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Hirji Laxmidas v. Francis Fernandes
Judicial Opinion Summary (as provided)
Factual and Procedural Background
This suit was brought in the Small Cause Court at Bombay by the landlords (plaintiffs) to eject defendant No. 1 (the tenant) from premises described as 31-D Matarpakhdi, Mazgaon, Bombay. The tenancy was a monthly tenancy at a rent of Rs. 125 per month. A notice to determine the tenancy was given (dates in the record include April 29, 1943 as stated by Stone, C.J.; Kania, J. refers to a notice served April 29, 1941 and proceedings commenced in August 1941). After service of notice the plaintiffs applied to the Controller under the Bombay Rent Restriction Order, 1942 for a certificate that would avoid the restrictions on recovery of possession; the Controller refused the application and the plaintiffs' appeal to the Collector was unsuccessful.
On April 6, 1944 a full bench held ss. 8, 9 and 12 of the 1942 Order invalid; plaintiffs then commenced this suit on April 12, 1944 (as described by Stone, C.J.). The Bombay Rents, Hotel Rates and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1944 (referred to as the 1944 Act) was promulgated on May 12, 1944 by the Governor exercising powers under a Proclamation of November 4, 1939 issued under s. 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935.
Defendant No. 1 pleaded the 1944 Act and relied on the effect of the Controller's prior refusal (under the 1942 Order), asserting that such refusal was binding on the plaintiffs under s. 15 of the 1944 Act. Plaintiffs challenged the validity of Part II of the 1944 Act as ultra vires. Because the challenge raised questions of public importance, the Advocate General for Bombay was added as a party and the matter was transferred to the High Court and heard by the bench (Stone, C.J. and Kania, J.).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Part II of the Bombay Rents, Hotel Rates and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1944 (the 1944 Act) is ultra vires.
- Whether the Governor, in exercise of powers assumed under s. 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935 (by the Proclamation of November 4, 1939), had power to legislate retrospectively.
- Whether a Provincial Legislature (or the Governor acting as such) can legislate retrospectively in matters falling in the concurrent field (seventh schedule, list III), and whether Governor-General's assent cures any repugnancy.
- Whether ss. 9 and 14 of the 1944 Act are void because they interfere with the powers and jurisdiction of the High Court, contrary to the proviso to s. 93 of the Government of India Act.
- Whether the Provincial Legislature (or the Governor acting under s. 93) could validly enact legislation that affects the jurisdiction or powers of the High Court (including the effect of Letters Patent clause 44).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant / Plaintiffs (as presented by Mr. Hathi)
- Part II of the 1944 Act is ultra vires.
- Four specific grounds attacking the validity of the 1944 Act were articulated:
- (1) The Governor legislating under s. 93 has no power to legislate retrospectively at all.
- (2) The Provincial Legislature itself cannot legislate retrospectively in the concurrent field (list III matters), and the subject-matter here falls in that field.
- (3) Sections 9 and 14 of the 1944 Act are void because they interfere with the High Court's powers and jurisdiction contrary to the proviso to s. 93.
- (4) The Provincial Legislature (and hence the Governor acting under s. 93) has no power to interfere with the powers and jurisdiction of the High Court; clause 44 of the Letters Patent and related provisions were invoked.
Respondent / Defendant No. 1
- Defendant No. 1 pleaded the 1944 Act (Bombay Act VII of 1944) and relied on its protections: in particular, that a prior refusal by the Controller under the Bombay Rent Restriction Order, 1942 binds the plaintiffs under s. 15 of the 1944 Act and prevents recovery of possession.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Emperor v. Prabhakar Kondaji Bhapkar (Full Bench of this High Court) | Upheld validity of a retrospective Ordinance promulgated by the Governor-General under s. 72 (Ninth Schedule) of the Government of India Act; held Governor-General could promulgate retrospective emergency legislation. | The Court relied on this decision to analogise that the Governor acting under s. 93 has comparable power to enact retrospective legislation; used to reject the first ground that the Governor cannot legislate retrospectively. |
| Emperor v. Shreekant Pandurang Ketkar | Upheld a retrospective Ordinance made by the Governor-General; used as supporting authority for retrospective emergency legislation. | The judgment was cited (through the Bhapkar decision) to support the proposition that emergency legislation promulgated by executive authority can be retrospective and valid. |
| King-Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee (Federal Court) | Discussed aspects of Governor-General's powers under s. 72; Federal Court refrained from expressing a final opinion on the broader question whether the Governor-General can make retrospective Ordinances (the court stated no final opinion was necessary for disposal). | The Court (Kania, J.) observed that Sibnath Banerjee did not decide the point relied on by plaintiffs (that retrospective power was absent) and therefore the plaintiffs' reliance upon it was misplaced. |
| Ramnandan v. Goshwami Madhwanand Ramji (judgment of Mr. Justice Sulaiman) | Authority for the proposition that the Governor-General's assent to a Provincial Act cures repugnancy between Provincial and Central legislation (reference to s. 107(2)). | Stone, C.J. cited this authority to support his conclusion that Governor-General's assent cures repugnancy and that retrospective effect does not make the Act invalid where such assent has been given. |
| Subramanyan v. Muttuswami (Federal Court) | Discussed interpretation of s. 100 and the relationship among lists I, II and III in the Seventh Schedule; explained 'pith and substance' approach and how concurrent and exclusive powers interact. | Kania, J. relied on the Federal Court's analysis to explain that once Governor-General's sanction under s. 107(2) is obtained in respect of concurrent-list legislation, repugnancy is removed and the Provincial Act (or Governor's law) is effective and may be retrospective within its competence. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The bench (Stone, C.J. and Kania, J.) analysed the plaintiffs' fourfold attack in detail and reached the following conclusions, based strictly on the materials and authorities cited in the opinion:
1. Retrospective Power of the Governor (First Ground)
Stone, C.J. treated the question of retrospective legislation by the Governor under s. 93 as analogous to the Governor-General's power under s. 72 (Ninth Schedule) and observed that binding authority of the High Court (Emperor v. Prabhakar Kondaji Bhapkar and Emperor v. Ketkar) supported the validity of retrospective emergency legislation by executive authority. The Court therefore rejected the contention that the Governor has no power to legislate retrospectively.
