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Jayappa Lokappa Nars... v. Shivangouda Dyamango...
Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff instituted Suit No. 229 of 1917 in the Court of the Additional First Class Subordinate Judge at Dharwar seeking possession of a one-third share in certain watan lands. Defendant No. 5 (the plaintiff's brother) supported the plaintiff's claim; other defendants were family members and it was alleged that Defendant No. 6 had been adopted by Defendant No. 4. The trial Court found for the plaintiff and Defendant No. 5 as nearest heirs and held that the alleged adoption of Defendant No. 6 was not proved. The trial Court directed partition and an inquiry as to mesne profits.
Defendants Nos. 2, 4 and 6 appealed to the High Court; an application to stay execution was made under Order XLI, Rule 5. On December 14, 1920 the High Court issued a "Rule and ad interim stay" (implying security was required under Order XLI, Rule 5(3)(c)). The District Judge at Dharwar certified that security had been furnished. The person described in the writ and return was Basangouda bin Mallangouda (defendant No. 6). The surety was Jayappa Lokappa Narasingnavar (the present appellant), who executed a bond (Appendix G, No. 2, CPR) mortgaging property and making himself liable to the extent of Rs. 4,000.
The High Court confirmed the trial decree (with immaterial variation). An inquiry fixed mesne profits at Rs. 9,250 recoverable from defendant No. 2. Defendant No. 2 failed to pay and the learned Judge ordered execution for Rs. 4,000 against the surety Jayappa. Jayappa appealed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Is the surety bond invalid for want of registration?
- Is the appellant (surety) liable for the decree except in so far as it is against defendant No. 6?
- How and to what extent can the surety bond be enforced in these proceedings?
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)
- The security bond requires registration under the Indian Registration Act and, therefore, cannot be relied upon (it "cannot affect the property or even be looked at as evidence"). Reliance was placed on the Madras High Court decision in Nagaruru Sambayya v. Tangatur Subbayya and other authorities.
- Relying on certain authorities (including a submission invoking Ma Shwe Mya v. Maung Ho Hnaung), the appellants contended that registration was compulsory and that, if unregistered, the bond could not be used to affect immovable property.
- It was also argued (later addressed by the Court) that the appellant's obligation under the bond might be a contingent liability within the meaning of section 32 of the Indian Contract Act — dependent on the property charged proving insufficient — and thus not enforceable until the contingency happened.
- Implicitly, the appellant contended that the bond (being in form addressed to "the Court" and not a named individual) raised additional procedural and enforcement difficulties, following authorities such as Raghubar Singh v. Jai Indra Bahadur Singh.
Respondent / Plaintiff's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)
- The plaintiff (decree-holder) sought to enforce the security bond and contended that the bond created a personal liability on the part of the surety and/or created a mortgage/hypothecation enforceable against the property, enabling execution under section 145 of the Civil Procedure Code or by enforcing the charge on the mortgaged property.
- The plaintiff argued the bond could be enforced without a separate suit to enforce the mortgage if the surety had not disposed of the equity of redemption; alternatively, the plaintiff pursued enforcement via the personal liability route under section 145.
- The plaintiff implicitly relied on authorities (discussed in the opinion) that permits court-ordered enforcement of such security in appropriate proceedings, and pressed that the bond should be operational against the surety for defaults of the appellants in the appeal (including defendants Nos. 2 and 4 as well as No. 6).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bindesri Naik v. Gangasaran Sahu (Privy Council) | Expressed the principle that section 17 (Registration Act 1877/1908) does not apply to "proper judicial proceedings" (pleadings or orders) — i.e., that judicial proceedings need not be registered. | The Court relied on Lord Watson's dictum to support the conclusion that a security bond forming part of or arising from judicial proceedings is not within the registration requirement of section 17. |
| Pranal Annee v. Lakshmi Annee (Privy Council) | Distinguished between an agreement not placed before a Court (which requires registration) and a document (razinamah) which was produced and acted upon by a Court — the latter being a judicial step not requiring registration. | The Court used the case to support the proposition that documents which have been submitted to and acted upon by a Court (constituting a step of judicial procedure) need not be registered to be effective as evidence or to operate. |
| Hemanta Kumari Debi v. Midnapur Zamindari Company (Privy Council) | Held that where a petition/compromise is incorporated in a decree, the decree itself makes the terms admissible as judicial evidence and the special exemption in section 17(2)(vi) applies; registration of the original agreement is unnecessary where the decree incorporates it. | The Court relied on this authority to show that even if the bond were not expressly embodied in the order, the order founded on the bond would necessarily refer to it and thus bring the transaction within the scope of judicial-proceedings exemptions. |
| Ma Shwe Mya v. Maung Ho Hnaung (Privy Council) | Dealt with registration procedures for a bond that had been registered; did not decide the core registration question before the present Court (registration point not decided on merits in that case). | The Court held that Ma Shwe Mya is not an authority on the question whether bonds of this kind require registration, because the registration issue was not decided there. |
