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Anant Krishna Modak v. Sarasvatibai Padmanabh Shetti
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Baker, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff advanced Rs. 800 and some gold to Padmanabh (the husband of defendant 1, a goldsmith) so that Padmanabh might prepare certain ornaments. Padmanabh did not perform that work. Approximately three weeks later the plaintiff obtained a promissory note dated 20th August, 1920 for Rs. 1,200, signed by Padmanabh and by defendants 2 and 3 (described as Padmanabh's cousins). Padmanabh subsequently died.
The plaintiff sued defendant 1 (Padmanabh's widow) and defendants 2 and 3 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Honavar. The execution of the promissory note was admitted. The Subordinate Judge raised and decided an issue on consideration in favour of the plaintiff, and (after a plea of coercion was abandoned) passed a decree for Rs. 1,572 with costs and future interest at 6% to be recovered from the estate of the deceased Padmanabh in the hands of defendant 1 and from defendants 2 and 3; the suit as against defendant 4 was dismissed. Defendant 1 did not appeal; defendants 2 and 3 did appeal to the District Judge of Kanara.
On appeal, the District Judge held that the promissory note was void for want of consideration, set aside the decree of the first Court and dismissed the suit altogether (including as against defendant 1, who had not appealed). The plaintiff thereupon brought a second appeal to this Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the question of consideration could properly be argued in appeal where consideration had been admitted or treated as found by the trial Court.
- Whether there was any consideration for the promissory note executed about three weeks after the original transaction — specifically, whether the plaintiff's forbearance to sue (implied or expressed) constituted sufficient consideration for the note.
- Whether defendants 2 and 3 (who were not directly concerned in the original transaction) were bound by the promissory note, i.e., whether consideration paid to one joint promisor can support the promise of all joint promisors.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The learned pleader for the appellant contended that the issue of consideration ought not to have been argued in appeal because consideration was admitted in the lower Court (the Subordinate Judge appeared to be of the view that the note was based on the original advance of money and gold).
- The appellant sought restoration of the decree of the first Court which had found consideration and awarded Rs. 1,572 with costs and interest.
Respondents' / Defendants' Arguments
- The position taken in the lower appellate Court was that there was no consideration for the promissory note: the District Judge held that the consideration for the note (if any) was merely the plaintiff's forbearance to sue and that this was not sufficient because nothing was promised by the plaintiff; further, because the note was payable on demand the note itself imported the contrary (relying on the reasoning in Rustomji Ardesir Davar v. Ratanji Rustamji Wadia and on Section 92 of the Evidence Act).
- For the liability of defendants 2 and 3, the lower appellate Court relied on Nanak Ram v. Mehin Lal (a case where a later surety bond was held to lack consideration because the payment had been made to the debtor before the surety bond was given), and argued that the present case was analogous.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Rustomji Ardesir Davar v. Ratanji Rustamji Wadia | Held that a promissory note payable on demand, given for interest due on a mortgage (with interest on such interest), could not be enforced for want of consideration; the note itself imported the contrary where there was no promise by the creditor to forbear. | The District Judge relied on this case to support the view that a demand-note imports the contrary of a promise to forbear; Baker, J. distinguished that case from the present facts and did not accept it as decisive here. |
| Alliance Bank v. Broom | Established that forbearance by a creditor to enforce an existing debt, in consequence of an agreement, can be sufficient consideration to support a new promise. | The Court treated this as a leading case for the proposition that implied forbearance for a reasonable time can amount to consideration and applied it to hold that the plaintiff's forbearance supported the promissory note. |
| Fullerton v. Provincial Bank of Ireland | Held that it is not necessary that forbearance be for a definite specified time; an implied request for forbearance for a reasonable time can be inferred from circumstances. | The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that an implied, reasonable forbearance suffices as consideration even where no definite period is specified. |
| Sornalinga Mudali v. Pachai Naickan | Holds that consideration paid to any one of several joint promisors is legally sufficient to support the promise of all the joint promisors. | The Court invoked this rule to support the contention that defendants 2 and 3 could be bound by consideration given in respect of Padmanabh's obligation. |
| Fanindra Narain Roy v. Kacheman Bibi | Holds that it is not necessary that the promisor personally benefit from the consideration; it is sufficient if the promisee does an act which benefits a third person and which he would not have done but for the promise. | The Court applied this principle to conclude that the plaintiff's forbearance to sue Padmanabh benefited Padmanabh (and thereby supported the promise of defendants 2 and 3) even though the promisors themselves did not personally receive the original advance. |
| Nanak Ram v. Mehin Lal | Decision where money was advanced on a bond and a separate surety bond was executed later; held that the later surety bond lacked consideration because the payment (the original consideration) had been made to the debtor before the surety bond, and the creditor had not promised to do anything for the benefit of the debtor. | The District Judge relied on this case; Baker, J. distinguished it from the present case on the ground that in Nanak Ram the creditor neither promised nor did anything for the benefit of the principal debtor, whereas in the present case the plaintiff forborne suing for an appreciable period. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court addressed the matter in several analytical steps, relying closely on the facts and cited authorities.
