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Nurbai v. Abhram Mahamad

Bombay High Court
Feb 13, 1939
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Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion (Broomfield, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This litigation concerns a house at Anand that belonged to Saban Aliji. On his death he left a widow, Bai Jivi, and a daughter, Nurbai (the plaintiff). Nurbai had a son who is defendant 1. In 1918 Bai Jivi purported to convey the house by a deed of gift to her grandson (defendant 1). Bai Jivi died in 1929. In 1930 defendant 1 mortgaged the house to defendant 2, and in 1934 he sold his equity of redemption to defendants 3 and 4. Defendant 2 obtained a decree on his mortgage; in the execution proceedings the plaintiff claimed the house as her property and was referred to a suit.

The plaintiff sued for a declaration that she was the owner of the house and that the mortgage and sale by defendant 1 were not binding on her. The trial Court held that there was a valid gift by Bai Jivi to defendant 1 and dismissed the suit. The plaintiff's appeal to the District Judge was summarily dismissed. This is a second appeal to the Court whose opinion is summarized here.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether there was a valid gift to defendant 1.
  2. Whether, if there was a valid gift, it remained effective after the death of Bai Jivi.
  3. Whether it was open to the plaintiff to challenge the gift.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Plaintiff) — Summary of Contentions

  • The gift was not valid because there was no delivery of possession and Bai Jivi did not relinquish control: she continued to live in the house after the alleged gift, leased part in 1924, and brought an eviction suit in 1926.
  • On the question of the widow's powers, the plaintiff contended that Bai Jivi as a Hindu widow took only a widow's estate (a limited estate) without power of alienation beyond her lifetime except for legal necessity.
  • The plaintiff did not ratify the transaction after Bai Jivi's death and was not precluded from challenging the gift.

Respondents — Summary of Contentions

  • The respondents relied on the documentary recital in the deed that possession had been delivered and on authorities (including Sir Dinshah Mulla's exposition) to contend that such a recital bound heirs (and so bound the plaintiff).
  • On the nature of Bai Jivi's estate, respondents argued she took an absolute estate, which would affect the availability of relief after her death.
  • It was argued (by Mr. Thakor for respondents) that the plaintiff should have alleged and proved a local custom to establish that widows take a limited estate; respondents also relied on earlier decisions (including 33 Bom LR 2357) to contend the plaintiff was precluded from disputing the validity of the deed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
20 Bom 531 Held that Sunni Bohras of Gujarat are governed by Hindu law of succession and inheritance (like Khojas and Cutchi Memons). Used to accept the parties' position that Hindu law governs succession and inheritance for the parties; therefore Mahomedan law governs gifts while Hindu law governs succession issues.
55 IA 171 (Privy Council) Expounded Mahomedan law as to gifts; cited Macnaghten's rules on gifts (necessity of acceptance, seizin, delivery, express intention, exceptions for gifts to husband or to minor, etc.). The Court applied the principles from this authority (the Macnaghten passage cited in 55 IA 171) to evaluate whether the gift was valid under Mahomedan law and concluded the gift was incomplete for want of delivery of possession.
16 IA 205 (Privy Council) Contains a statement that a declaratory recital in a deed by the donor that possession has been given can be an admission binding on heirs and persons claiming through them. The Court examined the decision and held that the Privy Council did not intend the admission to be conclusive in all circumstances; the Court distinguished that case on its peculiar facts and refused to treat the recital in the present deed as conclusive proof of delivery.
38 Bom LR 1034 Discusses the presumption that the law of inheritance applies and that coparcenary rules are not to be presumed without proof; used to show the presumption that Hindu law of inheritance applies to the parties. The Court relied on the reasoning to support the position that, because the parties accept Hindu law of inheritance, a widow in this community should be presumed to take a limited widow's estate rather than an absolute estate.
2 Bom 53 Illustrates a contest between a daughter and a widow where the widow was held to have a Hindu widow's estate. The Court cited this decision as tending to support the view that widows take a limited Hindu widow's estate in comparable circumstances.
9 Bom 1155 Authority relating to Cutchi Memons recognizing the distinction between stridhan and other property of a widow. Referenced to show that other local decisions recognize distinctions in widow's rights; cited in support of the view that a widow's estate may be limited.
30 Bom 197 Another decision concerning Cutchi Memons and recognition of distinctions in widow's property (stridhan). Used alongside 9 Bom 1155 as supportive material for the Court's view on the character of a widow's estate.
33 Bom LR 2357 Held that a reversioner who has ratified an alienation or unequivocally manifested an intention to abide by it may be personally debarred from disputing it (by election or estoppel); applied to the facts where a consenting daughter precluded herself and her issue. The Court considered this case but distinguished it: here there was no evidence of ratification or unequivocal manifestation by the plaintiff, so the preclusion principle did not apply.
54 IA 396 (Privy Council) Observation that an alienation by a widow in excess of her powers is not altogether void but voidable by reversioners who may be precluded from avoiding it by ratification or conduct treating it as valid. The Court noted this principle but held it inapplicable because the present gift was held to be void for want of delivery of possession (an incomplete transaction), and therefore the reasoning about voidable alienations did not govern this case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a stepwise fashion:

