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Emperor v. Osman Chotani (Accused No. 1) And Others (Accused Nos. 2 And 3)
Judgment Summary — Beaumont, C.J. (with Sen, J. concurring)
Factual and Procedural Background
Three persons were charged with the offence of cheating. The allegation was that accused Nos. 1 and 2 bought inferior-quality steel cheaply in the bazar and, through accused No. 3, resold it to a Government Department at a substantially higher price while falsely representing the steel to be of superior quality.
Many of the books of accused No. 1, which might be relevant to the investigation, were not forthcoming. The investigating officer served a summons on the Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay, under s. 65 of the Bombay City Police Act, requiring production of certain documents lodged by accused No. 1 with the Income-tax Department. The Commissioner declined to produce the documents, relying on s. 54 of the Indian Income-tax Act.
The police then conducted a search of the Income-tax Commissioner's offices under s. 66 of the Bombay City Police Act and seized certain documents lodged by accused No. 1. One seized document, exhibit Z-44, was tendered in evidence before the Chief Presidency Magistrate, who held it inadmissible, taking the view that s. 54 of the Income-tax Act constituted an absolute bar to the Court considering such documents. The present matter is a revision application challenging that ruling.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether s. 54 of the Indian Income-tax Act operates as an absolute statutory bar rendering income-tax returns, accounts or other documents lodged under the Act inadmissible in evidence before a criminal court.
- Whether documents lawfully seized by police under ss. 65 and 66 of the Bombay City Police Act (in the course of an investigation) may be produced in evidence, notwithstanding the confidentiality provisions of s. 54 of the Income-tax Act.
- Whether the police seizure under s. 66 of the Bombay City Police Act (and its ancillary provisions) was lawful in the circumstances of this case.
Arguments of the Parties
Opponents' Arguments (as presented by Sir Jamshedji Kanga)
- S. 54 makes the relevant income-tax documents confidential in whoever's hands they may be and thus renders them inadmissible in evidence.
- The prohibition in s. 54 is directed to a “public servant”; the statutory definition of “public servant” (referred to in the Income-tax Act and s. 21 IPC) includes a police officer, and therefore police seizure/production is caught by the prohibition.
- The seizure of exhibit Z-44 was illegal; the document remained constructively in the possession of the Income-tax authorities and so fell directly within the prohibition in s. 54.
- The adverb “voluntarily” in s. 66 of the Bombay City Police Act implies the Income-tax authorities must have a volition; because they are prevented by the Income-tax Act from producing the documents, they are not exercising volition and s. 66 cannot be invoked to justify a search/seizure.
- Permitting the police course of action defeats the legislative intent of s. 54 to protect confidentiality.
Police/Prosecution Position (as described in the opinion)
- The investigating officer relied on s. 65 to summon the Income-tax Commissioner to produce documents and, after refusal, invoked s. 66 to search the Commissioner's offices for the documents believed necessary for the investigation.
- The police contended that a lawful search under s. 66 authorized them to take possession of documents found during the search and to produce such documents in evidence.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Devidatt v. Shriram Narayandas (this Court) | Held that s. 54 of the Income-tax Act did not preclude the giving in evidence of income-tax documents, provided proper evidence could be given (i.e., secondary evidence was permissible under the circumstances). | The Court relied on this decision to support the proposition that s. 54 does not render the documents themselves statutorily inadmissible; if proper evidence of the documents can be given, they may be admitted. |
| Rama Rao v. Venkataramayya (Full Bench, Madras) | Same principle as Devidatt: s. 54 does not preclude the admissibility of documents mentioned in the section when proper evidence is available (consideration of secondary evidence). | Used to reinforce the interpretation that s. 54 does not create an absolute bar to evidence and to show consistency of judicial treatment on the point. |
| In re Bhanji (this Court) | Construction placed on the corresponding provision of the old Criminal Procedure Code that the power to search carried an incidental power to take possession of items found. | Applied to support the conclusion that a police officer conducting a search under s. 66 of the Bombay City Police Act is entitled to seize documents found during that search. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began with a close textual analysis of s. 54(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, which declares returns, statements and documents furnished under the Act to be confidential and provides that, subject to the Act, no Court shall be entitled to require any public servant to produce such items or give evidence in respect thereof. The Court noted that sub-section (2) makes unauthorized disclosure by a public servant punishable, and reasoned that the criminal sanction implies an imposed prohibition on public servants producing the documents.
