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Isap Bapuji Amiji v. Umarji Abhram Adam

Bombay High Court
Apr 2, 1937
Smart Summary (Beta)

Judicial Opinion Summary (based exclusively on the provided text)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant (Isap Bapuji) sued to recover Rs. 5,998 as principal and Rs. 4,001 as interest (total claimed Rs. 9,999) from the suit property. His case was that the property had been gifted to him by Mahamad Asmal by a gift deed dated 3 April 1919. Before that gift deed there existed two mortgages on the property: (a) a mortgage dated 14 March 1918 of part of the property by Mahamad Asmal to the plaintiff for Rs. 999; and (b) a mortgage dated 29 November 1918 of the whole property by Mahamad Asmal to Darasha for Rs. 4,999. The mortgage to Darasha contained a provision that the mortgagee should pay off the prior mortgage of Rs. 999. On 2 April 1919 (one day before the gift deed), the mortgage to Darasha was paid off. The mortgage deed (Ex. 32) was endorsed to show that Isap Bapuji had on that day paid Rs. 4,999 on behalf of the mortgagor and that the document had been returned to the mortgagor and possession handed over.

The plaintiff's account was that he paid Darasha at the suggestion of Mahamad Asmal so that Asmal could recover possession and thereafter make a gift to the plaintiff; the gift deed (Ex. 55) was executed the next day. Subsequently, on 17 December 1919, Mahamad Asmal executed a sale deed of the suit property in favour of others and in that sale deed alleged that Isap Bapuji had obtained a false deed of gift by fraud.

The plaintiff previously brought Suit No. 154 of 1923 on the strength of the gift deed to recover possession; that suit was dismissed and the decision confirmed by the High Court on 9 October 1929. In the present suit the plaintiff claimed a charge on the property for Rs. 5,998 (amount allegedly paid to Darasha) plus interest. The trial Judge held that the redemption from Darasha was effected by Mahamad Asmal with money borrowed from the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff had no relation to the mortgagor except that of an ordinary money-lender; there was no express or implied agreement of subrogation and hence no charge, and the trial Judge dismissed the suit.