| Nagaruru Sambayya v. Tangatur Subbayya (Madras High Court) | Earlier High Court authority treated registration as required for such bonds (as relied upon by the appellants). | The present Court expressly declined to follow Nagaruru Sambayya, observing that Privy Council decisions relied upon here were not cited or considered in that Madras decision. |
| Raghubar Singh v. Jai Indra Bahadur Singh (Privy Council) | Considered instruments giving security "to the Court"; held the Court is not a juridical person and discussed the practical mode of enforcing security given to the Court (property may be sold by Court order unless sureties pay etc.). | The Court relied on this authority to reason about enforcement mechanics of a bond given "to the Court" and to support the proposition that such instruments can be enforced by appropriate court proceedings against the hypothecated property. |
| Janki Kuar v. Sarup Rani (High Court of Allahabad) (as cited) | Recognized procedure for enforcement by the Court where security was given to the Court and no specific mortgagee named. | Cited in Raghubar Singh and noted in this opinion as an example of the sanctioned practice for enforcement when security is given to the Court rather than a named person. |
| Gurushantappa v. Gurava That (this Court) | Held that where a surety hypothecated property and became personally liable, personal liability could be enforced as if for a money decree; but if the equity of redemption is assigned, the claimant must bring a separate suit to enforce the mortgage charge. | The Court used this authority to explain enforcement options: reliance upon the personal liability (proceed under section 145) or enforcement of the mortgage/charge (which in some circumstances requires a separate suit). |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The opinion contains two principal judgments (Crump, J. and Marten, C.J.) whose reasoning is complementary and consistent on the decisive points.
On Registration (whether the bond needed registration)
- Crump, J. began by recognising that the bond, on its face, "purports or operates to create or declare in the future a contingent right of the value of more than Rs. 100 in immoveable property" and would ordinarily fall within section 17(1) of the Indian Registration Act (1908) and hence be registrable.
- He observed that the Registration Acts (1877 and 1908) contain an exemption in favour of "any decree or order of a Court or any award." If the bond were treated as an ordinary private instrument the consequence would be awkward: registration would be required at several stages of litigation, an impractical result inconsistent with legislative intent.
- Crump, J. relied on the Privy Council decisions (Bindesri Naik and Pranal Annee) where Lord Watson stated broadly that the provisions of section 17 do not apply to proper judicial proceedings (pleadings or orders) and that documents produced to and acted on by a Court as steps of judicial procedure need not be registered.
- He concluded the security bond in the present case was "in itself a step in judicial procedure" because the High Court's order was founded upon it; accordingly registration was not required. He expressly disagreed with the Madras High Court decision in Nagaruru Sambayya v. Tangatur Subbayya, noting that the Privy Council authorities were not considered in that case.
- Marten, C.J. agreed with Crump, J., adopting similar reasoning and emphasising that the bond was part of the judicial proceedings and incorporated therewith; therefore the Registration Act did not apply and related provisions (e.g., section 59 Transfer of Property Act) did not necessitate registration either in this context.
On Enforceability and Mode of Enforcement
- The Court examined whether the bond, being addressed to "the Court" rather than to a named person, created a practical difficulty for enforcement. Raghubar Singh v. Jai Indra Bahadur Singh (Privy Council) was discussed at length: that authority acknowledged practical mechanisms by which instruments addressed to the Court could be enforced by Court order (e.g., sale of charged property unless sureties pay).
- Marten, C.J. concluded that, on the authority discussed, the bond could be enforced in appropriate proceedings against the property hypothecated by the instrument; the Court accepted that enforcement by the Court against the property is an available route.
- The Court also considered enforcement via personal liability (section 145 CPC). The Court recognized two alternate routes: (a) rely upon the personal liability of the surety and proceed against the surety as for a money decree (section 145), or (b) enforce the mortgage/hypothecation by appropriate proceedings (which in some circumstances might require a separate suit if the equity of redemption had been disposed of). The Court cited Gurushantappa v. Gurava That to explain this principle.
- Marten, C.J. noted that because the bond was in the Appendix form and the Code now contemplates forms addressed to named persons, the present case’s difficulty arose from the bond being to "the Court" — yet prior authorities showed practical enforcement was possible.
On Extent of Surety's Liability (for which defendants' defaults the surety is liable)
- The Court scrutinised the pleadings, the writ issued by the High Court and the precise terms of the bond. The appeal (First Appeal No. 335 of 1920) had been filed by defendants Nos. 2, 4 and 6 but the High Court's writ and the District Judge's return referred only to Basangouda bin Mallangouda (defendant No. 6). The bond's language referred to "the said defendant (Prativadeyu)" in the singular and used masculine terms.
- Applying strict construction principles for surety bonds, the Court held that the bond, read strictly, bound the surety to one defendant only — the one identified in the chain of communication (defendant No. 6). Because the bond was ambiguous and the drafting and court process were carelessly handled, the Court resolved doubts in favour of the surety.
