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Janardan Eknath Hasabnis v. Ganesh Sadashiv Deshpande

Bombay High Court
Jul 14, 1944
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Full Bench on s.29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act and s.72 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute arose from a promissory note dated 6 March 1929, for Rs. 1,200, made by three original defendants in favour of the plaintiff. On 11 August 1932 defendant No. 1 wrote a letter which the plaintiff relied on as an acknowledgment of liability under the note. Relying on that letter the plaintiff filed suit on 2 June 1938 against all three defendants.

The common defence was that the letter did not amount to an acknowledgment; defendants Nos. 2 and 3 additionally contended they were not bound because they had separated from defendant No. 1. The trial Court found that defendants Nos. 2 and 3 had in fact separated and that the letter did not constitute an acknowledgment; the suit was dismissed. The plaintiff did not challenge the finding on separation but appealed the finding on acknowledgment; the first appellate Court dismissed the appeal. A second appeal followed.

Between the first and second appeals two decisions of this Court were delivered presenting conflicting interpretations of the Limitation Act provisions as applied to suits covered by the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act: (i) Keshav Krishna Dhopade v. Bhagwan Sambhu Chaudhari (single Judge, Divatia J.) and (ii) Kishorelal Stores v. Jagannath Bayaji (Wadia & Sen JJ.), and because of that conflict the two judges hearing the second appeal referred the specific question to a full Bench.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Having regard to s.29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, is the plaintiff in a suit governed by s.72 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act for the purpose of limitation entitled to the benefit of s.19 of the Indian Limitation Act?
  2. As framed by the judges in the opinion: (a) whether the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act is a special or local law within the meaning of s.29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act; and (b) if it is a special or local law, whether s.72 of that Act prescribes for the suit a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the first schedule of the Indian Limitation Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff / Appellant

  • The plaintiff contended that the letter of 11 August 1932 amounted to an acknowledgment within the meaning of s.19 of the Indian Limitation Act, thereby tolling or restarting limitation as against defendant No. 1.
  • Before the Full Bench, Mr. Gajendragadkar (arguing for the plaintiff) contended that s.72 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act did not, in fact, prescribe a period of limitation. He argued that when a local Act prescribes a period it must mention a starting point, and that the words of s.72 (particularly “substituted”) showed that the Legislature amended the schedule of the Indian Limitation Act rather than prescribing a different period by s.72 itself. On that basis he argued s.29(2) would not apply. He conceded that if the section were properly construed as prescribing a different period his contentions would fail.

Respondents / Defendants

  • The common defence before the trial Court was that the letter did not amount to an acknowledgment. Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 also argued they were not bound because they had separated from defendant No. 1. Those contentions were accepted by the trial Court on the points indicated.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Keshav Krishna Dhopade v. Bhagwan Sambhu Chaudhari (Divatia J., single Judge) Held that the amended provisions of s.29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act prevented a plaintiff in a suit covered by s.3, cl. (w) of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act from relying on s.20 of the Indian Limitation Act. The Full Bench regarded this authority as representing the correct view on the matter (consistent with the Full Bench's conclusion that s.29(2) applies to suits under s.72) and treated it as the correct line of authority.
Kishorelal Stores v. Jagannath Bayaji (Wadia & Sen JJ.) Reached a contrary conclusion to Divatia J., taking the view that the consequence drawn by Divatia (regarding s.29(2) preventing the application of s.20) was incorrect. The Full Bench expressly held that Kishorelal Stores was wrongly decided and rejected its view; the Bench answered the referred question in the negative (i.e., the plaintiff is not entitled to s.19 benefit where s.72 prescribes a different period).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The opinion contains a multi-judge analysis. The Chief Justice (Kania, A.C.J.) and Chagla J. elaborated the principal points of statutory construction and legislative history relied upon in reaching the conclusion.

  1. Interpretation of "period of limitation" and the first schedule:

    The Chief Justice examined the structure of the first schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, noting it has three columns: description of suit; period of limitation; and time from which period begins. He concluded that the expression “period of limitation” as used in s.29(2) corresponds to the second column (the period stated) and that it is not necessary for a special or local Act prescribing a period to also state the starting point (the third column exists separately in the schedule).

  2. Construction of s.72 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act:

    The Chief Justice rejected the argument that the word “substituted” in s.72 should be read as merely amending the schedule to the Limitation Act rather than prescribing a different period. He reasoned that s.72 uses appropriate words to achieve the same result as a schedule might (i.e., prescribing different periods for various kinds of suits) and that the word “substituted” naturally reads as prescribing the periods in cls. (a) and (b) of s.72 in place of those in column 2 of schedule I. Consequently, s.72 does prescribe periods of limitation different from those in the first schedule.

  3. Application of s.29(2) of the Limitation Act:

    Because s.72 prescribes different periods, s.29(2) of the Limitation Act applies. That sub-section, as amended (notably in 1922), deliberately provides that ss.19, 20 and 21 of the Limitation Act shall not apply where a special or local law prescribes a different period. The Chief Justice therefore concluded that the plaintiff could not rely on s.19 and that the plaintiff's contention must fail.

