- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Venkaraddi Mardeppa Lingdal v. Hanmantgouda Ramangouda Kulkarni .
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Patkar, J. and Murphy, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff sued for a declaration that a deed of gift executed by his wife, Tulsava, in favour of her brother (the defendant) was invalid because it was executed without the plaintiff-husband's consent. The property in dispute had been bequeathed in 1907 by the wife's maternal grandfather to the wife; in 1926 she executed a deed of gift in favour of her brother. The lower Court (Subordinate Judge) found as a fact that the plaintiff and his wife had not lived together since their marriage. The Subordinate Judge held the property to be saudayika stridhan (a class of stridhan) and therefore capable of alienation by the wife without the husband's consent; alternatively, the lower Court held that, if not saudayika, the wife could nevertheless alienate because she had been abandoned by her husband and was not under coverture, relying on Bhagvanlal v. Bai Divali. The plaintiff appealed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the property bequeathed to the plaintiff's wife by her maternal grandfather is "saudayika" stridhan under Hindu law, such that she could alienate it without her husband's consent.
- As an alternative (raised by the lower Court), whether abandonment by the husband removes the wife's obligation of coverture and thus permits alienation even if the property is not saudayika.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments
- The deed of gift is invalid because it was executed by the wife during the marriage without the husband's consent.
- The bequest from the maternal grandfather is not "saudayika" because, the appellant contends, the textual definitions refer only to gifts from the brother or parents and do not include a maternal grandfather.
- He sought to establish that he and his wife were living together, to rebut the lower Court's finding of abandonment (which, if accepted, would have provided an alternative ground for upholding the alienation).
Respondent's / Lower Court's Position
- The Subordinate Judge held the property to be saudayika stridhan (a kind of stridhan received from affectionate kindred) and therefore the wife was competent to make the gift without the husband's consent.
- In the alternative, the lower Court held that the wife had been abandoned by her husband and was not under coverture, and relied on Bhagvanlal v. Bai Divali for that alternative ground.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bhau v. Raghunath | Provides a statement of saudayika as that which is obtained by a married woman or maiden in the house of her husband or father, from her brother or parents. | The Court considered this definition but noted that in Bhau v. Raghunath the precise point now before the Court did not arise for decision (the prior case involved a different factual issue about a vritti inherited after a widow's death). |
| Muthukaruppa Pillai v. Sellathammal | Interprets saudayika to include gifts from affectionate kindred, treating saudayika as including both gifts at nuptial fire (yautaka) and gifts before/after marriage (ayautaka) when not received from strangers. | The Court relied on the reasoning in this case (including cited commentaries/translations) to support the conclusion that a bequest from a maternal grandfather, being from affectionate kindred, falls within saudayika. |
| Bhagvanlal v. Bai Divali | Referenced by the lower Court in connection with the proposition that abandonment removes the necessity of the husband's consent (i.e., wife not under coverture). | The appellate Court did not decide the alternative abandonment question and therefore did not rely on or analyze Bhagvanlal v. Bai Divali; it noted the lower Court had relied on it but found it unnecessary to reach that alternative ground. |
| Emperor v. Sat Narain | Identified as following Sir Dinshah Mulla's view that a gift by a relation of the woman (or of her husband) is saudayika. | The decision is cited as an instance where Mulla's interpretation (that gifts by relations are saudayika) has been followed; the Court relied on authorities adopting the view that gifts by relations are included within saudayika. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The courts (both Patkar, J. and Murphy, J.) addressed the appeal by examining the meaning and scope of the term "saudayika" as used in classical texts and later commentaries and treatises on Hindu law. Their reasoning proceeded in these principal steps:
- Identify the decisive legal question: whether a bequest by a maternal grandfather to a married woman is a species of saudayika stridhan such that she may independently dispose of it without her husband's consent. The lower Court had found non-cohabitation and treated the property as saudayika.
- Examine primary textual definitions: the Court cited Katyayana and Vyasa texts quoted in Mayukha and Mitakshara setting out that "that which is obtained by a married woman, or by a virgin in the house of her husband or of her father, from her brother or from her parents, is termed Saudayika." The Court considered variant translations and commentaries (Mayukha, Mitakshara, Smriti Chandrika, Vriddha Vyasa, and others) which discuss saudayika and note that it was given by kindred out of affection for maintenance.