- Accordingly the Court held it could not be said the surety knowingly undertook liability for the decree which might be passed against defendant No. 2 (a female defendant) and others; the surety could not be held liable beyond what he was clearly and unambiguously bound to undertake.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is allowed. The Court set aside the order of the trial Court (which had directed execution against the surety) and dismissed the darkhast. The opinion concludes: Appeal allowed.
Implications and direct consequences (as stated in the opinion):
- The security bond executed by the appellant does not require registration because it formed part of and was a step of the judicial proceedings; therefore the bond is not invalid for want of registration on the facts of this case.
- The bond can be enforced in appropriate proceedings against the hypothecated property (the Court accepted authorities showing enforcement against the mortgaged property is available by court order in suitable proceedings), and alternatively personal liability can be pursued under section 145 of the Civil Procedure Code if personal liability is clearly established.
- On strict construction of the bond and in view of the manner in which the stay application and writ were drafted (which referred to one petitioner, defendant No. 6), the surety (Jayappa) is not liable for defaults of defendants beyond defendant No. 6. The benefit of doubt was given to the surety and the attempt to hold him liable for defendant No. 2's default failed.
- The direct effect on the parties: the order for execution against the surety is set aside and the darkhast is dismissed with costs throughout (including the costs of the appeal).
Note on precedent: the Court expressly declined to follow Nagaruru Sambayya v. Tangatur Subbayya (Madras High Court) and relied on Privy Council authorities (Bindesri Naik, Pranal Annee, Hemanta Kumari Debi) to support its view that judicial proceedings and documents forming part of them are not caught by the registration requirement. The Court therefore applied those authorities, but did not state that it was creating a novel rule beyond applying and following those precedents.
Result recorded in the opinion: Appeal allowed. Darkhast dismissed with costs including the costs of this appeal.
This summary is prepared strictly from the content of the provided opinion and does not add information beyond that text.
Crump, J.:—
The plaintiff instituted Suit No. 229 of 1917 the Court of the Additional First Class Subordinate Judge at Dharwar to recover possession of a share of one-third of certain lands. Defendant No. 5 was the brother of plaintiff and supported plaintiff's claim. The other defendants were members of the same family and it was alleged that defendant No. 6 had been adopted by defendant No. 4, the widow of a deceased member named Baswantgouda. The properties in suit were watan properties, and plaintiff and defendant No. 5 claimed to be the nearest heirs under the law applicable to such property. The Court found that plaintiff and defendant No. 5 were the nearest heirs, and that the adoption of defendant No. 6 was not proved. Consequent upon these findings a decree was made giving plaintiff and defendant No. 5 certain shares in the suit properties. A partition was directed, and an order was made directing an inquiry as to the mesne profits due.
Against this decree defendants Nos. 2, 4 and 6 appealed to the High Court making plaintiff and defendant Nos. 1 and 5 respondents. An application was made to stay execution of the decree under Order XLI, Rule 5. On this the Court on December 14, 1920, passed an order in the ordinary form, “Rule and ad interim stay.” This implied that security was required from the applicants “for the due performance of such decree or order as may be ultimately binding upon” them. Order XLI, Rule 5(3)(c). This order was communicated to the District Judge of Dharwar by this Court's writ dated December 14, 1920, and in reply the District Judge certified that security had been furnished. The writ refers to the petition of “Basangouda bin Mallangouda in Appeal No. 335 of 1920” and directs that execution be stayed on due security being furnished to the First Class Subordinate Judge. Basangouda bin Mallangouda is defendant No. 6. The return is endorsed on the writ under date January 25, 1921, and certifies that “the appellant petitioner haying furnished the requisite security the further proceedings have been stayed.” The surety was one Jayappa, now the appellant before us, and the bond executed by him was in the form laid down in Appendix G, No. 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under it he makes himself liable to the extent of Rs. 4,000. On March 10, 1921, the Court made the following order, Rule absolute, costs in the appeal.”
The bond is in the following terms:—
“In the Court of the First Class Subordinate Judge at Dharwar.
Suit No. 229 of 1917.
Shivangouda bin Dyamangouda Patil … Plaintiff;
Versus
The First Class Subordinate Judge's Court at Dharwar.
In this Jayappa Lokappa Narasingnavar residing at Lokur, taluka Dharwar, states by this security bond passed for staying the execution of the decree as follows:—
In Suit No. 229 of 1917 plaintiff Shivangouda Dyamangouda Patil residing at Lokur has filed a suit in this Court, against Marewa, Somawa, Basangouda and Basawa and others. The suit was decided in plaintiff's favour on March 27, 1920, and a decree was passed therein. And defendants No. 2 Somawa and No. 6 Basangouda and Basawa Gaodti filed an appeal in the High Court against the said decree.
The plaintiff who has got the decree in his favour filed an application for executing the said decree. Defendant has applied for getting the execution stayed and he (awanige) has been ordered to furnish security. I, therefore, voluntarily become a surety to the extent of Rs. 4,000, by mortgaging the property mentioned in the schedule annexed herewith. I hereby agree that in case the decree of the original Court is confirmed in appeal or reversed the said defendant (Prativadeyu) will abide by the order and decree of the Appellate Court properly. And if he will have to pay anything in accordance with that he will pay the same and in case he fails to do so the amount that will have to be paid accordingly should be recovered from the estate mortgaged by this writing. And if the said property does not cover the amount that will have to be paid I and my legal representatives will be personally liable. For this I have passed this security bond.
