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Emperor v. Banappa Kallappa Ajawan No. 1 And Others

Bombay High Court
Oct 12, 1943
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Bench Opinion Summary — N.J Wadia, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Five appellants were charged under sections 148, 326 and 307 read with section 149 of the Indian Penal Code for participation, on 8 September 1942, in an unlawful assembly said to have the common object of committing murderous assault on named persons (Yellappa, Basalingaya, Bhimarai and Iraya Shivaya). The indictment alleged that the accused had committed a riot while armed with axes and scythes and had voluntarily caused grievous hurt to Yellappa and others. Accused No. 1 (Banappa) faced additional charges for attempting murder by firing a gun (s. 307 IPC) and for possession of a gun without a licence under s. 19(e) of the Indian Arms Act.

The jury (by a majority of four to one) found all accused not guilty of rioting or causing grievous hurt, and acquitted accused No. 1 under s. 19(e) of the Indian Arms Act. The assessors opined that s. 307 read with s. 149 was not proved against any accused. The Sessions Judge considered the jury's verdict on the charges under ss. 148 and 326 with s. 149 (and s. 19(e) Arms Act) to be manifestly perverse and against the weight of evidence, but, differing from the assessors on the s. 307 charge, convicted accused No. 1 under s. 308 and accused Nos. 2–5 under s. 308 read with s.149. He declined to make a reference under s. 307 CrPC against the jury's acquittal on those counts and entered orders of acquittal for rioting and grievous hurt.

The matter before the Court is an appeal from those convictions and sentences. The opinion deals extensively with difficulties arising from parallel or counter prosecutions stemming from the same riot, the reliability of the evidence, and deficiencies in police investigation.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the convictions of accused Nos. 2 to 5 under s. 308 read with s. 149 IPC can be sustained when the jury had acquitted them of rioting (ss. 148/326 read with s.149), which presupposes an unlawful assembly and a common intention.
  2. What is the appropriate procedural approach for trying counter cases arising out of the same riot (i.e., whether both cases should be tried by the same Judge and how judgment should be managed) to avoid conflicting findings and injustice?
  3. Whether the evidence (including identification of the gun and the person who fired it) and the police investigation were sufficiently reliable to sustain the convictions.

Arguments of the Parties

Prosecution's Position

  • In the present trial the prosecution contended that accused No. 1 (Banappa) had fixed and fired the gun which wounded Chayappa and thereby committed the offences alleged against him and, through common intention, against others.
  • In the earlier counter case (against Iraya and his party) the prosecution had alleged that Iraya had come armed with the gun and had shot Chayappa and wounded Devendra; that earlier prosecution resulted in conviction of Iraya.
  • The prosecution in the present case maintained its position about Banappa despite the earlier conviction of Iraya in the other case for the same shooting.

Defence (and Trial Judge observations regarding defence emphasis)

  • The defence in the present case stressed to the jury that the earlier jury's opinion in the other case was not binding upon them; the trial Judge observed that undue stress had been placed by the defence on the earlier verdict.
  • More generally, the defence contested the reliability of prosecution evidence identifying who fired the shot and what role each accused played in the riot; the Court found the evidence unreliable and inconsistent.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Krishna Pannadi v. Emperor (Madras High Court) Cases and counter cases arising out of the same riot should be tried in quick succession by the same Judge, who should not pronounce judgment until both hearings are finished. The Court endorsed this view as supporting its recommendation that, normally, the same Judge should try both cases in succession and postpone judgment in the first until the second is concluded to avoid conflicting findings and injustice.
Lakshminarayana v. Suryanarayana (Madras High Court) Expressed the same view as Krishna Pannadi regarding trial procedure for counter cases. The Court cited it as another authority in support of the recommended procedure for trying counter cases by the same Judge in quick succession.
Ujagar Singh v. Emperor (Lahore High Court) Similar procedural view favourable to trying related cases in a manner that avoids conflicting findings. Cited as consistent authority for the Court's recommendations on procedure in counter cases.
Madat Khan v. Emperor (Lahore High Court; appealed to Privy Council) The Privy Council observed that in such faction cases it is almost impossible to keep cases wholly separate; although technically separate judgments might be preferable, using a single Judge or combined consideration was not objectionable where no injustice resulted. The Court relied on the Privy Council's observation to note that while technically separate judgments might be better, some overlap is inevitable and the suggested procedural approach (same Judge hearing both before pronouncing judgment) would be acceptable.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analysed the convictions and the surrounding circumstances in several discrete steps:

