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Govind Narayan Kakade v. Rangnath Gopal Rajopadhye

Bombay High Court
Nov 20, 1929
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Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion addresses an appeal by Govind Narayan Kakade (respondent No. 5) against a decree of the District Judge of Sholapur holding him liable for misfeasance or breach of trust as a Director of the Sholapur Bank, Limited. The liquidator of the Bank filed an application under section 235 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, seeking recovery of losses caused by misfeasance, negligence, or breach of trust by the Bank's agents and directors. The Bank was registered in 1903 and faced financial troubles starting in 1913, culminating in suspension of payments in 1914, a court-sanctioned scheme of arrangement, and voluntary liquidation in 1917. Criminal prosecutions resulted in convictions of the managing agents responsible for fraud. The appellant was a Director who was found not guilty of fraud but was charged with wilful negligence. The liquidator's application was filed in 1920, seeking recovery of Rs. 1,47,000, with the appellant held liable for Rs. 12,000 jointly with other respondents. The appellant appealed this liability.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellant, as a Director, is liable for misfeasance, breach of trust, or wilful negligence resulting in loss to the Bank under section 235 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913.
  2. Whether the appellant is protected by the Articles of Association indemnity clauses (Articles 98 and 99) from liability for acts done in execution of his office except in cases of wilful fraud or negligence.
  3. Whether the appellant acted honestly and reasonably so as to be excused under section 281 of the Indian Companies Act.
  4. Whether the claim against the appellant is barred by limitation under the Indian Limitation Act, particularly which Article applies to the claim.
  5. The nature and extent of the appellant’s duty and liability as a Director in the context of the Bank’s management structure and financial losses.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant was not guilty of wilful neglect or default and is protected by the indemnity clauses in the Articles of Association (Articles 98 and 99).
  • He acted honestly and reasonably and ought to be excused under section 281 of the Indian Companies Act.
  • The claim against him is barred by limitation, relying on Article 36 or alternatively Article 115 of the Indian Limitation Act.
  • The managing agents had the general management of the Bank's business and the appellant relied on their statements, thus he was misled and not responsible for their fraud.

Liquidator's Arguments

  • The appellant failed to exercise reasonable care and was wilfully negligent in supervising the agents and managing the Bank's affairs.
  • The indemnity clauses do not protect the appellant because the exceptions for wilful fraud or negligence apply.
  • The claim is not barred by limitation and is governed by Article 120 of the Indian Limitation Act, as the cause of action is not independent of contract but a breach of trust.
  • The Bank suffered substantial losses due to advances made without security and poor supervision by the Directors, including the appellant.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
City Equitable Fire Insurance Co., In re Defines duties of directors including the standard of reasonable care and the meaning of wilful neglect or default. The Court applied its principles to hold that the appellant was wilfully negligent and failed to exercise reasonable care as a Director.
Dovey v. Cory Clarifies that a director who honestly trusts a fraudulent manager is not necessarily free from liability. The Court distinguished the facts but acknowledged the principle that directors cannot blindly rely on agents without supervision.
In the matter of the Union Bank, Allahabad, Limited Clarifies duties of bank directors and limitation period applicable to claims against them. The Court followed this precedent to reject the appellant’s limitation defence and to assess the extent of director liability.
The New Fleming Spinning and Weaving Company, Limited v. Kessowji Naik Directors held liable for gross negligence in permitting improper loans and failing to perform duties. Used to support findings of gross negligence by the appellant as Director.
Lewis v. Great Western Railway Co. Definition of “wilful” misconduct as misconduct that is intentional or recklessly indifferent. The Court adopted this definition in concluding that the appellant’s negligence was wilful.
Cavendish Bentinck v. Fenn Section 235 creates no new right but provides a summary remedy; misfeasance claims require proof of actual loss. The Court held the liquidator's claim was within time and properly founded on actual loss caused by breach of trust.
Ripon Press and Sugar Mill Co., Ltd. v. Nama Venkatarama Chetty Articles of Association constitute part of the contract between company and directors. Supported the Court’s conclusion that Articles of Association formed part of the contractual framework governing director liability.
Kathiawar Trading Company v. Virchand Dipchand Article 120 of the Indian Limitation Act applies to suits against directors for misapplication of funds. The Court adopted Article 120 as the appropriate limitation provision for this case.
Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates, Limited, In re Reasonable care standard for directors and auditors. Referenced to define the standard of care applicable to the appellant as Director.
Hickman v. Kent Romney Marsh Sheep-Breeders' Association Articles constitute a contract between company and members/directors as to their ordinary rights. The Court followed the Court of Appeal’s view that Articles form part of the contract with directors for ordinary rights and obligations.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the appellant's liability by examining the duties of directors under the Indian Companies Act and the Articles of Association, particularly in light of the management structure where agents held substantial control. The Court noted that the appellant was not involved in fraud but was charged with wilful negligence, which was amply proved by his failure to supervise the agents, attend meetings, and inquire into the Bank’s affairs despite clear signs of financial deterioration.

The Court relied heavily on the principles from City Equitable Fire Insurance Co., In re, which require directors to act honestly and with reasonable care, and that wilful negligence involves consciously acting or failing to act in a reprehensible manner. The appellant’s conduct was found to meet this threshold, as he was recklessly careless over a long period, ignored resolutions for information, and opposed shareholder committees investigating suspected fraud.

The indemnity clauses in the Articles of Association (Articles 98 and 99) were held not to protect the appellant because the exceptions for wilful fraud or negligence applied, and the appellant’s conduct fell within these exceptions.

