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Emperor v. Nana Shahu Sonavane And Another Accused.
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Divatia, J.; concurring: Lokur, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
This reference was made by the Sessions Judge at Poona concerning the meaning of the word “procession” in Rule 56 of the Defence of India Rules, 1939 (the opinion also refers to Rule 66 and sub-rules as applicable). Two accused were charged with going in procession to Laxmi Road Chowk via the City Post Office at Poona in contravention of a government notification issued under R.56(1) that prohibited processions except with prior written permission of the District Magistrate. The prosecution case (as summarized in the opinion) was that on 18 August at about 8:30 P.M. the two accused were marching on a public road, one carrying a Congress flag and both shouting slogans, without having obtained permission.
Both accused pleaded guilty before the Additional City Magistrate, who convicted them under sub-rule (4) and sentenced accused 1 to rigorous imprisonment for eighteen months and a fine of Rs. 500, and accused 2 to rigorous imprisonment for one year. They also faced a separate charge under R.53 (breach of curfew), which this reference does not concern.
The accused filed appeals to the Sessions Judge on grounds of sentence severity (still pending) and also filed revisional applications challenging their convictions as illegal. The Sessions Judge heard the revision and, finding a debatable point on the meaning of “procession”, referred the question to this Court for decision and recommended that if the Court agreed with his view the convictions should be set aside.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether two persons marching together (one carrying a flag and both shouting slogans) can be regarded as a "procession" within the meaning of Rule 56 (and related sub-rules) of the Defence of India Rules, 1939.
- Whether a procession requires participants to march in "orderly succession" (i.e., one behind the other or in rows) as an essential element, or whether marching abreast (side by side) can also constitute a procession.
- Whether, in the presence of a curfew preventing the public from entering the street, the march of the accused could nevertheless be a "public procession" under sub-rule (2) (i.e., whether the public could have joined it if so inclined).
Arguments of the Parties
Accused's Arguments
- The accused contended the convictions were wrong because two persons could not be said to have gone in a "procession": first, because a procession would require more than two persons; and second, because there can be no procession unless people are marching in successive rows (i.e., one behind the other), and there was no evidence they were marching in succession.
- Before this Court, counsel for the accused (Mr. Gumaste) reiterated that in popular sense a procession implies a fairly large number of persons; he conceded that three might conceivably make a procession but argued the popular sense tends to require more than two.
- Mr. Gumaste further raised a point that, due to the curfew order, the march was not open to the public or any class of the public and therefore could not be a "public procession" as defined under sub-rule (2).
Note: The opinion does not set out any detailed or opposing submissions advanced by the prosecution or the State beyond the factual description of the prosecution case; therefore no separate summary of State arguments is provided.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| 28 Bom. L.R. 10231 | That an accused who pleads guilty before a Magistrate and is convicted can still contend in revision under Section 412 CrPC that his conviction is illegal. | The court relied on this to justify hearing the revisional applications despite the accused having pleaded guilty; it confirms the Sessions Judge's jurisdiction to entertain revision on legality grounds. |
| (1896) 12 T.L.R. 3672 | Illustration that a by-law prohibiting assembly “together with any other person or persons” (for betting) was valid, showing an assembly may consist of only two persons. | Used to demonstrate that an assembly (and by analogy a procession) need not be numerous and that two persons can, in law, form an assembly; supports the view that small numbers do not exclude the statutory object. |
| (1822) 1 B. & C. 1233 (at p.136) | Principle that the meaning of statutory words, when doubtful, is to be found in the subject, occasion, and object of the statute rather than strict grammatical or popular sense. | Applied to support interpreting "procession" in a manner harmonious with the object of the Defence of India Rules — namely to prevent organized demonstrations objectionable to the District Magistrate. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded through a textual, contextual and purposive analysis of the term "procession" as used in the Defence of India Rules. The analysis can be summarized in the following steps.
- Context and object: The Court emphasized the object of the Rule (cited as R.66 in argument but originating in the Defence of India Rules framework) — to secure defence, public safety, maintenance of public order and to prevent persons combining for demonstrations. That object is broad enough to encompass small combinations.
- Essential characteristics: The Court identified the essential ingredients of a "procession" as (a) a common purpose or unity of intention among participants to demonstrate something, and (b) some degree of order, formality or organised marching sufficient to manifest that purpose. Number and precise formation are secondary factors that affect size/shape but do not determine the entity.
