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Emperor v. Saver Manual Dantes
Structured Summary of the Court's Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This reference arises under s. 432 of the Criminal Procedure Code from a Presidency Magistrate who asked the High Court to decide legal questions arising in a prosecution. On July 17, 1939, the Government of Bombay issued a Notification under s. 14B(2) of the Bombay Abkari Act, 1878, prohibiting, in substance, possession of specified intoxicants in the Town and Island of Bombay without a permit or license. On April 11, 1940, a Full Bench of this Court held that the said Notification (dated July 17, 1939) was “ultra vires and of no effect” on the basis that under s.14B the Government could not prohibit possession by the public generally. On the same day (after the decision had been pronounced), the Governor (legislative authority) enacted Bombay Act VI of 1940 (the Amending Act), which amended s.14B and included ss. 6 and 7; s.7 purported to validate certain prior rules, orders and notifications under the Abkari Act as amended. On April 19, 1940, the accused in the Magistrate's court was found at Dadar Station in possession of a bottle of country liquor (less than the s.14B(1) limit) and was charged under s.43(1)(a) of the Bombay Abkari Act for contravening the July 17, 1939 Notification. The learned Magistrate referred two questions: (1) Whether the Provincial Legislature has power under item 31, List II, Sch. VII of the Government of India Act, 1935, to enact a policy of total prohibition or whether sections of Bombay Act VI of 1940 are intra vires; (2) If the first is answered affirmatively, whether Notification No. 374/39(c) (July 17, 1939), declared ultra vires by the High Court, is in force by virtue of s.7 of Bombay Act VI of 1940.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Provincial Legislature (Bombay) has power under item No. 31, List II of Schedule VII of the Government of India Act, 1935, or otherwise, to enact a policy of total prohibition in the Province or certain areas thereof, and whether sections of Bombay Act VI of 1940 (notably s.3 and s.6(b) amending s.14B) are intra vires with regard to total prohibition of possession of liquor and intoxicating drugs.
- If the Provincial Legislature has such power, whether Notification No. 374/39(c) dated July 17, 1939 (declared ultra vires by the High Court) is to be considered in force by virtue of s.7 of Bombay Act VI of 1940 (i.e., whether s.7 revived or deemed the notification to have been issued under the Amending Act).
Arguments of the Parties
Advocate General / Government (as presented in the opinion)
- The Provincial legislature can amend the Act and treat the prior notification as having been issued under the amending Act; the notification can be deemed to have been issued under the amended statute.
- The Amending Act (Abkari Amendment Act, 1940 / Bombay Act VI of 1940) falls within the Provincial legislative competence under item No. 31 (intoxicating liquors) of List II; regulation of possession is within Provincial power even if it indirectly affects import/export.
- Section 7 of the Amending Act is divided into three parts and validates prior rules/orders/notifications as if issued under the amended Act; therefore notifications issued earlier should be deemed issued under the Act as amended.
- The notification in question only prohibits possession without a license/permit and does not directly legislate on import/export across customs frontiers; any incidental effect on import/export does not render it beyond Provincial competence.
- Cited authorities (e.g., Citizens Insurance v. Parsons; Attorney-General of Manitoba v. Manitoba License Holders' Association; Lemm v. Mitchell; Shantiniketan Co-operative Housing Society v. Madhavlal) to support the construction that legislation should be characterized by its pith and substance and that incidental effects do not defeat competence.
Counsel for the Accused (Sir Jamshedji Kanga)
- Provincial powers are circumscribed; neither item 31 nor any section of the Government of India Act authorizes total prohibition extinguishing the liquor trade — at most they allow regulation/control of manufacture, possession, transport and sale.
- The right to possess liquor is a common-law right; Provincial Legislatures were not intended to have power to prohibit absolute possession by the public generally.
- The word “possession” in item 31 must be read positively (control/regulation), not as including a power of absolute prohibition; “that is to say” and the items listed indicate regulatory powers (manufacture, sale, etc.) rather than total prohibition.
- The Amending Act (especially s.6 and the preamble amendment by s.3) went beyond regulating possession and had the effect of restricting import/export — thereby infringing item No.19 of List I (Federal), and indirectly sterilizing Central Government power.
- Section 7 does not revive a notification already declared void by the High Court; a notification declared illegal is a nullity and cannot be retroactively revived to create criminal liability where none existed when acts were done.
M.C. Setalvad (Reply for Government)
- “Possession” in item 31 should be read in its full sense and not given a restrictive meaning; List II does not use the word “control” and thus supports broad Provincial competence.
- There is nothing in the operative parts of the Amending Act that expressly deals with export/import, and the preamble is not operative law; s.297 of the Government of India Act does not prohibit the Provincial Government from legislating as to possession.
