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Madhavrao Anandrao Raste v. Omkareshvar Ghat

Bombay High Court
Oct 30, 1928
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Judgment Summary — Shree Omkareshvar Ghat v. Sardar Madhavrao Anandrao Raste

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a suit instituted by the Shree Omkareshvar Ghat of Kondodant Nana Gadgil, acting through its vahivatdais (the plaintiffs), against Sardar Madhavrao Anandrao Raste (the defendant). The plaintiffs sought an account for the years 1880 to 1923 in respect of the amount due for a 2/16th share payable to the plaintiff institution by the defendant, a determination of the balance after village expenses, and recovery of the balance.

In his written statement the defendant's principal contention was that the suit was bad for want of a certificate under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). The learned Sub-ordinate Judge held that the suit was barred by Section 92 and Order I, Rule 8 of the CPC and dismissed the suit. On appeal the learned Assistant Judge reversed that decree and remanded the suit for decision on the merits, holding that the suit was not barred by Section 92 and Order I, Rule 8. The present appeal raises, inter alia, whether Section 92 bars the suit for want of a Collector's certificate and whether the Sub-ordinate Judge had jurisdiction.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure bars the present suit for want of a certificate from the Collector.
  2. Whether the Sub-ordinate Judge lacked jurisdiction to decide the suit because it was not a principal civil Court of original jurisdiction.
  3. Whether the suit is maintainable by the plaintiff-institution (Shree Omkareshvar Ghat) as a juristic/religious entity suing through its vahivatdars, rather than being a suit on behalf of the public contemplated by Section 92.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Defendant's) Arguments

  • The suit is barred for want of a certificate under Section 92 of the CPC (i.e., procedural prerequisites for suits concerning charitable or religious trusts were not complied with).
  • It was argued that the plaint (together with certain paragraphs in the counter-written statement) alleged a breach of an express trust created for public/charitable purposes, and therefore the suit falls within the ambit of Section 92.
  • It was also urged (later in the appeal) that the institution described as Shree Omkareshvar Ghat was not maintainable as plaintiff in this suit.

Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • The statements relied on by the appellant (paras. 4 and 7 of the counter-written statement) were made in reply to the defendant's denial that he was a trustee and not as an express allegation of breach of trust in the original plaint.
  • There is no clear or direct allegation in the plaint of a breach of an express or constructive trust created for public/charitable purposes, nor any prayer asking the Court for directions for the administration of such a trust as required by Section 92.
  • The suit is brought by the plaintiff-institution to enforce its own individual right to receive a portion of income payable by the defendant's family; it is not a suit brought on behalf of the public for the vindication of public rights under Section 92.
  • The plaintiff-institution is a religious/juristic entity capable of holding property and vindicating legal rights and may sue through its vahivatdars (Panchas).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Abdur Rahim v. Abu Mahomed (Privy Council) Considered scope of earlier statutory provision (S.539 under prior Codes) and accepted the Bombay High Court's view that suits praying the reliefs covered by the provision should be brought in accordance with that section. Used to frame the general inquiry into whether the present suit falls within the statutory scheme corresponding to Section 92 and to emphasize that the section's scope must be clearly established before it is held to apply.
Narayan v. Vasudeo Recognized the difficulty of deciding whether a case falls within Section 92 and involved trustees actually in the management of the temple and a prayer for directions about trust funds. Distinguished on facts: that case involved trustees managing the temple and an express prayer for directions; hence it did not determine the present case.
Jugalkishore v. Lakshmandas Held that a defendant who assumed management could become a constructive trustee and be liable; case concerned removal from management and settlement of scheme under court directions. Distinguished: present suit did not seek removal or court directions for management and the defendants were trustees of a different fund liable to pay a portion to the plaintiff, rather than trustees of the plaintiff-institution itself.
Nilkanth Devrao v. Ramkrishna Vithal Stated that Section 92 applies only when (1) an alleged breach of an express or constructive trust for public/charitable purposes is pleaded, and (2) a court direction is necessary for administration; mere resemblance to such suits is insufficient. Relied upon as authoritative articulation of the two conditions for Section 92 to apply; the court applied this two-part test and concluded the present suit did not satisfy it.
Appanna Poricha v. Narasinga Poricha Discussed suits by trustees against co-trustees for accounts and defined classes of cases to which Section 92 was intended to apply; emphasized suits by the public or Advocate-General for vindication of public charitable trusts. Relied upon (especially by Murphy, J.) to show the legislative intent and scope of Section 92 and to support the conclusion that the present suit does not fall within those classes.
Nellaiyappa Pillai v. Thangama Nachiyar Resembled the present case: trustees of a temple sued to recover money from representatives of trustees of a fund; held maintainable without sanction of Advocate-General or Collector under section 539 (earlier statute). Viewed as materially similar in essential features and supportive of the proposition that such suits may be maintainable; distinguished on the basis that the present case lacks a prayer for removal of the defendant from trusteeship.
Jodhi Bai v. Basdeo Prasad Authority for the proposition that religious institutions (like maths or idols) are juristic persons capable of holding property and vindicating legal rights. Applied to support the conclusion that the plaintiff-institution can sue through human agents (vahivatdars) to enforce its rights.
Babajirao v. Laxmandas Same general proposition as Jodhi Bai concerning juristic capacity of religious institutions to hold property and sue. Applied alongside Jodhi Bai to uphold the maintainability of the suit by the plaintiff-institution through its vahivatdars.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by identifying the legal test for the application of Section 92 of the CPC and examining whether the present suit satisfied it. The judges relied on prior authorities that articulated a two-condition test for Section 92 to apply:

  1. There must be an alleged breach of an express or constructive trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature.
  2. A direction of the Court must be deemed necessary for the administration of such trust (i.e., the relief sought must invoke court directions as to management or administration of the trust).

Applying that test to the pleadings in this case, the court found:

  • The original plaint does not contain a clear allegation of breach of an express or constructive trust for public or charitable purposes. While certain passages in the counter-written statement (paras. 4 and 7) could arguably be read to suggest concerns about proportions of payments, these were viewed as responses to the defendant's denial of trustee status rather than as a clear pleading of breach of trust required to invoke Section 92.
  • There is no prayer in the plaint seeking directions from the Court regarding the administration of any trust. The relief sought is an account and recovery of amounts due to the plaintiff-institution, not a request that the Court direct how a public charitable trust should be administered.
  • Substantively, the suit is a claim by the plaintiff-institution to recover an amount payable by the defendant's family from a fund for which that family act as trustees; once payments are made to the plaintiff-institution, the defendant-family has no further interest in the administration of the plaintiff's trust. Thus the dispute is characterized as an enforcement of an individual institutional right, not the vindication of public rights in a charitable trust under Section 92.
  • The court distinguished several precedents relied upon by the appellant where facts involved trustees in actual management, prayers for directions or removal, or allegations of constructive trusteeship tied to management of the same trust. Those factual matrices differed materially from the present case.

Both Patkar, J. and Murphy, J. agreed on this analytical approach. Murphy, J. reiterated the two-condition test (relying on Nilkanth Devrao and Appanna Poricha), observed that any allegation of breach of trust in this case was not made in clear terms in the plaint, and concluded that the suit does not fall within Section 92.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeal is DISMISSED. The court affirmed the view of the lower appellate court (the Assistant Judge) that the suit is not barred by Section 92 of the CPC and that the suit is maintainable by the plaintiff-institution through its vahivatdars. The appeal is dismissed with costs.

Direct Consequences for the Parties

  • The decree of the Sub-ordinate Judge (dismissing the suit on the ground of Section 92 and Order I, Rule 8) is not upheld; the Assistant Judge's remand for decision on the merits stands and the appeal is dismissed.
  • The plaintiff-institution (Shree Omkareshvar Ghat) is recognized as a juristic/religious entity capable of suing through its vahivatdars to enforce its claim for the portion of income payable by the defendant's family.