Regarding limitation, the Court rejected the appellant’s reliance on Article 36 of the Indian Limitation Act, holding instead that Article 120 applies because the claim arises from breach of trust and is not independent of contract. The Court fixed the date when the right to sue accrued as February 28, 1915, the date of the directors’ meeting approving the balance sheet that first revealed the loss. The liquidator’s application in 1920 was therefore within the six-year limitation period.

The Court also addressed the quantum of damages, affirming the trial Judge’s approach to apportioning liability and reducing the appellant’s share of damages to Rs. 12,000, considering his position as one of five directors and the circumstances of the case.

Finally, the Court emphasized the need for legislative amendment to clarify the effect of section 235 and to restrict wide indemnity clauses in Articles of Association that can shield directors from liability for negligence in India.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is dismissed and the decree of the lower Court holding the appellant liable for Rs. 12,000 jointly with other respondents is confirmed.

The direct effect of the decision is that the appellant Director is held liable for wilful negligence causing loss to the Bank and cannot rely on indemnity clauses or limitation defenses. The Court reaffirmed the application of section 235 of the Indian Companies Act as a summary remedy without creating new rights, and clarified the applicable limitation period under Article 120 of the Indian Limitation Act. No new precedent beyond these conclusions was established, but the Court noted the desirability of legislative reform to address ambiguities in director liability and indemnity protections in Indian company law.

Show all summary ...

Marten, C.J:—

This is an appeal by Govind Narayan Kakade, respondent No. 5, against the decree of the learned District Judge of Sholapur finding him liable for misfeasance or breach of trust as a Director in the sum of Rs. 12,000 jointly with respondents Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 on an application made by the petitioner as liquidator of the Sholapur Bank, Limited, under section 235 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913.

2. The main defences are that the appellant not having been guilty of any wilful neglect or default is protected by the Articles of Association of the Bank from this claim: or alternatively, that he has acted honestly and reasonably and ought fairly to be excused under section 281 of the Indian Companies Act. Another main ground of defence is that in any event the claim against the appellant is barred by limitation.

3. The history of the Bank and the main facts of the case have been set out in the judgment of my brother Patkar which I have had the advantage of reading, and also in the judgment of the Court below. I, therefore, need not detail them.

4. Essential dates to bear in mind are that the Bank was registered in 1903 and that it was not till 1913 that any apparent trouble arose. There was then, however, a run on the Bank, due, it is said, in part to the well-known crisis in Bombay which arose from the failure of the Indian Specie Bank and other Indian as opposed to European Banks. The Bank paid out a sum of 2½ lacs of rupees; but on April 23, 1914, it was forced temporarily to suspend payment. On September 9, 1914, there was a petition to the Bombay High Court to sanction a scheme of arrangement, which provided shortly that the creditors should give time to the Bank for payment of their debts. This scheme was sanctioned by the Court on January 23, 1915, and the Bank resumed business. But on June 2, 1917, the Bank went into voluntary liquidation. Subsequently, there was an order for the winding up of the Bank under the supervision of the Court, but this supervision order has not been shown to us. The present application by the liquidator under section 235 was filed on November 18, 1920. A part of the intervening time was occupied by the criminal prosecution of respondents Nos. 1 and 2, who were partners in the firm of K.B Kale and Company, Secretaries, Treasurers and Agents. They were convicted of frauds on the Bank, and were sentenced.

5. It is important to observe that this firm was the villain of the piece, and primarily responsible for the defalcations that were caused to the Bank. Unfortunately as is the case with so many Indian concerns, these agents were not only the promoters of the Bank, but also succeeded in establishing themselves as its managing agents for a term of 30 years or longer as fixed by clause 7 of the Memorandum and Articles 117 to 119 of the Articles of Association. Although Article 100 provided that the business of the Bank should be managed by the Board with the assistance of the agents, and Article 120 that the Directors should cause true accounts to be kept, yet by Article 119 the agents were given power to make all purchases, sales, loans, and advances for and on behalf of the Bank and also to employ and dismiss all the staff. Consequently, in practice the combined effect of these various clauses was likely to vest all real power in the agents, and to enable them to usurp the position which the Companies Act intended should be occupied by the Directors.

6. One member of the agency firm was ex officio a Director, but as regards the present appellant respondent No. 5, though he was a Director from the beginning, he had no connection with the firm, and the learned trial Judge has found expressly that he was guiltless of any fraud. Indeed the charge of fraud was withdrawn in the Court below, and though some attempt was made to revive it here, we held this not to be permissible, having regard in particular to the admissions of the liquidator in the Court below. The subsisting charge then against the appellant is one of wilful negligence, and as to that he undoubtedly has a difficult case to meet.

7. As regards the general position of the Sholapur Bank, Limited, I may observe that though this concern is called a Bank, its title is misleading. In fact it more resembled what Mr. Justice Walsh in In the matter of the Union Bank, Allahabad, Limited, describes as “a sort of glorified money lender or bania.” Its initial working capital was only some Rs. 3,885, and even in its most prosperous days that capital only amounted to about Rs. 20,725. With these slender resources the Bank proceeded to receive deposits and make loans on an extensive scale; and indeed as regards one fortunate firm of borrowers in Bombay, in which the agents were personally interested, viz., Mhalsadas Vithal and Company, the advances to them in the course of one year alone amounted to over 4 lacs of rupees.

8. It is, here, important to note that the three primary objects with which the Bank was established as set out in its Memorandum are as follows:—

“3. (a) To encourage the habit of saving money.

(b) To facilitate small but safe investments at reasonable rates of interest.

