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Shridhar Mahadeo Pathak v. Emperor
Factual and Procedural Background
The applicant, chairman of the Nandane Co-operative Credit Society, was accused of criminally misappropriating Rs. 385 paid to him by the complainant in repayment of a loan; instead of crediting the society's books or remitting the money to the society's bank, the sum was allegedly taken by the chairman. The Magistrate and the Sessions Judge convicted the applicant under Section 409, I.P.C.; the Sessions Judge reduced the fine to Rs. 385 but upheld the imprisonment. The applicant filed this revision against the Sessions Judge's order. The offence was committed in 1929; the applicant is elderly, has already suffered more than two months' rigorous imprisonment, and is on bail under this Court's orders.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the accused, as chairman of a co-operative society, was a "public servant" within the meaning of Section 21, Clause (10), I.P.C., rendering conviction under Section 409, I.P.C. proper.
- If the accused was a public servant, whether sanction under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code was necessary and had been obtained.
- Whether the prosecution should have been instituted under the Co-operative Societies Act (with the Registrar's sanction) and whether the case was non-cognizable under that Act.
- Whether the lower courts erred in relying upon the evidence of a witness who had turned hostile.
Arguments of the Parties
Applicant's Arguments
- The applicant was not a "public servant," and conviction under Section 409, I.P.C. was therefore illegal.
- If he were a public servant, prosecution required prior sanction under Section 197, Cr.P.C., which had not been obtained.
- The proper procedure was prosecution under the Co-operative Societies Act with sanction of the Registrar; offences under that Act are non-cognizable.
- The lower courts illegally relied on the testimony of a witness who had become hostile.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court examined statutory definitions and the scope of the relevant provisions rather than any prior authority. It noted the definition of "officer" in the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act (Bom 7 of 1925) and quoted Section 21, Clause (10), I.P.C., which describes an officer "whose duty it is, as such officer, to take, receive, keep, or expend any property ... for any secular common purpose of any village, town or district." The Court interpreted the clause as requiring that the money received or expended be for a public (secular common) purpose at village/town/district level; accordingly, a chairman of a co-operative society receiving repayments for the society did not fall within that public-servant description. Therefore sanction under Section 197, Cr.P.C. was unnecessary.
On the contention that prosecution should have proceeded under the Co-operative Societies Act, the Court observed that Section 60 of that Act and Section 63(2) refer specifically to "an offence under this Act" (the offences enumerated in sub-sections (a)–(d)) and that Section 63(2) makes offences under that Act non-cognizable for Code purposes. The Court concluded those provisions do not govern offences charged under the I.P.C., so the argument failed; cognizance by the Deputy Superintendent of Police after inquiry was appropriate.
Regarding the hostile witness (the money-lender Rupchand), the Court held that it is ordinary for witnesses to resile from parts of earlier statements and that courts may accept parts of testimony and reject others; there was nothing illegal in the lower courts' approach. The Court found corroborative evidence (including testimony by the society's debtor Ragho and his son) that supported guilt on the facts.
On the merits, however, the Court concluded that conviction under Section 409 was legally incorrect. Exercising the power under Section 423, Cr.P.C., the Court altered the conviction from Section 409 to Section 406, I.P.C., reduced the substantive sentence of imprisonment to the term already suffered, and maintained the fine as fixed by the Sessions Judge. The Court noted the applicant's age, the antiquity of the offence (1929), that he had already served over two months' rigorous imprisonment, and that Government did not appear in the matter as reasons for the reduction.
Holding and Implications
Conviction altered: The conviction under Section 409, I.P.C. was altered to a conviction under Section 406, I.P.C.
Consequences for the parties: the substantive term of imprisonment was reduced to the period already suffered by the applicant; the fine fixed by the Sessions Judge was maintained. The opinion does not discuss broader precedent or wider legal implications beyond the direct effect on this case.
