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Narsi Tokersey And Company v. Sachindranath Gajanangidh
Kemp, J.:—
[His Lordship, after setting out the fact and issues, proceeded.] The date of birth of defendant No. 1 shows that at the date of the institution of this suit defendant No. 1 was over the age ??? eighteen years and under the age of twenty-one year and the position is the same to day. The plaintiffs contend that the appointment of the father as guardian ??? the property of these minor sons under the inherence jurisdiction of this Court is not the appointment of guardian of the property of the minor under section of the Majority Act (IX of 1875) because no appointment of the guardian of the property of a minor ??? can be made, where there are adult coparcener as the minor has only an undivided interest in the joint family property. In other words, they say that section 3 of Act IX of 1875 contemplates the existence separate property of the minor to which the guardian must be appointed.
I will first deal with the case law on the point. The can be no doubt that under the Guardians and Wards ??? VIII of 1890 no guardian can be appointed of a ??? coparcener's interest in the joint family property ??? there is any adult coparcener alive. This has been ??? down in the cases of Kajikar Lakshmi v. Maru Devi(1) Bindaji v. Mathurabai,(2) and the Privy Council case of Gharib-ul-lah v. Khalak Singh.(3) In the provision Council case a certificate of guardianship which we throughout the case assumed to be of the property we granted under section 8, Act XL of 1858, to the ??? as guardian of a minor coparcener and the judgment of their Lordships which was delivered by Sir ??? Wilson states as follows (p. 170):—
“It has been well settled by a long series of decisions in India that a ??? of the property of an infant cannot properly be appointed in respect of ??? interest in the property of an undivided Mitakshara family. And in their Lordships' opinion those decisions are clearly right, on the plain ground that the interest of a member of such a family is not individual property at all, and that therefore a guardian, if appointed, would have nothing to do with the family property.”
Now the certificate in that case was granted under Act XL of 1858, which was succeeded by the Guardians and Wards Act VIII of 1890. But it is to be noted that ??? on in their judgment at the same page of the report their Lordships, in dealing with the question of the certificate granted to another of the respondents who was also a coparcener but concerning whose age there was some doubt, state (p. 170):—
If it be true that the respondents' mother was appointed guardian of the second respondent as well as of the third (as seems to have been assumed in ???), that appointment might under Act XI of 1875, section 3, have the ??? of prolonging the minority of that respondent until he attained twenty-one.”
Therefore their Lordships expressed the opinion that though the certificate of guardianship was granted under the Act XL of 1858 the construction of section 3 the Majority Act IX of 1875 might have the effect of belonging the period of minority notwithstanding that ??? a guardian could not properly be appointed under Act XL of 1858 of a minor coparcener's interest to the joint family property.
Further, the cases show that where the guardian is pointed under the inherent jurisdiction of the High court such an appointment is valid. In Re Jagannath ??? Mr. Justice Starling held that the High Court ??? power to appoint guardian of the person and property of minor coparceners whether such minors possessed property or not. He states (p. 98):—
There is no doubt that the Court of Chancery has always had the power of pointing guardians to infants on a proper case being made out, whether ??? infants have property or not—see In re Spence, In re Fynn—though ??? ordinarily not necessary for a Court to interfere in cases where there is property—Wellesley v. The Duke of Beaufort(4). This power was possessed by the Supreme Court of Bombay under its charter, and was, amongst other powers, preserved to the High Court by the 24 and 25 Vict., c. 134, s. 9; and the Guardians and Wards Act VIII of 1890 also reserves the same power to the High Court.”
Indeed section 3 of the Guardians and Wards Act provides that nothing in that Act shall derogate in anyway from the jurisdiction of the High Court. The High Court, therefore, has in a proper case the jurisdiction which the Court of Chancery possessed to appoint guardians of the person or property of minors. Their in the case of In re Manilal Hurgovan our own appear Court held that under its general jurisdiction the High Court had power to appoint a guardian of the property of a minor who is a member of a joint Hindu family and where the minor's property is an undivided ??? in the family property. In that case the inherent jurisdiction was exercised in order to effect a sale of the family property and the Court considered it a ??? case for the appointment for the reasons given by ??? Lawrence Jenkins, C.J, at page 357 of the report. ??? therefore, hold that the High Court has jurisdiction appoint a guardian of the undivided share of a ??? coparcener where there are no adult coparceners in joint Hindu family.
Turning to section 3 of the Majority Act the ??? of the section merely exclude from the definition of guardian one who is appointed as guardian for a ??? within the meaning of Chapter XXXI of the Code Civil Procedure. There is nothing in the section who states that the minor must have separate property ??? a guardian of it can be appointed. It is my duty construe the section as it stands and it clearly ??? that the minority is extended to the completion of twenty-first year when a guardian of the property of minor has been appointed. Nor would it be ??? for the Court to hold an inquiry in every case who guardian of the property of a minor was appointed whether in fact the minor had separate property. I, therefore, hold that the period of minority, so far as defendant No. 1 in this suit is concerned, was extended ??? the completion of his twenty-first year.
Finally, it has been pointed out now that in Suit No. 2773 of 1926 which was a partition suit filed on November 29, 1926, by the present defendant No. 1's ??? against his father and the present defendant No. 1 the plaintiff in that suit was under the ruling which I have now given also a minor at the date of the stitution of that suit. But the answer to that appears ??? to be that the plaintiff in that suit, who is now defendant No. 2 in this suit, completed his twenty-first year in January 1927 and adopted the proceedings in ??? suit and continued them. And here I may refer to ??? Privy Council case of Gharib-ul-lah v. Khalak Singh, which I have already referred to, where the point in the passage that I last cited from the judgment of their Lordships is met by them in the following terms (p. 171):—
“As to this it seems sufficient to say that the second respondent is now of age and able to bring his case before the Court; that at the time of the ??? in question he was of full age according to the general Hindu law; ??? executed the mortgages himself as a person of full age; and that if ??? were any grounds for exempting him from liability, it was for him to them, which he has failed to do.”
??? is a very similar position to the position of the plaintiff in suit No. 2773 of 1926. Nor would the plaintiff position in that case have been different if a next ??? had been appointed for him in his place because questions in that suit were questions of law and ??? fully argued for him. I may state that in his ??? for his order dated March 19, 1928, the learned ??? Justice also adopted the view that the plaintiff in suit No. 2773 of 1926 had adopted and continued the proceedings in that suit after completing his twenty-first year. I, therefore, answer issue No. 1 in the affirmative.
I appoint Mr. Fahey guardian of defendant No. 1 for the suit. Liberty to the plaintiffs to amend the plain by describing defendant No. 1 as a minor and bringing on record Mr. Fahey as his guardian ad litem Mr. Fahey appointed guardian ad litem for defendant Nos. 3 and 4. The defendants waive service of the summons. Written statement to be filed by March 2, 1929, affidavit of documents by the 2nd proximo, inspection forthwith thereafter and hearing on April 11, ??? subject to part heard.
The plaintiffs to pay the costs of the trial of these ??? issues.
Attorneys for plaintiffs: Messrs Mohile & Parekh.
Attorneys for defendants: Messrs Madhavji & ??? Purnanand & Clubwala.
B.K.D
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