  1. Governing law: The parties are Sunni Bohras and accept that Hindu law governs succession and inheritance while Mahomedan law governs other matters. Consequently, the validity of the gift is to be determined under Mahomedan law; the Court relied upon the Privy Council exposition in 55 IA 171, which cites Macnaghten's rules on gifts.
  2. Requirements for a valid gift under Mahomedan law: The Court emphasized the Macnaghten rules (as cited in 55 IA 171): a gift requires acceptance and seizin by the donee, delivery of possession (seizin taking effect immediately or at the donor's desire), and an express unequivocal intention demonstrated by the donor's entire relinquishment of the thing given. Gifts cannot be implied, except for specified exceptions (e.g., gifts to a husband by a wife or by a father to his minor child; formal delivery may not be necessary to a trustee or to a minor where guardian's seizin suffices).
  3. Application to the facts: The Court found that Bai Jivi continued in actual occupation and control of the house after the deed of gift: she lived in the house with the plaintiff and defendant 1, leased part in 1924, and brought suit to evict a tenant in 1926. There was no practical change in possession resulting from the alleged gift. Defendant 1 was a minor (about ten years old) when the deed was executed and Bai Jivi was not his guardian (his parents were alive). The Court compared the facts with those in 55 IA 171 (where similar facts led to a finding of no valid gift) and concluded that the present facts warranted the same conclusion: execution of a deed does not remove the necessity for delivery of possession under Mahomedan law.
  4. Recital of delivery in the deed: The lower Courts had relied on a recital in the deed that possession had been delivered, invoking an authoritative passage (from Mulla) based on 16 IA 205. The Court carefully reviewed 16 IA 205 and concluded that the Privy Council did not mean such a recital to be conclusive in all circumstances; in 16 IA 205 the facts were peculiar and there was an assumption of actual handing over of rents and profits. The Court found no basis to assume any actual delivery of possession in the present case and observed further that, in law, the plaintiff must be regarded as heir of her father (not her mother), so the ratio of 16 IA 205 did not apply here.
  5. Conclusion on validity of gift: Applying the Mahomedan law principles, and given the absence of delivery and relinquishment of control by the donor, the Court held the gift to be incomplete and void in law.
  6. On whether the gift ceased on death of Bai Jivi: The Court treated this issue as largely moot because it had already held the gift void. It nonetheless analyzed the nature of the estate Bai Jivi held. The plaintiff urged that Bai Jivi had a Hindu widow's estate (limited), while respondents argued for an absolute estate. The Court observed there was no direct authority to resolve those competing views but reasoned that, since the parties accept that Hindu law governs succession, it reasonably implies a widow takes a limited (widow's) estate. The Court cited several local decisions (including 38 Bom LR 1034, 2 Bom 53, and decisions relating to Cutchi Memons) as tending to support the plaintiff's position that the widow's estate is limited.
  7. On whether the plaintiff was precluded from challenging the gift: Respondents relied on 33 Bom LR 2357 and associated authorities that a reversioner who ratified or unequivocally manifested an intention to abide by a widow's alienation is precluded from disputing it. The Court found no evidence here of ratification or unequivocal manifestation by the plaintiff (the only relevant fact being that the plaintiff was named as guardian of the minor in the deed). Consequently, 33 Bom LR 2357 was distinguishable. The Court further observed that the rule in Privy Council 54 IA 396 (that widow's excess alienations are voidable, not void) does not apply to a transaction that is void for want of delivery of possession; such a transaction is not merely voidable but incomplete and void.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED.