Kania, J. developed this point further by addressing the Federal Court's treatment in King-Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee and concluded that the Federal Court in that case did not finally decide the point relied upon by plaintiffs; Kania, J. concluded that a Governor acting under s. 93 may, within the scope of the powers assumed, enact retrospective laws where those powers are co-extensive with the Provincial Legislature.
2. Retrospectivity in the Concurrent Field (Second Ground)
The Court examined whether the subject-matter of the 1944 Act lay in the concurrent field (Seventh Schedule, list III items such as civil procedure, transfer of property, contracts, jurisdiction of courts) and whether that barred retrospective legislation. The bench noted that the Governor-General had given his assent to the 1944 Act; Stone, C.J. relied on s. 107(2) and the authority of Ramnandan v. Goshwami to hold that assent cures repugnancy, and therefore retrospective effect does not invalidate the Act. Kania, J. analysed s. 100 and s. 107(2) (with reference to Subramanyan v. Muttuswami) and concluded that once the Governor-General's sanction is obtained for a provincial law in a concurrent field, repugnancy is removed and the Provincial Act has overriding force in the Province; retrospective operation does not render it invalid.
3. Interference with High Court Powers (Third Ground)
The plaintiffs argued that ss. 9 and 14 of the 1944 Act effectively transfer determinations (for example, whether a tenant has committed acts contrary to s. 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, or whether conduct amounts to nuisance) from judicial determination in the High Court to executive officers (Controller and Collector) and then oust the jurisdiction of Civil Courts by express provision (s. 14(3)). The plaintiffs relied on the proviso to s. 93, which protects High Courts from certain assumptions or suspensions of their powers.
Stone, C.J. analysed the text of s. 93 and s. 223 and concluded that the proviso to s. 93 prevents the Governor from assuming to himself or suspending the powers of the High Court by Proclamation. However, once the Governor assumes the legislative functions of the Provincial Legislature under s. 93, laws made by him are to be treated as provincial laws (s. 93(4)), and the proviso does not prevent alteration of law by the Governor acting in that legislative capacity within the competencies of the Provincial Legislature. In short, the proviso bars the Governor from directly assuming judicial powers or suspending High Court powers by Proclamation, but it does not prevent valid legislation (made under assumed legislative powers) that changes the law in areas within provincial competence.
Kania, J. reached the same conclusion: the Governor had not assumed the powers of the High Court nor suspended any provision relating to it; instead he exercised assumed legislative powers and acted within s. 223 as the proper legislative authority. Kania, J. explained that the construction preserves the operative effect of the proviso while allowing the Governor, acting as the Provincial Legislature, to make laws altering jurisdiction or procedure to the extent competent by law.
4. Power to Interfere with High Court Jurisdiction / Letters Patent Argument (Fourth Ground)
Plaintiffs relied on clause 44 of the Letters Patent (and clause 12 granting jurisdiction to the High Court) to argue that only the Central Government could alter such provisions. The Court considered s. 293 of the Government of India Act and the Government of India (Adaptation of Indian Laws) Order, 1937. Stone, C.J. held that by the conjoint effect of s. 293 and the Adaptation Order the references in the Letters Patent to the Governor-General should be read as referring to all competent authorities; consequently the argument failed. Kania, J. made the same point and concluded that the proper legislative authority, as adapted, was the Provincial Legislature and, when its powers were assumed by the Governor under s. 93, the Governor became the proper legislative authority for the province.
Disposition of the Arguments and Result
Both judges concluded that the plaintiffs' attack on the validity of Part II of the 1944 Act failed on all the grounds raised. The Court held that the 1944 Act (Bombay Act VII of 1944) was intra vires as enacted by the Governor acting under the Proclamation and s. 93, and the plaintiffs' suit must be dismissed.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The action brought by the plaintiffs is DISMISSED. The Court upheld the validity of the Bombay Rents, Hotel Rates and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1944 (Bombay Act VII of 1944) so far as the challenge raised in this suit was concerned.