(c) To carry on the trade, and business of bankers in all its branches, and dealings in bullion, money, notes, bills, hundees, or other securities. To receive and employ moneys on loans or deposit, to advance money on substantial personal securities, and securities of all denominations, to conduct and manage exchange operations and such other operations, undertakings and enterprises of a financial character, as the Directors of the Company may think fit.”

9. As regards sub-clause (f) which runs, “Generally to transact any business of a Merchant or Capitalist either as Principal or Agent” this is obviously too wide, and would have to be cut down to conform with the main objects of the Company (see the judgment of Baggallay and Lindley L.JJ in In Re German Date Coffee Company; Stephens v. Mysore Reefs (Kangundy) Mining Company, Limited and Pedlar v. Road Block Gold Mines of India, Limited. With all respect, therefore, to the learned trial Judge, I do not attach the importance to sub-clause (f) which he appears to have done in paragraph 20 of his judgment.

10. It was argued for the liquidator that the expression “personal securities” in sub-clause (c) would not include advances on note of hand without any specific security. But even if this argument is incorrect, the word “substantial” has yet to be noted. On the other hand, as the learned Judge points out, the opening words in sub-clause (c) extended to “the trade and business of bankers in all its branches.” I may here observe that the final words contemplated “other enterprises of a financial character,” being such as the Directors might think fit. In fact, as I shall presently show, the Directors did little but leave everything to the agents. The latter indeed opened a new branch in Bombay without any clear antecedent consent of the Directors. They also made large advances without any specific security, and in my judgment the liquidator has established his contentions that many advances were to unsubstantial people, including the impecunious friends of the agents, and that other advances were to the gents themselves directly or indirectly. I further think that the Liquidator has established his case that out for the gross negligence and want of supervision ??? the Directors, substantial debts due to the Bank ??? either not have been made at all or if made would ??? in all cases have been lost or barred by limitation.

11. As regards the position and duties of the directors of this so-called Bank, I may refer to what Mr. Justice Romer says in City Equitable Fire Insurance Co., In re, viz. (p. 426):—

“It is indeed impossible to describe the duty of directors in general terms, whether by way of analogy or otherwise. The position of a director of a company carrying on a small retail business is very different from that of a ??? of a railway company. The duties of a bank director may differ ??? from those of an insurance director, and the duties of a director of one ??? company may differ from those of a director of another … The ??? the business carried on by the company the more numerous, and the ??? important, the matters that must of necessity be left to the managers, accountants and the rest of the staff. The manner in which the work of company is to be distributed between the board of directors and the staff ??? truth a business matter to be decided on business lines … In order, before, to ascertain the duties that a person appointed to the board of an ??? company undertakes to perform, it is necessary to consider not only nature of the company's business, but also the manner in which the work ??? company is in fact distributed between the directors and the other ??? of the company, provided always that this distribution is a reasonable in the circumstances, and is not inconsistent with any express provisions ??? articles of association.”

12. In the present case one very striking circumstance the small attention which the appellant gave to the ??? of this Company. I appreciate to the full the ??? of the appointment of managing agents with ??? like those in the present case. But unless the Companies Act is to be a dead letter, and the Directors names a mere trap for the unwary public, it must, think, follow that Directors have still their duties ??? perform, and that if they fail to perform them the must take the financial and other consequences of ??? negligence.

13. In the present case it is startling to find that over a series of years there were only two effective Directors' meetings per annum. We have had the figures taken out from the Directors' minute ??? (Exhibit 66) for the years 1910 to 1915, and they ??? that there was only one effective meeting in 1910: 2 1911; 2 in 1912; 2 in 1913; 3 in 1914; and 3 in ??? There were some further meetings called in 1911, 1912, but they were adjourned, we are told, for want a quorum. Moreover, it will be observed that ??? 1914 and 1915 were all periods of what one may ??? acute financial anxiety for the Bank. In effect it ??? appear that the main Directors' meeting in each ??? was for the purpose of passing the balance sheet, a that apart from that, little substantial business ??? done at those meetings.

14. Nor apart from the Directors' meetings does ??? evidence establish that the Directors exercised ??? effective supervision over the affairs of the Bank, or ??? made any effective inquiries. No general rules ??? laid down for the guidance of the agents in ??? advances. And when in August 1912 the Direct resolved that the deposits should be reduced as being large for the subscribed capital, and that a memorandum of the amounts due to the Bank “on ??? credit” should be laid before the Directors at their ??? meeting in September, nothing further appears to ??? been done except that the annual balance sheet, ??? as usual by the agents, was once more passed and ??? and a dividend again paid.

15. As regards the appellant himself, his evidence seems to me to be of a halting and self-condemnatory character, even after making all allowances for the fact that he was giving evidence in 1925 of matters which had taken place many years before. And though when financial troubles overtook the Bank, some investigation was at last made, the conduct of the Directors continued in my opinion to be open to adverse comment. The balance sheet, Exhibit 62, for the year ending May 31, 1913, which appears to have been published about October 16, 1913, shows no bad debts, and states that debts considered good for which the Bank holds no securities amounted to Rs. 1,19,207. In the following year the balance sheet, Exhibit 63, as at August 31, 1914, shows the figure of Rs. 1,36,212 for a similar item, viz., debts considered good for which the Bank holds no security, but adds for the first time an item of no less than Rs. 81,926 for “debts considered lad or doubtful.” And on the other hand the secured debts in the 1913 balance sheet amounting to nearly 2¼ lacs have dwindled in the 1914 balance sheet to a mere Rs. 21,352. On the facts before him the trial Judge has held that the 1913 balance sheet was false as the figure for secured debts was false as was also the figure for unsecured debts considered good (see judgment paragraph 23). In my judgment this finding was correct in both particulars.