- The true test is the pith and substance of the legislation; even if import/export may be incidentally affected, that does not necessarily amount to legislation on a Federal subject.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court (as recorded in the opinion) |
|---|---|---|
| Citizens Insurance Company of Canada v. Parsons; Queen Insurance Company v. Parsons | Used to illustrate the test for construction of legislative entries — determine whether legislation falls within a particular item or conflicts with another list (pith and substance test). | The cases were referred to by counsel to support Provincial competence to legislate on possession; the Court considered the pith and substance approach in assessing whether entries could be reconciled. |
| Attorney-General of Manitoba v. Manitoba Licence Holders' Association (Attorney-General of Manitoba v. Manitoba License Holders) | Authority on harmonizing Federal and Provincial legislative entries and on whether incidental effects on Federal subjects defeat provincial legislation. | The Advocate General relied on it to contend incidental effects do not deprive Provincial power; the Court considered it and noted it supports the proposition that incidental prejudice to federal revenue does not automatically invalidate provincial legislation but emphasized limits where provincial law would destroy federal rights. |
| Lemm v. Mitchell | Cited on retrospective effect and the possibility of validating prior acts/notifications by subsequent legislation. | Government cited it to support s.7's retrospective deeming; the accused's counsel argued the case was distinguishable. The Court noted such authorities but concluded s.7 did not revive a notification already declared a nullity. |
| Shantiniketan Co-operative Housing Society v. Madhavlal | Cited by Government for principle that legislature can give retrospective effect under express words; cited by other side as distinguishable. | The Court recorded the references; it accepted the general principle that legislation can, by express words, have retrospective effect, but held s.7 did not operate to revive the nullified notification. |
| Sheth Chinubhai Lalbhai (Original Accused) v. Emperor (Special Bench ruling) | Prior Full Bench authority held Abkari Act was not intended to introduce total prohibition; cited as previous decision on s.14B. | Counsel for the accused relied on that Special Bench ruling to show prior understanding of the Act; the Amending Act was passed after that decision and the Court treated that decision as material background to legislative intent but focused on whether s.7 revived the nullified notification. |
| Great West Saddlery Co. v. The King | Principle: one cannot do indirectly what one cannot do directly (used to argue against indirect usurpation of Federal power). | Counsel for the accused relied on it to argue s.6 indirectly sterilized Central power; the Court considered the point when discussing limits of Provincial power and indirect effects on import/export. |
| Atiqa Begam v. Abdul Maghni | Cited regarding limits on reviving or validating acts/notifications previously declared illegal. | Counsel for the accused cited it to support the proposition that a notification declared illegal could not be revived; the Court accepted the principle that a nullity cannot be revived by ambiguous deeming language in s.7. |
| Sir Byramjee Jeejeebhoy v. Province of Bombay | Authority cited on the construction of legislative entries and provincial powers (as recorded by counsel). | Cited by counsel in support of arguments about the scope of provincial powers; the Court recorded the citation while addressing the pith and substance and reconciliation of lists. |
| Municipal Corporation of City of Toronto v. Virgo | Cited by counsel in support of interpretive approaches to legislative powers (as recorded). | Recorded by the Court as one of the authorities referred to; used in argument about construction of entries but not relied upon as determinative in the Court's holding on s.7. |
| Bank of Toronto v. Lambe | Referenced in discussion of characterizing the true nature and character (pith and substance) of the legislation. | Counsel referred to it when arguing the object and main provisions should determine whether legislation deals with Federal subject; Court applied the pith and substance analysis in its reasoning. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court confined itself primarily to the second question — whether the July 17, 1939 Notification was in existence and effective by virtue of s.7 of the Amending Act — because the accused's charge relied solely on that Notification and not on the Abkari Act provisions directly.
The Court addressed two objections to the Notification as follows:
-
Construction of s.7 of the Amending Act:
- The Court applied the strong interpretive presumption against retrospective legislation that criminalizes previously lawful conduct, quoting Maxwell's observation that making an act illegal retroactively "manifestsly shocks one's sense of justice".
- It interpreted s.7 to include only notifications effective at the date of passing of the Amending Act (i.e., notifications that were in force on that date), and not notifications that had been rescinded or declared invalid prior to the Amending Act.
- The preamble of the Amending Act, which recited that it was expedient to remove doubts as to the validity of certain notifications, supported the Court's interpretation: there was no doubt about the validity of the July 17, 1939 Notification because it had already been declared invalid by the High Court.
- Conclusion on this point: s.7 does not embrace the July 17, 1939 Notification; it does not operate to revive a notification that was a nullity when the Amending Act was passed.
-
If s.7 did apply, whether it revives the Notification:
- The Court held that even if s.7 were applied to the Notification, the section does not operate to revive a nullity. The Amending Act merely deems prior notifications to have been issued under the Act as amended, but does not re-enact or re-issue a notification that had been declared of no effect.