Implications and immediate consequences (as stated in the opinion):
- The plaintiffs' claim for recovery of possession was dismissed because Part II of the 1944 Act was held valid and applicable.
- The Court directed that a certificate under s. 205 of the Government of India Act be issued (Per Curiam).
- Costs: The Court exercised its discretion regarding costs occasioned by the transfer to the High Court. The first defendant's costs were quantified at Rs. 1,000 (including previous orders for costs); the Court ordered that one half of that sum be paid by the plaintiffs and one half by the second defendant. Defendant No. 2 will bear his own costs.
- No broader new precedent was expressly claimed to be created by the Court's decision in this opinion; the Court relied upon extant authorities in reaching its conclusions. The direct legal effect is the dismissal of the plaintiffs' ejectment proceedings and upholding of the 1944 Act in the respects challenged in this suit.
Additional Notes from the Opinion
- The Advocate General for Bombay was added as a party because the constitutional question was of public importance; the transfer to the High Court on that basis was not contested.
- There are some date references in the record (for example, the date of the notice and the commencement of proceedings) that appear differently in parts of the opinion as reported (Stone, C.J. states April 29, 1943; Kania, J. refers to an April 29, 1941 notice and proceedings begun in August 1941). The summary states those differing references as they appear in the text without attempting to reconcile them.
Representation (as recorded)
Attorneys for plaintiff: Messrs Mankodi & Co.
Attorneys for defendant No. 1: Messrs Ambubhai & Diwanji.
Attorneys for defendant No. 2: Messrs Little & Co.
Stone, C.J:—
This suit was commenced in the Small Cause Court at Bombay, and is brought by the plaintiffs, who are the landlords, against defendant No. 1, who is the tenant, to eject him from 31-D Matarpakhdi, Mazgaon, Bombay, held by him under a monthly tenancy at a rent of Rs. 125 per month. The tenancy is alleged to have been terminated by notice dated April 29, 1943. The defence of defendant No. 1 is to plead the Bombay Rents, Hotel Rates and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1944, which I will refer to as “the 1944 Act”, and to rely on the fact that before this Act came into operation the plaintiffs had applied to the Controller for a certificate under the Bombay Rent Restriction Order, 1942 (which I will refer to as “the 1942 Order”), which was refused. Such refusal, it is said, is binding upon the plaintiffs under s. 15 of the 1944 Act.
In reply the plaintiffs allege that Part II of the 1944 Act is ultra vires and void for the reasons to which I will presently refer.
It is obvious that the challenge to the validity of Part II of the 1944 Act raises a question of public importance, since if Part II of the Act be invalid, all premises to which it is intended to apply would in effect never have been controlled at all owing to the invalidity of the 1942 Order. In these circumstances, the Advocate General for Bombay was added as a party to the suit, which was in effect transferred at his request to the High Court and has been heard by this bench. No question is raised by any one as to the regularity or propriety of this procedure.
As I have already said, the notice to determine the tenancy was given on April 29, 1943, and an application was subsequently made to the Controller under the 1942 Order for a certificate which, if granted, would have had the effect of avoiding the restriction placed on the recovery of possession by the 1942 Order then supposed to be valid. This application was refused, and the plaintiffs then went on appeal to the Collector under s. 12 of the 1942 Order. Again they were unsuccessful. On April 6, 1944, a full bench of this Court held ss. 8, 9 and 12 of the 1942 Order invalid, and accordingly the plaintiffs commenced this suit on April 12, 1944. On May 12, 1944, the 1944 Act was promulgated by the Governor, part of the preamble to the Act being as follows:
“and whereas the Governor of Bombay has assumed to himself under the Proclamation dated the 4th November 1939, issued by him under s. 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935, all powers vested by or under the said Act in the Provincial Legislature;
“Now, therefore, in exercise of the said powers, the Governor of Bombay is pleased to make the following Act:”
The relevant sections of the 1944 Act are ss. 9 and 14. Section 9 is a follows:—
“(1) The landlord shall not be entitled to the recovery of possession of any premises so long as the tenant pays, or is ready and willing to pay, rent to the full extent allowable by this Part and performs the other conditions of the tenancy:
“Provided that nothing in this section shall apply where the landlord has obtained a certificate from the Controller certifying that the tenant has committed any act contrary to the provisions of clause (o) or clause (p) of s. 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, or has been guilty of conduct which is a nuisance or an annoyance to any adjoining or neighbouring occupiers or that the rent charged to a sub-tenant is in excess of the standard rent, or that the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord either for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises are held or for any other cause which may be deemed satisfactory by the Controller.
“(2) Where an order for the recovery of possession has been made in favour of a landlord on or after the 6th day of April 1944 but not executed before the date of publication of this Act, the Court by which the order was made may, if it is of the opinion that the order would not have been made if this Part had been in operation at the date of the making of the order, rescind or vary the order in such manner as the Court may think fit for the purpose of giving effect to this Part.”