Dated this day 5th January 1921.
The High Court in appeal confirmed the decree of the lower Court with a variation which is immaterial for the purposes of the appeal now before us. An inquiry was then held as to the amount of mesne profits and these were assessed at Rs. 9,250, and were held to be recoverable from defendant No. 2. Defendant No. 2 failed to pay the amount and the learned Judge directed that execution for Rs. 4,000 should proceed against the surety Jayappa. Jayappa appeals against this order.
The appeal raises the following questions:—
(1) Is the surety bond invalid for want of registration?
(2) Is the appellant liable for the decree except in so far as it is against defendant No. 6?
(3) How and to what extent can it be enforced in these proceedings?
It is urged that the document requires registration and that therefore it cannot affect the property or even be looked at as evidence of the transaction. This point therefore stands in limine.
Reliance is placed on Nagaruru Sambayya v. Tangatur Subbayya. A number of other authorities have been cited bearing more or less upon the point, but the first question is whether certain decisions of their Lordships of the Privy Council, to which I drew attention in the course of the argument, are not decisive upon the matter. I shall, therefore, proceed to discuss these first. I may, however, say here that there is no decision of this Court upon the point and that according to the prevailing practice, so far as I am aware of it, such bonds are not registered. This document “purports or operates to create or declare in the future a contingent right of the value of more than Rs. 100 in immoveable property.” It is therefore within the scope of section 17, sub-section (1) of the Indian Registration Act, 1908. It may be noted that for the present purpose there is no difference between the terms of this Act and those of the previous Act of 1877. Therefore ordinarily the document under either Act is compulsorily registrable. In both Acts there is a special exemption in favour of “any decree or order of a Court or any award.” The result of holding that such a document executed as between a surety and the Court is not exempted from registration either on general principles or as falling within the special words cited would be somewhat embarrassing. What the precise result might be in view of section 49 is a question difficult to resolve, but the words of section 17 are very wide and, if they apply to proceedings in Courts, would cover a variety of documents, and necessity might arise for recourse to the registration office at several stages of a prolonged litigation. It is difficult to believe that the Legislature intended any such result. It seems reasonable to suppose that judicial proceedings in general are not within the scope of the Act. Order XXI, rule 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for the registration of documents executed by the Court, but no direction is to be found as to the registration of documents in the form prescribed by Appendix G, No. 2, as appropriate for the purpose of Order XLI, rule 5, or indeed in any other case. The argument ab inconvenienti is certainly very strong here. It would be most inconvenient in practice if the Judge were bound to register a variety of documents such as this. Some of the difficulties will be gathered from the decision in Ma Shwe Mya v. Maung Ho Hnaung, a decision to which I shall refer later.
Nor is this view without support in the decisions of their Lordships of the Privy Council. Bindesri Naik v. Gangasaran Sahu is a case decided with reference to the provisions of the registration act of 1877 which, as has been said, differ in no way for the present purpose from those of the Act of 1908. The question there was whether compound interest should be allowed on certain mortgages and reliance was placed on a number of petitions for time made by the mortgagors which contained admissions that compound interest was due. It was argued for the appellants (the mortgagors) that under section 17 of the Act of 1877 no effect could be given to those petitions as they were not registered. The matter was fully argued and, though the decision was based on other grounds, Lord Watson in delivering the judgment of the Board remarked as follows (p. 15):—
“Although, in the view which their Lordships take, the question whether those proceedings can be founded on, without their having been registered in terms of the Act of 1877, does not necessarily arise in this appeal, they think it right to add that, having heard counsel fully upon the point, they are satisfied that the provisions of section 17 of the Act do not apply to proper judicial proceedings, whether consisting of pleadings filed by the parties, or of orders made by the Court.”
This dictum is general in its terms and not expressed to be based on any specific provision of the Act. It might indeed be difficult to bring such petitions within the words “decree or order of the Court or any award.”
In Pranal Annee v. Lakshmi Annee, there had been a previous suit between the parties in 1885. That suit was brought to an amicable conclusion, and on January 16, 1886, two documents were executed. One was termed a razinamah, the other “agreement of union.” Neither was registered under the Act of 1877. The razinamah alone was produced in the suit. Both were relied upon in the second suit which came before the Privy Council in appeal. Lord Watson again delivered the judgment of the Board. As to the razinamah the following passage may be cited from pages 103-4 of the report:—
“The second document executed by the same parties, the razinamah, was not registered in terms of Act III of 1877; but it was produced in the suit of 1885; its terms were considered in a judgment delivered by the Subordinate Judge of Kumbakonum on March 31, 1886, and they were made the foundation of an order passed by the learned Judge, the parties to the document having concurred in moving that a decree may be passed in accordance with the razinamah which they have presented under section 375 of the Civil Procedure Act, after settling.’