Murphy, J.:— This is an application in revision against an order of the learned Sessions Judge of West Khandesh, confirming the conviction of the applicant under S. 409, I.P.C, but reducing the sentence of fine passed upon him to one of Rs. 385, while upholding the sentence of imprisonment. The facts alleged against the accused were that, being chairman of the Nandane Co-operative Credit Society and having a sum of Rs. 385 paid to him by the complainant in the case in repayment of the loan which he had taken from the society, he criminally misappropriated this sum instead of crediting the amount in the society's books and remitting it to the society's bank. Both the Courts have found the accused guilty of the offence, having believed the complainant's evidence that he paid the amount at the village of Songir having borrowed it on the strength of a promissory note from one Bupchand Hirachand Marwadi of that place. The conviction is however challenged on the ground of its illegality. The first argument urged on the applicant's behalf is that he was not a public servant and that therefore his conviction under S. 409 is illegal, and that in any case if he was really a public servant, sanction under Section 197 of the Cr PC, was necessary, and it has not been obtained. As to this point we think that the applicant's contention is correct. Both the Courts below have relied on the definition of ‘officer’ under the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act (Bom 7 of 1925). But this does not seem to carry us very much further. ‘Officer’ is defined to include
“a chairman, secretary, treasurer, member of committee or other person empowered under the rules or under the bye-laws of a society to give direction in regard to the business of such society.”
2. The definition in S. 21, Cl. (10), I.P.C, relied on is:
“Every officer, whose duty it is, as such officer to take, receive, keep, or expend any property, to make any survey or assessment, or to levy any rate or tax for any secular common purpose of any village, town or district, or to make, authenticate or keep any document for the ascertaining of the rights of the people of any village, town or district.”
3. Both the Magistrate and the Sessions Judge have, as it seems to us, read this definition stopping in the middle of it and so including a chairman of a society in the category of ‘Government servant’. But it includes the words “whose duty it is, as such officer, to take, receive, keep, or expend” and the sentence goes on to qualify the clause for any secular common purpose of any village, town or district.” And it seems “to us that this clause governs the section and that it must be for a public purpose that the money was received or expended. This being so, the accused would not appear to have been a ‘public servant’. We have recourse to the sections themselves as there is no authority on the point. If the accused is not a ‘public servant,’ then the objection that sanction under Section 197 of the Cr PC, was necessary to the prosecution obviously fails. The next contention is that the prosecution should have been instituted under the Co-operative Societies Act itself, with sanction of the Registrar, and that the case is not cognizable. Is appears that the cognizance of this case was taken by the Deputy Superintendent of Police after inquiry by the Co-operative Credit Society or its officials. We think that on this point Mr. Gumaste's contention fails. He relies on S. 60 of the Act and the following section. It is clear that S. 60 refers not to all offences but to ‘an offence under this Act,’ and these are enumerated in sub-Ss. (a), (b), (c) and (d) which follow the opening sentence, and S. 63(2), which is the foundation of the argument, is:
“Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898 every offence under this Act shall, for the purpose of the Code, be deemed to be non-cognizable.”
4. The offences referred to are those under the Act and not those under the I.P.C We think then that this contention is unsound and must fail. The next contention is that the lower Courts illegally relied on the evidence of a witness, who at the time of his examination was hostile to the prosecution.
5. The witness was the money-lender Rupchand, who it appears admitted the presence of the parties in his shop for the purpose of raising the money. He denied that he had seen the money being paid to the accused. Is is an ordinary incident of the Courts for a witness to resile from some portion of his statement and to be allowed to be cross-examined by the prosecution, and we do not think that there is anything illegal in the lower Courts partly believing this witness and partly not. On the evidence it seems clear that the accused is guilty. There is the testimony, which has been believed, that Ragho, the society's debtor, says that he paid the sum of Rs. 385 to him, and that fact is corroborated by his son and other evidence in the case, while a faint effort to charge the secretary of the society with defalcation is obviously a false one.
6. We think that on the merits the accused is guilty but that the conviction under S. 409, I.P.C, is wrong. Mr. Gumaste for the applicant submits that it would be a hardship on his client to be retried on the same facts, and it is not urged that the conviction under a wrong section has prejudiced his client in any way. However the accused is an elderly man and the offence was committed so far back as 1929, and in the circumstances of his having already suffered more than two months' rigorous imprisonment and being now on bail under the orders of this Court, we should reduce the sentence of imprisonment to the term already suffered. Since Government do not appear in the matter, we think we may do this on the ground just stated. Under Section 423 of the Cr PC, we alter the conviction under S. 409 to one under S. 406, I.P.C, and reduce the sentence of substantive imprisonment imposed to the term already suffered, and maintain the fine at the sum at which it was fixed by the learned Sessions Judge.
K.S
7. Conviction altered.
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