with certain costs ordered as between attorney and client.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the deed executed on 16 October 1928 is a valid wakf-alal-aulad within the meaning of the Mussalman Wakf Validating Act, 1913 (i.e., whether it complies with the Act's requirement that the ultimate benefit be reserved for a charitable object recognised by Muhammadan law of a permanent character).
  2. Whether the settlor's reservation of the entire net income of the trust property to himself for his "absolute use" during his life constitutes permissible reservation for "maintenance and support" (as contemplated by the relevant rules for Hanafi Mussalmans) or whether it amounts to an unlawful life-interest inconsistent with the protection afforded by the Act.
  3. Whether the specific objects enumerated by the settlor (four categories of charitable or quasi-charitable payments) qualify as charitable purposes under Muhammadan law and are of a permanent character such that the deed can be validated under the Mussalman Wakf Validating Act.
  4. Consequentially, if the wakf is invalid as a wakf-alal-aulad, what provisions of the deed (if any) are enforceable as present gifts to charity and what is the proper disposition of the remaining trust property (i.e., whether trustees must hold for the heirs).

Arguments of the Parties

Counsel's Argument (Mr. Taraporewalla)

  • Mr. Taraporewalla emphasised that, under the Mussalman Wakf Validating Act, where a settlor selects a particular charity to benefit on the extinction of his family, it is necessary to consider whether that chosen charity is of a permanent nature and therefore a valid ultimate beneficiary under the Act.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of other parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in a sequence of legal inquiries tied to the Mussalman Wakf Validating Act, 1913 and to principles distinguishing life-interest reservations from reservations for maintenance:

  1. The court first identified the central statutory test under the Mussalman Wakf Validating Act: a wakf-alal-aulad will be lawful if the settlor reserves the ultimate benefit for the poor or for a purpose recognised by Muhammadan law as religious, pious or charitable of a permanent character; S.4 permits postponement of the charitable benefit until extinction of the family.
  2. The court examined the deed's specific charitable clauses (four categories). It analysed each category against Muhammadan law and the permanence requirement:
    • The first category (payment of marriage expenses to specified persons) was held not to be charitable under Muhammadan law; payments had already been made, making that point academic in the context of present relief.
    • The second category (Rs. 200 annually to up to three poor members of the settlor's family) was recognised as potentially charitable under Muhammadan law, but the court noted the difficulty of treating this as a reliably permanent charity after extinction of descendants—there is no certainty that such relatives would exist or be poor when the family line died out.
    • The third category (Rs. 300 annually to Sayyeds and Fakirs) was problematic: while payment to Fakirs (understood as the poor) might be charitable, payment specifically to Sayyeds raised doubts whether that group constitutes a valid charitable class under Muhammadan law, and the clause was inseverable (the mutawalli was to spend Rs. 300 on both groups), rendering the whole provision bad because one part was clearly non-charitable and identification of genuine Sayyeds after time would be impracticable.
    • The fourth category (Rs. 1,000–1,200 for feasting Cutchi Memons annually on the settlor's death anniversary) did not qualify as a charitable object under Muhammadan law because it merely directed a feast without any religious ceremony or prayers.
  3. The court concluded that the settlor had manifested a desire to benefit specific, enumerated charities rather than displaying a general or dominant charitable intention that would ensure the entirety of the trust res vested ultimately in valid charitable objects. The income of the properties far exceeded the amounts allocated to those specific charitable objects; the court held it improbable that the enumerated charities could exhaust the trust income after extinction of descendants.
  4. The court then turned to the nature of the settlor's reservation during his life. It distinguished between a reservation for "maintenance and support" (which the legislature allowed for Hanafi Mussalmans) and a reservation of a life-interest for "absolute use" (which the settlor had done). The deed reserved the whole net income to the settlor for his absolute use (a life-interest), not merely for his maintenance and support. The court observed the legal distinction and the consequences under the Transfer of Property Act and the Code of Civil Procedure concerning transferability and attachment — emphasising that the settlor's provision was a life-interest and not the maintenance-based reservation contemplated by the validating statute.
  5. Because (a) the deed did not ensure that the whole trust property would ultimately vest in charitable objects of a permanent character as required by the Mussalman Wakf Validating Act, and (b) the settlor had reserved an absolute life-interest rather than a maintenance-based reservation, the deed could not be validated as a wakf-alal-aulad and therefore offended the rules against perpetuity absent protection by the Act.
  6. The court did identify a separate characterisation of part of the deed: the clause that created the charitable provision but postponed enjoyment until after the settlor's death was treated as a present gift to charity made in praesenti, subject to a stipulation that trustees should not spend the charity while the settlor lived but should give the income to him. The court held that such a provision can be a valid charitable gift in praesenti if the charitable objects themselves are valid under Muhammadan law; accordingly, the Rs.200 annual provision to poor family-members was treated as a valid charitable object to the extent identified.
  7. On remedial consequences, the court directed the trustees to set aside funds (out of sale proceeds if sale is necessary) to secure Rs.600 per annum (i.e., Rs.200 each to three persons) to carry out that identified charitable provision. For the remainder of the estate, having declared the wakf void, the trustees were to hold and hand over the balance of the trust estate to the heirs of the settlor.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The court held that the deed of wakf executed on 16 October 1928 is void and inoperative as a wakf-alal-aulad under the Mussalman Wakf Validating Act, 1913, because the deed did not secure that the whole trust property would ultimately benefit charitable objects of a permanent character and because the settlor reserved an absolute life-interest rather than a maintenance-based reservation permitted by law.

