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Ambedas Kashibhai Amin v. Vadilal Chhaganlal Choksey

Bombay High Court
Feb 5, 1940
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from a revision application challenging the refusal by the First Class Subordinate Judge of Thana to permit Mr. Purohit, an advocate enrolled on the Original Side of the High Court, to plead in the Subordinate Court without filing a Vakalatnama as required under Order III, Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Code. Mr. Purohit filed a memorandum of appearance under sub-rule (5) of the same rule, but the learned Judge rejected it without providing reasons. The revision application seeks to overturn this refusal and clarify the applicability of procedural requirements to advocates enrolled on the Original Side appearing in mofussil courts.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an advocate enrolled on the Original Side of the High Court is required to file a Vakalatnama or any written authority to appear and plead in a mofussil Court under Order III, Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Code.
  2. Whether the memorandum of appearance filed under sub-rule (5) of Order III, Rule 4 suffices for an advocate engaged only to plead in a Subordinate Court.
  3. The interpretation and scope of Rule 40 and Rule 45 of the High Court Rules concerning the authority required for advocates enrolled on the Original Side to appear in Courts of the Bombay Presidency.
  4. Whether the distinction in procedural requirements for advocates enrolled on the Original Side conflicts with Section 14 of the Indian Bar Councils Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments (Mr. Purohit)

  • He was engaged only to plead and thus filing a memorandum of appearance under sub-rule (5) of Order III, Rule 4 was sufficient.
  • The requirement to file a Vakalatnama was not applicable to advocates enrolled on the Original Side appearing in mofussil courts, based on Rule 40 of the High Court Rules.

Respondent's Arguments (Learned First Class Subordinate Judge and Bar Council)

  • The learned Judge refused to hear Mr. Purohit without a filed Vakalatnama, though reasons were not given.
  • Mr. Kane, representing the Bar Council, argued that any distinction in procedural requirements between advocates is inconsistent with Section 14 of the Indian Bar Councils Act.
  • The learned Judge considered Rule 40 to apply only to the High Court and not to mofussil courts.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Order III, Rule 4, Civil Procedure Code Requirement of a written document (Vakalatnama) authorizing a pleader to act in Court and memorandum of appearance for advocates engaged only to plead. The Court held that a memorandum of appearance under sub-rule (5) sufficed for an advocate engaged only to plead, and the refusal to accept it was improper.
Rule 40, Chapter II, Part I, High Court Rules Exemption of advocates enrolled on the Original Side from filing any document authorizing them to act in any appeal or proceeding. The Court interpreted this rule as applicable to all Courts in the Bombay Presidency, including mofussil Courts, thereby supporting Mr. Purohit's position.
Rule 45, Chapter II, Part I, High Court Rules Advocates of the High Court shall have precedence in all Courts in the Bombay Presidency where they are entitled to plead. The Court used this rule to reinforce that advocates on the Original Side have rights extending beyond the High Court itself.
Section 14, Indian Bar Councils Act Entitlement of advocates to practise in the High Court and any other Court in British India. The Court found no inconsistency between this provision and the procedural rules exempting Original Side advocates from filing authority documents.
Section 122, Civil Procedure Code Power of the High Court to frame procedural rules with Local Government sanction. The Court assumed the legality and sanction of Rule 40 under this provision, upholding its validity.
Indian High Courts Act, 1861 Previous provision exempting advocates of High Courts from filing authority documents. The Court noted the omission of this provision in the 1926 amendment but inferred continued applicability of the exemption through High Court Rules.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the provisions of Order III, Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Code, emphasizing that a pleader engaged solely to plead may file a memorandum of appearance instead of a Vakalatnama. Since Mr. Purohit was only engaged to plead, his memorandum should have sufficed, and the refusal to accept it was unjustified, especially as no reasons were provided by the learned Judge.

The Court then examined Rule 40 and Rule 45 of the High Court Rules, interpreting them as extending the privilege of advocates enrolled on the Original Side to appear in all Courts within the Bombay Presidency without filing authority documents. The juxtaposition and historical continuity of these Rules supported this interpretation.

Addressing the argument based on Section 14 of the Indian Bar Councils Act, the Court clarified that the statutory provision grants advocates the right to practise in various Courts but does not negate the procedural exemptions enjoyed by Original Side advocates. The Court also noted the power under Section 122 of the Civil Procedure Code to frame such procedural rules and presumed their lawful enactment and validity.

Therefore, the Court concluded that the learned Subordinate Judge erred in requiring Mr. Purohit to file a Vakalatnama and in rejecting the memorandum of appearance, warranting the allowance of the revision application and remand of the case for trial according to law.

Holding and Implications

The revision application is allowed and the order refusing to hear Mr. Purohit without a Vakalatnama is set aside.

