Ram Ratan Gupta v. Union Of India And Others

This order will dispose of three Writ Petitions Nos. 1485/73, 1487/73 and 1488/73, which will collectively be referred to herein as a petition. The reason is that the facts are identical except that the number of plots are different. Petition No. 1485/73 relates to Plot No. A-11, Petition No. 1487/73 relates to Plot No. A-13, and Petition No. 1488/73 relates to Plot No. A-12. The petitioners respectively are Ram Rattan Gupta, Ram Gopal Gupta and Prem Kumar Gupta, who also seem to be closely related. I will refer to them collectively as a petitioner.

2. The petitioner was a member of the Maharani Bagh House Building Co-operative Society. On 31-5-1965 a tripartite deed of perpetual sub-lease was executed between the President of India the lessor, Maharani Bagh House Building Co-operative Society the lessee and the petitioner the sub-lessee in respect of a plot is Maharani Bagh, New Delhi, mentioned in the said deed. It was registered on 4-6-1965. Under the terms of the sub-lease, the petitioner was required within a period of two years computed from 1-1-1965 to erect upon the said plot in a substantial and workman like manner a residential building in accordance with a sanctioned plan and to the satisfaction of Municipal and other authorities. The petitioner submitted the plans but due to change in the number of the plot, the plans were not sanctioned.

3. However, on 16-8-1969, the Lt. Governor sent a notice that since the petitioner had not erected a good and substantial building for purposes of private dwelling up to 30-5-1967, he has committed a breach of clause II (5) of the sub-lease and was directed to show cause within 30 days why the conveyance be not determined and the possession of the said plot be not taken back. On 1-9-1969 the petitioner replied that he had submitted the building plans to the Delhi Municipal Corporation, but the same were rejected because the number of the plot had been changed on site. On 20-4-1970, the petitioner was informed that as sufficient cause has not been shown, the sub-lease has been cancelled by the Lt. Governor and the petitioner was called upon to deliver possession of the plot to the DDA at 8.00 a. m. on 13-5-1970. The petitioner applied on 2-5-1970 for extension of time by one year to complete the building. He stated that he could not undertake construction on account of financial difficulties. He was granted extension of time up to 31-12-1970 on 26-5-1970, the petitioner obtained sanction for the plan from the Municipal Corporation and thereafter began construction. Meanwhile, on 9-6-1971, the Lt. Governor issued a general circular (Annexure H) that the period for construction will be extended up to 30-9-1971. Thereafter, another extension up to four years could be allowed on payment of penalty at the rates specified in the said circular. Clause 6 of that circular stipulated that the sub-lease will be determined only if construction is not completed within seven years. Despite that circular, the Delhi Development Authority (herein DDA) served the petitioner with a registered letter dated 9-8-1971 asking him to hand over the plot at 10.00 a. m. on 20-10-1971. The petitioner sent a reply on 18-8-1971 that the construction was almost complete except the roofing of one room, finishing and plastering. This could not be done on account of shortage of labour and material. On 28-9-1971, the petitioner informed the DDA that the construction of the dwelling house on the plot has been completed. He obtained a construction certificate from the Municipal Corporation on 5-1-1972 and began to be assessed to house-tax, water-tax and other charges of the Corporation. Yet by a notice dated 11-10-1973 (which was received by him on 23-10-1973), the petitioner was informed that the Lt. Governor has cancelled the sub-lease under the provisions of clause III thereof. He was called upon to hand over possession at 11.00 a. m. on 23-10-1973. On 27-10-1973 the petitioner made a representation requesting the respondents not to take any such action against the petitioner as there has been no violation of the provisions of the sub-lease and on 5-11-1973 filed the petition in this Court challenging the determination of the sub-lease and the threat to take possession illegal, invalid, unconstitutional and ultra vires and is in violation of the principles of natural justice,