16. I also think that the petition (appeal Exhibit AA.) which was presented to the High Court in 1914 for obtaining confirmation of the scheme of arrangement was inaccurate and misleading in its financial details, and did not represent the then true position of the Bank. We have thought it right that this petition and the subsequent proceedings should be in evidence, but as in the lower Court the appellant was not cross-examined on the petition, I do not propose to lay stress upon the fact that he was one of the petitioners.

17. It would also appear from the balance sheets from 1910-1913 and other documents, that ostensible profits were shewn in each year, and that the following dividends were paid, viz., Rs. 869 in 1910, Rs. 1,093 in 1911, Rs. 1,304 in 1912 and Rs. 1,554 in 1913. I think it reasonably clear that if the accounts had been properly kept and a proper allowance made for bad debts, a loss would have been shewn and not a profit. Consequently, the dividends paid must have been paid out of capital, and in breach of the general law and incidentally of Article 140 of the Articles of Association. But as the liability of the appellant has not been based specifically under this heading in the Court below, I need not pursue the point further.

18. This then being the general position, how has the learned Judge arrived at the amount of Rs. 12,000 for which he has held the appellant liable? He has first found the agents liable for Rs. 1,06,000, in respect of the aggregate losses amounting to Rs. 1,27,869 enumerated in Exhibits 107, 108 and 109. These Exhibits are lists filed respectively by the liquidator of

(a) advances for Rs. 72,906 without security to the agents or their friends or relatives or to bogus companies which the Directors and agents would have discovered with ordinary care and diligence,

(b) advances for Rs. 43,408 without security which have become time-barred but which could have been recovered with ordinary care and diligence by the agents and Directors, and

(c) advances for Rs. 11,555 without security to persons of no means which have become time-barred, and in respect of which the agents and Directors were ??? negligent in making the advances and in taking ??? steps to recover them.

??? learned Judge has next held that roughly half this ??? of Rs. 1,06,000 might have been avoided ??? the Directors had exercised any control and supervision over the agents. He accordingly held ??? the Directors were responsible to make good at ??? Rs. 53,000 to the liquidator. But as regards two the Directors, they had compromised for Rs. 15,000. ??? as regards the appellant, the Judge thought it fair reduce the Rs. 53,000 to Rs. 38,000 as his strict liability. The Judge then went one step further, and held that ??? all the circumstances he could reduce the appellant's actual liability to ¼ of Rs. 48,000, viz., Rs. 12,000, the appellant was only one of a Board of five Directors, ??? one Director had retired in 1913 and paid Rs. 5,000, ??? reducing the above Rs. 53,000 to Rs. 48,000. In ??? that reduction he in part relied on section 281 of Indian Companies Act.

19 It will be seen, therefore, that in the result the ??? has only been ordered to pay about one-ninth ??? above aggregate losses of Rs. 1,06,000 as found ??? learned Judge. There is, therefore, a very margin allowed for difficulties of proof as regards ??? individual items. Accordingly, it is not surprising ??? the appellant has not disputed before us the ??? of quantum, if once his negligence and legal ??? are established. On the other hand no ??? has been filed by the liquidator, and so it is necessary to consider whether a larger amount should ??? been awarded. In fact, this case does not permit ??? accuracy. It is essentially a case ??? as the learned Judge indicates, one has to ??? damages on broad lines. In the present case we the advantage of the chain of reasoning which led the learned Judge to fix Rs. 12,000. If the case he been tried with a jury, we should only have known ??? figure, and in my opinion there would have been ??? evidence to justify a verdict by a jury for that amount of damages or compensation.

20. I will next deal with the legal liability of appellant, if any, to answer any part of these loss Negligence, I think, is amply proved, despite Mr. Nadkarni's earnest and able argument to the contrary. ??? does this negligence amount to “wilful negligence” “his own personal wilful act, neglect or default” ??? the exceptions to the indemnity conferred upon him Articles 98 and 99 of the Articles of Association? my judgment it does. The cases of City Equitable Insurance Co., In re and Dovey v. Cory, in of which the Directors successfully disputed ??? liability, were much relied on by the appellant to ??? the contrary. In the former case there was a ??? indemnity clause. In the latter there was not. But regards the facts it is difficult to compare the ??? Indian Company and its supine Directors before us the heavily capitalised English Corporations and active Directors in the cases cited. The only point of comparison is that both East and West ??? deal with a rogue as one of the co-directors.

21. But as to the law the judgment of Lord ??? Sargant in the former case seems to me the more he for present purposes. In City Equitable Fire Insurance Co., In re he says (p. 528):—

“That being so, we have to consider how the matter would stand company itself was suing the auditors, and for this purpose we must ??? the question as to what is the extent of the protection given to the ??? by …. article 150. What is the meaning of the exception ‘wilful or default’ in that article? Romer, J. has analysed with great care ??? on the subject, and in my opinion he has, as a result of that analysis, a correct conclusion. I think that the word ‘wilful’ in this ??? importance, and means that the officer in question is consciously ??? to act, in a reprehensible manner. It may no doubt be for him to ??? that this is not so, and I do not think he would be protected if he simply ??? to give any consideration at all to the question of his duties, if he ??? recklessly and without caring whether he was fulfilling them or not. ??? in my judgment, these words excuse an officer if through mere ??? or error of judgment, and while endeavouring honestly to carry his duty he does or omits to do something which apart from these words ??? have rendered him liable. I need not carry the definition further, for as be seen this is enough, having regard to the view I take of the facts.”