“The razinamah had incorporated with it four Schedules of lands, marked respectively A, B, C and D; Schedule D containing a description of the lands which had been expressly excluded from the suit of 1885, and of no others. In the body of the document, the parties, first, set forth in detail the lands as to which they were in controversy in the suit of 1885, and concluded by stating that they had agreed each to take a certain share of these lands and their produce, ‘in full satisfaction of all claims within the 15th of Panguni (March 27, 1886) next; and that both the parties shall bear their respective costs of this suit.’ In the second place, the document set forth as follows: ‘Remarks: Not only have we, on this date, entered into a union agreement in regard to the lands etc., referred to in the plaint in this suit, and described in Schedule D hereof, and divided thereunder the said lands into two equal shares between us, but a deed of release has also been taken from the 7th defendant's (present appellant's) guardian in relinquishment of the right possessed by the 7th defendant (present appellant) to the said half-share of lands.’
“In the judgment delivered by him on March 31, 1886, the Subordinate Judge, having the razinamah before him, treated the first part of it as the only portion of the contents of the document with which he was desired by the parties to deal. In giving effect to its terms, the learned Judge observed: ‘The 7th defendant (present appellant) is her only daughter (i.e, of Ramaswami's grand-daughter) and she and the plaintiff have put in a razinamah in respect to items 1, 3, 5, and 7, and a decree in its terms has been passed.’ It is admitted that items 1, 3, 5, and 7, specified by the learned Judge, were the lands claimed from the present appellant in the suit of 1885. The learned Judge plainly did not understand that he was asked by the parties either to consider or to give effect to the terms of the compromise which the parties narrated, by way of remark, that they had made with respect to the lands contained in Schedule D of the razinamah, which are the subject of this appeal. Accordingly, the order passed by him did not include and had no reference to these lands.”
The distinction between the two documents is brought out in the following passage (pp. 105-6):—
“It is sufficiently obvious that, in maintaining that defence, the appellant can derive no aid from the terms of the agreement of union. The document has not been registered under the provisions of Act III of 1877; and, therefore, its stipulations are ineffectual in law to create, in favour of the appellant, any right, title, or interest to or in the lands in dispute.
“The razinamah was not registered in accordance with the Act of 1877; but the objection founded upon its non-registration does not, in their Lordships' opinion, apply to its stipulations and provisions, in so far as these were incorporated with, and given effect to by, the order made upon it by the Subordinate Judge in the suit of 1885. The razinamah, in so far as it was submitted to and was acted upon judicially by the learned Judge, was in itself a step of judicial procedure not requiring registration; and any order pronounced in terms of it constituted res judicata, binding upon both the parties to this appeal, who gave their consent to it.
“If the parties, after agreeing to settle the suit of 1885 on the footing that they were each to take a half-share of the lands involved in that suit, and also a half-share of the lands now in dispute, had informed the learned Judge that these were the terms of the compromise, and had invited him, by reason of such compromise, to dispose of the conclusions of the suit of 1885, their Lordships see no reason to doubt that the order of the learned Judge, if it had referred to or narrated these terms of compromise, would have been judicial evidence, available to the appellant, that the respondents had agreed to transfer to her the moiety of land now in dispute. But their Lordships are unable to find that any such course was taken, either in the razinamah, or in the judicial order which gave effect to it. The razinamah merely referred, by way of remark, to the lands now in dispute; and the Judge was only asked to give effect to a compromise which related to the lands then in dispute before him. This order, accordingly, merely concerns the latter, and has no reference whatever to the lands, described in Schedule D of the razinamah. So far as regarded these lands, the compromise was not submitted to the learned Judge, but was deliberately left by the parties to stand upon their unregistered agreement of union.”
The distinction drawn is that the “act of union” was not submitted to the Court and was not made the foundation of any order: the razinamah was so submitted and an order was founded on it. It was thus “in itself a step of judicial procedure not requiring registration.”
In this case too no reference is to be found to any special exemption created by the Act itself. As in Bindesri Naik's case the judgment rests on a broad general principle that the proceedings of Courts do not require registration. It is permissible to doubt whether the head-note in Pranal Annee's case is not too narrowly expressed.
It is surely no straining of language to hold that the security bond in the present case is “in itself a step in judicial procedure.” Plainly the order making the rule absolute was founded upon it, and in my judgment it matters not that it was submitted to the Court of the First Class Subordinate Judge and not to the High Court. The Subordinate Judge certified that the required security had been furnished and the Judges of this Court were seized of that fact when they made their order.
But even if it be supposed that in the two cases cited their Lordships of the Privy Council based their judgment on the expressed exemption in the Act, though they do not allude to it, the result is the same. If those proceedings fall within the exemption, why not the proceedings in the case before us? I am unable to see any real difference. All are steps in the procedure of the Court.