Direct consequences and directions ordered by the court:

  • The trustees must set aside sufficient funds (by sale of trust properties, if necessary) to produce Rs.600 annually (to satisfy the valid charitable provision of Rs.200 per year to not more than three poor members of the settlor's family) and carry out that charitable obligation.
  • As to the remainder of the trust estate, the wakf being void, the trustees are to hold and hand over the balance of the estate to the heirs of the settlor (noting that two persons, Fatmabai and Ebrahim Haji Ahmed Moosa, had released their interests by consent decree and therefore had no interest in the properties).
  • The suit was stood over for directions after consultation with the Advocate-General; the matter was adjourned to 9 July 1945.
  • Costs of all parties were directed to come out of the trust estate; costs of defendants 1, 2 and 3 and of the Advocate-General were ordered as between attorney and client.

Implications beyond the parties: The opinion confines itself to applying the statutory test in the Mussalman Wakf Validating Act and to statutory and doctrinal distinctions regarding life-interest versus maintenance reservations; it does not purport to lay down a new general rule of law. The practical effect is the invalidation of the particular wakf deed and a partial enforcement of a valid charitable gift contained within that deed, with the bulk of the estate reverting to the settlor's heirs.

Show all summary ...

1. The plaintiff has filed the suit for a declaration that the deed of wakf executed by Mahomed Moosa Adenwalla on 16th October, 1928, is void and inoperative and that defendants 1, 2 and 3, who are the present trustees under that deed, hold the properties, the subject-matter of the trust, as trustees for the heirs of the deceased other than Fatmabai and Ebrahim Haji Ahmed Moosa. The wakf which was executed by Haji Ahmed Moosa purports to be wakf-alal-aulad, and what I have to determine is whether it is a good wakf within the meaning of the Mussalman Wakf Validating Act of 1913. The settlor recites hia desire of making a wakf-alal-aulad in respect of his two immovable properties in order to provide himself and his children in the manner provided in the trust deed. He declares that he would be the first mutawalli or trustee under the deed and then he gives directions as to how the rents and profits of the two properties are to be distributed. He directs the trustees first to pay the outgoings and then to pay the net balance of the income of the two properties to the settlor during his life for his absolute use; and then he directs that the trustee or mutawalli who is to come after him should, after his death, set apart 25 per cent, of the gross rents of the trust properties to meet expenses of heavy repairs and utilise the balance of the income in the following manner: (1) one-third share for charitable purposes according to the Muhammadan law which are mentioned specifically in the clauses that follow; (2) one-eighth of the balance to his widow and one-half of the remaining balance to his son Abdul Karim Haji Ahmed and his descendants; (3) one-fourth of the balance to his daughter Rabiabai; and (4) the remaining one-fourth to his daughter Rahimabai and her descendants.

2. The settlor further provides that if there be no descendants of any of his said children, the share of the income should be utilised for the same charitable objects which are subsequently mentioned in the deed and to which reference was made when he set apart one-third share of the balance of his income. Then in four clauses the settlor deals with what he considers to be charitable objects under the Muhammadan law for which the one-third share of the income has to be expended and for which purpose also the share of the income of any of the line of the descendants which might become extinguished should also be utilised. These four objects are: firstly, the marriage expenses of the persons mentioned in that clause; secondly, a sum of Rs. 200 to be paid every year each to not more than three persons belonging to the family of Moosaor Moosani, which was the family of the settlor, who might be poor and in need of money; thirdly, a sum of Rs. 300 to be spent amongst the Sayyeds and Fakirs every year in the month of Ramzan; and fourthly, a sum of Rs. 1000 to Rs. 1200 for feasting Cutchi Memons of his community on the day of his anniversary of his death.

