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Pandurang Sakharam Thakur v. Narmadabai
Judgment Summary (Beaumont, C.J. and Broomfield, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
This is a second appeal from a decision of the District Judge of Ratnagiri. The dispute concerns the title to joint family property following an adoption. At the time of adoption Sakharam allegedly owned the whole family property. The plaintiff (who was thirty years old at the date of adoption) was adopted by Sakharam. The plaintiff contends that, despite having agreed at the time of adoption that he would take only half of the joint property (the other half to pass to relatives of Sakharam), such an agreement is void and that, as adoptive son, he is entitled to the whole property. The defendants claim under the agreement and are in possession. The plaintiff sued to obtain possession of the whole property. The District Judge's decision (and concurrent findings of lower courts) are under challenge in this second appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an adopted son who was an adult (sui juris) at the time of adoption is bound by an agreement made at the time of adoption limiting his share in the adoptive father's property.
- Whether the decision in Kashibai v. Tatya (a decision of this Court) has been implicitly overruled by the Privy Council decision in Krishnamurthi Ayyar v. Krishnamurthi Ayyar.
- Whether the agreement relied on by the defendants required a written instrument and registration (i.e., whether section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act or section 17 of the Indian Registration Act renders the agreement void or unenforceable without a registered document).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (Plaintiff) — Mr. Desai
- Contended that the agreement made at the time of adoption is void and that the plaintiff, being the adoptive son, is entitled to the whole property.
- Relied on the Privy Council decision in Krishnamurthi Ayyar v. Krishnamurthi Ayyar to argue that an adopted person cannot elect to accept adoption subject to conditions and then later repudiate the adoption or the associated conditions.
- Also argued that, if the agreement were a transfer or gift, it would require writing and registration under section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act and section 17 of the Indian Registration Act; therefore, lacking a registered document, the agreement should not be held enforceable.
Respondents (Defendants)
- Asserted title through the agreement made at the time of adoption under which the plaintiff purportedly agreed to take only half the joint property and the balance would go to Sakharam's relations.
- Are in possession of the disputed property; the agreement is relied on as a defence to the plaintiff's claim for the whole property.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Kashibai v. Tatya | Held that an adopted son who was of full age and who deliberately arranged the extent of his interest at the time of adoption is bound by that arrangement. | The Court treated this decision as binding on the present bench and applied it to hold that a major adopted son is bound by an agreement made at the time of adoption limiting his share. |
| Krishnamurthi Ayyar v. Krishnamurthi Ayyar (Privy Council) | Addressed agreements made on the adoption of an infant by the natural father on the infant's behalf; held such arrangements generally do not limit the rights of the adopted son, and expressed that the doctrine of approbate and reprobate does not apply because the adopted son (in that case a minor) has no election. | The Court distinguished this authority on the ground that it dealt with a minor; it did not consider the case of an adult adoption and therefore did not implicitly overrule Kashibai v. Tatya as applied to adults. |
| Ramasawmi Aiyan v. Vencataramaiyan | Held that an agreement made on behalf of an infant (by the natural father) limiting the infant's rights could be ratified by the adopted son upon attaining majority; implies that a person of full age could validly enter into such an agreement. | The Court cited this as supportive authority that a major can make an agreement affecting his interest and that such agreements can be ratified — reinforcing the view that a major adopted son is capable of contracting away rights at the time of adoption. |
| Shivram v. Ramkrishna (Mr. Justice Madgavkar) | Discussed Krishnamurthi Ayyar; concerned facts where a will and later adoption raised distinct issues; some dicta were not accepted by the current Court. | The Court found the case distinguishable on its facts (it dealt with a will and post-adoption disposition by the adoptive father) and did not accept all dicta of Mr. Justice Madgavkar regarding the Privy Council decision. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's reasoning proceeds in the following steps (as expressed in the opinion):
- Characterisation of the plaintiff's best case: The Court framed the plaintiff's contention in its strongest light — that Sakharam owned the whole family property at adoption and that an arrangement was made that the plaintiff would take only half, the remainder going to Sakharam's relations.