4. The contention of the petitioner is that the delay in completing the construction which was completed by Sept., 1971 was not due to him. No opportunity was given to the petitioner before issuing the notice dated 11-10-1973. The notice has been issued by respondent No. 4 Shri S.C Dixit, Addl. Secretary, DDA, in colourable exercise of power and is mala fide. The notice has not been issued by a person properly authorised to do so, for and on behalf of the President the lessor and as such contravenes the provisions of Art. 299 of the constitution. The respondents have no right of re-entry and in case they have any such right it cannot be exercised without proper proceeding for ejectment. It was contended that the clauses of the sub-lease dated 31-5-1965 in so far as they are inconsistent with the law laid down in chapters of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 are illegal, null and void, ineffective and not binding on the petitioner. S. 114-A of the Transfer of Property Act clearly provides that the lessor has to file suit for ejectment in the case of forfeiture of the breach of an express condition which provided that on breach thereof, the lessor may re-enter. The alleged breach was capable of remedy and yet no notice was given to the petitioner to remedy the breach. The petitioner has paid the maximum ground rent and complied with the other conditions of the lease and, therefore, the respondents are directed to enforce their right of forfeiture and re-entry. The respondents by their own action and conduct by acceptance of rent and otherwise have waived the breach and are estopped from taking any action (after) a lapse of two years. The action of the respondent in cancelling the lease and threatening to take possession deprives the petitioner of his fundamental rights guaranteed under Arts. 19 and 31 of the Constitution, as it amounts to deprivation of property without compensation. At any rate, the petitioner cannot be evicted without recourse to the provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act. 1971. The petitioner prayed that impugned ‘notice dated 11-10-1973 be quashed and the respondents be directed not to dispossess the petitioner from the plot in question.

5. In the counter-affidavit the respondents contended that the petition involves disputes and complicated questions of facts which cannot be gone into under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The lease deed contains an arbitration clause and should have been resorted to before filing the petition. Upon merits, it was stated that time was of the essence of the sub-lease and the petitioner on his own showing could not complete the dwelling unit within the specified period and, therefore, rendered the sublease liable to forfeiture. The extension of time up to 31-12-1970 was granted to the petitioner by the Lt. Governor, upon the clear understanding that no further extension of time would be allowed unless a substantial portion of the building is constructed by the said date. But the petitioner did not even start construction by then. The site was inspected in February, 1971 but it was found without any construction. Therefore, another show cause notice was issued on 31-5-1971 and the reply of the petitioner to the said notice was not found satisfactory. Consequently, the sub-lease was determined on 3-8-1971. The petitioner was asked to hand over possession on 20-8-1971 and hot on 20-10-1971. The general order issued by the Lt. Governor was not applicable in the case of the petitioner because the petitioner has constructed only an incomplete single storeyed unit, wile the petitioner was required to complete the construction by 31-12-1966, but there appeared to be no intention on his part to complete the construction. Only a small residential unit has been completed and that too with substandard material. Assistant Engineer went on to site to take possession of the plot in dispute on 23-10-1978 but nobody turned up to hand over possession. Acceptance of rent did not prejudice their rights.

6. In the rejoinder, it was submitted that time for construction was not of the essence of the sub-lease nor any failure to construct the building would incur the forfeiture of the sub-lease. This submission is borne out by the extension for construction granted to the petitioner specially and that available under the general order of the Lt. Governor permitting the construction upto 30-9-1971. The completion certificate vas obtained from the municipal authority although respondent No. 4 wrote to the Executive Engineer (Bldg.) not to grant completion certificate to the petitioner and thus betraying his mala fides and ulterior motives. The construction was completed according to the approved plans within the time as was extended by the general order of the Lt. Governor allowing the completion of the houses up to 30-9-1971 without any penal action. Sometime in 1977, one of the petitioners P.K Gupta applied to the respondents for the restoration of the lease of the plot in his case as well as the respondents had in several similar cases withdrawn the re-entry notices, restoring the lease of the plot to the sub-lessee. A note was recorded on the file No. 51 (1)/77-LAB that the petitioner may be called to the DDA to discuss the question of restoration of the plots on payment of suitable penalties and withdrawal of the petition. On or about 6-4-1979 tote petitioner was called by Mr. K.L Bhatia, the then Commissioner (Land) DDA. The petitioner's counsel agreed to the payment of penalties for restoration of the plot and Mr. Bhatia directed his subordinates to calculate the penalties. But no decision was communicated to the petitioner or his counsel despite several inquiries. Action of the respondents in cancelling the lease of the petitioner on the ground of non-construction within the required period is wholly unreasonable, arbitrary and discriminatory when the respondents in cases similar rather much worse had granted extension for construction of houses on payment of penalty. But the respondents have not done so in case of the petitioner while one such plot C-70 has been recently restored to its sub-lessee on payment of penalty. Assuming that the petitioner did not complete the construction of the building within the stipulated time, still he could do so on payment of penalty as specified in the general order permitting construction of the building. Since the respondents also admit that some construction bas taken place, they cannot take any action of re-entry on the ground of non-construction. The lease could not be determined because the alleged breach of the lease was capable of being remedied. No notice as required in clause IV of the lease deed was given to the petitioner. No particulars of the alleged breach were given nor was the petitioner called upon to remedy the alleged breach. It was denied that the receipt of ground rent was or could not be without prejudice to the rights of the respondents.