3. A wakf-alal-aulad is a method whereby a Mussalman can make provision for the maintenance and support of his family and descendants. Under ordinary law such a trust would be had as offending against the law of perpetuity. It is not open to a person to the up his property in perpetuity and give the income of it to his children and his descendants. But the law has made an exception in the case of Mussalmans, and that exception is to be found in the Mussalman Wakf Validating Act (4 [IV] of 1913). That Act makes it lawful for a Mussalman to create a wakf for the maintenance and support wholly or partially of his family, children or descendants, provided that the ultimate benefit is in such cases expressly or impliedly reserved for the poor or for any other purpose recognised by the Muhammadan law as a religious, pious or charitable purpose of a permanent character and S. 4 of that Act goes on to state that no such wakf shall be deemed to be invalid merely because the benefit reserved therein for the poor or other religious, pious or charitable purpose of a permanent nature is postponed until after the extinction of the family, children or descendants of the person creating the wakf. Therefore a Mussalman can the up his property in perpetuity for the maintenance and support of his family, children or descendants provided he makes a provision that the ultimate benefit goes to a charitable object recognised by the Muham madan law as charitable and the charitable purpose is of a permanent nature. It is open to him to postpone benefit being conferred upon charity till the extinction of all his family and his descendants.

4. Now in the trust before me one thing is perfectly patent that the settlor wanted specific charities which he has mentioned in the four clauses in the trust to benefit in the event of the share of any line of his descendants or children becoming extinguished. It is clear that the first of these so-called charitable objects, the payment of marriage expenses, is not charity according to the Muhammadan law. Those payments have already been made by the trustees, and the question in that sense becomes academic. With regard to the second object, payment of Rs. 200 every year to a person belonging to the family of the settlor who may be poor and in need of money, payment to poor relatives is really good charity under the Muhammadan law; but as Mr. Taraporewalla has pointed out, when we are dealing with the Mussalman Wakf Validating Act, we must consider a particular charity benefiting on the extinction of the family of the settlor and, therefore, it is necessary to consider whether the charity selected by the settlor which is ultimately to be benefited is or is not of a permanent nature. It is not possible to say with any certainty that there would be any members of the family of the settlor in existence when the descendants of the settlor became extinct; and even if such persons were to be in existence, whether necessarily they would be poor and in need of money. The third object is the payment of Rs. 300 every year to Sayyeds and Fakirs. It may be said that payment of money to Fakirs—not indeed professional beggars but treating that expression to mean the “poor”—would be a good charitable gift; but as far as the Sayyeds are concerned, I am not sure whether payment to Sayyeds is a good charitable gift according to the Muhammadan law. Sayyeds are members of the Prophet's family; and even assuming that was a good charitable object, it would be impossible to ascertain after this period of time as to who were genuinely the members of the Prophet's family and to benefit that particular class of people. Under the trust deed the obligation is cast upon the mutawalli to spend a sum of Rs. 300 upon both these objects, the Sayyeds and the Fakirs, and as one of the objects is clearly non-charitable, the whole provision is bad. As regards the fourth object, namely, spending about Rs. 1000 to Rs. 1200 for feasting the Cutchi Memons every year on the anniversary of the death of the settlor, I am clearly of opinion that is not a good charitable object according to Muhammadan law. It should be noted that there is no suggestion that any prayers are to be said in this feast or any religious ceremony to be performed. All that the settlor says is that a feast is to be held where a certain amount has to be spent every year.

5. Therefore the settlor was anxious to benefit these particular charities and that is clean also from the fact that even before the extinction of his family or descendants he has provided that a portion of the income should be spent on these objects immediately after his death. It is impossible to infer that any general or dominant charitable intention is shown by the settlor in making provision under this particular deed. The matter becomes even more clear when one remembers that the net income of the two properties—the subject-matter of the trust—is about Rs. 16,000 a year and the charitable provisions, assuming that they were all charitable, would hardly exhaust a very small proportion of the income of these properties. The part of the income set apart for being expended on these charitable objects after the death of the settlor is in itself sufficient to defray all the expenses and, there, fore, in the event of the family and the descendants becoming extinct and the income becoming available for charity it would be impossible to spend that income on the specific objects enumerated by the settlor. Therefore, in my opinion, the whole of the trust property is not given to charity as an ultimate bequest, and unless that is done, the most important provision of the Mussalman Wakf Validating Act of 1913 is not satisfied.