However, the Court rejected the Chief Presidency Magistrate's view that s. 54 rendered the documents themselves inadmissible. The reasons given were:
- The section does not expressly state inadmissibility; it (a) treats documents as confidential and (b) bars a Court from requiring a public servant to produce them. The confidentiality direction is primarily aimed at Income-tax authorities, to encourage full disclosure to them by taxpayers.
- The statute does not prevent an assessee from disclosing his own returns or accounts to third parties (e.g., a solicitor or friend); thus, the confidentiality obligation is not an absolute prohibition applicable to all holders of the document.
- If documents were statutorily inadmissible, the question whether secondary evidence could be given would never arise. The existence of authorities (Devidatt and Rama Rao) treating secondary evidence as permissible indicates that s. 54 was not meant to make the documents inadmissible per se.
- The operative part of s. 54 is that a Court cannot require a public servant to produce the documents. Therefore, if a document can be given in evidence without requiring a public servant to produce it (for example, because it has been lawfully seized and is in the possession of the police), the section does not bar its admission.
On the contention that the definition of “public servant” would include a police officer and thus s. 54 would apply to the police, the Court held that statutory definitions are context-dependent. The “public servant” referred to in s. 54 must be read as a public servant to whom disclosure was made under the Income-tax Act (i.e., a member of the Income-tax staff). This interpretation avoids anomalous results (e.g., permitting an ordinary assessee to disclose but precluding an assessee who happens to be a government servant).
Turning to the legality of the seizure under the Bombay City Police Act, the Court examined ss. 65 and 66. Section 65 allows an officer in charge of a police station to require production of documents; s. 66 permits searches when the officer reasonably believes that the person in possession will not voluntarily produce the documents. The Court observed that:
- Although s. 66 does not expressly mention seizure, the purpose of the search is to procure production of items necessary for an investigation; therefore, the officer is entitled to take possession of items found during a search. This construction is reinforced by s. 68 (which requires forwarding of documents found to the requesting officer) and by In re Bhanji.
- The adverb “voluntarily” in s. 66 was not to be interpreted in a narrow manner that would preclude a search whenever the person is incapable of voluntarily producing the document (for example, because doing so would be an offence). If the police officer has reason to believe the person will not produce the document—whether because the person refuses or because producing it would expose him to criminal liability—the officer may lawfully search.
The Court further noted that s. 54 itself contains an express exception (s. 54(3)(a)) permitting disclosure of particulars for the purposes of a prosecution under the Indian Penal Code or for prosecutions under the Income-tax Act, demonstrating that the Legislature contemplated circumstances in which confidential documents could be produced. Given the textual language and the statutory exceptions, the Court found no basis to invent a broader prohibition beyond what Parliament had expressly stated.
Applying these textual constructions and precedents, the Court concluded that the police were entitled to search under s. 66, lawfully seized exhibit Z-44, and that s. 54 did not render that document inadmissible. Accordingly, the Chief Presidency Magistrate erred in rejecting the tender of the document.
Holding and Implications
RULE MADE ABSOLUTE
Holding (core rulings):
- The Chief Presidency Magistrate was wrong to hold exhibit Z-44 inadmissible; s. 54 of the Indian Income-tax Act does not operate as an absolute statutory bar to the admission of documents lodged under the Income-tax Act.
- Documents lawfully seized by the police under ss. 65 and 66 of the Bombay City Police Act may be produced in evidence, and a police officer conducting a search under s. 66 is entitled to take possession of documents found during that search.
- The seizure of exhibit Z-44 in the circumstances of this case was lawful.
Implications:
- The direct practical effect is that the tendering in evidence of exhibit Z-44 should have been accepted; the Magistrate's exclusion of the document was reversed and the rule in revision was made absolute.
- The Court's interpretation limits s. 54 to its textually express effect (confidentiality vis-à-vis Income-tax authorities and a prohibition on requiring Income-tax public servants to produce documents), rather than creating a sweeping rule of inadmissibility in all hands. The opinion relies on existing authorities rather than purporting to establish a far-reaching new principle.
- The opinion does not purport to set a novel general precedent that overrides the statutory exceptions; it applies textual construction and previous decisions to resolve the dispute before the Court. No wider newly stated principle beyond this interpretative application is announced in the text of the opinion.
Disposition: Rule made absolute. Sen, J. concurred.
Beaumont, C.J:—
This is a revision application raising a point of some general importance.