The case is remitted to the First Class Subordinate Judge of Thana for trial in accordance with law, allowing Mr. Purohit to plead on the basis of the memorandum of appearance filed under sub-rule (5) of Order III, Rule 4. The opponent is ordered to pay the costs of the applicant.

No new precedent was established; the decision affirms existing procedural practice exempting advocates enrolled on the Original Side from filing authority documents in mofussil Courts.

Show all summary ...

Beaumont, C.J:—

This is a revision application against a refusal by the First Class Subordinate Judge of Thana to allow Mr. Purohit, an advocate enrolled on the Original Side of this High Court, to plead in the First Class Subordinate Judge's Court at Thana without filing a Vakalatnama under O. III, r. 4, of the Civil Procedure Code. That rule provides that no pleader shall act for any person in any Court, unless he has been appointed for the purpose by such person by a document in writing signed by such person or by his recognized agent or by some other person duly authorised by or under a power-of-attorney to make such appointment. Then sub-r. (5) provides that no pleader who has been engaged for the purpose of pleading only shall plead on behalf of any party, unless he has filed in Court a memorandum of appearance signed by himself and giving certain particulars. Then there is a proviso which excludes from the operation of sub-r. (5) any pleader engaged to plead on behalf of any party by any other pleader who has duly filed his Vakalatnama. The definition of ‘Pleader’ in the Civil Procedure Code is clearly wide enough to include an advocate enrolled on the Original Side of this High Court.

Mr. Purohit, when the learned Judge refused to hear him without filing a Vakalatnama, put in a memorandum signed by himself in accordance with sub-r. (5) of O. III, r. 4. But the learned Judge refused to accept that. I do not know why, since he gave no reasons. I understand that Mr. Purohit was only engaged to plead, and in that case a memorandum was sufficient. On that ground alone the case will have to go back to the Court of the learned First Class Subordinate Judge of Thana.

The wider question, which, has been argued, as to whether an advocate enrolled on the Original Side of this High Court can be required to file any document authorising him to appear in a Court in the mofussil, is not altogether free from doubt. Rule 40 in Chapter II, part I, of the High Court Rules provides that no advocate (O.S), which is a compendious form of saying “Advocate enrolled on the Original Side”, shall be required to present any document empowering him to act in any appeal or proceeding, civil or criminal. The learned Subordinate Judge considered that rule applied only to the High Court. But r. 45 which is in the same Chapter of the High Court Rules provides that advocates of this Court shall have precedence in all Courts in the Bombay Presidency, in which they are entitled by law to plead. Clearly that rule applies to all Courts in the Presidency, and it is to be noticed that in the Edition of the High Court Rules of 1901, rr. 45 and 40 of the present Rules appear next to each other, r. 45 being r. 33 of the 1901 Rules and r. 40 being r. 34. The Rules appear in the same order in the Appellate Side Rules of 1920. The relative position of the Rules in those two cases suggests that the present r. 40 was intended to apply to all Courts in the Presidency. So far as I know, it has always been construed in that sense, and advocates on the Original Side of this High Court never are in practise required to file any authority authorising them to appear in a mofussil Court.

The argument of Mr. Kane on behalf of the Bar Council is that any distinction between advocates of the nature suggested is inconsistent with s. 14 of the Indian Bar Councils Act. But that is not so, for the section merely provides that an advocate shall be entitled as of right to practise in the High Court of which he is an advocate and in any other Court in British India. It is not suggested that the privilege which members of the Original Side Bar may have of not being required to file any authority prevents any other practitioner from practising. Under s. 122 of the Code of Civil Procedure this Court had power to frame a rule in the terms of the present r. 40, with the sanction of the Local Government. Whether such sanction was obtained is not proved. It is somewhat curious to note that the original r. 4 of O. III, which was altered in 1926, expressly provided that no advocate of any High Court established under the Indian High Courts Act, 1861, or of any Chief Court, and no advocate of any other High Court who is a barrister shall be required to present any document empowering him to act. Why that provision was omitted when the Code was amended in 1926, I do not know. It may possibly have been thought that such a provision was unnecessary in view of the rules of the various High Courts. However, seeing that r. 40 of the High Court Rules has been in operation for a long time, we must, I think, assume that it was originally passed in accordance with law and that if the sanction of the Local Government was necessary, that sanction was obtained, and I am not prepared to assume that there is any invalidity about the rule, or that the practise which has been in existence of treating that rule as extending to the mofussil is wrong. As at present advised, I think the learned Judge was not entitled to require Mr. Purohit to file a Vakalatnama. Clearly he was not entitled to reject the memorandum under sub-r. (5) of O. III, r. 4.

The application must, therefore, be allowed and the case remitted to the lower Court to be tried according to law. The opponent must pay the costs of the applicant.

Sen, J.:—I agree.

Rule made absolute.
J.G.R