Holding (core ruling):

  • The Court held that the alleged gift from Bai Jivi to defendant 1 was incomplete and void for want of delivery of possession and relinquishment of control as required by Mahomedan law on gifts.
  • Because the gift was void, the question whether it survived the donor's death did not arise as a determinative issue for the outcome of the appeal.

Direct consequences and orders:

  • The decrees of the Courts below were set aside.
  • The plaintiff was granted the declaration and injunction sought.
  • Costs were ordered: costs throughout to be paid by defendant 1; the other defendants to pay their own costs.

Broader implications: The Court did not purport to establish a novel precedent beyond applying established distinctions under Mahomedan law of gifts and the presumption that Hindu law governs succession; it confined its decision to the facts and authorities before it and distinguished prior decisions relied upon by respondents.


End of summary. This summary is drawn exclusively from the text of the provided opinion and does not add information beyond that source.

Show all summary ...

Broomfield, J.:— The subject-matter of this litigation is a house at Anand which belonged to one Saban Aliji. He died leaving a widow Jivi and a daughter Nurbai who is the plaintiff. Nurbai was married and had a son defendant 1. In 1918 Jivi purported to convey the house by a deed of gift to her grandson defendant 1. She died in 1929. In 1930 defendant 1 mortgaged the house to defendant 2, and in 1934 he sold his equity of redemption to defendants 3 and 4. Defendant 2 got a decree on his mortgage, and in the execution proceedings plaintiff claimed the house as her property. She was referred to a suit and she sued accordingly for a declaration that she was the owner of the house and that the mortgage and sale by defendant 1 were not binding on her. The trial Court held that there was a valid gift by Jivi to defendant 1 and dismissed the suit. There was an appeal to the District Judge which was summarily dismissed. The issues which have been argued in this second appeal are: (1) whether there was a valid gift to defendant 1, (2) whether, if so, it was effective after the death of Jivi, and (3) whether it is open to the plaintiff to challenge the gift. The parties are Sunni Bohras, and it was held in 20 Bom 531 that the Sunni Bohras of Gujarat, like Khojas and Cutchi Memons, are governed by the Hindu law of succession and inheritance. This position is accepted by the parties, and the case falls to be decided on the footing that they are governed by Hindu law in matters of succession and inheritance but by Mahomedan law in other respects. The validity of the gift therefore is to be determined by the Mahomedan law, and the Mahomedan law as to gifts has been expounded by the Privy Council in 55 IA 171,2 where the following passage from Macnaghfcen's Principles and Precedents of Mahomedan Law, Chap. 5, is cited (p. 176):

(1) A gilt is defined to be the conferring of property without a consideration. (2) Acceptance and seizin, on the part of the donee, are as necessary as relinquishment on the part of the donor. (4) It is requisite that a gift should be accompanied by delivery of possession, and that seizin should take effect immediately, or, if at a subsequent period, by desire of the donor. (8) A gift cannot be implied. It must be express and unequivocal, and the intention of the donor must be demonstrated by his entire relinquishment of the thing given, and the gift is null and void where he continues to exercise any act of ownership over it. (9) The cases of a house given to a husband by a wife, and of property given by a father to his minor child, form exceptions to the above rule. (10) Formal delivery and seizin are not necessary in the case of a gift to a trustee, having the custody of the article given, nor in the case of a gift to a minor. The seizin of the guardian in the latter case is sufficient.