The appellant appealed. Two Judges (N.J. Wadia, J. and Broomfield, J.) delivered reasons and the appeal was dismissed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the mere fact that the plaintiff paid off the mortgage to Darasha at the request of the mortgagor created an equitable charge on the mortgaged property in favour of the plaintiff, entitling him to recover the amount paid.
  2. Whether, in the circumstances, it must be presumed that there was an express or implied agreement that the plaintiff would be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee (i.e., whether subrogation arose by implication).
  3. Whether Section 92 of the Transfer of Property Act (as introduced by the Amending Act, Act 20 of 1929) applied retrospectively to transactions before 1 April 1930 and, relatedly, whether the legislative rule embodied in that section should guide the equitable doctrine of subrogation for earlier cases.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant contended that payment by him of Darasha's mortgage debt at the request of the mortgagor created an equitable charge on the property in his favour, entitling him to recover the amount paid.
  • He further contended that, given the circumstances in which the money was paid, there should be a presumption of an agreement (express or implied) that he would be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee (i.e., that he would step into Darasha's shoes as mortgagee).
  • He relied in particular on the decision reported at 40 Bom 646 as supporting his contention that a stranger who pays off a subsisting mortgage may be subrogated to the mortgagee's position.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The opinion records that respondents' counsel drew attention to and relied upon the decision reported at 45 Bom 597, which the respondents used to argue that a mere payment did not itself confer rights against the property without a prior declaratory decree and that any suit for such a declaration was governed by Article 120 of the Limitation Act (six years).
  • Implicitly, respondents contested that there was any agreement (express or implied) to keep the mortgage alive for the plaintiff's benefit and contended that the plaintiff's role was that of an ordinary lender; the trial Court had found the payment was effectively a loan to Mahamad Asmal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
40 Bom 646 Held that a person (a stranger) who paid off a subsisting mortgage could be subrogated where evidence showed the parties intended to keep the mortgage alive for the payer's benefit. The Court distinguished this case on its facts, noting that in 40 Bom 646 there was evidence (including sworn testimony) showing an intention to keep the mortgage alive—whereas in the present case the evidence showed the opposite intention (to extinguish the mortgage so a gift could be made).
(1910) 2 Ch 277 (Warrington J.) Formulated an equitable presumption that if a stranger pays off a mortgage he presumably intends to keep it alive for his own benefit. The Court observed that Warrington J.'s view was referred to in 40 Bom 646 but that other authorities (including Indian High Courts) regarded that rule as going too far; the present Court did not treat Warrington J.'s statement as controlling where the evidence showed contrary intention.
36 Mad 426 Examined the scope of the rule of subrogation and concluded the doctrine in India is narrower: a mere agreement with creditor or debtor is insufficient to give a lien; conventional subrogation requires agreement or particular relations necessitating protection. The Court relied on the narrower rule as articulated in this decision to reject the contention that mere payment at the mortgagor's request created a lien or subrogation in favour of the payer.
36 Cal 193 Held that to invoke equitable subrogation a person must be a surety, must have made payment under agreement to receive assignment, or must stand in a relation to the mortgaged premises such that his interest cannot otherwise be protected; subrogation is not available to a mere stranger/volunteer. The Court treated this decision as supporting the view that mere payment by a stranger at the mortgagor's request does not create subrogation or an equitable charge, and applied that reasoning to reject the appellant's claim.
54 All 897 (Full Bench, Allahabad High Court) Held that Section 92 of the Transfer of Property Act (as introduced by Act 20 of 1929) has retrospective effect and that the legislative rule can be followed as a correct guide to equitable principles in pre-1929 cases. The Court accepted this Full Bench view (N.J. Wadia, J.) and treated Section 92 as having retrospective effect for the purposes of the present case; it further stated that even if Section 92 were not retrospective, its principles would guide equitable rules on subrogation.
13 Pat 111 (Patna High Court) Took the contrary view to 54 All 897, holding that Section 92 did not apply to rights already vested before 1 April 1930. The Court noted this contrary decision but observed that the Patna Bench gave no reasons and did not refer to Section 63 of Act 20 of 1929; the present Court preferred the reasoning of 54 All 897.
29 Cal 1548 and 39 Cal 527 (Privy Council cases referenced) Referenced as authorities whose effect on High Court decisions was debated—used in the background discussion of conflict of authority on subrogation. The Court noted conflicting decisions and said the legislative rule (Section 92) would be a safe guide where authorities conflict; the Privy Council cases were part of that broader context but were not applied to change the outcome here.
45 Bom 597 Held that a payment by a person in 1901 enabling him to establish a charge required a declaratory decree to be sought, and such a suit would be governed by Article 120 (six years) of the Limitation Act; otherwise the claim would be barred. The Court relied on this authority to hold that even if a charge had arisen, the plaintiff's suit seeking a declaration/enforcement would be time-barred because the right to sue accrued when the payment was made and no timely declaratory suit was brought; this provided an additional ground for dismissal.
54 Mad 708 (and related Madras decisions) Reportedly consistent with the view that mere payment by a stranger does not create subrogation; supportive of the narrower Indian approach. The Court (Broomfield, J.) cited these Madras decisions as agreeing with the trial Judge's approach and as further support for rejecting the appellant's contention.
2 IA 131 (referenced) Referenced in the opinion as an authority negating the contention that mere payment by a stranger creates subrogation in India. The Court cited this prior authority as part of the line of Indian cases which deny that mere payment by a stranger creates a lien or subrogation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in stages and addressed the appellant's points in turn.

1. Implied Agreement to Subrogation

  • The Court first considered whether there was an express or implied agreement that the plaintiff should be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee.
  • The Court found the evidence did not support such an agreement. The plaintiff's own account was that Asmal wanted to make a gift and had requested that the mortgage be paid off so that possession could be recovered and the gift effected. The gift deed was executed the next day.
  • The mortgage deed endorsement and Darasha's evidence showed the payment was made by the plaintiff on behalf of the mortgagor, the mortgage was endorsed as satisfied, and possession returned to the mortgagor. From these facts the Court inferred that both mortgagor and plaintiff intended the mortgage to be extinguished so that a valid gift could follow; there was therefore no basis to presume an implied agreement of subrogation.
  • The appellant's counsel largely conceded that the evidence did not support this contention.