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Whether consideration could be argued in appeal:
The Court examined the trial Court's judgment and found that the Subordinate Judge had been under the impression that the promissory note was based on the original handing over of cash and gold to Padmanabh. The Court observed, however, that the promissory note was not itself based on that original handing-over; rather, the relevant question was whether there was consideration for the promissory note executed some weeks after the original transaction. On that basis the Court treated the issue of consideration as properly open on appeal.
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Whether the plaintiff's forbearance constituted consideration:
The Court reviewed authorities (Alliance Bank v. Broom; Fullerton v. Provincial Bank of Ireland) establishing that a defendant's request for forbearance not specifying a time can be understood as a request for forbearance for a reasonable time, and that the plaintiff's forbearance extended for a reasonable time can constitute valid consideration where the defendant has offered a new promise in return. The Court rejected the lower appellate Judge's reliance on Rustomji Ardesir Davar as distinguishable, and rejected the argument that because the note was payable on demand (invoking Section 92 of the Evidence Act) no advantage could be shown to flow to the promisors.
The Court placed weight on the surrounding circumstances and on the words of the promissory note itself which stated that the defendants were unable to pay then and thus passed the note. The plaintiff had not sued on the promissory note for nearly three years. From these facts the Court inferred an implied request for forbearance and an actual forbearance for a reasonable time, and concluded that such forbearance was sufficient consideration for the promissory note.
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Liability of defendants 2 and 3 (joint promisors):
The Court considered authorities (Sornalinga Mudali; Fanindra Narain Roy) to the effect that consideration paid to one of several joint promisors is sufficient to support the promise of all, and that the promisor need not personally benefit from the consideration so long as the promisee did something which benefited a third person and which he would not have done but for the promise. Applying these principles, the Court held that the plaintiff's forbearance to sue Padmanabh in consideration of the promissory note was a benefit to Padmanabh and that defendants 2 and 3 were bound by the note on that consideration.
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Distinguishing authorities relied on by the lower appellate Court:
The Court considered Nanak Ram v. Mehin Lal (relied upon by the District Judge) and found it distinguishable because in that case the creditor did not promise to do anything for the benefit of the principal debtor and did not do anything; here, by contrast, the plaintiff forborne suing for an appreciable time, which constituted the relevant consideration.
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Conclusion of analysis:
On the combined application of the cited authorities and the factual findings about the contents of the promissory note and the plaintiff's conduct (forbearance for nearly three years), the Court concluded that there was sufficient consideration for the promissory note and that defendants 2 and 3 were bound thereby.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal was allowed. The Court set aside the decree of the lower appellate Court (District Judge of Kanara) and restored the decree of the first Court (the Subordinate Judge of Honavar) with costs throughout.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The decree of the first Court (for Rs. 1,572 with costs and future interest at 6% recoverable from the estate of the deceased Padmanabh in the hands of defendant 1 and from defendants 2 and 3) is restored and remains enforceable against those parties.
- No broader or novel legal principle was announced beyond applying established authorities on forbearance as consideration, joint promisors and the distinguishing of authorities relied upon by the lower appellate Court; the opinion explains why the prior appellate decision was incorrect on the facts and law in this case.
Note: The opinion records that Patkar, J. agreed with Baker, J., and concludes with the formal statement "Appeal allowed."
Baker, J.:— The plaintiff in this case sued the defendants on a promissory note dated 20th August, 1920 for Rs. 1,200. The note was passed under the following circumstances: The plaintiff had given Rs. 800 and some gold to Padmanabh, the husband of defendant 1, who was a goldsmith, in order that he might prepare certain ornaments. Padmanabh did not make the ornaments, and consequently, some three weeks later, the plaintiff obtained the suit promissory note which is signed by Padtnanabh and defendants 2 and 3 who are said to be his cousins. Subsequently, Padmanabh died and the plaintiff brought the present suit against defendant 1, who is Padminabh's widow, and defendants 2 and 3 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Honavar.