- The Court explained that a judicial order declaring invalidity remains valid as an adjudication of law unless and until the legislature expressly enacts that the order is to be disregarded; the legislature could have expressly enacted that the disputed notification should be treated as still in force, but it did not do so.
- Therefore the most s.7 could do (if it applied) was to challenge the legal grounds on which the Notification was held invalid; it could not convert a nullity into a valid source of criminal liability.
The Court added an obiter (non-decisional) discussion because parties had argued the broader constitutional competence issue:
- On the scope of Provincial legislative power under item 31 (List II) and s.100 of the Government of India Act, 1935, the Court acknowledged that item 31 includes matters such as production, manufacture, possession, transport, purchase and sale of intoxicating liquors; the Court reasoned that a power to legislate about possession necessarily can include a power to prohibit possession.
- However, the Court emphasized that Provincial power is qualified by the Central Government's power under item 19 of List I (import/export across customs frontiers). The Court referenced a Federal notification (April 1, 1937) that defined customs frontiers to include the sea frontier of Bombay, making import/export across that frontier a Central subject.
- The Court applied the principle that where items in List I and List II appear to conflict, courts must attempt reconciliation before applying the supremacy clause; it concluded that the Provincial legislature cannot exercise its possession-regulating power in a way that encroaches on the Central right to import/export across customs frontiers.
- Applying that principle to the July 17, 1939 Notification (assuming it were treated as in force under the Amending Act), the Court observed that a prohibition preventing anyone in Bombay from possessing intoxicants would make import/export across the sea frontier impossible without breaching the law or securing a license the Provincial Government might refuse. Hence such absolute prohibition would go beyond Provincial competence and indirectly destroy Central rights.
- Thus, even on the hypothetical that s.7 revived the Notification, the Court concluded (obiter) that the Notification would be invalid because it would encroach upon Central legislative powers in respect of import/export.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
There is no effective Notification under s. 14B(2) of the Bombay Abkari Act, 1878, prohibiting the possession of intoxicants by persons generally in the City of Bombay.
Implications (direct consequences and scope):
- Direct effect on the accused and the prosecution: No one can be validly convicted under the July 17, 1939 Notification because it was declared by this Court to be of no effect and was not revived by s.7 of the Amending Act. The specific prosecution before the Magistrate, which depends on that Notification, cannot succeed on that basis.
- On legislative validation: The Court found that s.7 of the Amending Act did not operate to reinstate or revive a notification that had already been declared a nullity; a mere deeming that a notification was issued under an amended Act does not make substantive past nullities into valid law for criminal prosecution.
- Obiter (non-binding) guidance on constitutional limits: The Court indicated that Provincial power to legislate regarding possession may include prohibition in principle, but such power is qualified and must not be exercised in a manner that destroys or unduly encroaches upon the Central Government's power over import and export across customs frontiers (List I, item 19). The court stated that an absolute prohibition that made import/export across the principal port impossible would be invalid as exceeding Provincial competence.
- No new binding precedent on all aspects: The Court limited its decision to the legal effect of s.7 and the specific notification; its broader remarks about Provincial competence and the inadmissibility of encroaching on Central powers are expressly obiter (the Court said those views are not part of the decision and should be considered only as obiter observations).
Answered accordingly.
Signed: Beaumont, C.J. (judgment delivered). J.G.R (initials as in the opinion).
[Wadia, J.:—
It is not a subsisting notification, and Government has not re-issued notification under the new Act.]
We submit that it would be competent for the legislature to amend the Act and say that the prior notification is good. The notification is deemed to have been issued under the amending Act and it is a notification under a new Act. The first notification affected persons who committed offences under the old notification. Cases against certain persons who were charged before the High Court decision were withdrawn after the High Court decision declaring the notification as ultra vires. Under the new Act only those persons are charged who committed offences after April 11, 1940.
[Beaumont C.J: Can legislature override the decision of the High Court declaring the notification as ultra vires.]
We submit that it can. In this case no question of vested rights under the High Court decision arises. Where a right is vested by a judgment, it cannot be taken away unless the Statute expressly provides to that effect. Here the offence was committed on April 19, 1940, and no question of vesting of any right arises and therefore that principle has no application to the present case.
Dealing with the first question we submit that question really does not arise. The point which arises actually for consideration can be thus put up “whether Government is empowered to prohibit possession of intoxicants by an individual or a class or body of individuals or public generally”.
We have to consider the legislative powers under Government of India Act, 1935. Section 99 deals with the extent of Federal and Provincial Laws. Section 100 has reference to the subject matter of Federal and Provincial Laws. Section 104 deals with the residual powers of legislation, and s. 107 deals with cases where there is inconsistency between Federal, Provincial or State Laws. Schedule VII deals with Legislative Lists under ss. 100 and 104 and item No. 31 of Provincial Legislative List II deals with intoxicating liquors. Provincial Government is empowered to deal with the possession of liquors under item No. 31. The Provincial Government can legislate regarding possession of liquor, hence they are entitled to prohibit possession of liquor though it may have the effect of affecting to a certain extent the export and import of liquor in the Province.