2. Equitable Subrogation and the Effect of Mere Payment

  • The Court examined whether the mere fact of payment by a stranger (here the plaintiff) at the request of the mortgagor creates an equitable charge or subrogation.
  • The Court analyzed statutory changes: Section 92 of the Transfer of Property Act (as introduced by the Amending Act, Act 20 of 1929) provides for subrogation where a mortgagor, by a registered instrument, agrees that the payer shall be subrogated. Prior to that, Section 74 dealt with a subsequent mortgagee's right but did not help the plaintiff who was not a subsequent mortgagee.
  • The appellant argued Section 92 could not apply to pre-1 April 1930 transactions and therefore equitable principles should govern. He relied on 40 Bom 646. The Court reviewed 40 Bom 646 in detail and found it distinguishable because in that case there was evidence that the parties intended to keep the mortgage alive (and other facts such as the payer being a lessee with a protectable interest).
  • The Court surveyed authority (including (1910) 2 Ch 277 and the examinations in Indian High Courts) and referred to Sundara Ayyar J.'s analysis in 36 Mad 426 and the Calcutta decision in 36 Cal 193. These authorities were taken to limit the equitable doctrine: conventional subrogation ordinarily requires agreement (express or implied) or that the payer stand in some special relation (e.g., surety or otherwise having an interest that needs protection); a mere volunteer or stranger paying a debt at the debtor's request cannot, by that fact alone, claim a lien or subrogation.
  • The Court concluded that the mere payment of Darasha's mortgage debt by the plaintiff at the mortgagor's request did not create an equitable charge or subrogation in the plaintiff's favour. The authorities did not support the proposition that simple payment suffices.

3. Retrospectivity of Section 92 and Use of Legislative Rule as Guide

  • The Court considered whether Section 92 of the Transfer of Property Act (as introduced by Act 20 of 1929) had retrospective effect. Section 63 of the Amending Act was discussed by the Court as indicating that the legislative change could apply retrospectively in relevant respects.
  • N.J. Wadia, J. expressed the view that Section 92 does have retrospective effect, a view taken by the Allahabad Full Bench in 54 All 897. The Court contrasted this with the Patna decision in 13 Pat 111 which took the contrary view but noted that 13 Pat 111 gave no reasons and did not refer to Section 63.
  • The Court further said that even if Section 92 were not retrospective, the principles underlying Section 92 would serve as a safe guide to what equitable rules on subrogation should be for cases arising before Act 20 of 1929.
  • Broomfield, J. preferred not to express a definitive opinion on retrospectivity but agreed that the Allahabad Full Bench reasoning was preferable and that whether or not S.92 were retrospective, it should be followed as guidance in cases of conflicting authority.

4. Limitation and Requirement of a Declaratory Decree

  • The Court relied on 45 Bom 597 to note that a person claiming the right of subrogation must first seek a declaratory decree establishing the charge before asserting rights over the property, and that such a declaratory suit is governed by Article 120 of the Limitation Act (six years).
  • The opinion states that in the present case the plaintiff's right to sue with regard to the charge "accrued on 2nd December 1919, when he made the payment" (as stated in the provided text). On that basis the Court concluded the suit for a declaratory decree would have been time-barred and therefore the plaintiff's remedy was barred by limitation.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal was dismissed. (The opinion concludes: "12. Appeal dismissed.")