Three persons are being charged with the offence of cheating, the general nature of the case alleged against them being that accused Nos. 1 and 2 having purchased steel of an inferior quality at a cheap price in the bazar, resold it through the instrumentality of accused No. 3 to a Government Department at a greatly enhanced price, falsely representing the steel to be of a superior quality.
We are told that many of the books of accused No. 1, which might be relevant, are not forthcoming. In order to remedy this defect, the investigating officer served a summons on the Income-tax Commissioner of Bombay, under s. 65 of the Bombay City Police Act, requiring him to produce certain documents lodged by accused No. 1 with the Income-tax Department in connection with his return for income-tax. The Commissioner of Income-tax declined to produce the documents in question, considering himself precluded from so doing by the provisions of s. 54 of the Indian Income-tax Act, as he clearly was. Thereupon the police authorities proceeded under s. 66 of the Bombay City Police Act to carry out a search of the offices of the Income-tax Commissioner, and seized certain documents, which had been lodged with the Income-tax Department by accused No. 1. One of those documents, exhibit Z-44, was tendered in evidence by a police-officer before the Chief Presidency Magistrate, who was hearing the charge. The learned Magistrate held that the document was not admissible in evidence. He took the view that s. 54 of the Indian Income-tax Act constituted an absolute bar to the Court considering any of the documents lodged under the Act, and the question is whether that decision is right.
Section 54(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act is in these terms:—
“(1) All particulars contained in any statement made, return furnished or accounts or documents produced under the provisions of this Act, or in any evidence given, or affidavit or deposition made, in the course of any proceedings under this Act other than proceedings under this Chapter, or in any record of any assessment proceeding, or any proceeding relating to the recovery of a demand, prepared for the purposes of this Act, shall be treated as confidential, and notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, no Court shall, save as provided in this Act, be entitled to require any public servant to produce before it any such return accounts, documents or record or any part of such record, or to give evidence before it in respect thereof.”
Then sub-s. (2) provides that if a public servant discloses any particulars contained in any such statement, return, accounts, documents evidence, affidavit, deposition or record, he shall be punishable with imprisonment or fine. The section does not in so many words say that the public officer is prohibited from producing any such document as is specified, but it is obvious that, as the production is made punishable as an offence, there is an implied prohibition against its production by a public servant.
In my opinion, there is nothing in s. 54 of the Income-tax Act to justify the extreme view taken by the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate that all the documents referred to in that section are made inadmissible in evidence. The section does not expressly enact that any documents are to be inadmissible in evidence. It provides two things: first of all, that the documents specified shall be treated as confidential; and, secondly, that no Court shall require a public servant to produce them. In providing that the documents are to be treated as confidential, I think the Legislature only mean that they are to be treated by the Income-tax authorities as confidential. Sir Jamshedji Kanga has argued that the section means that the documents are confidential in whosoever's hands they may be. I do not think that can be the meaning. I apprehend that there is nothing in the section to prevent an assessee from disclosing the terms of his assessment, or of any accounts on which it is founded to his solicitor or to any friend to whom he chooses to make the disclosure. All that the section means is that the Income-tax authorities are to regard communications made to them for the purpose of the Income-tax Act as being confidential, the object, no doubt, being to enable people to feel that they can freely state the facts relating to their income, facts, which may often involve confidential matters relating to their business, without fear of the matters being disclosed. But as long as there is no disclosure by a member of the Income-tax staff, I do not think the direction to treat them as confidential is infringed.
The main operative part of the section, however, is that the Court cannot require any public servant to produce these documents. I see no justification for extending the operation of those words beyond their natural and proper meaning. If a document can be given in evidence, without requiring a public servant to produce it, there seems to be nothing in the section to preclude that from being done. This Court in Devidatt v. Shriram Narayandas and a full bench of the Madras Court in Rama Rao v. Venkataramayya held that s. 54 of the Income-tax Act did not preclude the giving in evidence of the documents referred to, provided proper evidence of them could be given. In those cases the Court was considering primarily whether secondary evidence could be given of certain income-tax documents. But that question could not have arisen, if the documents themselves had been made inadmissible in evidence by statute, because it is obvious that secondary evidence could not be given of a document made by statute inadmissible. Therefore, taking the language of s. 54 as I find it, I do not think that there is anything to prevent a police officer from producing a document lawfully seized from the Income-tax authorities, which those authorities themselves would not be able to produce.