Section 14 is:
“(1) Any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Controller, under the provisions of this Part (including an order granting a certificate under the proviso to sub-s. (1) of s. 9 may, within fifteen days from the date on which the order is communicated to him, present an appeal in writing to the Collector.
“(2) The Collector shall then call for the record of the Controller and after examining the record and after making such further inquiry as he thinks fit, either personally or through the Controller, shall decide the appeal.
“(3) The decision of the Collector, and subject only to such decision, the order of the Controller shall, for the purposes of this Part, be final; and no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Part required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Controller and Collector.”
The Governor's competency to exercise the Provincial legislative function arises by virtue of the powers conferred on him by s. 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which I will refer to as “the Constitution Act”, and a Proclamation made by him on November 4, 1939. Section 93, so far as material, is as follows:
“(1) If at any time the Governor of a Province is satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the government of the Province cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Act, he may by Proclamation.
(a) declare that his functions shall, to such extent as may be specified in the proclamation, be exercised by him in his discretion;
(b) assume to himself all or any of the powers vested in or exercisable by any Provincial body or authority.
and any such Proclamation may contain such incidental and consequential provisions as may appear to him to be necessary or desirable for giving effect to the objects of the Proclamation, including provisions for suspending in whole or in part the operation of any provisions of this Act relating to any Provincial body or authority:
“Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall authorise the Governor to assume to himself any of the powers vested in or exercisable by a High Court, or to suspend, either in whole or in part, the operation of any provision of this Act relating to High Courts.”
Sub-section (2) deals with revocation, and sub-s. (3) contains, certain consequential provisions.
Sub-section (4) is as follows:
“If the Governor, by a Proclamation under this section, assumes to himself any power of the Provincial Legislature to make laws, any law made by him in the exercise of that power shall, subject to the terms thereof, continue to have effect until two years have elapsed from the date on which the Proclamation ceases to have effect, unless sooner repealed or re-enacted by Act of the appropriate Legislature,”
and then come the following words which are important:
“and any reference in this Act to Provincial Acts, Provincial laws, or Acts or laws of a Provincial Legislature shall be construed as including a reference to such a law” i.e a law made by the Governor.
The Proclamation of November 4, 1939, commences with the following preamble:
“Whereas the Governor of the Province of Bombay is satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the Government of the Province cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’):”
And the operative part of the Proclamation is this:
“Now, therefore, in the exercise of the powers conferred by Section 93 of the Act and with the concurrence of the Governor General, the Governor by this Proclamation—
“(a) declares that all his functions under the Act shall be exercised by him in his discretion;
“(b) assumes to himself all powers vested by or under the Act in the Provincial Legislature and all powers vested in either Chamber of the Legislature but not so as to affect any power exercisable by His Majesty with respect to Bills reserved for his consideration or the disallowance of Acts; and he hereby makes the following incidental or consequential provisions which appear to him to be necessary or desirable for giving effect to the objects of this Proclamation, namely—”
Then there follow clauses suspending the operation of certain ministerial sections of the constitution act and certain sections referential to legislative machinery of the Provincial Legislature.
Mr. Hathi in his very full and exhaustive argument has attacked the validity of the 1944 Act on four grounds:
(1) That the Governor legislating under s. 93 of the Constitution Act has not power to legislate retrospectively at all;
(2) That the Provincial Legislature itself cannot legislate retrospectively in the concurrent field, and it is said that the law we are concerned with is in the concurrent field;
(3) That ss. 9 and 14 of the 1944 Act are void, because they interfere with the powers and jurisdiction of the High Court contrary to the proviso to s. 93 of the Constitution Act; and
(4) That the Provincial Legislature has not power to interfere with the powers and jurisdiction of the High Court.
With regard to the first ground, there is no question as to the retrospective operation of the 1944 Act. Section 2 and Schedules A and B and sub-s. 9(2), which deals with the period from April 6, to May 12, 1944, make this retroactive operation abundantly clear. So far as the retroactive operation of the exercise of legislative powers is concerned, there is no difference between the position of the Governor-General under s. 72 in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution Act and the position of a Provincial Governor under s. 93. Indeed the contrary has not been contended. The position in this respect of the Governor-General is covered by authority which is binding upon us. In the case of Emperor v. Prabhakar Kondaji Bhapkar, which is a decision of a full bench of this High Court, the validity of Ordinance XIV of 1943 promulgated by the Governor-General under s. 72 in the Ninth Schedule was challenged, and the Chief Justice, Sir John Beaumont, said this (p. 52):
“It is argued, in the first instance, that Ordinance was beyond the powers of the Governor-General under s. 72 of the Ninth Schedule to the Government of India Act. But there is really no substance in that point. Under that section the Governor-General may, in cases of emergency, make and promulgate Ordinances for the peace and good government of British India or any part thereof, and any Ordinance so made shall, for the space of not more than six months from its promulgation, have the like force of law as an Act passed by the Indian Legislature. That is the material part of the section, and the limitation of six months has been removed by the St. 3 and 4 Geo. VI. c. 33.