  1. Verdicts and inconsistency: The jury acquitted all accused of rioting and causing grievous hurt; the Sessions Judge considered those acquittals perverse for the charges under ss. 148 and 326 read with s.149 but nevertheless accepted (reluctantly) the jury verdict on rioting and grievous hurt while convicting on s.308 and s.308 read with s.149. The Court found it difficult to reconcile convicting accused Nos. 2–5 under s.308 read with s.149 when they had been acquitted of rioting — because s.149 presupposes an unlawful assembly and a finding of common intention.
  2. Application of s.149: The Court explained that section 149 IPC requires an antecedent finding that an unlawful assembly existed with a common intention to commit the offence; the jury's acquittal on rioting and grievous hurt negated that prerequisite, and therefore the convictions under s.308 read with s.149 against accused Nos. 2–5 could not be sustained.
  3. Reference to s.34: Although the Judge had mentioned s.34 in his charge (stating it could apply even if not specified in the charge), he did not convict under s.308 read with s.34. The Court noted this point but regarded it as not decisive given its view of the evidence.
  4. Counter-case complication: The present trial was a counter case to another prosecution arising from the same riot; different Judges tried the two cases at different times and reached conflicting findings (both cases attributed firing the same gun to different accused). The Court highlighted how such parallel trials can produce serious injustice — here resulting in contradictory convictions for the same act (a single shot at Chayappa).
  5. Recommended procedure: To mitigate such risks, the Court recommended that, where rival factions are prosecuted, both cases ideally should be tried by the same Judge (with different juries or assessors if necessary), tried in quick succession, with the Judge postponing pronouncement of judgment in the first until the second is concluded; however, the Judge must confine each judgment to the evidence of the respective case and not allow findings in one to prejudice the other. The Court noted there is no absolute rule and that transfer of the second case is an option if the same Judge feels difficulty.
  6. Reliability of evidence and investigation: The Court found the prosecution case internally inconsistent and the evidence unreliable. It emphasised the police investigation was unsatisfactory — in particular, no effective effort was made to trace the ownership of the gun found at the scene, which might have clarified who fired the shot. These investigative deficiencies, together with inconsistent witness statements and obvious improbabilities in the prosecution narrative (e.g., the alleged accidental friendly-fire in broad daylight), undermined the convictions.
  7. Conclusion from the evidence: Given the lack of reliable evidence to establish the role of the accused or to identify who fired the gun, the Court concluded that the convictions could not stand.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: APPEAL ALLOWED; CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES SET ASIDE; ACCUSED ORDERED TO BE SET AT LIBERTY.

Direct consequences for the parties

  • All convictions and sentences imposed on the five accused in the present case were quashed.
  • The accused were ordered to be set at liberty.

Broader implications and guidance

  • The Court emphasised the procedural problem of trying counter cases arising from the same riot before different Judges at different times, which can lead to inconsistent findings and serious injustice; it recommended that, normally, both cases be tried by the same Judge in quick succession with pronouncement of judgment postponed until both hearings are complete.
  • The Court criticised the inadequate police investigation (notably failure to trace the ownership of the gun) and noted that prompt and proper investigation is critical to prevent fabrication of evidence and to ensure accountability after serious public disorders.
  • The decision sets forth recommended procedural practice but the opinion does not purport to lay down an absolute rule; the Court relied on existing authorities (Madras High Court and Privy Council observations) to support the view expressed.

Appeal allowed. (Opinion signed by N.J Wadia, J.)

Show all summary ...