- Consider the nature of the textual formulae: the Court emphasized authorities (Mitakshara placita, Mayukha, Colebrooke's Digest and commentaries such as Chandeswara, Misra, Jimutavahana, Raghunandana) that interpret the catalogue of donors ("brother or parents") as illustrative rather than exhaustive. Several commentators and texts were cited to show that the notion of "affectionate kindred" (sudaya) is broader than a literal list of particular relatives.
- Apply interpretive precedents and doctrinal analogies: the Court noted that other doctrines (for example, the concept of bandhudattam and the inclusion of matribandhus in Mitakshara) treat maternal relatives as included even when not explicitly listed; similarly the term "son" was previously held to be used generically in other contexts. From this pattern, the judges reasoned that the word "parents" and the overall concept of "affectionate kindred" logically include a maternal grandfather.
- Weigh appellant's textual objection and case law: the appellant argued that no text expressly mentions a maternal grandfather; the Court observed that the leading reported cases (Bhau v. Raghunath and Muthukaruppa Pillai) did not directly resolve the exact issue, but Muthukaruppa Pillai's reasoning and the cited commentaries supported a broad reading of "affectionate kindred." Bhau v. Raghunath in particular did not decide the precise question because of its distinct facts.
- Reach the legal conclusion: synthesizing the textual definitions, commentarial glosses, and precedents, the Court concluded that a bequest from a maternal grandfather possesses the essential attribute of a gift from affectionate kindred and therefore falls within the class of saudayika stridhan. Hence the wife could lawfully alienate it without the husband's consent. Because this conclusion disposed of the appeal, the Court did not consider the alternative abandonment-based ground further.
Holding and Implications
Holding (core ruling): The appeal is dismissed; the property bequeathed to the plaintiff's wife by her maternal grandfather is saudayika stridhan, and the wife could alienate it without the husband's consent.
Immediate implications for the parties:
- The judgment and decree of the lower Court (which upheld the deed of gift) are affirmed and the plaintiff's claim for a declaration of invalidity is rejected.
- The defendant (the wife's brother) retains the benefit of the deed of gift; the wife's act of alienation is treated as valid under the saudayika principle.
Broader implications: The opinion grounds its decision on textual interpretation and established commentarial authorities treating the list of donors as illustrative; the Court did not purport to announce any novel legal principle beyond applying those established interpretive approaches. The opinion did not expressly state that it was creating a new precedent.
Appeal dismissed.
Patkar, J.:—
This was a suit brought by the plaintiff for a declaration that the deed of gift passed by his wife Tulsava in favour of the defendant, her brother, was invalid as it was passed by her without the consent of the plaintiff, her husband.
The property in suit was bequeathed in 1907 by the maternal grandfather to the plaintiff's wife Tulsava, who passed a deed of gift in 1926 in respect thereof in favour of her brother, the defendant. According to the finding of the lower Court, which we think is correct, the plaintiff and his wife did not live together ever since they were married. The learned Subordinate Judge held that the property which came to the plaintiff's wife was saudayika stridhan, and therefore, she was competent to make a gift in favour of her brother without the consent of her husband. In the alternative he held that even if it were not saudayika stridhan, she was competent to alienate it as she had been abandoned by her husband and was not under coverture, and relied on the decision in the case of Bhagvanlal v. Bai Divali.
The question, therefore, in this appeal is whether the property which the plaintiff's wife obtained by bequest from her maternal grandfather is saudayika stridhan according to Hindu law. According to the decision in Bhau v. Raghunath, saudayika stridhan is that which is obtained by a married woman or by a virgin in the house of her husband or of her father, from her brother or parents. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that this being a bequest from the maternal grandfather, it is not obtained from her brother or her parents and therefore it is not saudayika stridhan. The dictionary meaning of saudayika is “whatever is given to a woman at marriage by her parents, or a relative in general, which becomes her own property.”
The text dealing with this question in Mayukha, Chapter IV, section X, pl. 5 and 8, (Mandlik's translation, p. 93) is as follows:—
“‘A wife, a son, and a slave are all incapable of property. Whatever they earn, belongs to him to whom they belong’, that too has reference to wealth acquired by mechanical arts and the like. It is also proper [to interpret the text as showing] the absence of absolute dominion even in the adhivedanika or other [species of stridhan]. Hence, says Manu [Ch. IX v. 199]:—‘a woman shouldnever make [any] expenditure out of tie family [property] belonging to several or even [out of] her own wealth without the assent of her husband’ … In a certain [kind of] property, Katyayana declares [their] absolute dominion. ‘That which is obtained by a married woman, or by a virgin in the house of her husband, or of her father, from her brother, or her parents, is termed Saudayika. The independence of women who have received the Saudayika wealth, is desirable [in regard to it], for it was given [by their kindred] for their maintenance out of affection. The power of women over Saudayika at all times is celebrated both in respect of gift and sale, according to their pleasure, even in [the case of] immoveables.”