2. The gift in the present case is challenged on the ground that there was no delivery of possession and Jivi in no way relinquished her control of it. She was living in the house at the time of the gift with plain, tiff and defendant 1. She continued to live in it till her death, and the alleged gifts as it appears made no practical difference. In 1924 she leased a part of the house to a tenant, and in 1926 she brought a suit to evict the tenant. As there was no actual delivery of possession to the donee, or relinquishment of control by the donor, the question is whether the case comes within any of the exceptions referred to in the passage cited from Macnaghten. Defendant 1 was a minor aged about ten years at the time of the gift. Bai Jivi was not his guardian for his parents were both alive. The facts were very similar in the Privy Council case and yet it was held that there was no valid gift. In the gift deed plaintiff was mentioned as the boy's guardian, but the gift was to him and not to her. Even if it had been to her it would have made no difference, for, in that case, the exceptions obviously would not apply and actual delivery of possession was essential. It is true that in the Privy Council case there was no deed of gift. But it cannot be argued that the execution of a deed of gift does away with the necessity for delivery of possession.

3. There is a recital in the gift deed that possession had been delivered and the lower Courts, relying on a passage in Sir Dinshah Mulla's Principles of Mahomedan law, have held that this recital binds the heirs of the donor, and therefore the plaintiff. The passage referred to in Mulla's Principles is based upon the Privy Council decision in 16 IA 205.3 It is true that, in the course of the judgment in that case, their Lord, ships said that a declaration in the deed of gift by the donor that she had made the donee possessor of all properties given by the deed was an admission by which her heir and all persons claiming through him were bound. Their Lordships however can not be supposed to have intended to lay down that the admission was conclusive. They did not by any means rely solely upon this admission as proof of the delivery of possession. The facts there were somewhat peculiar. The donor had merely proprietary and not actual possession of the greater portion of the property. She was merely in receipt of the rents and profits. The gift was by a mother to her daughter, and at the time of the gift the daughter's husband was the general manager of both mother and daughter, and their Lordships said he would doubtless take care that the deed of gift should be carried into effect. Their Lordships had no doubt that sufficient possession was taken on behalf of the daughter to render the gift effectual. On the facts of that case then it seems to have been assumed that there had been an actual handing over of the rents and profits to the donee which was all the delivery of possession which was possible under the circumstances. No such assumption as to actual delivery of possession in any shape or form can be made in the present case where, as I say, the circumstances are almost precisely similar to those in 55 IA 171. In the present case moreover the plaintiff, in spite of certain confusing statements which she has made in the plaint, must, in law, be regarded as legally the heir of her father and not of her mother, and that being so, the ruling in 16 IA 205 does not apply. In our opinion the lower Courts were wrong in holding on the strength of this declaration in the deed of gift that there was such delivery of possession and relinquishment of control by the donor as the Mahomedan law requires. We are of opinion that it must be held that the gift was incomplete and void in law.