[Beaumont C.J: Provincial Government cannot deal with export and import across customs frontiers, which is a matter for Federal Government under item 19 of List I.]
We submit that under the Abkari Amendment Act, 1940, as enacted there is no section which deals with export or import. The legislation is within the allotted field of item 31. There is nothing in the impugned Act which in any way overrides item 19 of List I. If the power to legislate is there, it is immaterial what may be the ultimate consequences; even if the effect be to prevent import or export it cannot be said that the Act was in any way legislation in respect to import or export.
Regarding the construction of entries, the first principle of constitutional law is to give effect to the words of the Act as they stand. Under the Canadian Act the test laid down is to see whether legislation falls within the particular item, or whether it falls within the other list or whether there is any conflict.
Counsel referred to Citizens Insurance Company of Canada v. Parsons: Queen Insurance Company v. Parsons, and Attorney General of Manitoba v. Manitoba License Holders' Association.(2) It was therefore submitted that the Governor was entitled to legislate regarding the possession of liquor, and the Act in no way conflicted with the power of Central Legislature because the Act was not a law in respect of export or import. The pith of legislation is to regulate possession and nothing more, though it may affect export or import either intra-provincially or across the customs frontiers. The test is to look at the Act as it stands. Further crucial question is whether the notification is bad. For this we must have reference to s. 7 of the Act. It is said that the notification being declared ultra vires by the High Court Special Bench decision, it cannot be revived by a new Act, and secondly it is bad as it infringes item No. 19 in List I by reason of its absolutely prohibiting possession of liquor.
We submit that s. 7 is divided into three parts: First part states that amendment in the preamble and provisions of the Act shall have effect from the date preamble and provisions were originally enacted. Second part says that rule, order or notifications issued under the old Act, shall be deemed to have been issued under the Act as amended by the new Act and third states that no prosecution, suit or other legal proceeding shall lie against any one for anything done in good faith.
The amended Act is passed on April 11, 1940, and notification came into effect after the Act was amended. No question of retrospective effect arises in this case because the cases which were pending under the old Act were withdrawn soon after the old notification was declared to be ultra vires by the High Court decision. Further, we submit that there is no warrant for saying that the notification being pronounced ultra vires by the Special Bench decision it cannot be revived. If the legislative powers are full, it is competent to reinstate the notification, though subject to this that it cannot override the vested rights. But no such question arises in the present case. The principle of law is that you can even give a retrospective effect to an enactment and retract the previously vested right though that must be done by express words. The notification here was promulgated and that promulgation made to the public shall be deemed to have been made under the Act. Counsel referred to Lemm v. Mitchell and Shantiniketan Co-operative Housing Society v. Madhavlal.
Secondly, it is said that the notification is bad as it infringes item No. 19. The test here to be applied is the same as in the case of a construction of a statute. The point to be considered is whether notification did at all purport to legislate on item No. 19. We submit it did not. All that the notification prohibits is the possession of liquor without the license or permit. There is nothing in the notification which infringes on export or import across the customs frontiers. License or permit is only in respect of possession.
As regards s. 297 of the Government of India Act, 1935, we submit that under sub-s. (1) the powers of Provincial Government are restricted as to entries relating to trade or commerce and as to the production, supply and distribution of commodity under items Nos. 27-29 of List II, but that is done with the object of providing free intra-provincial trade. This section in no way prohibits legislation regarding the restriction to be placed on the possession of liquor.
Sir Jamshedji Kanga for the accused:—We submit that Provincial Government's powers are circumscribed and until powers are given to them by the Statute they cannot legislate. Neither item 31 in List II nor any section of the Government of India Act give power to the Provincial Government to legislate for total prohibition as distinguished from regulating and controlling possession, manufacture, production, transport and sale of liquor. They have no power to extinguish the trade of liquor by passing any Act involving total prohibition. It is common law right to drink liquor. In America it is called fundamental right. It was never the intention of Imperial Legislature to give power to a Province to prohibit absolute possession of liquor by the public in general. That was quite clear from one fact that a Provincial Legislature has no power to restrict import and export of liquors.
In item 31 the word “Prohibition” is not used. The word ‘possession’ must be read in the positive sense and does not mean ‘no possession’ or absolute prohibition of possession. The words “that is to say” are also significant. The item could only mean that possession can be controlled or regulated. This item 31 must be read subject to item 19 of the List I of the VII Schedule under which the Federal or Central Government alone has power to legislate in respect of import or export of goods which by reason of the definition includes liquors across the customs frontiers. Further the Provincial Government has no power to legislate even in respect of export or import of commodities from one Province to another having regard to s. 331, sub-cl. (2) and s. 297(1) and items 27 and 29 of the Provincial List.