- On the number of participants: The Court rejected the notion that a procession necessarily requires more than two persons. It reasoned that if two persons can share a common purpose and proceed together in a formal/organised way to demonstrate it, they fall within the essential characteristics. Fixing a higher minimum number (e.g., five) would be arbitrary and inconsistent with the rule's object; case law and by-law examples show assemblies of two can be recognised.
- On orderly succession (formation): The Court considered dictionary authorities. The Oxford English Dictionary includes "orderly succession" language, but other authorities (Webster's, Wyld, Encyclopaedia Britannica) define procession more broadly as an organised body advancing in a formal manner, not strictly requiring one-behind-the-other formation. The Court concluded orderly succession/rows are not a sine qua non; marching abreast can equally indicate an organised demonstration, depending on circumstances.
- Application to the facts: Applying those principles to the factual description — two accused marching together, one carrying a flag and both shouting slogans — the Court concluded they manifested a common purpose and an organised demonstration. Whether they walked side by side or one behind the other, the conduct was worthy of being described as a procession within the meaning of the Rule.
- On "public" character despite curfew: The Court addressed the point that curfew might prevent the public from joining or observing. It held the proper criterion is whether members of the public could, in principle, join the march if they were willing to break the curfew — i.e., the potential for public participation rather than the factual ability to be on the street at that moment. Thus the event was a "public procession" within sub-rule (2).
- Procedural point on revision: The Court accepted the Sessions Judge's right to entertain revision despite guilty pleas, citing 28 Bom. L.R. 10231 and Section 412 CrPC principles; however, on the substantive point about "procession" the Court disagreed with the Sessions Judge's restrictive interpretation.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The reference was rejected. The Court held that two or more persons may constitute a "procession" within the meaning of the Defence of India Rules, and that marching side by side (abreast) need not be excluded from that meaning. The march by the two accused (one carrying a flag and both shouting slogans) constituted a public procession under the applicable sub-rule.
Implications and immediate effects:
- Direct effect on the parties: The Court refused the Sessions Judge's recommended view that would have invalidated the convictions on the basis that two persons could not be a procession or that marching abreast could not be a procession. The reference being rejected means the matter was returned to the Sessions Judge at Poona for disposal of the revisional applications and pending appeals according to law; the Court did not set aside the convictions in this reference.
- On precedent and law: The Court provided a clarified interpretive approach to "procession" for the Defence of India Rules: emphasis on common purpose and organised/formal marching rather than on a minimum numeric threshold or strict requirement of successive rows. The opinion grounds that interpretation in statutory purpose and authoritative dictionary usages cited. The Court did not purport to set a rigid numerical rule beyond "two or more," and indicated fact-specific inquiry remains necessary.
Disposition: Reference rejected; the matter returned to the Sessions Judge, Poona, for further disposal according to law.
Divatia, J.:— This reference made by the Sessions Judge at Poona raises a novel and interesting point as to the meaning of the word “procession” in Rule 56 of the Defence of India Rules, 1939. The two accused were Charged with going in procession to Laxmi Road Chowk via the City Post Office at Poona in contravention of a notification issued by the Government under R. 56(1). The notification was to the effect that no procession shall be held in any place in the Province of Bombay except with the previous permission in writing of the District Magistrate, and no person shall take part in such procession in respect of which such permission had not been obtained. Under rule 56(1):
The Provincial Government may, for the purpose of securing the defence of British India, the public safety, the maintenance of public order or the efficient prosecution of war by general or special order, prohibit, restrict or impose conditions upon, the holding of or taking part in public processions, meetings or assemblies.