The reason for this last sentence arose from the special ??? of the case. The learned Judge goes on to state ??? there were two circumstances on which special ??? should be laid. The first was the very great care ??? by Mr. Lepine (the auditor in question) in ??? performance of his duties, a circumstance to which ??? attention was drawn in the judgment of the ??? below. The second was that Mr. Lepine was ??? “with a most unusual state of things, a ??? in Mr. Bevan of exceptional ability, exceptional ??? and quite exceptional roguery.”

22. In the present case the facts are essentially different as regards the care exercised, by the Directors. ??? have we to deal with a financier of Mr. Bevan's exceptional qualities. In my judgment then the ??? of the appellant in the present case would be ??? as explained by Sargant L.J in the City Equitable case, viz., “as consciously acting or failing to act reprehensible manner.” There it was expressly found ??? the Judges that the Directors had not been ??? in diligence. In the case before us, I think a ??? could hardly take less effective care than the ??? did; and in my judgment he must have been ??? conscious of his want of attention to the Bank's ???. True it is that at a late stage, viz., 1918, he ??? to have proposed that the Criminal ??? Department should be called in (see his evidence paragraph 9 of Exhibit 70). But in 1912 he took no steps to enforce the Directors' resolution for information as to the Bank's debtors, and in 1914 he accounts fully opposed the proposed production of the ??? of the Kolhapur branch to a committee of shareholders and depositors. Exhibit 67 shews that this committee suspected fraud, and though according to the appellant this committee finally did inspect the accounts, yet in ??? cross-examination he says:—

“I do not remember if its report came ultimately before us. There no correspondence between the committee and Directors. I did not inquiry what that committee did. We Directors told the agents to do the needful. ??? did not further investigate into allegations of confusion in Kolhapur accounts.

23. I quote this because the Kolhapur branch ??? heavy losses—about half the total losses according the liquidator's evidence—and because the ??? conduct in this matter appears to me to be typical his general conduct as a Director. He also admits ??? never went to Kolhapur to see about the work of ??? branch, nor was any other Director sent, apart ??? the agents. Further the accountant ??? (Exhibit 97) deposes that the accounts of the Kolhapur branch were never reconciled with those at Sholapur and in his report Exhibit 72, he sets out the ??? figures year by year. In his opinion the object of ??? was to conceal the misappropriations by agents. As to the excuse put forward by the appellant that in 1915 he asked the agents for certain information and did not get it, this seems to me to be ??? According to the liquidator, the appellant was editor of a newspaper, the agent of a Life Insurance Company and a man well versed in business. ??? suggestion was made to us that at any his physical or mental powers were impaired, ??? he gave his age at the trial as 69. So I see adequate excuse for his inaction. Further, according the liquidator, the period of limitation in the Kolhapur Courts was only three years, although in ??? was six years. So some diligence was particularly desirable.

24. Taking then the case as a whole, it more resembles In the matter of the Union Bank, Allahabad, Limited and The New Fleming Spinning and Weaving Company, Limited v. Kessowji Naik, than any other cited. In the former case Directors who trusted a manager blindly were held liable to make good dividends paid out of capital. The main differences are that no agents were appointed as here, and that the Articles expressly put the management under the Directors; and that the misfeasance was in respect of the above dividends and not by way of general damages for loss of assets, and that there was no special indemnity clause. The similarities are that the ostensible profits out of which dividends were paid did not in fact exist owing to the loss of assets caused by the frauds of the manager: and that this loss in its turn was held due to the slackness and inaction of the Directors. In The New Fleming Spinning and Weaving Company, Limited v. Kessowji Naik Directors were held liable by Mr. Justice Scott for gross negligence in permitting loans to the agents whom they had also appointed to be the Company's bankers. There at p. 413 it was said of the Directors:—

“They certainly were not appointed to be mere dummies during those ??? months; nominally to watch over the interests of the shareholders, but ??? reality to supply without enquiry the wants of the agent, and sanction blindly all his acts. If they drifted into such a position through their confidence in him, I hold that they failed to perform their duty, and ran the ??? of being held liable to any losses caused by the misconduct of the agent, which would not have accrued had they exercised the duties clearly imposed ??? them by the articles I have cited.”

The learned Judge tells us at p. 412 that the articles provided that the business of the Company was to be managed by the Board with the assistance of the agent: and pages 375 and 376 show that the agents had power to enter into all contracts and to appoint and dismiss employees. This resembles our Articles 100 and 119. On the other hand there were no special indemnity clauses such as our Articles 98 and 99.

25. But, as pointed out by Lord Macnaghten in Dovey v. Cory, each case of this nature depends largely on its own facts. Thus he says (p. 488):—

“And I do not think it desirable for any tribunal to do that which Parliament has abstained from doing—that is, to formulate precise rules for the guidance or embarrassment of business men in the conduct of business affairs. There never has been, and I think there never will be, much difficulty in dealing with any particular case on its own facts and circumstances; and, speaking for myself, I rather doubt the wisdom of attempting to do more. I understand from my noble and learned friend Lord Shand that he also takes this view.”

Then at p. 489, Lord Davey quotes the judgment in Rance's Case of Lord Romilly as follows:—

“The learned Judge explained what he meant by a fraudulent payment: ‘I mean one where the person who makes it or is concerned in making it is at the time aware of the impropriety of making it, but does so in order to obtain a benefit for himself’; and he adds: ‘The director may be ignorant of this fact, but if his ignorance arises from his wilfully shutting his eyes to the facts which are before him, he is equally guilty’.”

And then Lord Davey proceeds (p. 490):—

“I think that this statement of the law is very nearly, but not quite, accurate. In my opinion it is not necessary that the motive of the improper payment should be to obtain a benefit for the director himself. I also understand Lord Romilly to include in the expression ‘wilfully shutting his eyes,’ culpable negligence or reckless indifference by the director in the performance of his duties.”