- Application of local precedent: The Court relied on the decision in Kashibai v. Tatya, which held that an adopted son of full age who deliberately agreed as to the extent of his interest at the time of adoption is bound by that agreement. The bench treated Kashibai as a binding decision of their Court and a controlling authority for cases involving adoption of adults.
- Distinguishing the Privy Council decision: The plaintiff relied on Krishnamurthi Ayyar v. Krishnamurthi Ayyar (Privy Council). The Court analysed that decision closely and concluded it dealt with the adoption of an infant and agreements made by the natural father on behalf of the infant. The Privy Council's remarks rejecting the doctrine of approbate and reprobate (on the ground that the adopted son has no election) were read by the Court in the context of infancy; the Court therefore declined to apply that statement as a general rule applicable to adoptions of adults.
- Consideration of the doctrine of approbate and reprobate: The Court noted the Privy Council's general statement that the doctrine assumes an election and therefore could not apply where the adopted person has no election (i.e., the infant). The Court reasoned that an adult has an election whether to be adopted and hence the doctrine can apply to adoptions of adults; that is, an adult who consents to adoption on terms should not be allowed to accept adoption and later repudiate the contemporaneous agreement.
- Support from Ramasawmi Aiyan: The Court relied on Ramasawmi Aiyan v. Vencataramaiyan as authority that an agreement affecting an adopted person's interest can be ratified when the adopted person attains majority; the Court inferred that if ratification is possible, then the adopted person being sui juris could himself have made the agreement.
- Treatment of Shivram v. Ramkrishna: That case was found distinguishable on its facts (it involved a will and subsequent disposition by the adoptive father) and the Court declined to accept some of the dicta in that judgment concerning the effect of the Privy Council decision.
- On the registration/writing point: The Court considered the submission that the agreement was a gift requiring writing under section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act and registration under section 17 of the Indian Registration Act. The Court found no gift nor any document; it held that those provisions do not apply to the family arrangement alleged. The Court expressly stated that the Registration Act applies only when a document is necessary, and here a document was not proven or required.
- Conclusion of analysis: Given that the plaintiff was adopted as an adult and that, on the facts as found, he had entered into the limiting agreement at the time of adoption, the Court held that the agreement is effective and the plaintiff failed to establish title to the whole property.
Both Beaumont, C.J. and Broomfield, J. reached substantially the same conclusion: Kashibai v. Tatya remains good law for adoptions of adults; Krishnamurthi Ayyar is distinguishable as it concerns infants; Ramasawmi Aiyan supports the proposition that agreements affecting an adopted person's rights may be effective in relation to a person of full age; and the document/registration argument was unsustainable on the facts.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is dismissed with costs; the Civil Application is dismissed with costs; the decree of the lower court is confirmed.
Direct consequences for the parties:
- The plaintiff fails to establish title to the whole property and cannot oust the defendants who claim under the agreement and are in possession.
- The defendants' claim under the agreement relied upon at the time of adoption is upheld to the extent found by the courts below.
Broader precedential implications (as stated or implied in the opinion):
- The Court treated the earlier decision in Kashibai v. Tatya as binding in cases where the adopted person was an adult and held that the Privy Council decision in Krishnamurthi Ayyar (which dealt with an infant) did not implicitly overrule Kashibai in relation to adults.
- The opinion indicates no new general rule overturning prior local authority; rather, it clarifies that the Privy Council's statements must be read in the factual context of infancy. The Court did not purport to lay down a novel precedent beyond applying existing authorities to the facts before it.
Decree confirmed.