4. That being so, the second question as to whether the gift ceased to be effective on the death of Jivi does not really arise. But in deference to the arguments of the learned advocates, I propose to discuss it briefly. The answer to the question depends on the nature of the estate taken by Jivi in the house inherited by her from her husband. On behalf of the plaintiff-appellant, it is contended that she took a Hindu widow's estate without power of alienation beyond her lifetime except for legal necessity. For the respondents it is argued that she took an absolute estate. There seems to be no direct authority for either view. But, obviously, if a widow in this community takes an absolute estate, the law of inheritance is neither the Hindu law nor the Mahomedan law and as it is admitted that the parties are governed by the Hindu law of inheritance, we think that reasonably implies that a widow inheriting from her husband takes only a limited estate. Apart from quite exceptional cases like the Jains, for instance, that is the ordinary and accepted rule of Hindu law. It was pointed out in 38 Bom LR 1034,4 that the law which is presumed to apply is the law of inheritance in the strict sense, i.e inheritance to a separated Hindu or to self acquired property. The application of the coparcenary law cannot be presumed and must be proved. That however does not help us in the present case because the widow of a separated Hindu takes only a limited estate. So far as the cases cited lend any assistance at all they rather go to sup port the appellant's view. In 2 Bom 53 the contest was between a daughter and a widow, and the latter only claimed to have and was therefore only held to have a Hindu widow's estate. In the case of Cutchi Memons the distinction between stridhan and other property of a widow has been recognized: 9 Bom 1155 and 30 Bom 197.6 In 38 Bom LR 1034 one of the judicial decisions produced as evidence in the case was a judgment in a suit brought by an alienee from the widow of the last male holder against a brother of her husband in which it was held that the Hindu law of succession applied and that the widow had a Hindu widow's estate.

5. Mr. Thakor for the respondents contended that the plaintiff was bound to allege and prove a custom in this community to the effect that widows take a limited estate. But that, I think, is not a correct statement of the position, for, it must be held that the presumption is that the Hindu law of inheritance and succession applies to the parties. That position is indeed admitted. There is no question of proving any special custom. The only question is whether it follows from the application of the Hindu law in this respect that a widow inheriting her husband's property takes what is ordinarily understood in the Hindu law as a widow's estate and we think that must be held to be the case. That being so, on Jivi's death the person next entitled would have a right to recover the property in spite of the gift. The argument that the plaintiff is not entitled to challenge the alienation is based upon the decision of this Court in 33 Bom LR 2357 and the cases referred to therein. The facts in that case were that a Hindu widow with the consent of her only surviving daughter made a gift of her husband's property to the son of a predeceased daughter and after the death both of the widow and the consenting daughter the step-sons of that daughter sued to set aside the alienation. It was held that the consenting daughter was precluded from disputing the validity of the deed of gift on the ground of election to treat the transaction as valid, if not on the ground of estoppel, and that her stepsons were similarly precluded. Fatkar, J. in his judgment said (page 288):

……it is now settled that where a reversioner has either ratified the transaction after the death of the widow or has unequivocally manifested his intention to abide by the act of the widow, e.g by joining in the deed of the widow during her lifetime, he is personally debarred from resiling from it and impugning its validity.

6. In the present case all that the evidence shows is that the plaintiff was mentioned in the deed of gift as the guardian of the minor defendant 1. From that circumstance it cannot be inferred, we think, that there was any unequivocal manifestation by her of an intention to abide by the act of Jivi. There is no evidence that she ratified the transaction after Jivi's death.

7. On the facts therefore 33 Bom LR 2357 can be distinguished. Moreover, the basis of the decision appears to have been that the alienation there was avoidable transaction. Beliance was placed on an observation of their Lordships of the Privy Council in 54 IA 3968 (page 402):

It is settled law that an alienation by a widow in excess of her powers is not altogether void but only voidable by the reversioners who may either singly or as a body be precluded from exercising their right to avoid it either by express ratification or by acts which treat it as valid or binding.

8. This reasoning cannot be said to apply to the case of a transaction such as a gift, which is incomplete for want of delivery of possession, and therefore void. We are not prepared to hold therefore that plaintiff is precluded from challenging the validity of the gift in this case. The result is that we must allow the appeal, set aside the decrees of the Courts below and grant the plaintiff the declaration and injunction sought with costs throughout to be paid by defendant 1. The other defendants to pay their own costs.

D.S/R.K

9. Appeal allowed.