2. The execution of the promissory note was, and is, admitted, and an issue about consideration was raised in the first Court and it was found that there was consideration. The defendants raised the plea of coercion, but that has now been given up. The first Court, therefore, passed a decree for Rs. 1,572 with costs and future interest at 6 per cent, to be recovered from the estate of the deceased Padmanabh in the hands of defendant 1 and from defendants 2 and 3. The suit as against defendant 4 was dismissed. Defendant 1, he is the widow of Padmanabh, did not appeal against this decree, but defendants 2 and 3 did. In appeal the question of consideration was raised, and the District Judge of Kanara held in a lengthy judgment that the promissory note was void for want of consideration. He, therefore, set aside the judgment of the first Court and dismissed the suit altogether although defendant 1 had not appealed against the decree.
3. The plaintiff makes this second appeal to this Court. Although the facts are very simple, the case involves an important point of law.
4. As regards the first contention which has been raised by the learned pleader for the appellant that the issue of consideration ought not to have been argued in appeal because it was admitted in the lower Court, I think on reading the judgment of the first Court that the Subordinate Judge, in para. 2 on p. 9 of his judgment (printed paper-book), was under the impression that the suit promissory note was based on a consideration consisting in the advance of money and gold to Padmanabh, for he says:
It is not a case in which the note was passed without consideration. It is proved beyond doubt that the first defendant's husband received consideration. It is also conceded by defendants 2 and 3's pleader in his argument.
5. The promissory note, however, is not based on the consideration evidenced by the original handing over of cash and gold to Padmanabh, and the plaintiff's case is not based on that consideration. The question is whether there was any consideration for the promissory note which was passed by Padmanabh and defendants 2 and 3 about three weeks or a month after the original transaction. The learned Judge of the lower appellate Court has held that the consideration for the promissory note was the plaintiff's forbearance to sue and that is not sufficient to constitute consideration. He says:
To constitute consideration, it would be necessary that the plaintiff should have promised not to sue immediately. In the present case, nothing is promised by the plaintiff, and to adopt the words used in a similar case by the Bombay High Court, the note being payable on demand, there is not merely no evidence of such an agreement, but the note itself imports the contrary.
6. This is a statement from the case of Rustomji Ardesir Davar v. Ratanji Rustamji Wadia(1), where it was held that a promissory note, payable on demand, given for interest due on a mortgage-deed with interest on such interest, cannot be enforced by suit, there being no consideration for the making of such a note. That case was held to be distinguishable from the case of Alliance Bank v. Broom(2), to which I would presently refer, and in that case, not only was there no evidence of any agreement suspending the remedy for the existing debt until the note was due, but it was held that the note itself imported the contrary.
7. The promissory note in the presents case has been translated by the learned District Judge at p. 1 of the print, and it runs as follows: After reciting that cash and gold had been given to Padmanabh for purposes which he did not perform, the note goes on:
Rupees 1,200 became due to you in respect of the same, and you pressed for the amount. As it is not possible just now to pay off the amount, we three persons have passed this promissory note to you.
8. It has been held that a request to forbear suing or other proceedings, not specifying any length of time, is understood to be a request for forbearance for a reasonable time. This is one of the class of cases in which, the defendant has requested the plaintiff to forbear the enforcement of a claim against him and has offered a new promise in return, and the plaintiff, without any express acceptance of the defendant's terms, has infect forborne for an appreciable time. Here the defendant's offer to pay or give security as the case may be, is accepted by the performance of its conditions, and that, performance is a good consideration for the defendant's promise. The leading case on the point is that of Alliance-Bank v. Broom, where a customer being called on by bankers to give security for money due from him on a loan account, agreed by letter to give security, and a bill which had been filed to enforce, such agreement: was demurred to on the ground that the agreement was without consideration. It was held that the forbearance of the bank to enforce payment of the existing debt, in consequence of the agreement, was a sufficient consideration to support it. It has been noted above that this case was expressly distinguished from the case of Rustamji Ardesir Davar v. Ratanji Rustamji Wadia, referred to above. Otherwise, this is a leading case on this class of cases. Another case of the same character is Fullerton v. Provincial Bank of Ireland(3). That was a case where a easterner of a bank in Ireland having overdrawn his account and being pressed by the bank undertook by letter to deposit a title deed of an Irish estate as security for his overdraft. He deposited the title-deed with the bank, who did not register the charge. The customer afterwards mortgaged the estate to the appellants, who registered their charge without notice of the prior charge. The question the priority of the two incumbrances arose and it was contended in the House of Lords that there was no stipulation foe forbearance for any definite time. It was held at p. 313:
In such a, case as this it is not necessary that these should be an arrangement for forbearance for any definite or particular time. It is quite enough if you can infer from the surrounding circumstances that there was an implied request for forbearance for a time, and that forbearance for a reasonable time was in fact extended to the person who asked for it.