“It is said that the Governor-General cannot pass a retrospective ordinance. But as this Ordinance is to have the like force of law as an Act passed by the Indian legislature, and it has not been disputed that the Indian legislature can pass a retrospective Act, there seems to be no force in that contention.
“Nor is there any force in the contention that the Governor-General cannot amend an existing Act of the Indian legislature. The same reasoning applies to that. The Indian legislature can amend an Act, and, therefore, the Governor-General can under s. 72. This Court very recently upheld a retrospective Ordinance made by the Governor-General in Emperor v. Shreekant Pandurang Ketkar.”
The second ground is that the Provincial Legislature itself cannot legislate retrospectively in the concurrent field, i.e in respect of the subject-matters enumerated in list III in the seventh schedule of the Constitution Act, and it is suggested that the 1944 Act deals with the subject-matters enumerated under item 4 “Civil Procedure”, item 8 “Transfer of property,” item 10 “Contracts” and item 15 “Jurisdiction and powers of all Courts”. But even if this was so, the answer in this case is that the Governor-General has given his assent to the 1944 Act; and Mr. Hathi concedes that if there was any repugnancy, it is cured by such assent: (See s. 107(2). There is also authority for this in the judgment of Mr. Justice Sulaiman in Ramnandan v. Goshwami Madhwanand Ramji. Mr. Hathi, however, says that notwithstanding this there is a distinction in the case of a law which as here is to have retrospective effect. In my opinion, there is no substance in this point. The Governor-General has given his assent to the 1944 Act, which is retrospective on the face of it.
It is the third ground which really forms Mr. Hathi's main assault upon the validity of the 1944 Act. Clearly the proviso to s. 9 of that act deals with matters which are within the jurisdiction of the High Court to determine, such as whether the tenant has committed an act contrary to the provisions of s. 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, or has been guilty of conduct which is a nuisance or an annoyance to any adjoining or neighbouring occupiers. The granting of a certificate with regard to these matters is placed in the hands of an executive officer, a Controller, with an appeal to another executive officer, namely the Collector. Further, by s. 14 it is expressly provided that
“No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Part required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Controller and Collector.”
Mr. Hathi points to the proviso to s. 93 of the Constitution Act relating to High Courts, and he then invites attention to s. 223 of the Act, which is as follows:
“Subject to the provisions of this Part of this Act, to the provisions of any Order in Council made under this or any other Act and to the provisions of any Act of the appropriate Legislature enacted by virtue of powers conferred on that Legislature by this Act, the jurisdiction of, and the law administered in, any existing High Court, and the respective powers of the judges thereof in relation to the administration of justice in the Court, including any power to make rules of Court and to regulate the sittings of the Court and of members thereof sitting alone or in division Courts, shall be the same as immediately before the commencement of Part III of this Act.”
Two things should be observed: In the first place, there is nothing in the Proclamation itself by which the Governor has assumed to himself any power of the High Court or suspended, either in whole or in part, the operation of the Constitution Act so far as it relates to High Courts. In the second place, it is provided by sub-s. 93(4) that
“any reference in this Act to Provincial Acts, Provincial laws or Acts or laws of a Provincial Legislature shall be construed as including a reference to such a law,”
i.e a law made by a Governor. Under s. 93 such a law is to have the same force and effect as a law enacted by the Provincial Legislature. The question is: does the proviso refer to the powers with which the Governor may invest himself under the Proclamation, or does it cut down or restrict what he may do if he invests himself as he has done with the same plenary powers as the Provincial Legislature? In my opinion, it must be the former. If it were the latter, he could not change the law at all, since he would be suspending the operation of the law as administered in the High Court as it stood immediately before he assumed the powers under the Proclamation. Be it observed that s. 223 itself is made subject to the “provisions of any Act of the appropriate Legislature”, and the Governor is the appropriate Legislature. The High Court is a Provincial authority within the meaning of s. 93; and, in my judgment, the effect of the proviso is to prevent the Governor from assuming or suspending the powers and jurisdiction of the High Court by any Proclamation under s. 93, but does not extend to alteration of the law by or under the assumed legislative powers which are within the competency of the Provincial Legislature, once the Governor has assumed those powers. In my opinion, this is clear when s. 93 is analysed. It provides that in the event therein mentioned the Governor may, by Proclamation, assume to himself all or any of the powers vested in, or exercised by, any Provincial body or authority. As I have already said, the High Court is such an authority. Then there follows an incidental particularization of some of the things the Proclamation may contain, including provisions for suspending in whole or in part the operation of any provisions of the Act relating to any Provincial authority. Then follows the proviso. In my opinion, the assumption and the suspension mentioned in the proviso are referential to the assumption mentioned in sub-s. 93(1)(b) and the suspension mentioned in the particularization of the subject-matters which the Proclamation may contain. In the result this attack on the validity of the 1944 Act also fails.
That brings us to the fourth ground, which is, whether the Provincial Legislature could have passed the 1944 Act. The only argument addressed to us on this point is founded on cl. 44 of the Letters Patent, which declares that all the provisions of the Letters Patent, and it is cl. 12 which gives the High Court jurisdiction, are subject to the legislative powers of the Governor-General as therein mentioned. There is nothing in this point, since by the conjoint effect of s. 293 of the Constitution Act and ss. 2 and 7 of the Government of India (Adaptation of Indian Laws) Order of 1937 the reference to the Governor General in cl. 44 of the Letters Patent refers to all other competent authorities.