N.J Wadia, J.:—

The five appellants in this case were charged under ss. 148, 326 and 307 read with s. 149 of the Indian Penal Code for having on September 8, 1942, been members of an unlawful assembly, the common object of which was to commit murderous assault on Yellappa, Basalingaya, Bhimarai and Iraya Shivaya, with having committed a riot in prosecution of this common object being armed with axes and scythes, and with having voluntarily caused grievous hurt to Yellappa and others. Accused No. 1 Banappa was also charged with having attempted to commit murder by firing a gun at Yellappa and others and with having thereby committed an offence under s. 307, Indian Penal Code, and the other accused with having committed an offence under s. 307 read with s. 149 of the Indian Penal Code. Accused No. 1 was further charged under s. 19(e) of the Indian Arms Act for having been in possession of a gun without a license. The jury by a majority of four to one found all the accused not guilty of rioting or of causing grievous hurt. They also found accused No. 1 not guilty under s. 19(e) of the Indian Arms Act. The assessors were of opinion that the offence under s. 307 read with s. 149 had also not been, proved against any of the accused. The learned Sessions Judge was of opinion that the verdict of the jury with regard to the charges under ss. 148 and 326 with s. 149 of the Indian penal Code and under s. 19(e) of the Indian Arms Act was manifestly perverse and against the weight of the evidence, but as he differed from the verdict of the assessors with regard to the charge under s. 307 and convicted accused No. 1 under s. 308 and accused Nos. 2 to 5 under s. 308 read with s. 149 of the Indian Penal Code, he thought it unnecessary to make a reference to this Court under s. 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the verdict of the jury. He therefore made an order on acquittal as regards the offences of rioting and causing grievous hurt.

The decision of the learned Judge not to make a reference to this Court under s. 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the verdict of acquittal by the jury with regard to the charges under ss. 148 and 326 of the Indian Penal Code has created a difficulty as regards the conviction of accused Nos. 2 to 5 under s. 308 read with s. 149 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned Judge very unwillingly accepted the verdict of the jury acquitting all the accused of rioting and of causing grievous hurt. He nevertheless convicted accused No. 1 under s. 308 for having attempted to commit an offence under s. 304 and the remaining accused Nos. 2 to 5 under s. 308 read with s. 149. It is difficult to see how the conviction of accused Nos. 2 to 5 can be sustained. They have been acquitted on the charge of rioting. It must therefore be held that there was no unlawful assembly and no common intention on the part of these four accused to commit a murderous assault on Iraya or any body else. Section 149 could not therefore be applied to them. That section pre-supposed a finding that there was an unlawful assembly with a common intention to commit an offence. The conviction of accused Nos. 2 to 5 under s. 308 read with s. 149 must therefore fail in any case. Although, the learned Judge has referred in one part of his charge to s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code and has pointed out to the jury that section could be applied even though, it had not been specifically mentioned in the charge, he does not actually convict accused Nos. 2 to 5 under s. 308 read with s. 34, but only under s. 308 read with s. 149. The question however is not of much, importance on the view which we propose to take of the evidence as a whole.

The present case is a counter case arising out of the same facts from which Appeal No. 181 of 1943, which we have just decided, arose. In that case one faction was prosecuted and convicted. The present case is against the rival faction. Accused No. 3 in the present case was the complainant in the other case, and the present complainant Iraya was accused No. 1 in that case. Each case was tried by a different Sessions Judge. The trial in the case against Iraya began on April 15, and was concluded on April 21, 1943. The trial against the accused in the present case commenced before a different Judge on June 21, 1943, and was concluded on July 9, 1943. The procedure which was followed in putting up these two cases, both arising out of a single riot, before two different Judges has produced somewhat startling results. The accused in both cases have been convicted of having used the same gun and of having wounded Chayappa with it. In the other case Iraya was found guilty of having shot at Chayappa with the very gun with which Banappa accused No. 1 in the present case has been found guilty of wounding Chayappa. Admittedly only one shot was fired at Chayappa in the course of the riot. The case affords a very striking example of the difficulties which may occur where counter charges arising out of a riot are tried by different Judges. The Judge in the present case referred to the counter case in his charge to the jury and pointed out that the jury in the earlier case had found the prosecution witnesses in the present case guilty of rioting and firing a gun, but he observed that the opinion of the jury in the earlier case was not in any way binding on the jury in the present case, and he thought that undue stress had been laid by the defence on this fact. His remarks maybe technically correct, but it is obvious that very serious injustice has resulted because of the procedure followed. One side or the other has obviously been wrongly convicted of having fired at Chayappa.