Implications and direct consequences:

  • The plaintiff (appellant) is not entitled to an equitable charge on the suit property by reason merely of paying off the Darasha mortgage at the mortgagor's request; there was no express or implied agreement to subrogate the plaintiff to the mortgagee's rights and the payment was intended to extinguish the mortgage to enable a gift.
  • The Court treated the legislative provisions (Section 92 as introduced by Act 20 of 1929 and Section 63 of the Amending Act) as relevant; N.J. Wadia, J. held Section 92 to have retrospective effect for present purposes and followed the Allahabad Full Bench view (54 All 897). Even where retrospectivity was uncertain, the principles underlying Section 92 were accepted as a guide to equitable subrogation rules for prior transactions.
  • Even apart from the lack of subrogation, the plaintiff's claim would be defeated by limitation: a declaratory suit to establish such a charge would be governed by Article 120 of the Limitation Act and, on the dates and facts stated in the opinion, would be time-barred (per the Court's application of 45 Bom 597).
  • The direct practical outcome is dismissal of the appellant's suit with costs. The Court did not purport to lay down a novel rule beyond following and applying existing authorities and the legislative change; it distinguished and applied prior cases factually and treated Section 92/principles as authoritative guidance in resolving conflicts among precedents.

Note: This summary is strictly confined to information contained in the provided opinion. No facts, arguments, holdings, or implications beyond what the opinion itself states have been added or inferred.

Show all summary ...

N.J Wadia, J.:— The suit from which this appeal arises was brought by the appellant to recover a sum of Rs. 5998 as principal and Rs. 4001 as interest from the suit property. His case was that the property in suit had been gifted to him by one Mahamad Asmal by a gift deed on 3rd April 1919. Prior to the gift deed there had been two mortgages in connexion with the property: on 14th March 1918, part of the property had been mortgaged by Mahamad Asmal to the plaintiff himself for Rs. 999 and on 29th November 1918, the whole of the suit property was mortgaged by Mahamad Asmal to one Darasha for Rs. 4999. The mortgage to Darasha provided that the mortgagee should pay off the prior mortgage of Rs. 999 to the plaintiff. One day prior to the passing of the gift deed, on 2nd April 1919, the mortgage to Darasha was paid off. On the mortgage deed (Ex. 32) there is an endorsement that Isap Bapuji (the present plaintiff) had on that day (2nd April 1919) paid Rs. 4999 on behalf of the mortgagor Mahamad Asmal and that the document duly endorsed as satisfied had been returned to the mortgagor Mahamad Asmal and the possession of the land had also been handed over to him. The plaintiff's case was that Mahamad Asmal had expressed a desire to make a gift of the property to him and had suggested that he should pay off Darasha's mortgage, and that it was in pursuance of this suggestion that the plaintiff had paid off the mortgage amount to Darasha, and on the next day the deed of gift (Ex. 55) was passed. Some months after the passing of the gift deed, on 17th December 1919, Mahamad Asmal executed a sale deed of the suit property in favour of defendants 1 and 2 and Vali Bagas and Umar Ali, the predecessors-in-title of the other defendants in this suit. In that sale deed the vendor said:

Isap Bapuji has got up a false deed of gift in my name by practising fraud, and has now produced the same, but the same is ineffective, and the possession of the property has never passed from me, and there has been no change (in the possession) of the same, but having taken advantage of my sickness he practised deceit upon me and got up one fraudulent document.

2. The plaintiff brought Suit No. 154 of 1923 on the strength of the gift deed to him to recover possession of the property. The suit was dismissed and the decision was confirmed in appeal on 9th October 1929 by the High Court. After that he brought the present suit in which he claimed that he had a charge on the suit property for the amount of Rs. 5998 paid by him to the mortgagee Darasha and interest on it amounting altogether to Rs. 9999. The learned trial Judge held that the redemption of the property from Darasha was not by the plaintiff himself, but by the deceased Mahamad Asmal with money borrowed from the plaintiff, and that the amount paid to Mahamad Asmal by the plaintiff was not a charge on the property; that the plaintiff had no relation with the mortgagor Mahamad Asmal except that of an ordinary money-lender to a debtor so far as this transaction was concerned, and that there was no agreement, express or implied, nor was it even contemplated that the plaintiff should be subrogated in place of the mortgagee. He therefore dismissed the suit. Two grounds have been urged before us in the appeal. It is contended that the mere fact that the plaintiff had paid off Darasha's debt at the request of the mortgagor created an equitable charge on the property in his favour entitling him to recover the amount which he had paid to the mortgagee. It is contended also that in the circumstances in which the money had been paid by the plaintiff, it must be presumed that there was an agreement between the plaintiff and Mahamad Asmal that the plaintiff was to be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee.

