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Jethalal Nanshah Modi v. Bachu
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from a dispute concerning the sale and attachment of defendant 1's share in certain properties. Defendant 2's father filed a suit against defendant 1 to recover Rs. 6000 and sought attachment before judgment of defendant 1's share in the houses. Defendant 1 assured by purshis that he would not sell or encumber the property, and thus attachment was not ordered. The suit concluded in favor of defendant 2's father, and the decree was confirmed on appeal. Subsequently, defendant 1 borrowed money from the plaintiff, his cousin, and agreed to sell his share in the property to the plaintiff for Rs. 2100, the amount of the advances. Before executing the sale deed, defendant 2 obtained attachment of the property under his decree. The plaintiff’s application to lift the attachment was rejected on the ground that the agreement did not create an interest enforceable against the attachment. The plaintiff then filed a suit for specific performance of the sale agreement and to declare that defendant 1’s share was not liable to attachment or sale by defendant 2. The trial court dismissed the suit, finding the sale agreement fraudulent and intended to defeat defendant 2. On appeal, the decree was modified to grant specific performance but refused to restrain defendant 2 from executing his decree. In second appeal, the higher court restored the trial court’s dismissal, holding that an agreement of sale cannot override an attachment made in execution of a decree.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an agreement of sale executed before attachment can prevail over an attachment made in execution of a decree under Section 64 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC).
- Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for specific performance of the sale agreement despite the attachment and prohibitory order against defendant 1.
- Whether the court should exercise its discretion to refuse specific performance on equitable grounds, considering the conduct of the parties and the effect on the decree-holder (defendant 2).
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The plaintiff contended that the agreement of sale was executed before attachment and hence should prevail over the attachment.
- The plaintiff sought specific performance of the agreement and a declaration that defendant 1's share was not liable to attachment or sale by defendant 2.
- The plaintiff admitted financing defendant 1’s litigation and agreed to the sale to recover advances made.
Defendant 2's Arguments
- Defendant 2 objected to specific performance on the ground that the property had already been attached in execution of his decree.
- Argued that the agreement was collusive and intended to defeat or delay execution of the decree.
Defendant 1's Position
- Defendant 1 admitted the agreement and was willing to execute the sale deed but was restrained by a prohibitory order issued under the CPC.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| 41 Bom. L.R 9431 | Effect of attachment on subsequent sale under an antecedent agreement. | Supports that a purchase pursuant to an agreement prior to attachment may prevail over attachment in private sales. |
| 43 Bom. L.R 2062 | Same principle on attachment and sale. | Reinforces the principle that prior agreements can prevail over attachment in private sales. |
| 45 Bom. L.R 2083 | Effect of attachment on sale of immovable property. | Used to demonstrate the legal position regarding attachment and subsequent sales. |
| I.L.R (1939) Mad. 8534 | Effect of attachment on sale under antecedent agreement. | Referenced to confirm that private sales before attachment may prevail over attachment. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court analyzed Section 64 of the CPC, which renders any private transfer of attached property void against claims enforceable under the attachment. It distinguished between private sales and enforced sales pursuant to a court decree, holding that Section 64 does not affect the latter. The plaintiff sought specific performance of the agreement, not a private sale post-attachment, thus the question was whether the Court should exercise its discretion to grant specific performance.
The Court recognized that specific performance is discretionary under Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, and must be exercised reasonably considering all surrounding circumstances. It noted that a prohibitory order under Order 21, Rule 54 of the CPC was in force, restraining defendant 1 from transferring the property, and that enforcing specific performance would violate this order and aid evasion of statutory provisions.
The Court emphasized equitable principles, particularly the doctrine of "clean hands," observing that the agreement was collusively created shortly after the decree was confirmed to defeat defendant 2’s rights. Although a debtor may prefer one creditor over another, the Court refused to assist in such a fraudulent preference by granting specific performance that would unfairly prejudice defendant 2, who was not a party to the agreement but would be injured by its enforcement.
The Court agreed with the District Judge that while the agreement was valid and not impeachable for fraud, the equitable discretion to refuse specific performance applied here due to the unfair advantage it would grant the plaintiff and the injury to defendant 2’s attachment rights.
Holding and Implications
The appeal is dismissed. The Court held that even a valid agreement of sale executed before attachment does not override an attachment made in execution of a decree when specific performance would violate a prohibitory order and cause unfair prejudice to a decree-holder.
The direct effect of this decision is that the plaintiff is not entitled to specific performance of the sale agreement and defendant 2’s attachment and execution rights remain unimpaired. No new precedent was set beyond the application of established principles regarding attachment, specific performance discretion, and equitable conduct.