The question of the proper procedure to be followed in such cases, where rival factions which have taken part in a riot are both prosecuted, is one of considerable importance. The two factions must obviously be prosecuted separately, since the common intention of each of the two parties to the riot would be different and they could not be tried in a single case. There is of course no objection in law to both the cases being tried by separate Judges with the help of separate juries or assessors, but such a procedure is always open to the risk of the two Courts coming to conflicting findings, and occasionally, as in the present case, it may result in very serious injustice, one side or the other being wrongly convicted. In our opinion the most desirable procedure in such cases would seem to be that both the cases should be tried by the same Judge, though with different assessors or juries. The first case should be tried to a conclusion and the verdict of the jury or the opinion of the assessors taken. But the Judge should postpone judgment in that case till he has heard the second case to a conclusion, and he should then pronounce judgments separately in each case. He would of course be bound to confine his judgment in each, case to the evidence led in that particular case and would not be at liberty to use the evidence in one case for the purpose of the judgment in the other case and to allow his findings in one case to be influenced in any manner to the prejudice of the accused by the views which he may have formed in the other case. It would be obviously necessary that he should try the two cases in quick succession, one after the other. It may be that in some particular cases he might feel some difficulty about trying both cases, and in such a case it would always be open to him to get the second case transferred. No hard and fast rule can be laid down, and we do not suggest that the procedure which we have recommended above should be invariably followed in the trial of counter cases arising out of one and same riot. But normally we think that procedure is the one least open to objection. The view which we have taken on this point is in accord with the view which was taken by the Madras High Court in Krishna Pannadi v. Emperor. It was observed in that case that cases and counter cases should be tried in quick succession by the same Judge, who should not pronounce judgment till the hearing of both cases is finished. The same view was taken by another Judge of the Madras High Court in Lakshminarayana v. Suryanarayana. A similar view was also taken by the Lahore High Court in Ujagar Singh v. Emperor. In Madat Khan v. Emperor two cases arising out of a village faction fight were tried separately against members of each faction by the same Sessions Judge who delivered a single judgment. In both cases he convicted some of the accused. Against these convictions appeals were preferred to the High Court of Lahore. The learned Judges delivered a single judgment in the two cases dismissing both appeals and confirming the convictions and sentences. The matter went up in appeal to the Privy Council. It was observed by their Lordships that in a case of this kind it is almost impossible to keep the cases wholly separate. With regard to the contention on behalf of the accused that the High Court in delivering a single judgment had imported considerations from one case into the other, their Lordships said that to some extent that was inevitable, and they remarked that although technically it might have been better to keep the evidence entirely distinct and to have delivered two separate judgments, no injustice had followed from what was done. It would appear from this that in the opinion of their Lordships there would have been no objection if the two cases had been separately tried by the same Judge in the manner indicated by us above.

We have found it very difficult to understand the attitude taken up by the prosecution in the present case. In the first case, in which, only Iraya and his party were prosecuted, it was alleged by the prosecution that Iraya had come armed with the gun (article 6 in the present case and article 11 in the other case) and that he had shot Chayappa with it and had also wounded Devendra. That case ended in the conviction of Iraya. We cannot understand how, after that conviction, the prosecution could have contended in the present case that the shot which wounded Chayappa had been fixed by accused No. 1 in the present case, Banappa. The attitude adopted by the prosecution must undoubtedly have misled the Judge and the jury.

[His Lordship then dealt with the facts of the case and concluded:] There is thus no reliable evidence to show what part the accused took in the riot, whether they were the assailants, and whether the gun was fixed by accused No. 1 as alleged by the prosecution. The story that accused No. 1 fired the gun at Iraya and accidentally wounded his own partisan Chayappa, seems on the face of it absurd considering that the incident took place in broad day-light, at 8 or 9 in the morning, and the parties were very close to each other. Chayappa's injury as described by the Doctor showed that the skin around the wound had been blackened, indicating that the shot must have been fired at him from a distance of 5 to 12 feet at the most. When one considers this evidence, bearing in mind the fact that immediately after the offence both Iraya and Yellappa gave out an entirely different story altogether, it is impossible to place any reliance on it.

In our judgment in the other case we have already, pointed out that the police investigation in both these cases left much to be desired. If some attempt had been made to trace the ownership of the gun, which was found lying on the scene of the offence and which is alleged to have been used, it might have been possible to say who had fired the shot and which party was the assailant in the riot.

It is, in our opinion, most regrettable that in a case of this kind, where a very serious riot was committed in broad day-light in the presence of a number of witnesses, and several persons were injured, the offences should go unpunished. This unfortunate result is partly at least due to the unsatisfactory manner in which both cases have been investigated. Time was allowed to the parties to fabricate false evidence and points which probably could have been cleared up, if the investigation had been prompt, were left uninvestigated.

The appeal is therefore allowed, the convictions and the sentences passed upon all the accused are set aside and the accused ordered to be set at liberty.

Appeal allowed.
Y.V.D