It must follow that as a result this action must be dismissed.
Kania, J.:—These proceedings were started by the plaintiff landlord in August 1941 under the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act to eject his tenant on whom the notice to quit was duly served on April 29, 1941. The relevant provisions of the Government of India Act, the Proclamation issued by the Governor of Bombay under s. 93, and Bombay Act VII of 1944 enacted by the Governor, have been set out in the judgment of the learned Chief Justice. The only point urged before us is whether Bombay Act VII of 1944 is ultra vires. the contention fails, these proceedings must be dismissed.
The argument that Bombay Act VII of 1944 is ultra vires is based on four contentions. They are set out in the judgment of the learned Chief Justice. The first contention is that the Governor has no authority to make retrospective legislation and his powers are not co-extensive with those of the Provincial Legislature. For this counsel relied on the words of the proviso to s. 93 of the Government of India Act, which was contended to limit the Governor's powers. It was argued that in King-Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee the Federal Court expressed the view that an Ordinance, issued by the Governor-General in exercise of his powers under s. 72 of the Government of India Act, cannot be made retrospective. It was contended that the powers of the Governor acting under s. 93 had the same limitations, and therefore the Governor had no power to make retrospective laws. This argument is unsound because the Federal Court did not decide that point in Sibnath Bennerjee's case. The Court only discussed the various aspects of the powers of the Governor-General acting under s. 72 and at p. 15 stated:
“As the general question framed by the Calcutta High Court cannot be satisfactorily answered without further discussion of the above and other similar aspects of the problem, we refrain from expressing any final opinion upon it, as no such decision is necessary for the disposal of these cases.”
The argument advanced before the Federal Court was in respect of ss. 2 and 3 of Ordinance XIV of 1943. The Federal Court thus declined to express any definite opinion in respect of s. 2, while in respect of s. 3 it decided that the same was valid. On the other hand our High Court in Emperor v. Shreekant Pandurang Ketkar expressed the opinion that in construing emergency legislation it is not necessary to express words or necessary intent to make the same of retrospective effect, unlike the normal rule of construction applicable to Acts passed in normal times. A full bench of this Court in Emperor v. Prabhakar Kondaji Bhapkar held that the Governor General's powers to make retrospective Ordinance was valid and relied on the previous decision of this Court in Emperor v. Ketkar (supra). In order to consider whether the Governor has such power or not the relevant question is what is the position of the Governor on the issue of a proclamation under s. 93. If his powers are the same as of the Provincial Legislature, he has the power to pass laws having retrospective effect. This cannot be disputed because a Provincial Legislature, within the orbit of its legislative sphere, has plenary powers, and all legislatures having plenary powers are held to have power to make laws with retrospective effect within the scope of then authority. This contention will therefore depend on the decision of the third contention urged on behalf of the landlord.
The second contention is that the Provincial Legislature cannot legislate retrospectively on matters falling in the concurrent list. It was not disputed that in respect of the exclusive list II, found in the seventh schedule of the Constitution Act, the Provincial Legislature had authority to pass a law having retrospective effect. The contention was that in respect of the concurrent list the Provincial Legislature had not unconditional and absolute plenary powers because the Federal Legislature had also authority to pass laws on the same matters. I apprehend that the two questions are mixed up in advancing this argument. The first question is whether the Act passed by the appropriate authority in respect of a concurrent list is valid or not. The second question is whether, it being valid, there can remain any objection to its validity on the ground that it has been given retrospective effect. The question of validity of the Act must depend on the true construction of s. 100 and s. 107(2) of the Government of India Act. In Subramanyan v. Muttuswami the Federal Court had occasion to distinguish the spheres of the separate lists and the concurrent list found in the seventh schedule to the Constitution Act. It observed, (p. 57):—
“… On a very strict interpretation of s. 100, it would necessarily follow that from all matters in list II which are exclusively assigned to Provincial Legislature, all portions which fall in list I or list III must be excluded. Similarly, from all matters falling in list III, all portions which fall in list I must be excluded. The section would then mean that the Federal Legislature has full and exclusive power to legislate with respect to matters in list I, and has also power to legislate with respect to matters in list III. A Provincial Legislature has exclusive power to legislate with respect to list II ‘minus matters falling in list I or list III’, has concurrent power to legislate with respect to matters in list III, ‘minus matters falling in list I.’ In its fullest scope s. 100 would then mean that if it happens that there is any subject in list II which also falls in list I or list III it must be taken as cut out from list II. On this strict interpretation there would be no question of any real overlapping at all. If a subject falls exclusively in list II and no other list, then the power of the Provincial Legislature is supreme. But if it does also fall within list I, then it must be deemed as if it is not included in list II at all. Similarly, if it also falls in list III, it must be deemed to have been excluded from list II. The dominant position of the Central Legislature with regard to matters in list I and list III is thus established. But the rigour of the literal interpretation is relaxed by the use of the words ‘with respect to’ which as already pointed out-only signify ‘pith and substance,’ and do not forbid a mere incidental encroachment. But, even if such an accidental encroachment may be ordinarily permissible, the field may not be clear. There may be competency and yet repugnancy also. The question is how to prevent a clash if the trespass is on a field already occupied by the Central Legislation.”