Broader Legal Implications

The court applied and relied on existing authorities to define the scope of Section 92 rather than creating any new legal principle. It reiterated that Section 92 applies only where both (a) a breach of an express or constructive public/charitable trust is clearly pleaded and (b) a court direction as to administration is sought; mere resemblance to cases under Section 92 is insufficient. The opinion therefore clarifies application of the statutory test on the facts but does not purport to lay down any novel precedent beyond the authoritative interpretations cited.

Note: This summary is confined to the facts, reasoning, precedents and rulings as set out in the provided opinion and does not add or infer any information beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

Patkar, J.:— This is a suit brought by the Shree Omkareshvar Ghat of Kondodant Nana Gadgil, through its vahivatdais, the plaintiffs, against the defendant Sardar Madhavrao Anandrao Raste, for as account for the years 1880 to 1923 in respect of the amount due for 2/16th share payable to the plaintiff institution by the defendant and for the determination of the balance due from the defendant after deducting the amounts of village expenses, and for the recovery of the balance due from the defendant.

2. The principal contention on behalf of the defendant in the written statement was that the suit was bad for want of a certificate under section 92 of the cpc. The learned Sub-ordinate Judge held that the suit was barred by S. 92, and O. 1, R. 8 of the CPC, and dismissed the plaintiff's suit. On appeal, the learned Assistant Judge reversed the decree of the lower Court and remanded the suit for decision on the merits, holding that the suit was not barred under S. 92 and O. 1, R. 8 of the CPC.

3. The defendant, in this case, is described as a trustee in the plaint. The ancestor of the defendant granted a Dharadatta Agrahar Inam in the year 1803 to several institutions, viz., the Shri Mahalaxmi of the Rastes, the seven Ghats of Wai and to seventeen specified Brahmin families. The plaintiff institution is one of the seven Ghats. The defendant's ancestor may be considered to have constituted himself and his family as trustee of the fund liable to the several institutions. The learned Assistant Judge is of opinion that the present suit is brought by the plaintiff institution through its Vahivatdars for recovery of the arrears from a person who is the holder of the fund charged with the liability to pay for expenses of the festivals of the plaintiff institution.

4. The question, therefore, in this appeal, is whether Section 92 of the CPC, bars the present suit for want of a certificate from the Collector, and whether the Sub-ordinate Judge bad jurisdiction to decide the suit as it was not a principal civil Court of original jurisdiction.

5. The scope of S. 92 has been discussed in a recent decision of the Privy Council in Abdur Rahim v. Abu Mahomed(1), where it was held that, under the Code of Civil Procedure of 1877, as well as the Code of 1882, the question had arisen whether S. 539 was mandatory and, therefore, all suits claiming any relief mentioned in S. 539 should be brought as required by that section or whether the remedy provided by S. 539 corresponding to S. 92 of the present Code was in addition to any other remedy that existed under the law for redress of any wrongful action in connexion with a public trust of a charitable or religious nature. The view of the Bombay High Court, that the suit which prayed for any of the reliefs mentioned in S. 92 could only be instituted in accordance with the provisions of that section, was accepted by the Privy Council in the case of Abdur Rahim v. Abu Mahomed. The question therefore, in this case, is whether the present suit falls within the ambit of section 92 of the cpc. It has been argued on behalf of the appellant that the suit falls within the provisions of S. 92. Two conditions are necessary for the application of S. 92: first, there must be an alleged breach of any express or constructive trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature, and, secondly, the direction of the Court is deemed necessary for the administration of such trust. It is urged on behalf of the appellant that there is an allegation in the plaint of a breach of an express trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature, and reliance is placed on paras. 4 and 7 of the counter-written statement of the plaintiff. It is urged on behalf of the respondent that the statements in paras. 4 and 7 in the counter-written statement were made in answer to the contention of the defendant in the written statement that he was not a trustee and was not liable to pay anything to the plaintiff institution. It is further urged on behalf of the respondent that in the original plaint there is no express allegation of a breach of trust on the part of defend int. In para. 4, it is said:

“Soma amount is being received from the defendant from year to year for the Shrikrishnotsava of the plaintiff's Madhali Allicha Ghat (of Kondopant Nana). But it is not known whether the same is given in the proportion of the income received or in the par portion of the right.

6. And it is further stated in the same paragraph:

“So the whole matter should be made clear.”