J.G.R
Beaumont, C.J:—
This is a second appeal from a decision of the District Judge of Ratnagiri. [His Lordship stated the facts as above set out and continued:]
Now, putting the case at the highest in the plaintiff's favour it comes to this, that at the time of his adoption Sakharam was the owner of the whole of the family property, and that he agreed with plaintiff that after adoption the plaintiff should only get half of the joint property, and the other half should go to the defendants as claiming through Sakharam's brother. On that basis, Mr. Desai on behalf of the plaintiff says that the agreement is void, and that he is entitled to the whole property. He contends that, although the plaintiff was 30 years old at the date of the adoption, and although he may have agreed that if Sakharam would adopt him he would allow half the family property to go to Sakharam's relations, nevertheless he is entitled now to claim the benefit of the adoption, and not carry out that agreement, and he says that we are bound to arrive at that conclusion because of the case in the Privy Council to which I have referred. But before coming to that case I would point out that this very question is covered by a decision of this Court in Kashibai v. Tatya. In that case it was held that an adopted son who was of full age, having deliberately made an arrangement as to the extent of his interest in the property of his adoptive father at the time of his adoption, was bound by it. That case was not cited and is not in terms overruled by Krishnamurthi Ayyar v. Krishnamurthi Ayyar in the Privy Council. In that case the agreement in question was made on the adoption of an infant, and was made by the natural father on behalf of the infant, and what the Court held was that, except in respect of an arrangement whereby the widow of the adoptive father is to enjoy the property during her life or for a less period, any arrangement or agreement made by a natural father on behalf of an infant on the occasion of his adoption is not effectual to limit the rights of the adopted son. Their Lordships dealt at length with the cases and they arrived at the conclusion I have stated. But at page 263 they say this:—
“Next, can the case be solved by the doctrine of approbate and reprobate? Their Lordships think clearly not, for the doctrine of approbate and reprobate assumes election, and the adopted son has no election. He cannot undo the adoption and be as he was. The same fact destroys the idea of conditional adoption. The adoption cannot be undone; it cannot, therefore, be conditional.”
Mr. Desai on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant says that statement of the law is a general statement, and applies whether the person adopted is a major or a minor. But I think the statement must be taken in connection with the facts of the case then before their Lordships, particularly the fact that the adopted person was a minor. I cannot myself see why, in the case of a major, the doctrine of approbate and reprobate should not apply. It is quite true that a person adopted, whether a major or a minor, cannot after wards get out of the adoption. But it seems to me that where a major is adopted he has an election whether he will be adopted or not. No doubt he is given in adoption by his natural father if he has one, and, if he has not, then by his mother. But obviously, if he is sui juris, he is entitled to say that he refuses to be given in adoption. If he agrees to be given in adoption and at the same time agrees that on that event happening be will carry out certain arrangements as to the property which he will acquire on adoption, I cannot see why he should be at liberty to accept the adoption and disregard the agreement. I know of no principle in Hindu or English law which enables that to be done and I do not think that their Lordships of the Privy Council intended to hold that such a thine was legal. Amongst the cases which are referred to in the judgment of the Privy Council is the case of Ramasawmi Aiyan v. Vencataramaiyan which seems to me to be a strong authority in favour of the view that a major is bound by an agreement which he makes on adoption. In that case a Hindu widow during the lifetime of her minor son alienated part of her husband's estate, and after the son's death she, under an authority from her husband, adopted the plaintiff, who was then an infant, and the plaintiff's natural father gave him in adoption under an agreement that he would inherit only about one-third of his late adoptive father's estate; that is to say, the father agreed in substance on behalf of his minor son that he would not challenge the alienation of the two-thirds made by the widow. Two years after the plaintiff's coming of age he entered into an agreement, which the Privy Council held amounted to a ratification of the agreement made on his behalf by his natural father on the occasion of the adoption, and the Privy Council held that ratification was effective. If the ratification was effective it necessarily follows that the agreement which was ratified might have been made by the ratifying party. There can be no ratification of an agreement which the person ratifying was not competent to make. Therefore it seems to me that decision is an authority for saying that the adoptive son could himself have made an agreement affecting his interest in the property of his adoptive father had he been sui juris.
We were also referred to a decision of Mr. Justice Madgavkar in Shivram v. Ramkrishna in which he discusses the case of Krishnamurthi Ayyar v. Krishnamurthi Ayyar. The case before Mr. Justice Madgavkar is clearly distinguishable from the present case because there a Hindu had made a will dealing with his property in a certain manner, and after that he adopted the defendant who was a major, and subsequently died; the will of course took effect from the death of the testator, and therefore that was a case of the adoptive father, after the adoption, disposing of the joint property in a way which he could not do; there was apparently some suggestion that at the time of the adoption the person adopted agreed to carry out the terms of the will, but I do not find that it was proved that any such agreement was made. I think, therefore, that case is distinguishable from the present case, but I am not prepared to accept some of the dicta of Mr. Justice Madgavkar as to the effect of the Privy Council decision.