2. Under sub-r. (2) any procession, which was open to the public or any class or portion of the public, whether held in a public or private place and whether admission thereto was restricted by the issue of tickets or otherwise, shall be deemed to be a public procession, and sub-rule (4) provides for the punishment. The prosecution case was that the two accused were marching along on 18th August last at about 8-30 P.M on a public road, one of them carrying a Congress flag and both of them shouting slogans, without obtaining the previous permission of the District Magistrate. Both the accused pleaded guilty to the charge and the Additional City Magistrate convicted them under sub-r. (4) and sentenced accused 1 to rigorous imprisonment for eighteen months and a fine of Rs. 500, and accused 2 to rigorous imprisonment for one year. They were also charged under R. 53 of the defence of india rules relating to the breach of curfew order, but we are not concerned with that charge in this reference. The accused, thereafter, filed appeals to the Sessions Judge on the ground of severity of the sentence which are still to be disposed of and they also filed revisional applications challenging their convictions as illegal. As the learned Sessions Judge points out, it is open to them in revision to challenge the conviction as illegal even though they pleaded guilty to the charge. As held by our Court in 28 Bom. L.R 10231, an accused person, who pleads guilty before a Magistrate and is convicted, can contend, under Section 412 of the Cr PC, in his application for revision, that his conviction is illegal. The learned Sessions Judge therefore heard the revisional applications. It was urged on behalf of both the accused that the convictions were wrong inasmuch as the accused could not be said to have marched in procession, firstly, because it would require more than two persons to constitute a procession, and secondly, because there can be no procession unless people are marching in successive rows, and there was no evidence in this case that the accused were marching one after the other. With regard to the first argument, the learned Judge was inclined to the opinion that the fact that the two applicants were shouting slogans and were marching together would indicate a common bond between them, and that it was possible to argue that they formed a body of persons, and therefore constituted a procession. He was, however, of the opinion that as there was no evidence that the accused were marching one after the other, it must be presumed that they were marching side by side, and he felt it difficult to call such marching together as a procession according to the dictionary meaning of that word. As it has not been defined in any legal enactment, it is permissible to find out its meaning as it is commonly understood and that could be only done by finding its dictionary meaning. In the Oxford English Dictionary, on which the learned Judge relied, a procession is described as “the action of a body of persons going or marching along in orderly succession in a formal or ceremonial way.” Belying on that definition the learned Sessions Judge was of the opinion that the two accused marching abreast cannot be described as going in a procession. He has, therefore, made this reference and recommended that if that view is accepted by this Court, the convictions of the accused should be set aside.
3. The learned advocate on behalf of the accused has supported the reference not only on the ground on which it is made but also on the ground that two persons cannot make a procession. It must be emphasized at the outset that the point for determination is not the abstract question as to whether two persons marching in a line would constitute a procession, but whether the two accused— one of them carrying a flag and both shouting slogans—marching together in a line for the purpose of demonstration can be regarded as a procession. Any number of persons moving forward in the same direction would not be necessarily described as a procession. A certain degree of order and formality in marching together is an essential element in its connotation. Although a body of persons may not move in regular form, some degree of orderliness is necessary to demonstrate its common object. Without such common purpose and intention to demonstrate it, there can be no procession however large the number of persons may be and in whatever manner they might proceed forward. On the other hand, with such common purpose and the intention to make a demonstration by marching in some order, the number of persons and the manner of march are variable and less important factors in determining whether the body constitutes a procession. They regulate its size and shape but do not affect its entity as a body. The fact that there must be a common purpose and orderly march would necessarily imply that one person cannot form a procession, but if two persons are capable of having a common purpose and of proceeding together to demonstrate it, there is no reason why two should not be regarded as a sufficient number in forming a body of persons for the purpose of such demonstration. That being so, it is not really correct to say that there must be a fairly large body of persons to form a procession. If two persons are regarded as insufficient for that purpose, no particular number above two can be logically fixed as a minimum number, and there could be no definite and uniform test to be applied. The test of there being at least more than one person to form a procession would be both logical as well as definite having regard to its essential characteristic as a demonstration for a common purpose. At first sight, it might appear strange to say that only two persons moving forward in a line can form a procession, and in ordinary experience a procession consists of a fairly large number of persons walking in rows of two or more, but once it is realised that the only important ingredients of a procession are a common purpose and a formal or demonstrative march, and that a particular number of persons is not an essential factor, even two persons can conceivably form a procession by satisfying those essential requirements. Mr. Gumaste for the accused has relied on a passage in Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes which says that “in dealing with matters relating to the general public, statutes are presumed to use words in their popular sense,” and he has urged that in the popular sense a procession must consist of a fairly large number of persons. When asked as to the minimum number required, he conceded that three might conceivably make a procession, but it may very well be doubted whether even that is the popular sense. It is not, however, in my opinion, strictly necessary to determine the popular sense, because as observed by Maxwell in another passage, the meanings of the words of a statute are found not so much in a strictly grammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular sense, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained.