The question is further dealt with by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Hemanta Kumari Debi v. Midnapur Zamindari Company. In that case a petition of compromise had been made in a previous suit between the parties. The petition was not registered. The whole was embodied in a decree, but as to one clause of the petition the decree was not operative as that clause was outside the scope of the suit. The question raised was whether that clause could be put in evidence. It was held that the special exemption in section 17, sub-section 2(vi), applied inasmuch as there was a decree or order of the Court embodying the disputed clause. Their Lordships refer to Pranal Annee v. Lakshni Annee, and cite a passage from Lord Watson's judgment which has been set out above. They then say (p. 248):—
“Sect. 375 and its effect were clearly under the consideration of the Board, and the judgment thus expressed showed that, merely regarding the question as a question of evidence and not as to the effect of the decree on lands outside the subject of the suit, such a document as that in the present case when incorporated in a decree was clearly admissible as judicial evidence. Though this judgment does not in terms refer to section 17, sub-section 2(vi), of the Registration Act, it gives full effect to the opinion that their Lordships have formed as to its interpretation. The decree in the present case is a decree which makes no difference whatever in its language between one part and another part of the compromise; it incorporates the whole; and it is, in other words, a decree which, though affecting the lands in the suit as a decree, incorporates the whole of the agreement which led to the suit being compromised. For this reason their Lordships think that the registration of the agreement was unnecessary and that the decree is sufficient evidence of its terms.”
Now it is true that here the surety bond is not embodied in the Court's order, but none the less the Court's order is based on the surety bond, and were the order written out in extenso it would of necessity refer to the bond which had been made an exhibit in the case. Thus in my judgment the matter is within the scope of the judgments of Lord Watson, if not directly covered by the case last cited.
Reliance was placed for the appellants on Ma Shwe Mya v. Maung Ho Hnaung, but the point of registration was not decided there. The bond was registered. The question was whether it had been validly registered. It was assumed that registration was compulsory. The case was heard ex parte and the only point decided was as to the proper method of presentation. At p. 397 their Lordships say, “The respondent was not represented on the appeal and their Lordships have accordingly not heard an argument in support of the validity of the bond.” It would be wrong to rely on this decision as being in any sense an authority on the point before us.
In my opinion it is a fair conclusion upon these authorities that on the facts of this case the surety bond executed by the appellant does not require registration. I am therefore unable to agree with the judgment of the Madras High Court in Nagaruru Sambayya v. Tangatur Subbayya. It does not appear that the decisions of the Privy Council set out above were cited or considered in that case.
I now turn to the second point. Did the appellant undertake to be bound by the decree which might be passed against the appellants other than defendant No. 6? First Appeal No. 335 of 1920 was filed by defendants Nos. 2, 4, and 6. The application for stay of execution describes the applicants as “Basangouda bin Mallangouda and others.” Basangouda is defendant No. 6. It is carelessly drafted. In the preamble, in paragraph 1 and also in the concluding sentence the plural “petitioners” is used. In paragraph 3 the word “petitioner” appears in the singular. The affidavit in support is made by defendant No. 6 and it sets out that execution proceedings were being taken against defendant No. 2. The Court's order “Rule and ad interim stay” clearly meant having regard to Order XLI, rule 5, that security must be given by the applicant, and the application must be read as being on behalf of all the appellants. But the Court's writ speaks of one petitioner only, viz., defendant No. 6. It was upon that writ that the surety bond came to be executed. The precise terms of the bond are set out above. A surety bond must be construed strictly and upon a strict construction appears that the appellant before us agreed to become surety for one defendant only. The word used is masculine and singular, and as one only of the three appellants was male, the description can apply to him alone. That one defendant is defendant No. 6. Thus there is a very real doubt as to whether the obligation of the surety extends beyond the decree as against defendant No. 6. The result is unfortunate, but in my opinion a surety cannot be held liable except to the extent to which he is clearly bound. It is impossible to say that the appellant knowingly undertook to be liable for the decree which might be passed against defendant No. 2. That being so the attempt to hold him so liable must fail.
Marten, C.J:—This first appeal raises numerous questions which are far easier to ask than to answer and which have not been adequately dealt with in the trial Court. The main questions are (1) whether the security bond, Exhibit 11, of January 5, 1921, which was expressed to be given by the appellant surety Jayappa to the First Class Subordinate Judge's Court at Dharwar in suit No. 229 of 1917 requires registration under the Indian Registration Act, and (2) whether this security bond can be enforced in the present darkhast either against the property thereby expressed to be mortgaged, or against the obligor personally or otherwise and (3) if so, in respect of whose default is the appellant surety liable.
The present darkhast is No. 39 of 1925 taken out in suit No. 229 of 1917. That was a suit filed by the plaintiff Shivangouda in the Court of the First Class Subordinate Judge at Dharwar against Marewa, defendant No. 1, Somawa, defendant No. 2, Basangouda, defendant No. 6, and Basawa, defendant No. 4, and others. The suit was decided in the plaintiff's favour on March 27, 1920, and a decree was passed therein. Somawa, defendant No. 2, and Basangouda, defendant No. 6, and Basawa, defendant No. 4, filed an appeal in the High Court against the said decree. The plaintiff who got the decree in his favour filed an application for executing the said decree. Thereupon an application was made to the High Court in which the petitioners were described in the title as “Basangouda and others.” A rule nisi was granted by the High Court for a stay of execution on terms. Subsequently, on the security being furnished, that rule nisi was made absolute. The security in question is this bond, Exhibit 11, of January 5, 1921. It is expressed to be given to the First Class Subordinate Judge's Court at Dharwar.