  4. Rejection of policy-based arguments:

    The Chief Justice acknowledged arguments about the policy of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act (that it was intended to help debtors and that denying ss.19/20 benefits would cause hardship) but held that where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous the court should not import legislative intentions or presumed policy concerns to alter the plain meaning.

  5. Concurring analysis (Chagla J. and Weston J.):

    Chagla J. formulated the dispute as two precise questions (whether the Dekkhan Act is a special/local law, and whether s.72 prescribes a different period). He rejected the submission that s.29(2) required the special Act to be a “self-contained code” and explained that the amendment to s.29 in 1922 reflected a deliberate legislative departure — namely that ss.19–21 would not apply when a special Act prescribed a different period. Weston J. concurred without further comment. All judges agreed on the negative answer to the referred question.

Holding and Implications

QUESTION ANSWERED IN THE NEGATIVE.

Holding (direct ruling): The Full Bench answered the referred question in the negative — a plaintiff in a suit governed by s.72 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act is not entitled to the benefit of s.19 of the Indian Limitation Act where s.72 prescribes a different period of limitation and s.29(2) therefore applies. The Bench held that s.72 does prescribe periods of limitation different from those in the first schedule and that, in consequence, ss.19 and 20 (and by implication ss.19–21 as excluded by the sub-section) do not apply to such suits.

Immediate consequences for the parties: The plaintiff's contention that the 11 August 1932 letter amounted to an acknowledgment under s.19 fails as a matter of law in the context of a suit governed by s.72; the plaintiff cannot rely on s.19 to extend or revive limitation in this case.

Precedential effect noted in the opinion: The Full Bench expressly held that Kishorelal Stores v. Jagannath Bayaji was wrongly decided and adopted the approach consistent with the view expressed by Divatia J. in Keshav Krishna Dhopade. Beyond these points the opinion does not elaborate other broad policy consequences.

Answered accordingly.

Concurring opinions: Kania, A.C.J., Chagla J. and Weston J. (Chagla and Weston explicitly concurred with the negative answer; the opinion records their agreement).

Show all summary ...

Kania, A.C.J:—

On the hearing of Second Appeal No. 549 of 1941 Mr. Justice Lokur and Mr. Justice Rajadhyaksha having found a conflict of authorities about the interpretation of s. 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, read with s. 72 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act, 1879, referred the following question for the decision of a full bench:—

“Having regard to s. 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, is the plaintiff in a suit governed by s. 72 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act for the purpose of limitation entitled to the benefit of s. 19 of the Indian Limitation Act?”

The short facts leading to this appeal are as follows. On March 6, 1929, the original three defendants passed a promissory note for Rs. 1,200 in favour of the plaintiff. On August 11, 1932, defendant No. 1 wrote a letter to the plaintiff which was contended to be an acknowledgment of the liability under the promissory note. Relying on that letter, the plaintiff filed the suit on June 2, 1938, against all the three defendants. The common defence of all the defendants was that the letter in question did not amount to an acknowledgment. Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 further contended that they were not bound by the letter, because they had separated from defendant No. 1. There was also a dispute about the consideration. At the hearing the trial Court found against the plaintiff on the question of separation of defendants Nos. 2 and 3. It also found that the letter in question did not amount to an acknowledgment and therefore dismissed the suit. The plaintiff appealed. He did not contest the finding of the trial Court in respect of defendants Nos. 2 and 3, but contended that the letter amounted to an acknowledgment within the meaning of s. 19 of the Indian Limitation Act and defendant No. 1 was therefore liable on the promissory note. The first Appeal Court rejected that contention and dismissed the appeal. The plaintiff filed a second appeal. In the interval two decisions of this Court were pronounced. The first was by Mr. Justice Divatia, sitting as a single Judge, in Keshav Krishna Dhopade…Plaintiff v. Bhagwan Sambhu Chaudhari…Defendant .. That was in respect of the application of s. 20 of the Indian Limitation Act in the case of a suit covered by s. 3, cl. (w) of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act. The learned Judge held that the amended provisions of s. 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act prevented the plaintiff from relying on s. 20 of the Act. Some time later Mr. Justice N.J Wadia and Mr. Justice Sen in Kishorelal Stores v. Jagannath Bayaji took a contrary view and differed from the view of Mr. Justice Divatia. The referring judgment mentions both these cases which have given rise to this reference.

It was argued before us by Mr. Gajendragadkar that s. 72 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act did not prescribe a period of limitation, because if a local Act prescribed a period, it must mention a starting point. He further contended that the words used in s. 72, particularly the word “substituted”, showed that the Legislature amended the schedule of the Indian Limitation Act but did not prescribe a different period by s. 72. From those arguments it was contended that s. 72 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act was not a special or local law which prescribed a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act and, therefore, s. 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act did not apply. He frankly conceded that if on a proper construction of s. 72 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act the Court came to the conclusion that it prescribed a different period of limitation, his contentions must fail. It is, therefore, necessary to consider those two arguments as advanced.