Then, after citing the judgment of Stirling, J. in Leeds Estate, Building and Investment Company v. Shepherd, Lord Davey continues:—

“My Lords, I agree in this statement of the law, and I do not think it inconsistent with that of Lord Romilly, properly understood, and subject to the observation which I have already made upon it. It is by this ??? that the conduct of the respondent must be judged in this case.”

26. No case precisely on all fours as regards the facts has been cited to us. But in my judgment the expression “wilfully shutting his eyes” as explained by Lord Davey, aptly applies to the conduct, or rather I should say to the misconduct, of the appellant in the present case. For as pointed out by Romer, J. in City Equitable case, quoting Lord Justice Bramwell's definition of “wilful” in Lewis v. Great Western Railway Co. “the misconduct, not the conduct, must be wilful.”

27. The result is that in my judgment the appellant's defence, so far as it is based on the protection given him by the Articles of Association, must fail, for in his case the exceptions stated in Articles 98 and 99 have been established against him.

28. I would also hold that his defence under section 281 of the Indian Companies Act must fail. That section is not meant to cover gross neglect of a Director's ordinary duties over a long series of years. In the gross neglect shewn by the appellant in the present case he has not, in my opinion, acted reasonably,” nor ought he “fairly to be excused.” With all respect, therefore, I do not think the lower Court was entitled to apply section 281 as was done in paragraph 33 of the judgment.

29. This leaves me with the defence of limitation to ??? with. This is based on sub-section (3) of section 235 of the Indian Companies Act, which enacts ??? “the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, shall ??? to an application under this section ??? if such application were a suit.” It is ??? that the Legislature did not make this sub-section more explicit. As it is, no less than four different articles of Indian Limitation Act have been relied on one or other of the rival arguments before us, as ??? the Article which the Legislature intended to apply to misfeasance applications by a liquidator. The appellant has put forward Article 36 or alternatively Article 115. The liquidator has put forward Article 120 or alternatively Article 116. The appellant relies on the judgment of Mr. Justice Harrison and Mr. Justice Fforde in Bhim Singh v. Liquidator, Union Bank of India, holding that Article 36 is the appropriate Article in such a case, and dissenting from the judgment of Sir Cecil Walsh and Mr. Justice Mukerji in In the matter of the Union Bank, Allahabad, Limited The liquidator relies on the latter case where it was held that Article 120 is the appropriate Article, and that section 235 of the Indian Companies Act confers a new right of action upon the Liquidator. That case in its turn dissented from the view taken by the Lahore High Court in the case of The Bank of Multan, Ltd. v. Hukam Chand not reported in the authorised reports. My experience in the Bombay High Court is that no ??? has given rise to more differences of judicial opinion ??? the Indian Limitation Act. And in the present case regret to find that, with all respect to the learned Judge who decided these two reported cases, I am unable ??? adopt entirely the interpretation of the Act given either in the one case or the other.

30. As regards Article 36 I feel no difficulty. In ??? judgment the present claim against the Directors ??? misfeasance or breach of trust is clearly not “independent of contract” and consequently Article 36 does ??? apply. In this respect, therefore, I agree with the ??? of the Allahabad High Court in In the matter of the Union Bank, Allahabad, Limited in preference to the expressed by the Lahore High Court in Bhim Singh Liquidator, Union Bank of India. I say this because the relations between the Bank and its Directors are part governed by numerous Articles in the Articles of Association, including their qualification shares and remuneration, and indeed the very indemnity which they are relying on in this case. In my opinion these articles constitute part, though not the whole, of a contract between the Company and its Directors.

31. In support of this view I may refer to what was held in the City Equitable Case, already cited. There at p. 520 Lord Justice Warrington dealt expressly with this point, and held that Article 150 in that case giving an indemnity to Directors and auditors, formed part of a contract between the Company and its auditors. He said:—

“In the first place, I think that article, as the learned judge has held expressly in the case of the directors and impliedly, if not expressly, in the case of the auditors, does in such a case as the present form part of the contract between the company and the auditors, and for the reason that auditors ??? engaged without any special terms of engagement. When that is the case, ??? if the articles contain provisions relating to the performance by them of their duties and to the obligations imposed upon them by the acceptance of the office, I think it is quite plain that the articles must be taken to express the ??? upon which the auditors accept their position. Of course, if the terms ??? their employment are expressed in a separate document, then that document ??? be taken to define the conditions of their engagement, and it would not ??? proper to assume any implied terms either from the provisions of the ??? or elsewhere. But in the present case I think it is quite plain that the ??? of article 150 do, according to their proper construction, whatever that ??? be, effect a modification in what would prima facie be, but for that article, ??? obligation and liability of the auditors.”

32. So, too, in Molineaux v. London, Birmingham ??? Manchester Insurance Company Lord Justice ???-Hardy, in delivering the judgment of the Court appeal, said (p. 595):—

“On principle, and apart from authority, it seems to us that a person who ??? an appointment as director, knowing that the holding of a certain ??? of shares is a necessary qualification, and acts as director, must be ??? to have contracted with the company that he will, within a reasonable time, ??? the requisite shares either by transfer from existing shareholders or ??? from the company.”

And then at p. 596 he said:—

“The articles, though not themselves a contract between the company and the director, must be regarded as shewing the terms upon which on the one hand he agrees to act as director, and on the other hand the company agree to pay him remuneration for his services.”