It has been argued on behalf of the opponents that the prohibition is directed to a public servant, and it is said that the definition of “public servant”, contained in s. 2(13) of the Income-tax Act and s. 21 of the Indian Penal Code, includes a police officer. But the definition in the Income-tax Act is, like most statutory definitions, made subject to any context to the contrary, and it seems to me clear, on the terms of s. 54 of the Income-tax Act, that the public servant referred to is a public servant to whom disclosure has been made under the Income-tax Act. I have already said that I can see no reason why an assessee himself, if he is able to do so, should not disclose the contents of documents referred to in the section, and it can hardly be suggested that, whereas an ordinary assessee could make such a disclosure, an assessee who chances to be employed by Government, and, therefore, to be a Government servant, is precluded from so doing. In my opinion the public servant referred to in s. 54 is a public servant to whom disclosure has been made under the Income-tax Act.
Then it is said that in point of fact the seizure of this document, exhibit Z-44, by the police was illegal, and, that it must be regarded as constructively still in the possession of the Income-tax authorities, and, therefore, falls directly within the prohibition in s. 54. That question depends on the construction of ss. 65 and 66 of the Bombay City Police Act. Section 65 enables an officer in charge of a police station to require the production of a document, which he thinks necessary for the purpose of any investigation being made by him. Then s. 66 of the Bombay City Police Act, which corresponds more or less to s. 165 of the Criminal Procedure Code, provides, so far as material, as follows:—
“(1) Whenever an officer making an investigation under this chapter considers that the production of any document or other thing is necessary to the conduct of an investigation into any offence which he is authorized to investigate, and there is reason to believe that the person in whose possession or power such document or thing is believed to be, will not voluntarily produce the same, on being required so to do by a Police officer, or in compliance with a summons or written order which has been, or might be, issued under s. 65, such officer may search, or cause search to be made, for the same in any place within the limits of the City of Bombay.”
It is to be noticed that the section does not in terms enable the police officer to seize anything; it only enables him to search. But as the object of the search is to procure production of some thing required in an investigation, I feel no doubt that the police officer conducting the search under the section is entitled to take possession of that for which he is authorized to search. That construction is assisted by a reference to the terms of s. 68 of the Act, under which an officer of another section, who is authorized to search, is required to forward the document or thing found to the officer at whose request the search was made. A similar construction was placed on the corresponding provision of the old Criminal Procedure Code by this Court in In re Bhanji. I think, therefore, that the police are entitled to seize on a search under s. 66 of the Bombay City Police Act.
Then Sir Jamshedji Kanga has argued that s. 66 does not apply in this case, because there was no question of the Income-tax Officer voluntarily refusing to produce the document, or to comply with the summons which had been served upon him under s. 65. His argument is that the adverb “voluntarily” implies that the Income-tax authorities can exercise a volition in the matter, and as they are precluding the Income-tax Act from producing the document, they are not exercising any volition. But that argument involves reading the adverb “voluntarily” out of its context. What the section provides is, not that something must be done voluntarily, but that the police officer must have reason to believe that the person, in whose possession or power such document or thing is believed to be, will not voluntarily produce the same. If the police officer knows that in point of fact that person cannot produce it, because by so doing he will be committing an offence it is easy for him to conclude that the document will not be voluntarily produced. All that the section means is that the police officer must be satisfied that the person in possession of the thing in question will not produce it of his own accord, or under the compulsion of a summons. If he is so satisfied, then he may search. In my opinion, therefore, the police were entitled in this case to make a search under s. 66 of the Bombay City Police Act, and the seizure of Z-44 was legal.
It is urged that the effect of holding the police to be entitled to adopt the course they have adopted in this case is to defeat the intention of the Legislature as disclosed in s. 54 of the Income-tax Act. However, we can only gather the intention of Legislature from the language used; and, if the course of action adopted in this case, on a fair reading of the section, has not been forbidden, there is no occasion for the Court to invent a prohibition. It is to be noticed that sub-s. (3)(a) of s. 54 contains an exception in the case of disclosure of particulars for the purposes of a prosecution under the Indian Penal Code in respect of any statement, return, accounts and documents mentioned, or for the purposes of a prosecution under the Income-tax Act. So that, for the purposes of certain prosecutions confidential documents may be produced even by the Income-tax authorities; and I see no convincing reason for attributing to the Legislature any greater measure of tenderness for an assessee charged with other offences than the Legislature has chosen to express. To my mind the section does not preclude the course of action which the police have adopted in this case.
I think, therefore, that the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate was wrong in rejecting the tendering of this document.
Rule made absolute.
Sen, J.:—I agree.
Rule made absolute.
Y.V.D
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