Under s. 107(2) it is clear that in respect of an item found in the concurrent list if an Act of the Central Legislature exists and the Provincial Legislature passes an Act, the same has to receive the consent of the Governor General. The effect of such consent is also provided for in the same section. The effect is that in the Province the Provincial Act is supreme. It is further provided that this need not prevent the Central Legislature from further passing an Act, if it was so minded, but its authority to pass such Act is circumscribed by the previous consent of the Governor-General being obtained to introduce any Bill for that purpose. Therefore, once it is found that the sanction of the Governor-General under s. 107(2) in respect of a Provincial Act has been obtained, there can remain no question of repugnancy. In the Province, the Provincial Act has the overriding force. Once that stage is reached, I do not see how the question of the Act being ultra vires, because it gives retrospective effect, remains. The Governor-General having given consent to the Provincial Act, the Provincial Legislature is given power to pass that law and it is valid. If so, the same is within the powers of the Provincial Legislature. Every Provincial Legislature, having plenary powers, is entitled to enact a law having retrospective effect, and I do not see any difference in the position of an Act passed in respect of an item mentioned in the concurrent list, which has obtained the consent of the Governor-General, and an Act passed in respect of a matter in the exclusive list, after both are held valid. This argument must therefore fail.
The third contention was sub-divided under four heads. It was first contended that the power of the Governor to interfere with the jurisdiction of the High Court was expressly excluded by the proviso to s. 93 (1) of the Government of India Act of 1935. A similar provision, with regard to the Governor-General containing a similar proviso, is found in s. 45, when the machinery of the Central Government breaks down. The bearing of the two sections of the scheme of the Constitution Act has therefore to be considered together. The argument is put thus: By the proviso it is enacted that nothing in the sub-section shall authorise the Governor to suspend, either in whole or in part, the operation of any provision of this (constitution) act that relates to High Court. It was argued that s. 223 of the Constitution Act maintained the jurisdiction of the High Court as it existed till then. By that section the proper authority was given power to interfere with that jurisdiction. Therefore, s. 223 was a provision of the Constitution Act relating to High Court, and the operation of that section covered the exercise of jurisdiction of the existing High Courts. The proviso to s. 9 and s. 14 of the act vii of 1944, during the existence of that Act, prevented the High Court from exercising its jurisdiction in respect of s. 108 of the Transfer of Property Act and administering that law in the High Court and thus suspended the operation of s. 223 of the Constitution Act. The Bombay Act therefore clearly infringed the words of the proviso and was invalid. In order to appreciate the force of this argument, it is necessary to scrutinise the scheme of s. 93. The section provides for the assumption by the Governor of a province of the government, when a situation had arisen under which the government could not be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution Act. The first part of the sub-section provides that in such circumstances and with that object the Governor may by a proclamation (a) declare that its function shall be exercised by him in his discretion, and (b) assume to himself all or any of the powers vested in or exercisable by any provincial body or authority. Clause (b) only is relevant for the present discussion. The Governor, therefore, by a proclamation can assume to himself all the powers of any provincial body or authority. Inasmuch as the High Court of a province exercises jurisdiction and has powers exercisable, within the province, it is a provincial authority. If the section stopped there, it could be contended that when issuing the proclamation the Governor could state that he would assume the functions of the High Court. The first part of the proviso prevents that possibility. The second part of the sub-section proceeds to state that any such proclamation may contain incidental and consequential provisions, as may be necessary to the objects of the proclamation, including provisions for suspending the operation of any provision of this Act relating to any provincial body or authority. (I have omitted the words which are not material for the present discussion). Therefore, in the proclamation the Governor is given further power to make incidental and consequential provisions which are to attain the objects of the proclamation. Such provisions may include the suspension of the operation of certain provision of the constitution act which relate to a provincial body or authority. The second part of the proviso follows the exact words of the last part of the sub-section. The result, therefore, is that if the words in the second part of the proviso did not exist, although the Governor may not assume powers under cl. (b), in including incidental and consequential provisions in the proclamation he may suspend the operation of any section relating to High Court. The second part of the proviso prevents him from doing so. That appears to be the plain scheme of sub-s. (1) read with the proviso.