And in Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates, Limited, In re Mr. Justice Neville at p. 440 after citing these observations said:—

“And, having regard to the above decision, I do not see how to escape from the conclusion that this immunity was one of the terms upon which the directors held office in this company.”

This decision of Neville J. was in its turn followed by Romer, J. in the City Equitable Case, without expressing any opinion of his own; and though counsel for the Liquidator intimated his intention to question it in the Court of Appeal, there was, eventually, no appeal as regards the Directors, and the appeal failed as regards the auditor as I have already shown.

33. Having regard to these decisions of the Court ??? Appeal, I do not think that I need consider in any details the judgment of Astbury J. in Hickman v. Kent ??? Romney Marsh Sheep-Breeders' Association. The actual decision was that an Article providing for the reference of disputes to arbitration was a sufficient ??? mission in writing within the English Arbitration Act, 1889, as between the Association and its members. ??? the course of his judgment the learned judge review the various authorities as to the effect of section 14 ??? the English Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908 (corresponding to section 21 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913), and came to the conclusion at p. 900 that ??? Articles do constitute a contract between a Company and its members in respect of their ordinary rights members, but not in any other capacity as, e.g, a Direct nor do they constitute a contract between the Company and a third person. In so far, if at all, as the opinion expressed by the learned judge is inconsistent with the above decisions of the Court of Appeal, I would respectfully follow the latter.

34. In the present case the appellant was one of the original Directors named in Article 85. But under Article 87 he had to retire at the first General Meeting, and Article 88 provided for the subsequent retirement of Directors by rotation. Under Article 89 it was for the General Meeting to appoint successors, and in default the retiring Directors were to continue to act until successors were duly appointed by a subsequent General Meeting. We have looked at the original of the Company's minute book, Exhibit 67, and it appears therefrom that the appellant was formally reappointed a Director in each of the years 1909, 1912 and 1916. Accordingly there must at various times have been something in the nature of an offer by the appellant to serve further, and an acceptance of that offer by the Company or vice versa, either express or implied. And so the whole contract was not in the Articles.

35. As regards the Directors' remuneration, we have required the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies to produce to us the original Memorandum and Articles which had been returned to the witness Kashinath Exhibit 52). This original shows that the amount fixed or remuneration by Article 84 was Rs. 5 per meeting, and that the copy Exhibit 53 is incorrect in omitting that figure. This is confirmed by the evidence of the liquidator (Exhibit 65, para. 45), and of the accountant, Exhibit 97. Accordingly that term in the contract between the Company and the Directors is to be found in lie Articles.

36. There is no evidence before us to shew that there as ever any formal written contract independent of the Articles. Consequently, the possible exception which Warrington L.J had in mind in the City Equitable Case at p. 521 above cited need not be considered here. I may also add that although one would gather from the evidence of the witness Kashinath (Exhibit 52) that the appellant as an original Director named in Article 85 was one of the original signatories to the Memorandum and Articles, yet the production of the original shows that this was not so. But even if he had been an original signatory, I would not have attached importance to it in the present case.

37. My conclusions then in the present case are that following the decision in the City Equitable Case there was a contract between the Company and ??? of its Directors, and that the terms of such contract are to be found mainly in the Articles of Association, but partly dehors the Articles. I have already held that Article 36 of the Indian Limitation Act does not apply, and in my opinion the better view is that neither Article 115 nor Article 116 applies either. I say that Article 116 does not apply because the whole of the contract was not in writing registered. A more difficult question then arises as regards Article 115. The conflicting arguments were that if Article 116 did not apply then Article 115 must, for the contract must either be “in writing registered” or “not in writing registered.” One answer made to this argument was that Article 11 would not apply either, because part of the contract was “in writing registered,” viz., in the Articles of Association. For this purpose the decision of Sir John Walli and Mr. Justice Seshagiri Ayyar in Ripon Press and Sugar Mill Co., Ltd. v. Nama Venkatarama Chetty was relied on to the effect that the expression “registered” includes Articles of Association registered under the Indian Companies Act, and that accordingly a suit by a shareholder to recover dividends from the Company was governed by Article 116. This case was followed by Mr. Justice Mukerji in In the matter of the Union Bank, Allahabad, Limited. It was, however, dissented from by the Madras Full Bench in Rama Seshayya v. Sri Tripurasundari Cotton Press, Bezwada, where it was held that such a suit was governed by Article 120 and not by Article 115 or 116. The view of the Full Bench was that a dividend was a debt, and that no Article expressly applied to a debt. There Courts Trotter, C.J said (p. 478):—

“The Indian Limitation Act is one of those unfortunate pieces of Indian legislation which by trying to provide for everything conceivable very often ??? by leaving at cases of the most glaring description. I might take this as a very good ???, for there is no article which provides simpliciter for a debt due, ??? a debt as would have been the subject of the old common law action in debt, although, oddly enough, provision is made by article 63 for money payable for interest upon money due from the defendant to the plaintiffs';

so that a special article is enacted for the interest and nothing is said whatever about the principal debt.”

Maneklal v. The Suryapur Mills Co., Ltd. was ??? suit by a Company against a shareholder based on the forfeiture of his shares and his consequent liability under an express Article to pay all moneys then payable. The Court held that there was an express or implied contract to pay and that Article 115 was the appropriate Article. Mr. Justice Crump negatived Article 116 because he agreed with the ??? of the Madras Full Bench that the word “registered” in Article 116 of the Indian Limitation Act was ??? to registration under the Indian Registration Act, 1908. My judgment in that case left that particular point open, but negatived Article 116 because in any event the whole of the contract was not in writing registered. It does not, however, appear that the point was ever taken that Article 115 could not apply either because part of the contract was in writing registered. That point is, however, now taken, and on the whole I think it should succeed, as I prefer the view expressed by Sir John Wallis in Ripon Press and Sugar Mill Co., Ltd. v. Nama Venkatarama Chetty as to the meaning of the word “registered” to any of the judgments which conflict with it.