Under the impunged Act even common carriers and warehousemen are prohibited from possessing liquor. That clearly shows that the Act has placed restrictions on import and export of liquor. The possession of liquor following import and preceding export cannot be taken away under item 31 and yet the Act has attempted to do that.
The only possible items by which export and import can be controlled in Provinces are items Nos. 27 and 29 in List II. The Parliament intended that between Provinces there should be free trade and therefore it enacted s. 297(1) by which Provincial Governments are restricted from making any law restricting or prohibiting the entry into or export from the Province of goods of any class or description and this would include intoxicant liquors. Item No. 14 was referred to and it was contended that the Provincial Government would have the right to prohibit totally certain things on the ground of public health. We submit that item No. 14 has no bearing on the point in question in the present case.
The amendment in the preamble of the impugned Act by s. (3) is also ultra vires. The Government were fully aware that Abkari Act was never intended to be a measure for introducing total prohibition. It was so held by the last Special Bench ruling in Sheth Chinubhai Lalbhai…(Original Accused), v. Emperor*. The amendment has the effect of prohibiting import and export of liquor across the customs frontiers, as well as intra-provincially. It is incorrect to say that the present legislation is merely intended for restricting possession. It has the immediate and direct effect of restricting export and import and thus infringes item No. 19 in the Federal List. The principle of law is that you cannot do indirectly what you cannot do directly. It sterilizes the power of Central Government which alone has the right to legislate on it, as was said in Great West Saddlery Co. v. The King. We submit that s. 107 has no application to the present case. It only points out that where there are two Acts affecting Central and Provincial subjects, the law passed by the Central Legislature will prevail. We are considering here the items in different lists and no question of any conflict arises. Citizens Insurance Company of Canada v. Parsons: Queen Insurance Company v. Parsons, Attorney-General of Manitoba v. Manitoba License Holders' Association, and Lemm v. Mitchell(3) which were relied on by the Advocate General are not applicable to the present case. On facts these cases are clearly distinguishable.
We further submit that s. 6 of the Act which totally prohibited the possession of liquor by the public generally was illegal and ultra vires. It has the effect of sterilizing the power of the Central Government regarding export and import across the customs frontiers. Even the Special Bench Case held that there could be no prohibition in respect of the public generally and the Abkari Act was not intended for that purpose. Still they legislate and say that they can introduce total prohibition under the Act.
From the use of the words “that is to say” and the words “Manufacture, sale, etc.” in item No. 31, it is apparent that only the power of regulating and control in respect of intoxicants is given to the Provincial Legislature and not absolute prohibition. The Devolution Rules under the previous Government of India Act support this view. The words used there are “control of”. It was realised that these were not appropriate words and therefore in present Act these words are taken out because what was intended by the Legislature was apparent in the language that was being used. Counsel referred to Sir Byramjee Jeejeebhoy v. Province of Bombay(4) and Municipal Corporation of City of Toronto v. Virgo.(5)
Assuming that the powers are good we submit that the notification is clearly bad as it infringes item No. 19 in the Federal List. Under s. 7 of the impugned act the notification must be read as of the date when it had been passed, that is July 17, 1939, and not as of the date when the Act was passed, i.e April 11, 1940. In any event, that notification of July 17, 1939, had not been revived by the impugned Act nor is it even referred to in s. 7. That section had provided for the validation only of such orders and notifications which at that date, viz. April 11, 1940, Were in existence and did not include the notification in question, which, after having been declared to be of no effect by the High Court, was a nullity and non-existent. Further, a notification which had been declared to be illegal and of no effect could not be revived because the effect of such revival would be to make an Act which was perfectly innocent at the time a criminal Act. It was not competent to the Provincial Legislature to pass ex-post-facto legislation making an innocent Act a criminal one as it has been done by the notification in question. Legislature cannot by passing an enactment in loose words revive that notification. Counsel referred to Atiqa Begam v. Abdul Maghni and also pointed out that the decision in Shantiniketan Co-operative Housing Society v. Madhavlal and Lemm v. Mitchell relied on by the Advocate General were distinguishable.
M.C Setalvad, in reply: In dealing with the validity of the Act, we submit that full effect should be given to word “possession” used in item No. 31 of List II, Schedule VII. It should be read in its full sense and should not be given restrictive meaning. There is nothing to show that mere control of “manufacture, possession and sale of intoxicating drugs” was meant by Legislature. There is no word “control” used in the List II. It was mainly contended that the Act infringed on two things: (1) it infringed on the power given to Central Legislature by item No. 19; (2) intra-provincial import or export of liquor was restricted by total prohibition. Regarding the latter, we submit, that there is nothing in item No. 31 regarding export or import from one province to another. The powers to legislate in regard to possession is not restricted by the provisions of s. 297 of the Government of India Act, 1935. That section does not apply in the present case as the prohibition of import or export from the Province by the Provincial Government was not attempted to be done under items Nos. 27 and 29 of the Provincial List and as a matter of fact the Abkari Amendment Act made no mention of export or import either across the customs frontiers or even intra-provincially.