4. One of the objects of prohibiting a procession under the Defence of India Rule 66 is to prevent persons combining together for making demonstrations of certain types, and a combination of two persons would not be excluded from its object. As the word occurs in a legal enactment, we have to give a definite sense to it and not to leave its meaning vague and uncertain. Such definite sense can be attached by making it applicable to a body however small and the smallest body would consist of two persons. The learned Sessions Judge seems also inclined to accept this view.
5. The only point on which he feels a doubt is whether such a body marching side by side would form a procession, because under the dictionary meaning it must march in orderly succession. The question, therefore, is whether marching in succession or rows is an absolutely necessary ingredient of a procession. Although in the Oxford English Dictionary, on which the learned Sessions Judge has relied, a procession is described as a body of persons going along in orderly succession in a formal or ceremonial way, it is not so described in another standard work, viz., Webster's Dictionary where it is stated to mean “that which is moving onward in an orderly, stately or solemn maimer; especially a train of persons advancing in order.” Thus although it applies especially to a train of persons, it is not restricted to it but includes all bodies moving forward in an orderly manner. To the same effect is the meaning expounded in the Universal Dictionary of the English Language by Dr. H.C Wyld, which the learned Sessions Judge has quoted in his judgment. I may lastly refer to the description of a procession in Encyclopaedia Britannica, Edn. 14, vol. 18, p. 543. There it is described as “an organised body of people advancing in a formal or ceremonial manner,” and it is further observed that definition covers a wide variety of such progress. Orderly succession is not mentioned as its essential ingredient.
6. It will thus appear that it is not the unanimous opinion among the expounders of its meaning, that a procession must in all cases proceed in orderly succession, although they all agree that it means a body of persons marching forward in a more or less formal or organised way. When they are marching in this way, they may all proceed in one line or in rows and that would depend upon their number as well as the breadth of the road. There seems to be no reason to regard walking in rows as a sine qua non of a procession. It is only one though it is the most frequent mode of going in a procession. If, for example, ten persons move forward with unity of purpose and in a formal manner, it does not stand to reason that they should be regarded as a procession only if they all walk in successive rows and not if they walk together in one row on a broad thoroughfare. The question of successive rows comes in only if a large number is regarded as a necessary feature of a procession. But if, as the learned Sessions Judge is himself inclined to think, two persons can possibly form a body, and therefore a procession, the element of orderly succession ceases to be its essential requisite. On the facts of the case, it is clear that both the accused were proceeding presumably together in a line with the common intention of making a demonstration, and I therefore think that they must be taken as marching in procession within the meaning of that word in Rule 66. The reference is not accepted and it is returned to the learned Sessions Judge at Poona for disposal of the case according to law.
7. Lokur, J.:— I agree. The point raised by this reference being novel, I wish to add a few words. The two questions arising are whether two persons are enough to make a procession and whether they can be said to be going in procession if they are walking abreast and not one behind the other. There is no statutory definition of the word “procession.” Its etymological meaning is “going forward.” Its origin is Latin, and in classical Latin the word generally used for a procession was “pompa”, a formal march or progress of persons to some particular spot to celebrate some event, or for some public or religious purpose. The word “procession” is used by Cicero in the sense of marching forward, an advance, any public progress, such as the formal entrance of the Consul upon his office, or the public appearance of the Emperor. In that sense even a single person may go “in procession”. But in dealing with matters relating to the general public, statutes are presumed to use words in their popular sense, though regard must always he had to the context. The popular meaning of a word is to be gathered from modern standard dictionaries. Several such dictionaries were referred to in the course of the arguments, and, on behalf of the accused, reliance is placed on the Oxford English Dictionary edited by Drs. Murray and Bradley, cited by the learned Sessions Judge in his order of reference. There a pro-cession is defined as “the action of a body of persons going or marching along in orderly succession in a formal or ceremonial way.” It is argued that “a body of persons” necessarily means more than two persons, and “marching in succession” means “going one behind the other.” But this meaning cannot be regarded as worded with the precision of a statutory definition. Usually a procession does consist of a large number of persons going together in a formal manner, more or less in a way to attract public attention. Necessarily, some of them would be walking in front and some behind so as to form rows. Hence the word, in common parlance, is associated with the idea of a body of persons going in an orderly succession. But these two ingredients are not the essential factors of a procession.
