Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Hanmant Bhimrao Kalg... v. Gururao Swamirao Kul...

Bombay High Court
Mar 13, 1942
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

On February 26, 1927, a decree was issued for Rs. 1,850, payable by annual instalments of Rs. 300 each, with the first instalment due on May 31, 1927, and subsequent instalments due annually thereafter. The decree included a default clause allowing the plaintiff to recover the entire remaining amount immediately if any instalment was not duly paid, by selling the mortgaged property. After default in payment of the first instalment, the decree-holder issued a darkhast on July 1, 1939, to recover the whole amount, but this attempt failed due to lack of bidders on June 2, 1933. Subsequently, on September 2, 1927, the decree-holder issued a new darkhast seeking recovery of instalments due in the preceding three years. A difference of opinion arose between two judges regarding whether the instalment decree terminated after the decree-holder's unsuccessful attempt to recover the whole amount, raising a question relevant to limitation.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, under the terms of the decree, the instalment decree ceased to exist after the decree-holder unsuccessfully exercised the option to recover the entire amount in the first darkhast.
  2. Whether the decree-holder, having once elected to recover the whole amount, can subsequently seek to recover instalments due under the decree.

Arguments of the Parties

Mr. Justice Divatia's View

  • The decree-holder, by issuing a darkhast to recover the whole amount, made a conclusive election to treat the decree as one for immediate payment.
  • Once this election is made, the decree-holder cannot revert and recover instalments subsequently.

Mr. Justice Macklin's View

  • The unsuccessful first darkhast to recover the whole amount did not preclude the decree-holder from later recovering instalments.
  • Reliance was placed on a recent House of Lords decision, United Australia, Ltd. v. Barclays Bank, Ltd., to support this position.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
United Australia, Ltd. v. Barclays Bank, Ltd. (House of Lords) Distinction between choosing one of two alternative remedies versus choosing one of two inconsistent rights. The court observed that this case involved alternative remedies (contract and tort) where pursuing one remedy does not bar the other until judgment; thus, it was distinguished from the present case of inconsistent rights.
Scarf v. Jardine Recognition of alternative remedies available against different parties for the same debt. Illustrated that a plaintiff may pursue multiple remedies up to judgment, reinforcing the distinction from inconsistent rights requiring election.
Morel Brothers & Co., Limited v. Westmoreland (Earl of) Alternative remedies against a principal and an agent. Supported the principle that alternative remedies can be pursued concurrently until judgment, unlike inconsistent rights.
Landlord's Right to Forfeit Lease (Illustrative Case) Election between inconsistent rights: enforcing forfeiture or waiving it to maintain lease. Used as an analogy to demonstrate that election of one inconsistent right precludes later reliance on the other, even if no judgment is obtained.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the nature of the default clause, emphasizing that it grants the creditor two alternative and inconsistent rights upon default: either to recover the entire debt immediately or to continue recovering by instalments. The creditor cannot exercise both rights simultaneously. The issuance of a darkhast to recover the whole amount constitutes an unequivocal election to enforce the lump sum recovery right. The court distinguished this from cases involving alternative remedies, where a plaintiff may pursue multiple remedies until judgment is obtained. By analogy to landlord forfeiture cases, once an election is made to enforce one right, the creditor cannot retract and rely on the other. Therefore, after the decree-holder's election to recover the whole amount, the instalment decree ceased, and the decree-holder cannot later seek instalment recovery. The court agreed with Mr. Justice Divatia's position and rejected Mr. Justice Macklin's reliance on the House of Lords decision, clarifying the crucial distinction between alternative remedies and inconsistent rights.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED

The court held that the decree-holder's election to recover the entire amount in one lump sum terminated the instalment decree, precluding subsequent recovery of instalments. The appeal was dismissed with costs. This decision directly affects the parties by affirming the finality of the creditor's election and clarifying the legal effect of default clauses in instalment decrees. No new precedent beyond this case's immediate context was established.

Show all summary ...

Beaumont, C.J:—

This is a second appeal, which comes before me on a reference occasioned by a difference of opinion between Mr. Justice Divatia and Mr. Justice Macklin, raising this question:—

“Whether on the terms of the decree under execution the instalment decree came to an end after the decree-holder unsuccessfully exercised his option in the first darkhast to recover the whole amount?”

The facts giving rise to the question are these. On February 26, 1927, there was a decree for Rs. 1,850, payable by annual instalments of Rs. 300 each, the first instalment being due on May 31, 1927, and subsequent instalments on May 31 in succeeding years, and there was a default clause providing that if the defendants failed to pay duly any one instalment, the plaintiff should recover forthwith the whole of the remaining amount and further interest by sale of the mortgaged property at his pleasure. There was default in payment of the first instalment, and on July 1, 1939, the decree-holder issued a darkhast for recovery of the whole amount due on the decree. On June 2, 1933, that darkhast was disposed of for lack of bidders. On September 2, 1927, the present darkhast was issued for recovering payment of the instalments due under the decree during the three years preceding the date of the darkhast.