In Colebrooke's Digest of Hindu Law, Volume II, pages 594 and 595, after reciting the texts of Katyayana, reference is made to several commentaries. Reference is made to Chandeswara, who says that the words “from her brother or her parents” are merely illustrative and a gift from affectionate kindred would include a gift from other persons. Misra, instead of saying from other persons, says “from her own kindred, or from the relations of her lord.” Reference is made to Jimutavahana who says:— “That which is received from affectionate kindred (sudaya), is the gift of affectionate kindred (saudayica).” Then Raghunandana's commentary is:—“That which is received from an affectionate father, mother, or husband, or from the kindred of these, is a gift from affectionate kindred.”
Apararka quotes also the text of Vriddha Vyasa as follows:—
“That which is received by a woman either at the time of or subsequent to the marriage or which is obtained from the house of the father or the brother is called Saudayika.”
In Smriti Chandrika for the word (brother), the word (husband) is used. In Smriti Chandrika, Ch. IX, s. II, pl. 5 and 6, the texts of Katyayana and Vyasa are cited. See Setlur's translation, page 260:—
“5. The same author [Katyayana] also defines Saudayika: ‘That which is received by a married woman or by a maiden in the house of her husband, or of her father, from her brother or from her parents, is termed the gift of affectionate kindred [Saudayika].’”
“6. Vyas accordingly:—‘Wealth which is received by a woman either at the time of, or subsequent to, marriage, from the house of the father or the husband, is denominated Saudayika.’”
The subject relating to the description of stridhan is dealt with in Mitakshara, Ch. II, s. XI, Gharpure's translation, pages 270 to 274, and Mayukha, Ch. IV, s. X, Gharpure's translation, pages 127 to 131.
In placitum (4) the Mitakshara dealing with the six kinds of stridhan mentioned by Manu says that the denomination of sixfold property of a woman is intended not as a restriction of a greater number but as a denial of a less. It would, therefore, follow that the texts are not exhaustive but illustrative. In placitum (5) Saudayika is defined as follows:—“That which is received by a married woman or by a maiden, in the house of her husband or of her father, from her brother or from her parents, is termed ‘a kind gift’ (saudayikam).” A gift after marriage in the house of her father would include the gift from the father's relations. Further Yainyavalkya in verse 144 mentions a kind of stridhan (Bandhudattam) that which has been given to a woman by her kindred and is explained by Mitakshara as follows:—“By her kindred, i.e, by the matribandhus as well as pitribandhus of the damsel.” A maternal grandfather would be included in the matribandhus.
Mayukha in Ch. IV, section X, pl. 5 to 8, Gharpure's translation pp. 128 and 129, deals with the text of Katyayana. In pl. (5) the Mayukha in dealing with the texts of Katyayana and Vyasa says that even immoveable property can be given in gift by father, mother, brother,-husband and kindred (Dnati). In pl. (7) and (8) distinction is made as regards wealth acquired from mechanical arts and received from a stranger and also presents at the time of supersession (Adhivedanika) which can be spent with the assent of her husband, and in pl. (8) reference is made to the power of disposal over saudayika as being stridhan over which the woman has independent power of disposal on the ground that it is given out of affection and for maintenance. Distinction is, therefore, made between a gift from kindred which term would include maternal grandfather and gift from a stranger as regards the power of disposal.
Mayne in his Hindu Law, 9th Edition, pp. 971 and 972, after referring to the text of Katyayana and Vyasa, states:—
“Provided the gift is made by the husband, or by a relation either of the woman or of her husband, it seems to be immaterial whether it is made before marriage, at marriage, or after marriage; it is equally her saudayika.”
The same view is accepted by Golapchandra Sarkar Shastri in his Hindu Law, 6th Edition, p. 638, and by Sir Dinshah Mulla in his Hindu Law, 7th Edition, p. 142, followed in Emperor v. Sat Narain
Sir Gurudas Banerjee in his Hindu Law of Marriage and Stridhan, 5th Edition, p. 337, observes that “Saudayika, or gift of affectionate kinsmen, is explained as being a general name for several sorts of stridhan.”