3. I will deal with the second point first. The evidence in the case does not support the contention that there was an agreement, express or implied, that the plaintiff was to be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee. Plaintiff's own case is that Mahamad Asmal had told him that he intended to make a gift of the whole property in his favour and that he suggested to him that he should pay off the amount due to the mortgagee, so that possession of the property might be recovered by Mahamad Asmal before it could be sifted over to the plaintiff; and on the next day, after the mortgagee had been paid off, a gift deed was actually executed by Mahamad Asmal. It is clear therefore that at that time neither the plaintiff nor the mortgagor could possibly have had any intention of keeping alive the rights of the mortgagee in favour of the plaintiff, since they contemplated that as soon as the mortgagee was paid off, the full owner, ship of the property would be transferred to the plaintiff by the gift deed. The endorsement on the mortgage deed and the evidence of the mortgagee Darasha show that the amount was paid to the mortgagee by the plaintiff on behalf of the mortgagor, and the mortgage deed duly endorsed and the mortgaged property was handed over to the mortgagor. The only inference one can draw from these facts is that the object of the mortgagor and of the plaintiff himself at the time when Darasha was paid off must have been to extinguish the rights of the mortgagee and to secure the return of the property to the mortgagor himself, so that he could make a valid gift of it to the plaintiff. There is therefore nothing in the circumstances in which the money was paid which can justify us in saying that an implied agreement that the plaintiff was to be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee should be presumed, and in fact the learned counsel for the appellant has in his reply practically conceded that this contention of his cannot be supported by the evidence.

4. The other contention urged on behalf of the appellant is that the mere fact that he had paid off the debt at the request of the mortgagor must be taken to have created an equitable charge in his favour on the property. Section 92 of the Transfer of Property Act, which deals with subrogation provides that a person who has advanced to a mortgagor money with which the mortgage has been redeemed shall be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee whose mortgage has been redeemed, if the mortgagor has by a registered instrument agreed that such person shall be so subrogated. This section was introduced into the Act for the first time by the Amending Act, Act 20 of 1929. Prior to that the only provision in the Act dealing with the question was S. 74 which provided that any second or subsequent mortgagee may, at any time after the amount due on the next prior mortgage has become payable, tender such amount to the next prior mortgagee, and such mortgagee is bound to accept such tender and to give a receipt for such amount; and the subsequent mortgagee shall, on obtaining such receipt, acquire in respect of the property all the rights and powers of the mortgagee as such, to whom be has made such tender. Admittedly, that section could not help the plaintiff since he was not a subsequent mortgagee. The appellant's contention was that S. 92 of the Act could not apply to transactions which had taken place prior to 1st April 1930, on which date the Amending Act came into force, and that therefore the suit must be decided on equitable principles. In support of his contention that there was an equity created in his favour by the payment of the mortgage amount to Darasha, reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in 40 Bom 646.1 As this decision is the main basis of the appellant's case, it is necessary to refer to the facts of the case in some detail. Defendant 1 in that case had mortgaged his lands in 1893. In 1894 the mortgagee sued on the mortgage and obtained a decree for the mortgage amount, or in default, the sale of the property. In 1905 he applied for sale of the mortgaged property. About that time the plaintiff went into possession of the lands on a ten years' lease from defendant 1. Shortly afterwards defendant 2, who held a money decree against defendant 1, brought the property to sale and purchased it himself. In 1907 the property was put up to Bale in execution of the mortgagee's decree. But defendant 1 borrowed a sum of Rs. 2463 from the plaintiff and paid off the mortgagee. Subsequently defendant 1 sold a portion of the property mortgaged to plaintiff for Rs. 4000, the consideration being made up of Rs. 2463 with other sums lent to defendant 1 personally. In 1908 defendant 2 sued the plaintiff who was in possession of the land as lessee to recover possession, and obtained possession. The plaintiff thereupon filed the suit to recover the amount of Rs. 4000 from the defendants personally or by sale of the property. It was held that the land in possession of defendant 2 was chargeable with the sum of Rs. 2463 which the plain, tiff had lent to defendant 1 for paying off the mortgagee, because the plaintiff being a stranger who paid off a subsisting mortgage was entitled to be subrogated to the position of the mortgagee. In the course of his judgment, Batchelor J. dealing with the contention based upon the equitable doctrine allowing a stranger who pays off a subsisting mortgage to be subrogated to the position of the mortgagee, said (page 652):