7. I have heard arguments. Though no specific objection was raised in the counter-affidavit in this regard, yet the learned counsel for the respondents contended that the writ petition is not maintainable as it seeks to enforce the contractual rights under the sub-lease. He relies upon Radha Krishna Aggarwal v. State of Bihar, AIR 1977 SC 1496. It was said in that case that after the State or its agents have entered in to the field of ordinary contract, the relations are no longer governed by the constitutional provisions but it is the legally valid contract which determines the rights and obligations of the parties inter se. The question which normally arises in such cases is whether the action complained of is or is not in consonance with the terms of the contract and no question of any fundamental right arises. It was held in Jasjeet Films (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Delhi Development Authority, AIR 1980 Delhi 83, that a writ petition is not a remedy for enforcing contractual obligation. It was further contended on behalf of the respondents that the sub-lease deed provides vide clause VIII thereof that in trite event of any question, dispute or difference arising under the sub-lease or in connection therewith, same shall be referred to the sole arbitration of the Chief Commissioner or any other person appointed by him. It further provides that the sub-lessee cannot object to arbitration on the ground that the arbitrator is a Government servant and that he has to deal with the matters to which the lease or sub-lease relates or that in course of his duties he has expressed views in the matter in dispute. Since the deed itself provides for remedy by way of arbitration for the resolution of the dispute, the petitioner is not entitled to involve the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court, Bisra Stone Lime Co. Ltd. v. Orissa State Electricity Board AIR 1976 SC 127, was cited in support of this contention. But in Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union, Sindri v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 344, the Court said that the right conferred by Article 226 can be exercised not only for the rights but for any other purpose and in Calcutta Gas Co. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1962 SC 1044, it was held that a writ can be issued even to enforce contractual rights. It appears to me that availability of other remedy by way of a suit or an arbitration does not deprive the High Court of its jurisdiction under Art. 226, but it is only a self-imposed restriction upon the exercise by it of its discretion to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction. It further seems to me that in Radha Krishna (AIR 1977 SC 1495) (supra) and Bisra Stone Lime (AIR 1976 SC 127) (supra), the Court was rather precluded from exercising its jurisdiction on account of the Presidential proclamation under Art. 359 of the Constitution under which the enforcement of fundamental rights remained suspended. But the citation has since then changed. The petitioner has invoked Article 14 of the Constitution which is now available to him even against the DDA : Premji Bhai v. Delhi Development Authority, AIR 1980 SC 738. The contention of the petitioner is that he has committed no breach of the covenants of the grant and yet grant is being revoked in an arbitrary manner which violates Art. 14. The petitioner can challenge any arbitrariness of the State even in case of contracts and leases. The power of the State is confined and structured by rational, relevant and nondiscriminatory standard or norm and if the Government departs from such standard or norm in any particular case or cases, the action of the State would be liable to be struck down unless it can be shown that the action was not arbitrary and was based upon some valid principle which in itself was not irrational, unreasonable or discriminatory: Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India, AIR 1979 SC 1628 and Kasturilal Laxmi Reddy v. State of J. and K., AIR 1980 SC 1992. According to M.A Rasheed v. State of Kerala, AIR 1971 SC 2249, even where a matter rests upon subjective satisfaction or opinion as is claimed in this case, the Court will not readily defer to the conclusiveness of the executive authority's opinion. The criterion of reasonable conduct is not subjective but objective. In the State of Orissa v. Madangopal Rungta, AIR, 1952 SC 12, and State of Orissa v. Ram Chandra Dev, AIR 1964 SC 685, it was laid down that the existence of a legal right be it fundamental or not, is the foundation of a petition under Art. 225. Ordinarily, there property has been granted by the State on conditions which make the grant resumable and the State seeks to recover possession of the property without filing a suit, the grantee can ask for an appropriate writ or order or direction under. Art. 226 if the title of the grantor can be determined in the writ proceedings themselves and the parties are at issue on the question about the character of the grant. In this case, the, petitioner is claiming not on the basis of long possession or on the basis of a mere contract but on the basis of conveyance of interest and grant which is not resumable at will. It was also urged that the sub-lease was as good as a sale and the lessor cannot effect reentry without any authority of law and deprive the petitioner of his property for which full premium has been paid and ground rent has been paid and accepted; vide Chotu Mia v. Mst. Sundri, AIR 1945 Pat 260 (FB). It is true that in such cases the usual remedy lies by way of suit but in this case the petitioner challenged the order of revocation on the ground of discrimination that in similar cases, time has been extended for construction and re-entry has not been effected and restoration was allowed on payment of penalty. A suit, therefore, does not seem to be an appropriate remedy. The remedy of arbitration in this particular case seems to be worse because it subjects the dispute for determination of the Lt. Governor (or his nominee) whose arbitrariness is the main grievance of the petitioner. If there is a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that the arbitrator has prejudged the matter or has made up his mind in certain matters, he may not act fairly, the petitioner is released from the arbitration clause: Roshanlal Sethi v. Chief Secretary, AIR 1971 J and K 91. That apart, it will be unduly harsh to ask the petitioner to resort to arbitration after a decade the petition has been pending in the Court. The only way to stop the respondents from acting in an arbitrary and capricious manner, therefore, is to seek recourse to Article 226. I, therefore, reject the objection and hold that the writ is maintainable.