[Beaumont C.J In s. 3 which provided for the amendment of the preamble to the Abkari Act, the words “export or import of liquor” have been used.]
Preamble is not a law. There is nothing in the operative part of the sections regarding export or import. There is no provision in the Act which comes into conflict with the Federal List. Further, we submit that it is competent under various entries to prohibit export or import intra-provincially, subject only to the limitation contained by s. 297(1) e.g for public health, Government can under item No. 14 prohibit import of certain articles of food or in times of famine they can restrict export of fodder.
Dealing with the question whether item No. 19 in Federal List is infringed, we submit that the question must depend on the consideration whether the Act was a legislation on item No. 19 in List I. The Court has to examine the subject-matter of legislation. The true nature and character of legislation is to be determined with regard to its main provisions: Russell v. The Queen. The question is whether it is a legislation with reference to export or import across customs frontiers. We submit it is not. Entry No. 19 in List I is regarding export or import of all commodities. The object of the Act is to restrict possession of liquor by any individual or public generally, and though the effect of the Act may be that to some extent, export or import of liquor may be affected, it is immaterial. There is no conflict of entries. The question of harmonizing entries can arise only when there is a conflict of entries in the Federal and Provincial Lists. Regulation of possession is controlled by the permits granted. From the fact that the license may not be issued or a permit may not be granted, it cannot be said that the import is restricted. It cannot be said that entry No. 19 is undermined by the passing of the impugned Act. Counsel referred to Bank of Toronto v. Lambe.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Beaumont, C.J:—This is a reference made by the Presidency Magistrate, 4th Court, under s. 432 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which entitles him to refer any question of law arising in the hearing of a case before him. The facts giving rise to the reference are as follows.
On July 17, 1939, the Government of Bombay issued a Notification under sub-s. (2) of s. 14B of the Bombay Abkari Act, 1878, prohibiting the possession by any person in the area specified, which was in substance the Town and Island of Bombay, without a permit or a license issued by an Abkari Officer, of any intoxicant specified in the schedule thereto in excess of the amount therein mentioned. On April 11, 1940, a full bench of this Court held that the said Notification was “ultra vires and of no effect”, the basis of the decision being that under s. 14B of the Bombay Abkari Act Government could not prohibit the possession of intoxicants by the public generally. On the same day, but after the Court's decision had been pronounced, the Governor of Bombay, being the then legislative authority in Bombay, passed Bombay Act VI of 1940 amending the Bombay Abkari Act. The material sections of that Act, which we will refer to as “the Amending Act”, are ss. 6 and 7. Section 6 amends s. 14B of the Bombay Abkari Act, and in order to appreciate the amendment it is necessary to state the terms of s. 14B, which were as follows:
“(1) No person not being a licensed manufacturer or vendor of any intoxicant or hemp and no licensed vendor except as authorised by his license shall have in his possession any quantity of any intoxicant or hemp in excess of such limit as the Provincial Government under section 17 may declare to be the limit of retail sale, except under a permit from the Collector:
provided that nothing in sub-section (1) shall extend to any foreign liquor, other than denatured spirit, in the possession of any common carrier or warehouseman as such, or purchased by any person for his bona fide private consumption and not for sale.
“(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) the Provincial Government may by notification in the Official Gazette prohibit the possession by any person or class of persons, either throughout the whole Presidency or in any local area, of any intoxicant, either absolutely or subject to such conditions as it may prescribe.”
By s. 6 of the Amending Act the proviso to sub-s. (1) was deleted. One object of the proviso would seem to have been to facilitate import and export into and from the Port of Bombay by enabling warehouse-keepers and railway companies on the docks to possess any quantity of foreign liquor, and it is difficult to see what object the Legislature had in deleting the proviso except to destroy, or at any rate render very difficult, import and export into and from the Port of Bombay. Then sub-s. (2) of s. 14B was amended by enabling the Prohibition to extend to “any individual or a class or body of individuals or the public generally”, thus removing, in the case of notifications issued under the Amending Act, the ground upon which this Court had held the Notification of July 17, 1939, to be invalid.
Section 7 of the Amending Act provided that the amendments to the preamble and the provisions of the Act should have effect from the date on which the said preamble and the said provisions were respectively enacted, and then proceeds in these terms: “and any rule, order or notification made or issued under the said Act” (i.e the Abkari Act) “before the commencement of this Act shall be deemed to have been made or issued under the said Act as amended by this Act.”