The mortgage of Atmaram was paid off with the help of the plaintiff's moneys by defendant 1, and it cannot in my opinion be doubted that defendant 1 had an interest in paying off that mortgage. Therefore if the doctrine is made out, defendant 1 could claim to stand in the mortgagee's shoes, and if that be so, the same position would be occupied by the plaintiff who claims through defendant 1 and whose moneys were advanced to defendant 1 precisely in order that Atmaram's mortgage should be discharged.

5. In Support of the view which he took of the equitable doctrine relied upon, he referred to the decision of Warrington J. in (1910) 2 Ch 277.2 At first sight it appears as if the decision in 40 Bom 646 supports the appellant's contention, but there is a distinction with regard to the facts. The claim in connexion with the charge in that case was not based merely on the fact that defendant 1 had paid off the prior mortgage. There was evidence, which the Court accepted, to show that the parties had intended that the mortgage was to be kept alive for the benefit of defendant 1 with whose money it was paid off. Batchelor J. in dealing with this point said (page 653):

It was contended in argument that mortgages in these cases are only kept alive where the charge is paid off at the express or implied request of the mortgagor. That argument however was rejected by Warrington J. who observed that the statement of claim, or as we should say the plaint, proceeded on the well-known equitable doctrine that if a stranger pays off a mortgage on an estate he presumably does not intend to dlr charge that mortgage but to keep it alive for his own benefit. I pause to observe that in our own case we have not only that presumption, but the sworn testimony of the plaintiff that such was in fact his intention.

6. This circumstance distinguishes that case from the one before us. I have already shown that there is nothing in the evidence in this case which could justify the Court in presuming that there was an implied agreement between the mortgagor and the plaintiff that the latter was to be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee Darasha, who had been paid off with the plaintiff's money. Several cases have been cited before us in support of the appellant's contention, but none of them goes so far as to say that the mere fact that a stranger has paid off a mortgage debt at the request of the mortgagor creates a charge in his favour on the mortgaged property or has the effect of subrogating him to the rights of the mortgagee. The authorities on this question have been examined at some length by Sundara Ayyar J. in 36 Mad 426.3 After discussing the decision of Warrington J. in (1910) 2 Ch 277, which has been referred to in 40 Bom 646, and which he thought went too far, he referred to the rule with regard to subrogation as stated by Sheldon in his book on Subrogation (page 433):

Whenever a payment is made by a stranger to a creditor in the expectation of being substituted to the place of the creditor, he is entitled to such substitution. But the doctrine generally adopted, and that of these very cases when limited to the point actually decided, is that a conventional subrogation can result only from a direct agreement, express or implied, made with either the creditor or debtor, and it is not sufficient that a person paying the debt of another should have merely an understanding on his part that he is to be subrogated to the rights of the creditor, though if the agreement have been made, a formal assignment will not be necessary.

7. The learned Judge then pointed out that in India the scope of the rule appeared to be narrower still; and that a mere agreement either with the creditor holding a mortgage or with the debtor owing it, cannot give a person lending money to discharge the mortgage a lien over the property. The conclusion at which he arrived was stated by him as follows (page 434):

The principle contended for by the appellant that the mere payment of a mortgage debt by a stranger would entitle him to the mortgagees' rights by subrogation has always been negatived in India: see 2 IA 131.4 It is impossible to argue that it is open to any meddler to claim a lien by discharging a mortgage with which he has no concern. I must therefore overrule the contention that the plaintiff can claim to be subrogated to the rights either of the daughters or of Muthu Goundan by the mere fact that he discharged the mortgage of the latter.