9. That proposition was held to be established by the case of Alliance Bank v. Broom, referred to above, and the various other cases which are quoted is the judgment of Lord Macnaghten.
10. There can be no doubt, therefore, that it is not necessary that there should be an arrangement for forbearance for any definite or particular time, and this answers the argument for the respondents that as the promissory note was payable on demand, under Section 92 of the Evidence Act, it cannot be held that by entering into this transaction with the promisee, the promisors obtained any advantage, since they were liable to be sued at any time fay the plaintiff. Now, the surrounding circumstances of this case are quite sufficient to warrant the Court in inferring that there must have been a request for forbearance for a time, and that forbearance for a reasonable time was extended to the person who asked for it. The very words of the promissory note, which I have already given, show that the promissory note was passed because the defendants were unable to pay the money then, and there would have been no object in passing the promissory note if the money was to be demanded from them immediately by virtue of the note being expressed to be payable on demand. Aa a matter of fact the plaintiff did not sue on that promissory note for nearly three years from the date of its execution. So far, therefore, as regards the consideration for the promissory note, I am of opinion that there was sufficient consideration for it in the form of the promise of the plaintiff not to take any action on it.
11. Then, as regards the liability of defendants 2 and 3, who were not themselves directly concerned in the original transaction with Padmanabh the learned Judge of the lower appellate Court has relied on the case of Sornalinga Mudali v. Pachai Naickan(4), which holds that the consideration paid to any one of several joint promisors is legally sufficient to support the promise of all the joint promisors. There is also the case of Fanindra Narain Roy v. Kacheman Bibi(5) which is very similar to the present case: Where A executed a mortgage in favour of X in 1884, and in consideration of X not enforcing the same and, in Substitution therefor, A along with B, C and D executed a fresh mortgage in 1893, in favour of X and, on X suing to enforce the later mortgage the Court of first instance dismissed the suit on the ground that there was no legal consideration it was held that the mortgage of 1893, which replaced that of 1881, was for legal consideration, and it was held further that it was not necessary that the promisor should benefit by the consideration: it was sufficient if the promisee did some act from which a third person was benefited, and which he would not have done but for the promise. At p. 778 the facts, which are closely akin to the present case are set out as follows. Their Lordships say:
Here, we have, in 1884, a mortgage by Sadan in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff was entitled to enforce the security as against Sadan. He was asked to accept in lieu of that security a fresh bond executed in 1893 by Sadan along with three other persons, viz., Edu., Badaruddin and Lakhu. The promise by Edu., Badaruddin and Lakhu, to be bound by the mortgage, plainly formed a good consideration for the abstinence of the mortgagee to sue Sadan upon the first bond. The respondents have, however, argued that a consideration is not lawful unless it benefits the promisor. There is no foundation for this contention. Valuable consideration has been defined as some eight, interest, profit or benefit, accruing to one party, or-some forbearance, detriment, loss or responsibility given, suffered, undertaken by the other at his request. It is not necessary that the promisor should benefit by the consideration: it is sufficient if the promisee does some act from which a third person is benefited and which he would not have done but for the promise.
12. Now, in the present case, the plaintiff was entitled to sue Padmanabh for damages or possibly in a criminal Court for not returning him the gold and cash which had been entrusted to him for a specific purpose. In consideration of this promissory note passer by Padmanabh and by defendants 2 and 3 the plaintiff has forborne suing Padmanabh on his original cause of action. This was a benefit to Padmanabh, and it may be taken that the plaintiff would not have abstained but for the promise entered into by defendants 2 and 3. In these circumstances I am of opinion that the finding of the lower appellate Court is wrong, and that there was a consideration for the promissory note by which defendants 2 and 3 are bound as well as the estate of Padmanabh who is now dead.
13. The main case on which the learned District Judge has relied is Nanak Ram v. Mehin Lal(6). It is a case where money was advanced on a bond, and a separate surety bond was passed by another person at a later date, and it was held that there was no consideration for the surety bond as the payment, which had been the consideration for the original bond, had been made to the debtor before the surety bond. But in that case it is dear from the judgment of Spankie, J., at p. 497, that the creditor did not promise to do anything, and did not do anything, for the benefit of the principal debtor, whereby there was a consideration for the surety's giving the guarantee. The case is, therefore, distinguishable from the present case. I am, therefore, of opinion that the appeal should be allowed, the decree of the lower appellate Court should be set aside and the decree of the first Court restored with costs throughout.
14. Patkar, J.:— I agree.
15. Appeal allowed.
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