The first point for consideration is whether this bond required registration under the Indian Registration Act. I have had the advantage of reading the judgment of my brother Crump on this question, and I respectfully agree with his reasoning and conclusion that the Act does not apply here by reason of the fact that the bond was part of the judicial proceedings and incorporated therewith. It follows, therefore, I think, that section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act does not necessitate registration; for “registered” is defined to mean “registered under the law for the time being in force regulating the registration of documents.” Further, sections 5, 58 and 100 contemplate a transaction between two persons, but here the bond was to “the Court,” and as stated in Raghubar Singh v. Jai Indra Bahadur Singh, the Court is not a juridical person.
This brings me to the next point, viz., that the security was given to the Court and not to a named individual and is therefore void. Now the form is one taken from the First Schedule to the Civil Procedure Code, Appendix G, Form No. 2, but that form is headed “To (blank)” and is no doubt intended to be given to a named individual. In Raghubar Singh v. Jai Indra Bahadur Singh, their Lordships of the Privy Council had to consider a case where the old Code of Civil Procedure was in force when the suit began, but the new Code of 1908 was in force the application against the widow and sureties for the recovery of mesne profits was started. There also a security bond had been given to the Court, but no person was mentioned in the instrument. After stating at p. 236 that “there remains a matter which has given their Lordships considerable trouble” and after holding that section 145 did not apply because the lower Court had construed the instrument as giving only a charge upon property, and after holding that sections 47 and 144 did not apply, the judgment proceeded on page 237:—
“But the questions of their liability upon the instrument, whether they were personally liable, and whether, in the events which happened, it had become applicable, were matters which they were entitled to have determined against them in a regular and authorized manner. The contention for the appellants is that for this purpose there should have been a separate suit to enforce the charge, and that this must have been one according to the procedure provided by section 90 of the Transfer of Property Act.
In order to see whether this is so their Lordships turn to the instrument itself. For a proceeding under the Transfer of Property Act there must be a mortgagor and a mortgagee. Their Lordships have to examine whether in this case there is any mortgagee, any person to whom the security was given. Now, no person is mentioned in the instrument. It recites the decree that the widow has been ordered to furnish security, and then the declarants furnish security by hypothecating their property. The form of an instrument such as this, in the absence of any special form being provided by the Code, and there is no suggestion that there was any such form provided under the Code then in force, must vary according to the practice of the Court. It appears that in the High Court at Calcutta, in instruments of this nature, the parties bind themselves to some named officer of the Court, and that, if the instrument has to be put in suit, either the officer sues, or he, under order of the Court, assigns the security to the party who wishes to avail himself of it; but this instrument does not purport to bind the sureties to any individual officer or to any one.
It is suggested that they are bound to the Court. But the Court is not a juridical person. It cannot be sued. It cannot take property, and as it cannot take property it cannot assign it. It remains, therefore, that here is an unquestioned liability, and there must be some mode of enforcing it, and that the only mode of enforcing it must be by the Court making an order in the suit upon an application to which the sureties are parties, that the property charged be sold unless before a day named the sureties find the money. This form of procedure is that to which the High Court of Allahabad gave its sanction in the case of Janki Kuar v. Sarup Rani.
The new Code of Civil Procedure, that of 1908, provides a special form of security bond to be given during the pendency of an appeal (Appendix G, No. 3). The form shows that it is intended to be given to someone and not to be a mere undertaking to the Court. Whether that someone should be the other party or an officer of the Court is not made clear; but with this form in use it is not likely that the difficulty which surrounds the present case will arise in future.”
Stopping there for a moment, unfortunately that very difficulty has arisen in the present case because the bond was given to the Court, as I have already stated, and not to a named individual. Then their Lordships proceeded (p. 238):
“It appears to their Lordships that the proper way of dealing with the present case is to consider that there are three steps: 1. The assessment of the mesne profits to which the sureties need to be parties. 2. The construction of the instrument determining that the property charged is liable as security in the events which have happened. 3. The order that the property be sold unless the sureties pay.
It might have been more regular to take the first by itself….and to take the second with the third; but unless it be that there is possibly some increase of costs, no harm has been done. It is idle to talk of the proceedings as if they had been taken before a Court which had no jurisdiction; and no serious objection was raised to the form of procedure; nor can the appellants point to anything which would show that justice has not been done to them.
In the result, therefore, their Lordships think that, except as to the matter of the personal liability of the appellants, the decree appealed from is right.”
They accordingly directed that the decree of the Subordinate Judge should be varied by substituting the words “the property hypothecated by the instrument of security of September 16, 1902, is liable” for the words “the two sureties are liable.”