8. It is to be noted that in this case the plaintiff had paid off the mortgage amount at the request of the daughters who were the reversioners. The same view was taken by the Calcutta High Court in 36 Cal 1935 in which it was held that to entitle one to invoke the equitable right of subrogation, he must either occupy the position of a surety of the debt or must have made the payment under an agreement with the debtor or creditor that he should receive and hold an assignment of the debt as security, or he must stand in such a relation to the mortgaged premises that his interest cannot otherwise be ad equately protected; and that the doctrine of subrogation is not applied for the mere stranger or volunteer who has paid the debt of another without any assignment or agreement for subrogation, being under no obligation to make the payment and not being compelled to do so for the preservation of any rights or property of his own. In my opinion, the contention that the mere fact that the plaintiff had paid off Darasha's mortgage debt created an equitable charge in his favour on the property for the amount of the mortgage debt without any express or implied agreement to be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee is unsupported by authority and cannot be allowed. There is also another ground on which the appellant's case must fail. This suit was filed after the Transfer of Property Act was amended by the Amending Act 30 of 1929. Section 92 of the Amended Act provides that a person, who has advanced to a mortgagor money with which the mortgage has been redeemed shall be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee whose mortgage has been redeemed, if the mortgagor has by a registered instrument agreed that such person shall be so subrogated. Section 63 of the Amending Act provides that nothing in any of the provisions of the Act which are mentioned shall be deemed in any way to affect (a) the terms or incidents of any transfer of property made or effected before 1st April 1930, (b) the validity, invalidity, effect or consequences of any thing already done or suffered before the aforesaid date, (c) any right, title, obligation or liability already acquired, accrued or incurred before such date, or (d) any remedy or proceeding in respect of such right, title, obligation or liability. The provisions mentioned do not include Section 47 by which section 92 of the present act was enacted. S. 63 goes on to say that nothing in any other provision of the Act shall render invalid or in any way affect any thing already done before 1st April 1930, in any proceeding pending in a Court on that date. It would appear from this that section 92 of the present act has retrospective effect, and this view has been taken by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in 54 All 897.6 It was held in that case that Section 92 of the Transfer of Property Act, as introduced by the Amending Act 20 of 1929, has retrospective effect. We have been referred to a decision of the Patna High Court in 13 Pat 111,7 in which a Division Bench of that Court took the contrary view and held that Section 92 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 which came into force in 1930, did not apply to a case in which the rights which the defendant claimed had already vested in him before that date. No reasons have been given for the view which was taken, nor is Section 63 of the Amending Act, referred to at all. I am, with respect, of the opinion that the view taken by the Allahabad High Court is correct and that S. 92 has retrospective effect so far as the case before us is concerned. Even however if this view were not correct the principles underlying S. 92 would have to be accepted as a guide in deciding what the equitable doctrine with regard to subrogation prior to the introduction of S. 92 was, as was held by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court (p. 904):

Supposing, however, that the said sections (Ss. 92 and 101) have no retrospective effect, we have got this position. This Court itself was divided as to the rule of subrogation in the circumstances of this case and there are conflicting decisions of other High Courts. Opinion is likely to differ as to how far the Privy Council cases in 29 Cal 1548 and 39 Cal 527,9 quoted above affect the decisions of the High Courts. In the circumstances, the rule laid down by the Legislature would be a safe guide to follow as laying down correctly the rule of justice, equity and good conscience for cases arising before the passing of Act 20 of 1929.

9. The view taken by the learned trial Judge is therefore in my opinion correct and the appeal must fail. There is still another ground on which the plaintiff's appeal would have to be dismissed. Oar attention was drawn by the learned counsel for the respondents to a decision of this Court in 45 Bom 597.10 The plaintiff had brought a suit in 1914 for sale of the mortgaged property on the ground that a payment made by him in 1901 to the mortgagor to pay off a prior mortgage created a charge on the property to the extent of the money advanced. It was held that the payment made in 1901 enabled the plain, tiff to establish his right to a charge on the property, but the mere payment would not give the plaintiff any right against the property either to go into possession, or to sell it, that he was bound to ask for a declaratory decree, that a charge was created before the Court could have jurisdiction over the property, and that such a suit for a declaratory decree would be governed by Article 120, Limitation Act, and was therefore barred not having been brought within six years from the date of the payment. In the present case the plaintiff's right to sue with regard to the charge accrued on 2nd December 1919, when he made the payment. He could not sue to enforce the charge without first asking for a declaration of it and the suit for declaration would be clearly time barred. The appeal fails and should in my opinion be dismissed with costs.