In Bhau v. Raghunath, the vritti was inherited by the woman as the bequest to her by the grandmother was invalid, and the precise point under consideration did not arise for decision.
In Muthukaruppa Pillai v. Sellathammal,(3) Seshagiri Ayyar J. observes as follows (p. 300):—
“An examination of the various commentaries shows that stridhanam property is divisible into Yautaka and Ayautaka. Yautaka is that which is given at the nuptial fire. That interpretation is in accordance with the etymological significance of the term. In that term, moreover, are included all gifts made during the marriage ceremonies. Ayautaka is gift made before or after marriage. Saudayika includes both Yautaka and Ayautaka not received from strangers. It is defined to be gifts from affectionate kindred. This property can be dealt ??? by a married woman in any way she likes.”
The gift or bequest from a maternal grandfather, having the essential attribute of a gift from relations or affectionate kindred falls within the class of stridhan called saudayika.
I think, therefore, that the lower Court is right in holding that the property obtained by the plaintiff's wife by bequest from her maternal grandfather is saudayika stridhan, and she can alienate it without the consent of her husband.
It is, therefore, unnecessary to go into the alternative ground on which the decision of the lower Court is based, and consider the decision in the case of Bhagvanlal v. Bai Divali.(4)
We, must, therefore, dismiss this appeal with costs.
Murphy, J.:—This is a plaintiff's appeal and the grievance is that the Court below has refused him a declaration that his wife had no power to give her stridhan estate to her brother, during the continuance of their marriage and without his assent. What he set out to prove was that the property gifted was ordinary stridhan and not the kind which is excepted from the need of the husband's sanction before alienation, and that he has been living with his wife, in order to counter the finding of abandonment of the Court below…..
As to the first point, the decision turns upon whether the property in question is of the class of stridhan known as saudayika, or not. If it is, then the husband's sanction was not necessary to the wife's gift. This property which consists of a house and some land, was willed to the defendant by her grandfather. To discover the answer we must refer to one of the governing texts of the Hindu law. According to Mr. Ghose's translation of this text, quoted in the judgment in Muthukaruppa Pillai v. Sellaihammal, saudayika is, “whatever is received from the husband's father's family, from the brothers, or from the parents.” According to the translation in Sir Dinshah Mulla's work on Hindu Law, the meaning of the text is “what a woman, either after marriage or before it, either in the mansion of her husband or of her father, receives from her lord or her parents is called Saudayika, that is, a gift from affectionate kindred.” Our attention has been drawn to another version to be found in Golapchandra Sarkar Sastri's book on Hindu Law, which is to the following effect: “That which is received by a married woman or maiden in the house of her husband or of her father, from her husband or from her parents, is termed the gift of affectionate kindred.” The word itself means good kindred and this finds expression in the term of “affectionate kindred.”
Mr. Thakor's main contention has been that there is no text which includes as saudayika a gift from a maternal grandfather as in this case. On the other hand, gifts from strangers come within another category, and unless we consider the grandfather as included in the group of parents, there is no place for him in this connection for clearly he is not a stranger. The case law does not solve the exact question before us. The leading cases are Bhau v. Raghunath and Muthukaruppa Pillai v. Sellathammal. The Bombay case was a decision that property got by inheritance was not saudayika, though it had originally been got as a gift, and it was held that the gift was exhausted on the donor's—a Hindu widow's—death owing to her limited estate. In the Madras case, the property had been gifted by the father to the daughter, and it was held to be saudayika as being included in the gifts from affectionate kindred. Neither of these cases really cover the point we have to decide.
It is clear that the plaintiff can only succeed if we hold that the terms used in the text are meant to exclude all donors except the husband, or the father, or the brother or the mother, that is, who are not mentioned. Personally I think “parents” would include a maternal grandfather, as this view seems to be more in harmony with the general ideas of the Hindu law on the subject, as in the case of bandhus where the mother's father is not mentioned in the list of the matribandhus but has been held to be included logically, the reason given being that the text is illustrative and not exhaustive. Similarly, the word son has been used in the text, and has been held by the Court to be used in a generic sense and not literally. So here it seems to me that the real meaning must have been to include both the ancestral lines, and not to limit it to the immediate parents of the person mentioned.
I agree, therefore, that the case has been rightly decided, and the appeal must be dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
B.G.R
Alert