The effect of that decision was that the property hypothecated by the surety bond was held liable for the sums in question. The result, therefore, was that in effect their Lordships enforced the security bond given to the Court. Accordingly, stopping there, it would seem on the authority of that case that the present security bond could be enforced by the Court against the property in appropriate proceedings.
An alternative view is that the words in the bond refer not to the Court but to the Judge for the time being occupying the position of the First Class Subordinate Judge at Dharwar. That view presents obvious difficulties particularly having regard to what their Lordships say at p. 238. Having regard to the numerous changes which take place unfortunately amongst the personnel of the Subordinate Judges, I can understand the practical convenience of a bond to the Court instead to an individual Judge by name. But an undertaking to the Court is one thing, and could, I take it, be enforced by any Judge of the Court to whom the action was assigned for the time being. A mortgage to the Court as pointed out by their Lordships is quite another.
The next difficulty is that the present application is said to be based on section 145 of the Civil Procedure Code. That section provides that “the decree or order may be executed against him (the surety) to the extent to which he has rendered himself personally liable, in the manner herein provided for the execution of decrees.” Now in the above case in Raghubar Singh v. Jai Indra Bahadur Singh their Lordships of the Privy Council, as I have already pointed out, took the view that section 145 only applied if the sureties were personally liable, and as the instrument there only gave a charge on the property, the section had no application, nor was it in fact relied on. A similar decision has been arrived at by this Court in Gurushantappa v. Gurava That was a case where, pending insolvency proceedings, a composition deed was arrived at between the creditors and the insolvent. The appellant, Gurushantappa, became a surety for the insolvent, and hypothecated his property as surety, and he also became personally liable. It was there held in effect that the personal liability of the surety could be enforced as if it was for a money decree, and that then the property in question could be sold in execution of that quasi money decree. But in doing so the parties entitled to the benefit of the security bond, or the Court in their behalf, would only be in the position of unsecured creditors. Consequently, supposing the surety had assigned his equity of redemption to the third parties, then the mortgage security could only be enforced in a separate suit. Thus Sir Norman Macleod at p. 606 says:
“If, therefore, the surety has not disposed of the equity of redemption, the position is this, that the decree-holder, if he wishes to rely upon the mortgage contained in the surety bond, must get a decree upon the mortgage before he can realize his security. But he is not obliged to rely upon the security given him by the hypothecation of the property under the bond. He can rely upon the personal liability of the surety and seek to attach the property on account of that personal liability. Thereby he only, releases his own interest in the mortgage, and runs the risk of other claims being made against the property either by persons entitled to later charges on it, or by other attaching creditors. However, that is a matter which the present respondent must consider for himself. At present we say that the order made by the Judge for sale of the property in question was right, and the appeal must be dismissed….”
In the present case it does not appear that the surety has mortgaged or assigned his equity of redemption. But the decree-holder, the plaintiff, does not wish to be put to a separate suit to enforce the charge given by the security bond. His darkhast is framed in the alternative, and if necessary he contends that the security bond creates a personal liability on the part of the surety, and that consequently proceedings can be taken against him under section 145 on that basis. The two cases above cited are in his favour on that point. If, however, contrary to our view, the Registration Act had applied, then on the construction of this particular bond a difficult question might arise as to whether the personal covenant was severable. Alternatively it was argued for the surety that this was a contingent liability within the meaning of section 32 of the Indian Contract Act, because it was dependent on the property charged proving insufficient, and so it could not be enforced until the contingency happened. But in the view we take, I need not pursue this point.
I arrive then at the conclusion that the bond could be enforced in appropriate proceedings against the property itself. The next main question then arises whether the surety, the so-called defendant No. 8, was liable for the default of defendant No. 6 only as he contends, or for that also of defendants Nos. 2 and 4, as the plaintiff contends. I say “so-called defendant No. 8,” because the surety was not an original party to the suit. He has only been a party to the present darkhast proceedings to enforce the bond he gave. Now the above question as to the liability of defendant No. 8 depends primarily on the construction of the bond itself taken in conjunction with the proceedings referred to in the body of the bond itself. My mind has fluctuated on the point, and the case appears to me to be on the line. But undoubtedly there was carelessness in the application to the Court for a stay, and in the subsequent orders that were made. I mean as to the person or persons for whom security was to be given. Unfortunately for the plaintiff, this Court's writ of December 14, 1920, mentioned only one petitioner, viz., defendant No. 6: and the return to the writ by the District Judge on January 25, 1921, is to the like effect. Further, the bond given is more consistent in its language with one petitioner and he of the male sex than with three petitioners of different sexes. In the result, I think the benefit of the doubt must be given to the surety. Accordingly I agree with my brother Crump in holding that the surety is not liable for the default of the female defendant No. 2.
In the result, therefore, this appeal will be allowed, and the order of the trial Court set aside, and the darkhast dismissed with costs throughout including the costs of this appeal.
Appeal allowed.
J.G.R
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