Broomfield, J.:— I see no reason to doubt that the plaintiff advanced the money to discharge Darasha's mortgage on behalf of and at the request of the mortgagor Mahamad Asmal. The question is whether the plaintiff is subrogated to the position of the mortgagee, i.e is entitled to the benefit of the discharged security. It is not the plaintiff's case, or at any rate it is not proved that there was any agreement between the plaintiff and Mahamad Asmal that the mortgage was to be kept alive for plaintiff's benefit. On the contrary the position is that Mahamad Asmal promised to make a gift of the land to the plaintiff, and the object of paying off the mortgage was not to keep the security alive but to enable the mortgagor to make a gift of the property to the plaintiff, complying with the requirements of the Mahomedan law in respect of possession. It cannot be said that the plaintiff himself had any intention of keeping the mortgage alive under the circumstances. His desire was that the mortgage was to be extinguished in order that the transfer to him might take place. In all probability, the parties never even thought of keeping the mortgage alive. The gift to the plaintiff followed almost at once on the following day. Under these circumstances the plaintiff can only rely on the bare fact that he discharged the mortgage at the request of the mortgagor. In support of the argument that he thereby acquired a right of subrogation, reliance has been placed on 40 Bom 646 and (1910) 2 Ch 277. The person who lent the money in 40 Bom 646 being a lessee from the mortgagor under a lease for ten years had a legal interest in the mortgaged property which he was entitled to protect and that, it would seem, would bring the case within the doctrine of subrogation as explained in 36 Mad 426 and 36 Cal 193. Besides, what were the facts in 40 Bom 646 in other respects? The circumstances justified the presumption that the person who had paid off the mortgage had not intended to discharge it but to keep it alive for his own benefit. Not only was that the presumption but there was sworn testimony, the sworn testimony of the person concerned to that effect. And what was the principle deduced from the case in (1910) 2 Ch 277? It is stated by Batchelor J. in his judgment (p. 653):

The well-known equitable doctrine that if a stranger pays off a mortgage on an estate, he presumably does not intend to discharge that mortgage but to keep it alive for his own benefit.

10. Both these cases therefore are clearly distinguishable on the facts and in respect of the principles to be applied, because in the present case it was evidently not the intention of either party that the mortgage should be kept alive. The decisions of the Madras High Court, 36 Mad 426 and 54 Mad 70811 and of the Calcutta High Court, 36 Cal 193, are clearly in favour of the view which has been taken by the learned trial Judge. As regards the question whether Section 92 of the Transfer of Property Act, is to be regarded as retrospective, I prefer not to express a deluded opinion, although I agree with my learned brother that the reasoning of the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court in 54 All 897, is preferable to that in 13 Pat 111. In fact in the latter case the point has not been really discussed and there is no reference to the vital S. 63 of Act 20 of 1929. In any case I agree with respect with the view taken by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court that whether S. 92 is retrospective or not, it ought to be taken as a guide for determining in cases where there is a conflict of authority what equitable rules not inconsistent with the Transfer of Property Act should be adopted as valid in this country.

11. The principle laid down in 45 Bom 597, viz that in a case of this kind it is necessary for a person claiming the right of subrogation to get a declaration from the Court, the suit for which must be brought within six years under Article 120, is undoubtedly a difficulty in the plaintiff's way. It seems to me that you could only get out of that difficulty by suggesting that the right to subrogation arose in the alternative so to speak after the real intention of the lender of the money had been frustrated when he failed to establish his claim under the gift deed. If it were possible to take that view, it might be argued that the cause of action only arose on the final determination of the litigation about the gift deed. But that would certainly be a strange view to take and no authority has been cited in support of it. I agree that the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs.

D.S/R.K

12. Appeal dismissed.