In order to appreciate true true effect of s. 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, it is necessary to first turn to the fist schedule of the Indian Limitation Act. It is divided into three columns: the first is headed “Description of suit,” the second “Period of limitation,” and the third “Time from which period begins to run.” The expression “period of limitation” is thus used in that Schedule to mean what is prescribed under the second column. Incidentally, in my opinion, it negatives the contention that a period of limitation must prescribe the starting point because, if that was correct, there was no necessity for the Legislature to make the third column “Time from which period begins to run.” It seems to me, therefore, that by the use of the words “period of limitation” in s. 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act the Legislature clearly meant a period stated in another special or local law which could be put in place of the period shown under the second column of the first schedule.

The second argument, in my opinion, is also unsound. While under s. 72 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act the Legislature could have prescribed a schedule like the one found in the Indian Limitation Act, there appears no objection to achieving the same result in a different way by using appropriate words. It should be noticed that under s. 72 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act it is not one kind of suit for which one period of limitation is prescribed under all circumstances. It deals with several kinds of suits covered by s. 3, cl. (w) of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act. It provides two different periods of limitation under two different circumstances. In my opinion, therefore, the word “substituted” as used in s. 72 is equivalent to prescribing the periods mentioned in cls. (a) and (b) of s. 72 in place of those prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act. That appears to be the natural and proper reading of the words used in s. 72 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act. I am unable to read the word “substituted” as amounting to an amendment of the schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, as contended by the plaintiff. On the construction of the section itself, I think it prescribes a period of limitation, for the suits mentioned therein, different from the period prescribed in sch. I, col. 2, and therefore s. 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act applies. That sub-section deliberately omits the applicability of ss. 19 and 20 of the Indian Limitation Act to such suits and, therefore, the plaintiff's contention must fail.

We were asked to look to the general policy of the Act. It was argued that the object of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act was to help the debtor and the omission to give the benefit of ss. 19 and 20 would impose a hardship. I am not sure whether this is the correct view. In any event, when the words of the section are clear, I do not think it is proper to discuss what was passing in the mind of the Legislature in framing the section as they had done or to construe it in view of what was supposed to be their intention.

In my opinion Kishorelal Stores v. Jagannath Bayaji was wrongly decided. The answer to the question referred to us is in the negative.

Chagla, J.:—I agree.

Two questions arise for our determination on the construction of s. 29 sub-cl. (2), of the Indian Limitation Act: first, whether the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act is a special or local law? and second, if it is a special or local law, whether it prescribes for the suit with which we are concerned a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule? Now it is not disputed that the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act is a special or local law within the meaning of sub-cl. (2) of s. 29 of the Indian Limitation Act. So the only question that remains to be decided is: Does s. 72 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act prescribe for the suit a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule of the Indian Limitation Act?

Gajendragadkar has contended that the language used in s. 72 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act is that the periods mentioned in that section shall be deemed to be substituted for those precribed in the first schedule to the Indian Limitation Act. Mr. Gajendragadkar has emphasized the expression “to be substituted” and he has argued that what s. 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act requires is that the special or local Act should provide a self-contained code relating to the law of limitation and should not merely deal with the period of limitation mentioned in the second column of the first schedule. Now that would be importing words into s. 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act which it does not contain. It is quite clear that all that s. 29(2) requires is that the special or local law should prescribe for a suit a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule and it cannot possibly be contended that when under s. 72 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act a different period is prescribed, the provisions of s. 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act are not complied with.

Mr. Gajendragadkar has also asked us to consider the policy of the Legislature. I agree with the learned Chief Justice that it is unsafe to consider the policy of the Legislature when the language of the section we are construing is clear and unambiguous. But even if we are to consider the policy of the Legislature, the position is that prior to 1922 when s. 29 of the Indian Limitation Act was amended there was some conflict of judicial opinion as to whether the old s. 29 of the Indian Limitation Act permitted ss. 19, 20 and 21 to be applied when a spcial Act prescribed different periods of limitation, but the consensus of opinion was that on a true reading of the old s. 29 of the Indian Limitation Act ss. 19, 20 and 21 of the Indian Limitation Act applied notwithstanding the fact that the special or local law prescribed a different period of limitation. With those facts present to the mind of the Legislature the Legislature deliberately departed from the law as it was then understood to be by enacting s. 29, sub-cl. (2) of the Indian Limitation Act, and it specifically provided that ss. 19, 20 and 21 shall not apply when the special or local law prescribed a different period of limitation. We are not concerned with the reasons which led the Legislature to change its policy, but there can be no doubt that there was a deliberate change of policy as evidenced by the amendment of s. 29, sub-cl. (2) of the Indian Limitation Act.

I, therefore, agree with the learned Chief Justice that we should answer the question as he has suggested we should do.

Weston, J.:—I agree that the question referred to us should be answered in the negative. I have nothing further to add.

Answered accordingly.
J.G.R