8. The learned Sessions Judge seems to think that even two persons can form a procession, provided they are walking one behind the other, but not if they are walking side by side. This would mean that even a large number of persons matching abreast in a line, carrying flags, beating drums and shouting slogans, cannot be regarded as going in procession. This would further lead to the strange result that two such men would not be a procession so long as they walk side by side, but as soon as one of them lags a bit behind, there would be a procession, so that the same two persons shouting the same slogans would “be a procession for a few paces and would not be a procession for the next few paces alternately. If this meaning is to be attributed to the ‘word “procession,” then the object of prohibiting a procession can be easily defeated. All the dictionaries, however, do not define a pro-cession as consisting of persons going in an orderly succession. In Webster's International Dictionary the meaning of the word is given as “that which is moving onward in an orderly, stately or solemn manner, especially a train of persons advancing in order, as a procession of mourners.” The expression “in order” evidently means in an orderly manner, and not necessarily one behind the other. The expression “a train of persons” does connote a number of persons, but it is mentioned as “especial,” and not as a sine qua non. The Encyclopaedia Britannica defines a procession as “an organized body of people advancing in a formal or ceremonial manner,” and adds that it covers a wide variety of such progresses. By way of illustration it mentions a procession organized as a demonstration of political or other opinions. In Moles-worth's Marathi English Dictionary, the corresponding Marathi word (the word used by the Police Sub-Inspector and the Police Constable in their evidence) is defined as “a slow, majestic march proceeding with solemnity and state or with parade and pomp.” These definitions give us a better idea of the essentials of a procession.
9. It is urged that even according to the definition given in Encyclopaedia Britannica, a procession requires “a body of persons,” that is to say, an assembly of persons, and hence there must be at least five persons, as in the case of an unlawful assembly. But that number is arbitrarily fixed by the Penal Code for a particular purpose. Under the common law of England, the number of persons required to make an unlawful assembly is not five, but only three. Though an unlawful assembly may require three or five persons, it does not follow that two persons cannot form an assembly. In (1896) 12 T.L.R 3672 a by-law which provided that “a person shall not together with any other person or persons assemble in a street or public place for the purpose of betting” was held to be good. This shows that there can be an assembly of only two persons. As held in (1822) 1 B. & C. 1233 at p. 136 the meaning of the words of a statute, when there is a doubt about their meaning, is found not so much in a strictly grammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. Hence, in the absence of a statutory definition, a word is to be understood in the sense in which it best harmonises with the subject of the rule and the object which it has in view. In the pre-sent case the object of the rule is to penalize an organized demonstration in a public place, which the District Magistrate may consider to be objectionable. If such de-monstration be stationary it would be called a meeting or an assembly, and if in motion it would be called a procession, and R. 66, Defence of India Rules, deals with processions, meetings as well as assemblies.
10. In this view, if a definition, as nearly precise as possible, is to be attempted, I would define a procession as a formal and organized march of two or more persons, “formal” implying a kind of solemnity or something spectacular, so as to attract attention, and “organized” implying a common intention or unity of purpose. It is true that this definition may include even a couple of blind beggars going along a street shouting for alms. Even such beggars, thus going, may be regarded as going in procession. Whether to require the District Magistrate's previous permission for such a procession or whether to prosecute every one going in procession is a matter of policy with which we are not concerned. After all, every case must be decided on its own facts. Whether a march of two persons or more, walking abreast or one behind the other, is to be deemed a procession or not must depend, to a large extent, on what the onlookers are likely to take it to be, and from this point of view, the march of the two accused, one of them carrying a flag and both shouting slogans, must be held to be a procession.
11. Mr. Gumaste for the accused raised a new point in this Court that the procession of the accused was not open to the public or to any class or portion of the public, since by reason of the curfew order no member of the public could at that time get out into the street, and therefore, it would not be a public procession as defined in R. 66, sub-r. (2), defence of india rules.
12. But the criterion is not whether the public could see it by going into the street, but whether the public wishing to break the law, as the accused did, could join it, and there was nothing to prevent any member of the public from doing so, if he or she was prepared to take the consequences. The march of the two accused, as described in the evidence, whether they were going side by side or one behind the other, was, therefore, a public procession within the meaning of that sub-rule. I, therefore, concur in the order proposed by my learned brother.
13. Reference rejected.
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