7. It is suggested on behalf of the appellant that these statements amount to an allegation of a breach of an express trust created for a public purpose. We do not agree with the contention on behalf of the appellant that there is an alleged breach of any express or constructive trust created for public purposes in the plaint, and though such an allegation may by twisting of language be spelt out of the statements in the counter-written statement we think that for the purpose of S. 92 there must be a clear allegation of a breach of an express or constructive trust created for public purposes. It does not appear from the plaint that any direction of the Court is invoked for the administration of any such trust. In the present case there are two trusts, a trust which is to be performed by the defendant in respect of the fund of which the members of the defendant's family have constituted themselves trustees, and a second trust in respect of the plaintiff institution for the purpose of the several festivals which are to be performed during the year. As soon as the amount payable by the defendant's family is made over to the plaintiff-institution the plaintiffs are interested in the administration of the trust relating to the plaintiff institution, and the defendant family is not interested in the administration of that trust. In the plaint no direction is invoked in regard to the administration of the trust relating to the fund in the possession of the defendant's family; nor is there any direction invoked in regard to the administration of the trust relating to the plaintiff institution. The suit is a simple suit of the plaintiff institution through its managers to recover the amount payable by the defendant. In my opinion there being no express allegation of a breach of a constructive trust for public purposes and there being no prayer for direction to the Court for the administration of such trust, Section 92 of the CPC, does not apply to the present suit. What we have to see is the nature of the suit, not in its form but in its substance. Though an account is asked for and that relief may fall under S. 92(d), the present suit is really a suit brought by the plaintiff institution to recover the amount due to the plaintiff institution by the defendant's family, who have constituted themselves trustees of the fund liable to pay certain portion of that fund to the plaintiff for the observance of the several festivals in which the plaintiff institution is interested.

8. On behalf of the appellant a reference is made to the case of Narayan v. Vasudeo(2). In that case the difficulty of deciding whether a particular case falls within the scope of S. 92 was recognized. The facts of that case are quite different from the facts of the present case. There the defendants trustees were in the actual management of the temple in respect of which the suit was brought and there was a prayer for a direction as to what should be done with the trust funds. The suit there was against the trustees of the temple in respect of which the suit was brought and there was a specific relief asking for a direction as to what should be done with the trust funds. In that case there was really a dispute between the parties as to who were or should be the trustees of a public trust. In the present case as soon as the amount was paid by the defendant's family they had no further interest in the administration of the fund so far as the plaintiff-institution was concerned.

9. In the case of Jugalkishore v. Lakshmandas(3), referred to on behalf of the appellant, it was held that the defendant though he was not appointed as a trustee had made himself a constructive trustee, by purporting to manage it as temple property and was liable as such to the beneficiaries. That was a suit brought on behalf of a Hindu temple by the pujari and five other worshippers of the idol alleging a breach of a constructive trust and praying for the removal of the defendant from the management and for settlement of a scheme under the directions of the Court for the future management of the charity.

10. In Nilkanth Devrao v. Ramkrishna Vithal(4) it was held, that S. 92 applied only when two conditions were satisfied, first, either there must be an alleged breach of an express or constructive trust created for a public purpose of a charitable or religious nature, and, secondly, a direction of the Court must be deemed necessary for the administration of any such trust. It was further held that unless the suit fell within the scope of section 92 of the cpc, 1908, the mere fact that it resembles in certain respects a suit which may properly be brought under S. 92 can afford no good ground for holding that S. 92 could apply. In that case the suit was brought by the hereditary muktesara (trustees) of a temple for a declaration that defendants 1 to 4 were not properly appointed trustees of the temple, and for an injunction restraining them from interfering with the plaintiffs in the management of the affairs of the temple, and it was held that the suit was outside the scope of that section as the plaintiffs were not suing on account of any breach of trust as contemplated by it, nor were they applying for any direction of the Court for the administration of the trust.

11. The case of Appanna Poricha v. Narasinga Poricha(5), which refers to a suit brought by one of the trustees against a co-trustee for accounts, does not directly apply to the facts of the present case where the defendants are not the trustees of the plaintiff-institution, but trustees of a different fund liable to pay a portion of the fund to the plaintiff-institution.

