Mahadev Dattatraya Rajarshi v. Secy. Of State .

1. The plaintiff's father in this case gave notice to the Secy. of State for India in Council on 17th August 1925. The plaintiff's father died on 17th September 1925, and the present suit was brought on 23rd December 1925. After the institution of the suit the plaintiff gave notice on 28th December 1925. The notice given by the plaintiff after the institution of the suit is useless.

2. The only question in this appeal is whether the notice given by the plaintiff's father on 17th August 1925, is a valid notice under section 80 of the cpc. Under S. 80:

“no suit shall be instituted against the Secy. of State for India in Council, … until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been, in the case of the Secy. of State in Council delivered to, or left at the office of, a Secretary to the Local Government or the Collector of the District, stating the cause of action, the name, description and place of residence of the plaintiff and the relief which he claims.”

3. The notice, therefore, must contain the name of the actual plaintiff who would bring the suit.

4. It is clear, therefore, from the wording of S. 80 that notice must be given by the person who becomes the plaintiff and by no other.

5. In Bachchu Singh v. Secy. of State (1) it was held that the language of S. 424 is imperative, and absolutely debars a Court from entertaining a suit instituted without compliance with the provisions of the section. At p. 191 it was observed:

“If we acceded to this contention, it appears to us that we should be addins words to S. 424 which find no place in it. It would be necessary to add after the words “name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff” some such words as “or of the party through whom such intending plaintiff claims.”

6. Those remarks apply with greater force to the present S. 80 in which the word “intending” has been omitted. We think, therefore, that the view taken by the lower Court is correct.

7. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that the word “plaintiff” is defined in the Limitation Act as “including any person from or through whom a plaintiff derives his right to sue.” That definition has not been adopted by the legislature in the Code of Civil Procedure, and would not govern S. 80 of the Code, and it must, therefore, follow that the actual plaintiff who brings the suit must give notice under section 80 of the cpc.

8. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal with costs.

R.M/R.K

9. Appeal dismissed.