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Emperor v. Ganesh Raghunath Vaishampayan And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
An objection was raised concerning the admissibility of statements made to the approver by a man named Swamirao, alleged to be a co-conspirator but not an accused before the Court. The statements related to an alleged attack on the Lamington Road police station and were made after the attacking party had returned to the approver’s residence. The objection contended that these statements, being made after the completion of the attack, did not fall within the scope of section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act since they were not made in reference to the common intention of the conspirators.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether statements made by a co-conspirator after completion of the criminal act can be admitted under section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act as referring to the common intention of the conspirators.
- Whether narratives about past acts of the conspiracy qualify as statements "in reference to their common intention" under section 10.
- Whether statements about future actions or propaganda in furtherance of the conspiracy are admissible under section 10.
Arguments of the Parties
Crown's Arguments
- Any statement made by any one of the conspirators is a relevant fact, provided it is made after the time when the intention of the conspirators was first entertained by any one of them.
- The statements made by Swamirao should be admissible because they relate to the common intention of the conspirators, regardless of being made after the attack.
Defence's Objection
- The statements made after the completion of the attack do not come within section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act.
- Such statements are not made in reference to the common intention of the conspirators.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Emperor v. Abani Bhushan Chuckerbutty | Interpretation of section 10 regarding statements made by conspirators; confessions after arrest. | Used to illustrate that statements made after the act, especially confessions after arrest, may not be admissible as agency under section 10. |
| Sital Singh v. Emperor | Interpretation of the phrase "in reference to their common intention" under section 10. | Supports the view that statements must relate to a future intended act to be admissible under section 10. |
| Emperor v. Shafi Ahmed | Principle of agency among conspirators: acts done in pursuance of common design are admissible against all. | Used to explain the basis of section 10 and the scope of admissibility of statements among conspirators during the conspiracy. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court examined the language and purpose of section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act, emphasizing that the term "intention" implies acts intended in the future. It held that statements narrating past acts by conspirators do not refer to the common intention and are therefore inadmissible under section 10. The Court interpreted "in reference to their common intention" as referring to statements about future acts contemplated at the time of the statement.
The Court referred to the principle of agency underlying section 10, where once concert is proved, each conspirator acts as an agent for the others, making acts done in pursuance of the common design admissible. However, this agency does not extend to statements made after the completion of the act or after arrest, such as confessions or descriptions of past events.
Nonetheless, the Court distinguished parts of the statements which related to future plans, such as propaganda and the distribution of pamphlets, as admissible under section 10 because they concerned future acts in furtherance of the conspiracy’s objectives. The Court found that statements about the intended pamphlet, which might contain an account of the attack, were not mere narratives of past events but statements related to future intentions and thus admissible.
Holding and Implications
The Court held that statements made by a co-conspirator after the completion of the criminal act, which merely narrate past events, are not admissible under section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, statements concerning future acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, such as plans for propaganda, are admissible.
This decision limits the scope of admissible statements under section 10 to those made in reference to future common intentions rather than past acts, clarifying the temporal aspect of "intention" under the provision. The ruling directly affects the admissibility of evidence in conspiracy cases but does not establish new precedent beyond the interpretation of section 10 as applied.
Barlee, J.:—
An objection has been raised to the proof by the approver of some of the statements made to him by a man called Swamirao, who is alleged to have been a co-conspirator but is not an accused before this Court. The statements had reference to the alleged attack on the Lamington Road police station and were alleged to have been made after the return of the attacking party to the approver at his residence. The objection is that such statements made after the completion of the attack do not come within section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as they were not made in reference to the common intention of the conspirators. For the Crown Mr. Velinker argues that any statement made by any one of the conspirators is a relevant fact so long as it is made after the time when the intention of the conspirators was first entertained by any one of them.
Reading section 10 it appears to me that narratives coming from the conspirators as to their past acts cannot be said to have a reference to their common intention. The word “intention” implies that the act intended is in the future and the section makes relevant statements made by a conspirator with reference to the future. I interpret the words “in reference to their common intention” to mean in reference to what at the time of statement was intended in the future. This appears to me the ratio decidendi of the Calcutta cases, Emperor v. Abani Bhushan Chuckerbutty and Sital Singh v. Emperor, though the full argument is not contained in the judgments of their Lordships. On principle this interpretation seems to be correct. The principle on which section 10 is based is that of agency—see the extract from the judgment of Mr. Justice Crump at page 519 in Emperor v. Shafi Ahmed:—
“when concert has once been proved, each party is the agent of all the others, and acts done by him in pursuance of the common design are admissible against his fellow conspirators.”
It can scarcely be said, however, that one conspirator has any implied authority to make a confession after his arrest as in the case of Emperor v. Abani Bhushan Chuckerbutty, or even as in this case to give a description of past events to his co-conspirator.
But this ruling does not suffice for a decision as to all the portions of the record of the committing Magistrate to which the learned counsel for the defence object. It is not the case for the Crown that the object of the conspiracy was achieved by the attack on the police-station. That, it is said, was merely an incident. I find the following passage in the record of the committing Magistrate:—
“Bapat told Swami to continue this for eight days and then to lie low.”
And later on Swamirao said:—
“It is essential that a pamphlet should be written about this and be distributed.”
From this it appears that Swamirao proposed to start propaganda, in furtherance of the objects of the conspiracy. It is permissible under section 10 to prove what that propaganda was to be; and if the pamphlet was to contain an account of the attack on the Lamington Road police-station, the prosecution must be entitled to prove what that version was, not as a mere narrative of past events but as a statement which Swami intended to publish in the future in reference to the common intention.
B.K.D
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