8. Before I proceed to examine the merits of the case, I may dispose of two arguments of Mr. Gupta advanced on behalf of the petitioner. He urged that the letter of revocation or cancellation of the deed was conveyed by Mr. S.C Dixit, Addl. Secretary (Lease Admn.) DDA who had no authority to act on behalf of the President or the Lt. Governor. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that by a notification issued under S. 22 of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 the lands have been placed at the disposal of the DDA and further that in terms of the Notification No. GSR (contract/amendment) No. 307, published in Part II, Sec. 3, subsection (I) of the Gazette of India, (Annexure R-IV), the Administrative Officer is entitled to sign the contracts. Therefore, the letter written by Mr. Dixit was not written by an unauthorised person. But the authority to execute a contract under Article 299 of the Constitution does not include an authority to revoke it, and it can be revoked only by the lessor or by the Lt. Governor in terms of the sub-lease, Article 299, therefore, has no relevance. The precise provision that is relevant in their case is Section 28 of the Delhi Administration Act, 1966, and it has not been shown that the Addl. Secretary, DDA, is authorised to authenticate the orders of the Lt. Governor under that section. Therefore on the face of it, the order seems to be not in order and would be invalid for that reason. But it is always available to the respondents to prove that the Lt. Governor himself has cancelled the sub-lease, They have said so, vide para 2 of their counter. This is a question of fact and I see no reason to doubt the affidavit. Therefore, the impugned order is not open to challenge even though it may not be authenticated in accordance with the law. I therefore, reject this argument.

9. The other contention requiring disposal is that the impugned order of revocation was mala fide because Mr. Dixit who issued the same was hostile to the petitioner. He even went to the extent of writing to the Corporation not to issue the completion certificate. I do not think that to write such a letter in order to safeguard the interests of the DDA or to avoid future complications can by any stretch of imagination constitute mala fides. I, therefore, reject this contention as well.

10. Now, to undertake a discussion on merits, the first question that will arise is whether the case is governed by the Government Grants Act, 1895 or by the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Sections 2 and 3 of the Government Grants Act read:

“2. Nothing in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, contained, shall apply or be deemed ever to have applied to any grant or other transfer of land or of any interest therein heretofore made or hereafter to be made (by or on behalf of the State), to, or in favour of any person whosoever, but every such grant or transfer shall be construed and take effect as if the said Act had not been passed.”

“3. All provisions, restrictions, conditions and limitations over, contained in any such grant or transfer as aforesaid shall be valid and take effect according to their tenor, any rule of law, statute or enactment of the Legislature to the contrary notwithstanding.”