Lokur, J.:— This is a Letters Patent appeal against a decision of Macklin J., and the facts out of which it arises are not now in dispute. The father of defendant 2 filed against defendant 1 a suit in the Court of the First Class Subordinate Judge at Ahmedabad to recover Rs. 6000 and applied for attachment before judgment of defendant 1's share in the houses in suit. Defendant 1, however, put in a purshis that he was not going to sell or encumber the said property and that he would not do so. Thereupon the property was not attached and the suit ended in a decree in favour of defendant 2's father and was confirmed in appeal by the High Court on 8th April, 1937. Defendant 1 borrowed some amounts for that litigation from the plaintiff, who is his cousin, and within five days after dismissal of the appeal by the High Court he agreed to sell his share in the property in the suit to the plaintiff for Rs. 2100 due to him in respect of the advances already made. The sale deed in pursuance of the agreement was to be executed within one month, but in the interval defendant 2 sought the execution of his decree in darkhast no. 325 of 1937 and on 5th May, 1937, got defendant 1's share in the property in suit attached. The plaintiff then made an application under O. 21, R. 58 of the CPC, to have the attachment raised on the ground that he had already acquired an interest in the properties attached. But his application was rejected on the ground that the agreement by itself did not create any interest in the properties, and that the proper course for the plaintiff was to obtain a decree for specific performance of that agreement. The plaintiff, therefore, filed this suit for specific performance of that agreement and to have a registered sale deed executed in his favour and also to obtain a declaration that defendant 1's share in the properties in suit was not liable to be attached and sold by defendant 2 in execution of his decree against defendant 1. Defendant 1 admitted the plaintiff's claim and expressed his willingness to pass the agreed sale deed, but stated that he could not do so as a prohibitory order had been issued against him in the darkhast of defendant 2 under O. 21, R. 54 of the CPC. Defendant 2, however, objected to the specific performance of the contract of sale on the ground that he had already got the property attached in execution of his decree. The trial Court held that the agreement of sale was fraudulent and brought about with a view to defeat or delay defendant 2 and that the plaintiff was not, therefore, entitled either to obtain specific performance of that agreement or to have defendant 2 restrained from executing his decree against defendant 1. The suit was, therefore, dismissed. In appeal the learned District Judge held that although the agreement might have the effect of giving preference to the plaintiff, and thereby perhaps delaying other creditors, the agreement was not vitiated and that defendant 1 was bound to pass the sale deed in accordance with that agreement. But though defendant 1's share in the properties in suit had already been attached, the sale deed passed in pursuance of the antecedent agreement would not be affected by the intervening attachment and, therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled to have defendant 2 restrained from proceeding with his darkhaat against defendant 1. As a result, the decree of the trial Court was modified and the plaintiff was given a decree for specific performance of the agreement by defendant 1, but the suit as regards the prayer for injunction against defendant 2 was dismissed. In second appeal it was held that there was no reason why an agreement for sale, even when untainted with any fraud, should prevail over an attachment already made in execution of a decree and, therefore, the appeal was allowed and the decree of the trial Court dismissing the suit was restored.
2. Section 64 of the CPC, provides that where an attachment has been made, any private, transfer of the property attached shall be void against all claims enforceable under the attachment. A large number of rulings were cited at the bar regarding the effect of the attachment of immovable property on its sale subsequent to the attachment but in pursuance of an agreement of sale entered into before the attachment. Out of those rulings we may refer to the decisions in 41 Bom. L.R 9431, 43 Bom. L.R 2062, 45 Bom. L.R 2083 and I.L.R (1939) Mad. 8534. The effect of these rulings may be said to be that where a purchase is subsequent to the attachment, but the agreement in pursuance of which the purchase is made is prior to the attachment, the purchase prevails against the attachment and in such a case the party attaching the property will not be entitled to the benefit of S. 64. This question however is really immaterial for the purpose of this appeal, since S. 64 affects only private sales after attachment and does not cover the enforced execution of a conveyance in obedience to a decree of a Court. In the present case there has been no private sale following upon the agreement to sell. The plaintiff wants that the agreement should be enforced and if a decree for specific performance of the agreement is passed, and a sale deed is executed in accordance with that decree, it will not be affected by S. 64. We are therefore concerned only with the plaintiff's right to have the agreement of sale enforced by a decree for its specific performance and not with the nature or extent of the rights created by it in view of the attachment of the property after the agreement.