The question, which I am asked to decide, is, of course, relevant on the question of limitation. If the decree has become a decree for payment of the whole amount in one sum, then it is time-barred, and the darkhastdar is, therefore, endeavouring to treat the decree as still being an instalment decree, and to recover the instalments due within the preceding three years. Mr. Justice Divatia took the view that the decree-holder by issuing a darkhast to recover the whole amount had conclusively elected to treat the decree as a decree for immediate payment, and that he could not afterwards recede from that position, and seek to recover the instalments. Mr. Justice Macklin, on the other hand, held that as the previous darkhast for recovery of the whole amount had been infructuous, it did not debar the decree-holder from subsequently recovering the amount due by instalments.

It is well settled that a default clause of this nature is inserted for the benefit of the creditor, and that when default in payment of an instalment occurs, the creditor may either exercise his right to recover the whole amount, or may waive the operation of the default clause, and continue to recover the debt by instalments. But it is clear that he cannot have both rights together; they are alternative rights. If he is entitled to recover the amount in one lump sum, he is not entitled to recover annual instalments. On the other hand, if he is entitled to recover annual instalments, he is not entitled to recover the whole amount in one lump sum. In my opinion as soon as default occurs, the decree-holder has two alternative, and inconsistent, rights, and he must make up his mind which he is going to rest upon. Having in this case issued a darkhast to recover the whole amount, he has, in my view, unequivocally elected to stand on his right Tinder the decree to recover the whole amount in one sum, and he cannot afterwards go back on that election, and proceed to recover the amount in instalments. I, therefore, agree with the conclusion of Mr. Justice Divatia.

Mr. Justice Macklin relied upon a recent case in the House of Lords, United Australia, Ld. v. Barclays Bank, Ld. But I venture to think that the learned Judge has not observed the warning uttered by Lord Atkin in the course of his very learned and interesting judgment (p. 29):—

“It seems to me that in this respect it is essential to bear in mind the distinction between choosing one of two alternative remedies, and choosing one of two inconsistent rights.”

The House of Lords in that case was dealing with a case of two alternative remedies, one in contract and the other in tort, and it was held that the mere issue of a writ to enforce one remedy did not debar the plaintiff from proceeding on his other remedy. Nothing short of judgment on the one remedy would have that effect. There are other cases of alternative remedies, for instance, the well-known case of Scarf v. Jardine, where the plaintiff had a right to proceed against the partners in a firm on the true facts, and a alternative remedy against former partners in the firm for the same debt on estoppel: and the case of Morel Brothers & Co., Limited v. Westmoreland (Earl of) where the plaintiff had alternative remedies against a principal and an agent. In cases of that nature the plaintiff can pursue all or any of his remedies up to judgment. In general it is only on obtaining judgment on one remedy that the plaintiff loses the right to proceed on the other remedy. But where a man has two inconsistent rights, he must elect which of them he is going to rely on, and having elected to rely on one right, he is not allowed to retract his election. A good illustration of that principle is to be found in the case of a landlord who has a right under a lease to forfeit the lease. As soon as he has notice of an event which, occasions forfeiture, he has an option either to enforce the forfeiture, or to waive it and maintain the lease. It is well settled law that if, in such a case, the landlord issues a writ to recover possession, that amounts to an unequivocal election to enforce the forfeiture, and he cannot afterwards rely on the lease as subsisting. On the other hand, if he issues a writ to recover rent accrued due under the lease after he received notice of the act giving rise to the forfeiture, he waives the forfeiture, and cannot afterwards seek to enforce it. It is irrelevant in such a case that the action does not proceed to judgment. It seems to me that principle applies here. The decree was originally a decree for payment by annual instalments. As soon as default was made, the decree-holder was given two inconsistent rights; he could continue under the decree to recover the amount by instalments, or he could recover the whole amount at once; but he could not do both. He was bound to limit his darkhast to a principal sum either of Rs. 1,850 or Rs. 300. He had alternative right?, and the debtor was subject to alternative obligations. The creditor having elected to enforce his right to recover the whole debt in one lump sum, the future obligation of the debtor was fixed accordingly, and, in my opinion, it was not open to the creditor subsequently to turn round, and seek to enforce the decree as an instalment decree.

I, therefore, answer the question submitted to me in the affirmative.

The appeal is dismissed with costs in accordance with the opinion of the majority of the Judges.

Appeal dismissed.
J.G.R