11. Several decisions were cited to expound the true implications of these two short sections. I need not refer to all of them and will content myself with only those of the highest pursuasive or compulsive authority. The Supreme Court in the Collector Of Bombay v. Nusserwanji Rattanji Mistri & Others, (1955) 1 SCR 1311 at p. 1325: (AIR 1955 SC 298 at p. 306), observed that the Transfer of Property Act does not apply to Crown Grants. But reading the enactment as a whole, the scope of Section 3 is that it saves ‘Provisions, restrictions, conditions and limitations over’ which would be bad under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, such as conditions in restraint of alienations or enjoyment repugnant to the nature of estate, limitations, offending the rule against perpetuities and the like. But in the State of U. P. v. Zahoor Ahmed, AIR 1973 SC 2520 para 16 it was held that the scope of the Government Grants is not limited to affecting the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act only. The Government has unfettered discretion to impose any conditions, limitations or restrictions in its grants, and the rights, privileges and obligations of the grantee would be regulated according to the terms of the grant, notwithstanding any provisions of any statutory or common law. However, as held in Thakur Jagannath Baksh Singh v. United Province, AIR 1946 PC 127, the general words of Section 3 of the Crown Grants Act cannot be read in their apparent generality. They must be read with reference to the general context and cannot be construed to extend to the relations such as between a sanad holder and his tenants. Still less can they be construed to limit the statutory competence of the legislature under the Constitution Act. All decisions, therefore, which are contrary to Thakur Jagannath Bakch Singh (supra) are of no moment. Consequently, I am in respectful agreement with the decision handed down in Mathura Dass v. Punjab Province, AIR 1949 East Punj 246, Raisahab Chandanmul Intrakumar Private Limited v. State of Orissa, AIR, 1972 Orissa 40 (FB) and Tek Chand v. Union of India, AIR 1980 Punj and Har 339. I hold (that though a Government grant is to be regulated by its own terms irrespective of the Transfer of Property Act or any other law, yet no State can bind itself not to enact in future any law which it is albeit subject to the Constitution, competent to make on the subject matter of the grant and such law can expressly or by implication repeal or revoke or modify not merely any or all of the provisions of the grant or transfer but also the Government Grants Act itself. Therefore, every Government grant made at any time shall be subject to the law enacted after 1895 prospectively or otherwise. This is so because a statute applies to State as much as does to a citizen unless it expressly or by necessary implication exempts the State from its operation: Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Corporation of Calcutta, AIR 1967 SC 997 and Union of India v. Jubbi, AIR 1968 SC 360. It is further subject to any future executive action, which must necessarily be determined by the needs of the community when the question arises, as the Government cannot by contract hamper its freedom of action in matters which concern the welfare of the State: Rederiaktiebolaget Amphitrite v. The King, (1921) 3 KB 500 and Antonia Buttigieg v. Captain Stephen H. Cross, AIR 1947 PC 29. Whether a particular transfer is a grant governed by the Government Grants Act or not is a mixed question of law and fact: Delhi Simla Catholics Archiliocess v. State of U. P., AIR 1980 Delhi 240. The character of the land, the manner of making the sub-lease and its context in this case all indicate that the sub-lease in question was a Government grant and in the absence of any legislation prior or posterior thereto on its subject matter the sub-lease shall take effect according to its tenor and will not be regulated by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act unless justice, equity and good conscience require that the principles contained therein should be applied: Chiragh Din v. Muhammad Usman Khan, AIR 1924 Lah 281 (2). As I go through the deed, it appears to me that the terms thereof are more or less in accordance with the principles contained in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