The question to be determined is whether the Governor when acting under s. 93 has infringed the words of this proviso. He has not assumed any of the powers of the High Court. He has not suspended the operation of any provision relating to it. The answer, therefore, to the argument advanced on behalf of the landlord is clearly in the negative. The approach to s. 223, contained in the argument advanced on behalf of the plaintiffs, is erroneous because in passing act vii of 1944 the Governor has not suspended the operation of any provision relating to the High Court, but in fact he is acting under s. 223. By the proclamation he has assumed all the legislative functions which are vested in the Provincial Legislature. The result is that after the proclamation he becomes the Provincial Legislature, and for the purpose of passing laws in respect of any items mentioned in list II or list III he is the proper legislative authority within the meaning of s. 223. The contention that the Bombay Act trespasses on or curtails the jurisdiction of the High Court is confusing the issue. The only question before the Court is whether the Governor in assuming the powers which he is entitled to under s. 93 has suspended the operation of s. 223. The answer clearly is in the negative, because, firstly, he has not so stated in the proclamation, and, secondly, he has not suspended but is acting under s. 223. It may be argued that this construction renders the proviso quite ineffectual. In my opinion, that is not correct. Under s. 223 the alteration in the jurisdiction of and the law administered in any existing High Court, can be effected by a provision or any Order-in-Council made under the Constitution Act, or any Act of the appropriate Legislature. The last would include an act of the central legislature. item 15 in list III in the seventh schedule gives authority to the Central Legislature to pass laws in respect of jurisdiction and powers of all Courts, which would include a High Court. If the Governor, acting under s. 93, proclaimed that a portion of s. 223 was suspended, while he himself retained the power to act in the capacity of a Provincial Legislature to pass laws in respect of the matters included in list II and list III to the extent the field was not already occupied by any Central Act, he would deprive the authority entitled to issue an Order-in-Council and the Central Legislature from passing any Act which would affect the jurisdiction of or the law administered in the Provincial High Court. It is clear that the proviso is framed to prevent the Governor from creating that situation. In my opinion, this construction of s. 93 and s. 223 is perfectly logical and according to the scheme of the Government of India Act. Therefore, the contention that the proviso prevents the Governor from enacting Bombay Act VII of 1944 is unsound.
The second branch of the argument under this heading was that the powers are limited to the purposes mentioned in s. 93, and in this connection counsel referred to ss. 88 and 89 of the Constitution Act. It was urged that in these sections the powers of the Governor are limited to the purposes mentioned therein. This argument is unsound, because the powers under each section are controlled by what is mentioned in the particular section. It is true that in the present case the powers to be assumed by the Governor are for the purposes mentioned in s. 93. But it is irrelevant to consider whether the passing of Bombay Act VII of 1944 is for the purpose of s. 93. The two questions are quite independent. For the purpose of s. 93 the only question is whether the Governor has assumed the necessary powers required to achieve the objects mentioned therein. It has nothing to do with the question whether the exercise of the legislative functions, which are vested in him on the assumption of powers under s. 93, is for the purpose of s. 93.
The third part of this argument was that the “law passed by the Governor” is not an Act of the Legislature, and, therefore, the words of s. 223 are not complied with. It is described as the law. In this connection counsel relied on the interpretation clause s. 311(6) and s. 311(2), which defined the Provincial Act and the Provincial Law. This contention overlooks the express words of s. 93(4). The concluding words of that sub-section clearly show that wherever there is a reference to provincial act in the constitution act, the same is to include the Governor's law passed under s. 93. Reference to s. 311(6) is not useful because the general interpretation clause need not necessarily repeat what had already been provided by the Legislature in s. 93(4). This argument therefore has no substance.
The last argument advanced under this heading was the same as the fourth contention advanced in a different form. The contention was that cl. 44 of the Letters Patent can be altered only by the Central Government and not by the Provincial Legislature, and therefore much less by the Governor acting under s. 93. This contention overlooks the provision made in the Government of India (Adaptation of Indian Laws) Order, 1937. Section 293 of the Constitution Act is wide enough to cover the Letters Patent, as a law, according to the last sub-clause of that section. Under s. 2(2) of the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1937, “Indian Law” includes every law which is covered by s. 293 of the Constitution Act. Under s. 7 of the Adaptation of Laws Order “proper authority” is the authority entitled to legislate on the subject in question. Reading all these together, it is clear that the proper authority to legislate in respect of the matter in question is the Provincial Legislature. As the powers of the Provincial Legislature, by virtue of the Proclamation issued under s. 93, are now vested in the Governor, the proper Legislative Authority is the Governor. This contention therefore must also fail.
I, therefore, agree that the proceedings adopted by the plaintiffs must fail and should be dismissed.
Per Curuam. Certificate, under s. 205 of the Government of India Act, to issue.
With regard to costs, this matter is admittedly within the Small Cause Court's jurisdiction. It was transferred to the High Court on the application of Government as raising a question of public importance. It is true that the litigating parties did not object; but the result has been that considerably more costs have been incurred, whilst Government have got a decision upon this matter of public importance. In the exercise of our discretion we think that the fair and proper order to make in these circumstances with regard to the first defendant's costs is, first, to quantify them at Rs. 1,000 (One thousand) including all previous orders for costs, and then to direct that half that sum should be paid by the plaintiffs and half by the second defendant. Defendant No. 2 will bear his own costs.
Attorneys for plaintiff: Messrs Mankodi & Co.
Attorneys for defendant No. 1: Messrs Ambubhai & Diwanji.
Attorneys for defendant No. 2: Messrs Little & Co.
A.J.P
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