On April 19, 1940, the accused in the case before the learned Magistrate giving rise to this reference arrived at Dadar Station on the B.B & C.I Railway and was found to be in possession of a bottle of country liquor containing admittedly less than the limit fixed by the Provincial Government under s. 14B(1) of the Bombay Abkari Act. He was charged under s. 43(1)(a) of the Bombay Abkari Act with being in possession of an intoxicant in contravention of a rule or order made under the Act. The only order which he is alleged to have broken is that contained in the said Notification of July 17, 1939, and the learned Magistrate has submitted to this Court the two following questions:
First Question: (a) Has the Provincial Legislature power, under item 31 of List II of the 7th Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, or otherwise, to pass a law of which the object is to introduce a Policy of total Prohibition in the Province of Bombay or in certain areas thereof; and (b) whether section 3 and section 6(b) of Bombay Act VI of 1940 are intra vires, in particular with regard to total prohibition of possession of liquor and of intoxicating drugs.
Second Question: In the event of the first question being answered in the affirmative, whether there is in existence any effective Notification under section 14B(2) of the Bombay Abkari Act, 1878, absolutely prohibiting the possession of intoxicants by persons generally in the City of Bombay; in other words, whether Notification No. 374/39/(c), dated July 17, 1939, which was declared by the High Court to be ultra vires and of no effect, is to be considered as in force by virtue of section 7 of the Bombay Act VI of 1940.
In our view the first question does not really arise in connection with the prosecution. It is admitted that the accused has not infringed any provision of the Abkari Act; he is alleged to have infringed the provisions of the said Notification of July 17, 1939, and the only question, therefore, which arises, is whether that Notification is valid and in force. No doubt the notification might be invalid by reason either of a defect in the Notification itself or of some invalidity in the Act under which it was passed, but it is only in that indirect sense that the validity of the Act can be called in question. We propose, therefore, to confine ourselves to the second question.
Two objections are taken to the Notification itself: first, that it does not fall within the ambit of s. 7 of the Amending Act, and, secondly, that, if it does so fall, the Notification having been declared by this Court to be of no effect, the accused cannot be convicted under it.
The first point is one of construction of the Amending Act, and in dealing with it we have to bear in mind the rule that the Court leans strongly against a construction which gives to an Act retrospective action because, as stated in Maxwell's “Interpretation of Statutes”, 8th Edn., p. 5, “it manifestly shocks one's sense of justice that an act legal at the time of doing it, shall be made unlawful by some new enactment”. If the Notification in question falls within the scope of s. 7, it would render illegal acts committed before the Act was passed and which were legal when committed. The present accused no doubt does not fall within that category, but others might. In our opinion s. 7 of the Amending Act does not embrace the Notification of July 17, 1939. We think that the only notifications which fall within the section are notifications effective at the date of the passing of the Amending Act. We cannot suppose that the section was intended to affect the construction of notifications already rescinded, still less of a notification which had been declared invalid, and therefore had never had any effect, and was a mere nullity. This view is supported by the preamble to the Amending Act, which recites that it is expedient to amend the Abkari Act so as to remove doubts as to the validity of certain notifications issued under the Act; there was no doubt whatever about the validity of the Notification of July 17, 1939, since it had been declared invalid. In our view, therefore, s. 7 of the Act does not apply to the Notification in question.
Upon the second point, if s. 7 does apply to the Notification in question, it has not, in our opinion, the effect of reviving that Notification. It was argued by the learned Advocate General that the declaration of this Court having been made in favour of another accused, the present accused cannot take advantage of it, since the judgment of this Court is not a judgment in rem within s. 41 of the Indian Evidence Act. But the Notification having been held by this Court to be invalid, it is invalid according to the law in force in this Province, and everybody can act upon that view of the law. There having been no appeal from the decision of this Court, the only manner in which the law as declared by this Court could be altered would be by an Act of the legislature. The legislature could no doubt have enacted that notwithstanding the decision of this Court the Notification in question should be treated as being still in force, and as having been issued under the original Act as amended. But the legislature has not done that. All it has done is to say that the Notification shall be deemed to have been issued under the Bombay Abkari Act as amended. That is to say, the original Notification is not revived, or deemed to have been passed on a different date to that on which it was passed; it is merely deemed to have been passed under a law different from that which in fact existed at its date. Such a provision cannot revive a Notification which is a nullity; the most it can do is to challenge the grounds on which the Notification was held to be invalid. But an order of the Court is valid, although the reasons upon which it is based no longer apply; there may well be other grounds of invalidity. In our opinion, the Notification in question having been held by this Court to be of no effect, and not having been revived, no one can be convicted under it.
That really disposes of the whole reference. But as the question as to the validity of the Notification, on the assumption that it has been revived and is to be treated as passed under the original Act as amended by the Amending Act, has been argued, and as the learned Advocate General has asked us to indicate our views upon the subject, we proceed to do so. But it must be understood that our views on this point are not intended to form part of our decision, and must be regarded as obiter only.