12. The relevant provisions with which we are immediately concerned are contained in Clause II (5) of the grant in question. They are that the petitioner shall erect upon the plot and complete in a substantial and workmanlike manner a residential building for private dwelling in accordance with the sanctioned building plan and to the satisfaction of the municipal and other authorities within a period of two years which period shall be of an essence of the contract. If the petitioner failed to so contract and if in the opinion of the lessor or the lessee, it is the breach of the covenant, which opinion shall be final, then in terms of Cl. III, it shall be lawful for the lessor or with the prior consent in writing of the lessor, for the lessee, notwithstanding the waiver of any previous cause or right of re-entry to re-enter upon and take possession of the residential plot and buildings and fixtures thereon, and thereupon the sub-lease shall cease and determine. However, the lessor or the lessee as the case may be, may without prejudice to their rights of re-entry as aforesaid, waive or condone the breaches temporarily or otherwise on receipt of such amount on such terms and conditions as may be determined by the lessor and the lessee, etc. But Cl. IV provided that no forfeiture or re-entry shall be effected until the lessor has served on the sub-lessee, a notice in writing specifying the particular breach complained, of and if the breach is capable of remedy, requiring the sub-lessee to remove the breach, and the sub-lessee fails within such reasonable time as may be mentioned in the notice to remedy such breach. And in the-event of forfeiture or re-entry, the lessor may relieve against forfeiture on such terms and conditions as the lessor thinks proper. But nothing in this clause shall apply to forfeiture or re-entry for the breach of covenants and conditions relating to sub-divisions or amalgamation, erection and completion of building within the time provided and transfer of the plot. It flows from these conditions, limitations, and provisions that in case of the breach of covenants relating to erection of the building within the time provided, the lessor shall be at liberty to re-enter without notice and without opportunity to remedy the breach. Since the liberty is that of the lessor, it equally follows that he may refrain from doing so upon or without any conditions. He has a discretion which he is otherwise enjoined to exercise in an even manner and without violating the provisions of natural justice. It must also be noted that a forfeiture clause has to be construed strictly so as to uphold the grant as far as possible. In this case, an earlier notice given to the petitioner on 20-4-1970 of cancellations of the lease and of taking possession on 30-5-1970 will have no effect because the Lt. Governor had issued a general order to allow the Sub-lessees to complete construction up to 30-9-1971. It means that the initial time limit has been waived and had ceased to be of the essence of the contract. The petitioner claims that he had completed the building by the end of Sept., 1971 and has also obtained a completion certificate from the Municipal Corporation on 5-1-1972. The contention of the respondents appears to be that the covenant has been violated because during this period, the petitioner had constructed only an incomplete single-storeyed unit and that too with sub-standard material. Out of the 1800 sq. yds. only a small portion was covered while the idea of the Government is that no urban land can be allowed uncovered so as to amount to a waste. The idea of the petitioner was to avoid re-entry and not to construct the dwelling unit in accordance with the terms of the agreement. Therefore, a notice dated 11-10-1973 was given informing the petitioner that that Lt. Governor has cancelled the sub-lease and the petitioner was called upon to hand over possession on 23-10-1973. The question, therefore, for consideration is whether the completion of one room tenement on the land within the time allowed by the general circular will not amount to substantial compliance with Clause II (5). The opinion of the respondents is that it is not. It is not possible to uphold the stand taken by the respondents because there is nothing in the sub-lease to insist how much area or how many floors should at least be covered by construction. Whatever construction the petitioner has so far raised is certainly of the kind meant for private dwelling purposes. The only question that remains to be answered is whether whatever he had done was not done ‘in a substantial and workman like manner’ so as to amount to a breach. This is an expression capable of variable construction. The dictionary meaning of substantial is; not elusive; not seeming; real true. What the lessor perhaps meant was that the maximum permissible area would be required to be covered and it would not be what one may call a temporary structure. But it has not been specified in clear terms. There is nothing sinister or wrong if the petitioner has undertaken only so much of construction as would avoid forfeiture. In such dubious state of affairs, the petitioner had a right to be clearly told what was in fact expected of him to be done and what material was to be used. But that does not mean that the contract should not be honoured in spirit. The dwelling unit should conform to general pattern in the colony. The petitioner himself appears to have realised that he had not carried out the covenant, in its spirit. That is why Mr. Gupta urged that the lease should be restored on payment of penalty as has been done in several other cases. This is an attitude which should be encouraged by the DDA. It was submitted by the respondents that plots have been resumed in several other cases and no discrimination can be made against the petitioner. But it also seems equally correct that in some cases, they had condoned the breach by imposing reasonable penalties. That will be a reasonable thing to do instead of enforcing resumption the last of the adverse consequences.

13. I, therefore, direct that the impugned order be set aside and the DDA may regularise the matter and issue fresh permission upon payment of penalty as has been done in like cases. The exercise initiated in this regard should be resumed and no possession shall at any time be taken without going through the procedure provided in the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 unless the petitioner himself surrenders his possession.

14. The petitions stand disposed of accordingly. No costs.

Order accordingly.