6. The trust deed may also be looked at from another point of view. It is open to a settlor when he belongs to the Hanafi sect to reserve for his own maintenance and support during his lifetime the income of the trust property. In this case what the settlor has done is that he has reserved for himself during his life for his absolute use the whole income of the trust property. The income is not reserved for his maintenance and support but for his absolute use. The Legislature advisedly did not permit a Hanafi Mussalman to reserve the income of the trust property during his life for his own benefit or for such use as he may put it to. It was only when he reserved that income for his maintenance and support that he was permitted to do so without offending against the provisions of the Act. What the settlor has done in this deed is that he has reserved to himself a life-interest in the income of the trust property. Now a reservation of a life-interest in the income of a trust property is a very different thing from securing to himself for his own maintenance and support the income of the trust property. The difference in law between these two provisions is clear and of considerable importance. If what he had reserved to himself was for his own maintenance, that would not be transferable as property under the Transfer of Property Act nor could it be attachable under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Whereas if he had reserved for himself a life-interest, that particular provision would not attract to itself the provisions of Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act, and Section 60 of the CPC, with regard to non-transfer-ability and non-liability to attachment contained in the provisions of the two sections. What is even more significant is that the trust deed nowhere indicates that the settlor is making this provision for the maintenance and support of his family, children or descendants. Now that again is important because it is only when the trust is for the maintenance and support of the family, children and descendants of the settlor that it comes within the ambit of the Mussalman Wakf Validating Act of 1913. As far as one can see, on the provisions of this trust deed, the trust is created not for the maintenance and support of his family, children and descendants but in order to give them income in the manner specified in the trust deed for their absolute use. Therefore, taking everything into consideration, in my opinion the wakf deed is not a valid and proper wakf-alal-aulad to which the Act of 1913 applies, and as every wakf created by a Mussalman which offends against the rules of perpetuity is bad unless it is protected by that Act, I must hold that this particular deed is void and inoperative.

7. But there is one provision of the deed to which I must refer. As I have pointed out, the settlor provides in this deed that after his death the trustees should spend a certain proportion of the income of the property on certain charitable objects which he has specified and to which I have referred. That particular provision in the deed would not amount to a provision for his descendants with an ultimate gift to charity. It is really a gift to charity in præsenti through the medium of a trust. What the settlor says is this:

“I make the gift to charity. I appoint trustees. I hand over the subject of the gift to trustees. But I make a stipulation with the trustees that they should not spend the money on charity so long as I am alive and give the income to me.”

8. As far as I can see, there is nothing in Muhammadan law to prevent a Mussalman from creating a trust of that nature. Of course the charitable objects must be such as are recognised as good under Muhammadan law. I have already held that the provisions with regard to feasting the Cutchi Memons and the payment of Rs. 300 among the Sayyeds and the Fakirs are not charitable objects as understood by the Muhammadan law. But as far as the provision with regard to the payment of Rs. 200 every year to not more than three persons belonging to the family of the settlor who may be poor and in need of money is a perfectly good charitable object. Therefore, there is no reason why the trustees should not carry out this particular provision in the trust deed although the deed itself should be void as a wakf-alal-aulad and to the extent that it ties up property in perpetuity. I would, therefore, direct the trustees that they must set apart sufficient amount out of the sale proceeds of the trust properties if it be necessary to sell those properties as would fetch a sum of Rs. 600 every year so as to carry out this particular charitable object. With regard to the rest of the trust estate, as I have held that the wakf is void, they are merely trustees for the heirs of the settlor and they must hand over the balance of the trust estate to these heirs.

9. With regard to the heirs, all the heirs are before me except two who are Fatmabai and Ebrahim Haji Ahmed Moosa. There were three administration suits filed to administer the estate of the settlor and a consolidated consent decree was taken in these three suits and the consent decree which has been put in shows that as far as these two heirs are concerned, they have released all their right, title and interest in the estate of the settlor and also their interest under this wakf deed.

10. Therefore neither Fatmabai nor Ebrahim Haji Ahmed Moosa has any interest in these trust properties. Parties want to take directions from me with regard to the disposal of the trust properties and other matters and they want to do that after they have consulted the Advocate-General. I therefore stand this suit over for that purpose. Suit adjourned to 9th July, 1945. Costs of all parties to come out of the trust estate. Costs of defendants 1, 2 and 3 and of the Advocate-General as between attorney and client.

D.R/D.H

11. Order accordingly.