The learned Magistrate expressed the view that the Provincial Legislature had no power to prohibit the possession of intoxicants in this Province, and that view has been pressed upon us by Sir Jamshedji Kanga for the accused. The right of the Provincial Legislature to legislate on the subject is derived from s. 100 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and item No. 31 in List II of the 7th Schedule. The effect of those provisions is to enable the Provincial Legislature, subject to the light of the Central Legislature to make laws in respect of the matters enumerated in List I, to make laws relating to intoxicating liquors and narcotic drugs, that is to say (in the words of item No. 31), the production, manufacture, possession, transport, purchase and sale of intoxicating liquors, opium and other narcotic drugs. The learned Magistrate was of opinion that the words of item No. 31 have a positive import and do not cover prohibition. The argument is that the Provincial Government is given control of the matters enumerated in item No. 31, and that prohibition destroys the subject-matter of control. We are not in agreement with that view. It seems to us clear that a right to legislate as to possession of intoxicating liquors must necessarily involve a right to prohibit possession. We have not in fact to deal with total Prohibition, because the Notification now in question does not prohibit possession throughout the whole Province; it only enforces Prohibition within the Town and Island of Bombay. We see no reason to doubt that the Provincial Legislature has power so to limit possession, provided that in so doing it does not encroach upon the legislative powers of the Central Legislature. Now, under item No. 19 of List I of the 7th Schedule, which contains the subjects on which the Central Government can legislate, is included “import and export across customs frontiers as defined by the Federal Government”. By a Notification of April 1, 1937, the Federal Government for the purpose of item No. 19 in List I has defined the “customs frontier” as “the frontier, whether one or more than one, whether sea or land, whether exterior or interior, of British India”. It is, therefore, clear in our view that the Central Legislature is the authority to legislate in respect of import and export of intoxicants across the sea frontier of Bombay, and the powers of the Provincial Legislature under item No. 31 in List II must be exercised subject to this right of the Central Legislature. It is settled that in cases of conflict between the items in List I and List II it is the duty of the Court to endeavour to reconcile those items before having recourse to the non-obstante clause under which the powers of the Central Legislature must prevail in the event of an irreconcilable conflict. We see no difficulty in reconciling the two items now in question by holding that the Provincial Legislature has no power to legislate in respect of possession of intoxicants in such a way as to encroach upon the right to import and export across the customs frontiers. No question arises in this case as to the validity of the prohibition contained in s. 14B(1) of the Bombay Abkari Act, because admittedly the accused did not fall within such prohibition, though it is obvious that section makes it virtually impossible to import or export intoxicants without obtaining a license from the Provincial Government which may or may not be granted.
Turning to s. 14B(2) as amended, the power to prohibit any individual or a class or body of individuals or the public generally from possessing intoxicants would seem to us to be valid, but the power must not be exercised so as to encroach upon the rights of the Central Government. The Notification of July 17, 1939, if effective, in prohibiting possession by any person in Bombay, would in our view render import and export across the sea frontier of Bombay impossible without breaking the law or obtaining a license which the Provincial Government is under no obligation to grant. It is impossible to land goods on the docks of Bombay, if no one in Bombay is entitled to be in possession of such goods. The learned Advocate General has contended strenuously that the Amending Act does not deal, or purport to deal, with import and export across customs frontiers, and the mere fact that one consequence of the Act may be to discourage, or even prevent, such import and export does not deprive the Provincial Legislature of the power conferred upon it by the Government of India Act, and he relies on Attorney-General of Manitoba v. Manitoba Licence Holders' Association. No doubt any legislation which restricts possession or consumption of intoxicants is likely to have a prejudicial effect upon the customs revenue of the Central Government, and we agree that fact would not prevent the Provincial Government from exercising the power conferred upon it by item No. 31. But, as we have pointed out, the power of the Provincial Government to legislate as to possession is a qualified, and not an absolute power; it is subject to the rights of the Central Government. The absolute prohibition against possession goes much further than merely incidentally diminishing the revenue of the Central Government; it destroys, indirectly no doubt but none the less effectively, the right to import and export intoxicants across the sea frontier of Bombay; and Bombay is the principal port of British India.
If, therefore, we were at liberty to consider the validity of the Notification of July 17, 1939, on the basis that it is still in force and was passed under the Abkari Act as amended by the Amending Act, we should still be of opinion that the Notification was invalid, because it goes beyond the powers of the Provincial Legislature.
We answer the questions propounded by the learned Magistrate by saying that in our opinion there is not in existence any effective Notification under s. 14B(2) of the Bombay Abkari Act, 1878, prohibiting the possession of intoxicants by persons generally in the City of Bombay.
Answered accordingly.
J.G.R
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