12. The case of Nellaiyappa Pillai v. Thangama Nachiyar(6) resembles the present case in its essential features. In that case the trustees of a temple sued to recover from the representatives of the trustees of a fund constituted for special purposes in connexion with the temple worship a sum of money misappropriated by him and to obtain the appointment in his place of himself or some other fit person, it was held that the suit was maintainable without the sanction of the Advocate-General or the Collector under section 539 of the cpc. In the present case, however, there is no prayer for removal of the defendant from his position of a trustee of the fund in his charge. We think, therefore, the view of the lower appellate Court is correct that the suit is not barred by section 92 of the cpc.

13. Another point which was not taken in the lower Court is urged on behalf of the appellant, viz., that the present suit brought by the institution described as Shri Omkareshvar Ghat was not maintainable. On the other hand, it has been argued on behalf of the respondent that it is a religious institution and that the present suit is not brought on behalf of the public, but to enforce the individual right of the plaintiff-institution entitled to receive a portion of the income from the defendant. A temple is attached to each of the several Ghats. We agree with the contention of the respondent that the suit is maintainable by the present plaintiff-institution, the Shree Omkareshvar Ghat, a religious institution. The property can be said to belong to the plaintiff-institution in an ideal sense like other religious institutions and temples. The plaintiff-institution like a math or an idol is a juristic person capable of holding property and acquiring and vindicating legal rights though of necessity it can only act in relation to those rights through the medium of some human agency: see Jodhi Bai v. Basdeo Prasad(7) and Babajirao v. Laxmandas(8). The plaintiff-institution can, therefore, bring a suit through its vahivatdars, the Panchas. The suit, therefore, brought by the present plaintiff is not a suit brought on behalf of the public for vindication of the rights of the general public as contemplated by S. 92, but was a suit by the plaintiff-institution to enforce the right to recover the amount due to the institution from the defendant. We think that the view of the lower Court is correct and, therefore, dismiss the appeal with costs. Murphy, J.:— The facts have already been fully set out in my learned brother Patkar's judgment, and I need not recapitulate them. The simple question before us is whether the plaintiff's suit is within one of the classes covered by Section 92 of the CPC, and is consequently barred by the formalities required by that section not having been complied with, or is not covered by the section. I think that it is not a suit of the nature contemplated in S. 92. It was actually brought by certain persons, who described themselves as the Panchas” of a charity known as “Shree Omkareshvar Ghat,” against the representative of the Raste family whose ancestor was the donor of an allowance of Rs. 100 to this “Ghat,” apparently for the purposes of the annual Dtsava” and in support of its attached Brahmins. In fact, it is a claim by the Brahmins for what they believe to be a larger sum which has become available owing to an increase in the village revenue, out of which the allowance is to be paid. The class of cases included in S. 92 has been very clearly defined in two cases on which I rely. The first of these is Nilkanth Devrao v. Ramkrishna Vithal, where the principle has been laid down that to be covered by the section there must either be an allegation in the plaint of a breach of trust, or a prayer for direction on some point in connexion with its management. Although it has been urged before us that an allegation of breach of trust has been made in this case, it certainly has not been made in dear terms, though it may possibly and with difficulty be spelled out from the plaintiff's counter written statement.

14. The second case I rely on is Appanna Poricha v. Narasinga Poricha. Kumaraswami Sastri, J., has at p. 127 of the same volume clearly defined the general classes of cases to which S. 92 was intended to apply. In his opinion the object was that it should govern suits by the public, or by the Advocate-General, or the vindication of the rights of the public in charitable trusts, and the relief asked for should be all or any of the reliefs specified in Cls. (a) to (h) of sub-S. (1). It appears to me that, looking at the section in the light of and with the aid of the opinions to be found in these rulings, it is not possible to say that the present suit, as framed, comes within any of the classes to which the section was intended to apply. I agree, therefore, that the learned Assistant Judge's judgment is correct, that his order of remand is proper, and that the appeal should be dismissed with costs.

15. Appeal dismissed.