It seems to me that we are bound by Kashibai v. Tatya which is a decision of this Court, and that we cannot hold that case is impliedly overruled by the decision of the Privy Council in which it was not cited. Moreover, if we adopted that course we should really be departing from the principle on which the decision of the Privy Council in Ramasawmi Aiyan v. Vencataramaiyan was based.
Mr. Desai also took a further point, viz., that the agreement, under which the defendants claim, is void as not being in writing or registered. But I am quite unable to see that there is any force in that argument. The suggestion is that the agreement amounts to a gift which requires to be in writing under section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, and that the written document ought to have been registered. But in point of fact there is no gift and no document and as far as I can see no foundation for applying either section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act or section 17 of the Indian Registration Act. The defendants are in possession and the plaintiff is suing to oust them; he sets up his title as the adopted son of Sakharam, and the answer to him is the agreement that he would not claim more than half the property. In my opinion there is nothing whatever in that second point. I think, therefore, that the appeal must be dismissed with costs. The Civil Application also is dismissed with costs.
Broomfield, J.:—In view of the finding that the brothers Sakharam and Soire were joint, the plaintiff as the adopted son of Sakharam would be the owner of the whole property in suit unless he is bound by the agreement which he entered into at the time of the adoption. According to the decision of this Court in Kashibai v. Tatya he is bound by that agreement and the principal question in this appeal is whether, as Mr. Desai for the appellant-plaintiff contends, that decision has been overruled by implication by the decision of the Privy Council in Krishnamurthi Ayyar v. Krishnamurthi Ayyar. In that case the Privy Council were dealing with a minor who had been given in adoption with the consent of his natural father. We have gone carefully through the judgment and in my opinion it is clear that their Lordships had not the case of an adult son in their minds at all. Although numerous decisions were cited, there was not a single case referred to in which the person given in adoption was sui juris, although there would seem to have been no reason at all why the case of Kashibai v. Tatya should not have been cited along with the other Bombay decisions if the minority of the adopted son had not been an essential factor in the question which was then being considered. I agree also with the learned Chief Justice that the remarks of their Lordships of the Privy Council with respect to the doctrine of approbate and reprobate are difficult to understand except on the assumption that they were dealing with the case of a minor. I am unable to see how an adult person who is given in adoption can be said to have no election. He can presumably elect that he will not go in adoption at all if the conditions are not satisfactory to him. In another case decided by the Privy Council, Ramasawmi Aiyan v. Vencataramaiyan, it was held that an agreement by the natural father limiting the rights of the adopted son was not void but capable of ratification on the adopted son's coming of age. In the case of Krishnamurthi Ayyar v. Krishnamurthi Ayyar their Lordships have not suggested that this previous case was wrongly decided, and it seems clearly to follow from it that if the agreement had been made by the adopted son himself being of full age it would have been a valid agreement.
The only other point taken by Mr. Desai is that we have no document evidencing the transaction and he has argued that the agreement set up is not valid and cannot be given effect to without an instrument registered under section 17 of the Indian Registration Act. Obviously the provision in the Indian Registration Act requiring certain documents to be registered has no application until it is first shown that a document is necessary. The only provision to which Mr. Desai referred us as showing that a document was necessary is section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act which relates to gifts, but the transaction with which we are concerned was obviously not a gift. In my opinion Mr. Desai has been quite unable to show that a document was necessary to give effect to a family arrangement of this kind. The plaintiff is suing to get possession of the whole property and it is for him to establish his title to it. If, as we hold, the agreement subject to which he was adopted is valid, then he has failed to establish his title, and I consider that the lower Courts were right and that the appeal should be dismissed.
Decree confirmed.
J.G.R
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