3. Prima facie, the agreement of sale passed by defendant 1 to the plaintiff being proved and valid, the plaintiff ought to get a decree for its specific performance, especially when defendant 1 does not resist the claim and is willing to pass a sale deed as agreed upon. But the claim for a decree for specific performance of a contract is not a matter of right. Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, provides that the jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary, and the Court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so; but the discretion of the Court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles. The Court has to consider the whole of the surrounding circumstances and the conduct and position of the parties and then consider whether in the exercise of its discretion it should grant the relief of specific performance. The section itself does therefore contemplate cases where specific performance ought not to be decreed, and the present is, we think, a case of that kind. When the property agreed to be sold was attached in the suit filed by defendant 2's father, a prohibitory order was issued by the executing Court under O. 21, R. 54(1) of the CPC, prohibiting defendant 1 from transferring or charging the property in any way and all persons from taking any benefit from such transfer or charge. That prohibitory order is still in force, and it would not be right for the same Court to order defendant 1 in another suit to pass a sale deed in violation of the prohibitory order and thereby enable defendant 2 to purchase the attached property in similar violation of the prohibitory order. Moreover it would be helping the parties to the agreement to successfully carry out the device of evading the provisions of S. 64 by clothing the transaction with the character of a court sale. Specific performance of a contract being an equitable relief, within the discretion of the Court, he who seeks equity must come with clean hands. When the father of defendant 2 filed this suit against defendant 1, he wanted to have the property now in suit attached before judgment, alleging that defendant 1 was going to alienate it in order to defeat his claim. Defendant 1 then passed a purshis giving him assurance that he would not sell or encumber the property. On that assurance the property was not attached. It is true that the purshis may not have the legal effect of a binding undertaking not to alienate the property for all time to come. But it was understood by the parties that the property should not be alienated and rendered unavailable to the decree-holder for the satisfaction of his decree, but defendant 1 did not keep that promise. The plaintiff is the son of defendant 1's mother's sister and admits to have financed the litigation between him and defendant 2's father. The latter succeeded in obtaining a decree against defendant 1, and within five days after it was confirmed by the High Court, defendant 1 passed an agreement to sell the property for Rs. 2100 said to have been due to him on account of the advances taken during the litigation. No consideration was received by him in cash and the plaintiff admits that he did not even make an entry in defendant 1's khata in his account books that Rs. 2100 had been received from him by way of consideration for the sale of the property. In view of the help he was rendering to defendant 1 in his litigation, he must have been aware of the purshis passed by defendant 1, and in spite of that, as soon as the decree of defendant 2's father was confirmed in appeal, the agreement of sale was collusively brought into existence in unseemly haste as an obstacle in the way of the execution of that decree.
4. The learned District Judge has rightly pointed out that it is permissible to a debtor to give preference to one creditor over another and, therefore, though the agreement may amount to a fraudulent preference of the plaintiff to the detriment of defendant 2, the validity of the agreement cannot be impeached. The specific performance of such an agreement, however, need not be decreed merely because it is lawful. Courts can take into consideration the conduct of the parties to the agreement and the circumstances attending its execution and can refuse to order specific performance in their discretion and we think that this is a preeminently fit case for such refusal. The first instance cited in Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, where the Court may properly exercise a discretion not to decree specific performance is where the circumstances under which the contract is made are such as to give the plaintiff an unfair advantage over the defendant, though there be no fraud or misrepresentation on the plaintiff's part. Here the specific performance of the agreement in suit would certainly give the plaintiff an unfair advantage over defendant 2. Really defendant 2 was not a necessary party to the suit for specific performance of the agreement between the plaintiff and defendant 1. But in spite of the objection taken lay defendant 2, the plaintiff insisted upon having a decree against both the defendants and this gave defendant 2 an opportunity of resisting his claim and pointing out the circumstances under which the agreement was entered into. As pointed out in Halsbury's Laws of England (Hailsham edition), Vol. 31, para. 418, p. 368, one species of unfairness which may stay the hand of the Court is that the contract, if enforced, would be injurious to third parties. Here, though defendant 2 is not a party to the agreement, its specific performance will be injurious to him as it will deprive him of the benefits of his attachment of the property in execution of his decree.
5. It is open to defendant 1 to give preference to his cousin and defeat or delay defendant 2 or any other creditor, but we are not prepared to assist him in doing so when we are given a statutory discretion to refuse his request for assistance. There is no question of compensation in this case since the plaintiff has not parted with any consideration in consequence of the agreement of sale and no damages have been claimed in the suit. The appeal is dismissed with costs.
6. Appeal dismissed.
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