38. Another answer to the argument on Article 115 is that the misfeasance to be established in the present case must be a breach of trust or misfeasance in the nature of breach of trust as pointed out by Lord Macnaghten in Cavendish Bentinck v. Fenn, and that Article 115 is not strictly applicable to a misfeasance of that character, nor is Article 116, as “breach of contract” is not the sole liability sued on, nor is it the usual nomenclature for a breach of trust whether specific or quasi. But whichever answer is adopted, this leaves us only, with Article 120. Accordingly in my judgment Article 120 is the appropriat Article to adopt, and in this respect I arrive at the same conclusion as that in In the matter of the Union Bank Allahabad, Limited. So, too, in Kathiawar Trading Company v. Virchand Dipchand Sir Charles Sargent’ judgment treats Article 120 as the appropriate Article for a suit against Directors for misapplication of the Company's funds in ultra vires transactions, though the actual decision was that the suit was barred by laches.

39. Applying then Article 120 to the present case the period of limitation was six years from the time when the right to sue accrued. The present application was made on November 18, 1920, and it was argued ??? the liquidator in reliance on In the matter of the Union Bank, Allahabad, Limited, that the right to sue accrued at the date of liquidation, viz., June 2, 1927. But, with all respect to the view of the Allahabad High Court and of the learned trial Judge in the present case, I am unable to accept this solution of the difficulty. Accordingly on this point I agree with the view of the Lahore High Court in Bhim Singh v. Liquidator, Union Bank of India, and would follow Cavendish Bentinck v. Fenn, where Lord Macnaghten held that (p. 669):—

“it has been settled, and I think rightly settled, that section creates no new offence, and that it gives no new rights, but only provides a summary and efficient remedy in respect of rights which apart from that section might have been vindicated either at law or in equity.”

That was also the view expressed by the Court of Appeal in the City Equitable Case (see the judgment of Pollock M.R at p. 507).

40. The case of Cavendish Bentinck v. Fenn also shews that a misfeasance application, to be successful, must establish that actual loss resulted to the Company from the misfeasance. But by section 24 of the Indian Limitation Act, in the case of a suit for compensation for an act which does not give rise to a right of action unless some specific injury actually arises therefrom, the period of limitation is to be computed from the time when the injury results. So, too, under section 23 in the case of a continuing breach of contract, a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment when the reach continues.

41. Now in the present case the losses arose from the various causes I have already mentioned, but I think ??? were not definitely ascertained prior to the Balance ??? for the period June 1, 1913, to August 31, 1914, which was laid before the Company at its general meeting on February 28, 1915, together with the Directors' 10th Annual Report (see Exhibit 63/2). This Balance Sheet includes amongst the assets Rs. 81,926 for “debts considered bad or doubtful,” but the contra amount “reserved for bad debts” is only Rs. 5,700, and even then a loss of Rs. 5,418 is incurred. The Directors' report is significantly silent as to the Rs. 81,926 for bad or doubtful debts.

42. I would take, therefore, February 28, 1915, as being the earliest date “when the specific injury actually arose” within section 24, and consequently the date when the right to sue accrued. In this connection I think that “injury” in section 24 includes a legal injury; and that the present application is clearly one for “compensation,” which is the expression used in section 235 of the Indian Companies Act itself. And in so far, if at all, as the case is not covered by section 24 I think it comes within section 23. As I have already held, there was here a breach of contract by a Director, and in my opinion it was a continuing breach of contract right down to the above meeting of February 28, 1915, and later.

43. Under these circumstances it follows that in my judgment the Liquidator's application of November 18, 1920, was brought in time, and that consequently the appellant's defence based on limitation entirely fails. ??? may add that a similar result would be arrived at if, contrary to the view I hold, Article 116 was regarded a the appropriate Article to apply. The period of limitation in that Article is also six years, and the Article contains by reference a provision for continuing breach of contract.

44. In the result, therefore, I agree with the conclusion arrived at by the learned trial Judge and ??? dismiss this appeal with costs

45. I should like to acknowledge the special assistance which the arguments of Mr. Coyajee and Mr. Nadkarni for the Appellant and of Mr. Kane for the Liquidator have given us in the present case, and to regret the delay which my absence on leave has caused in delivering judgment.

46. I would also like to add that in my opinion this appeal shews the desirability of some amendment of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, so as to nullify the existing differences of opinion in various High Courts as to the effect of section 235 of that act, and also to nullify the wide indemnities given by such articles of association as articles 98 and 99 in the present case. In this connection I would draw attention to section 152 of the new English Companies Act, 1929, which in effect makes Articles of that nature void. That Act also makes other important amendments for the protection in England of the investing public. This, however, is a matter for the Indian Legislature to decide on here. Fools cannot ??? be protected from the wiles of Company promoters and agents, but the path of the latter may be made more difficult by the Legislature, and particularly so in case like the present, where, thanks to the managing gents and the Directors, the expressed objects of the company, viz., “to encourage the habit of saving money to facilitate small but safe investment,” have been ??? falsified in actual practice.

Patkar, J.:— This appeal is filed against the order the District Judge on an application under section 235 the Indian Companies Act, 1913, by the liquidator the Sholapur Bank, Limited, against the agents and directors of the Bank to recover from them a sum of Rs. 1,47,000 on the ground of breach of trust, negligence ??? misfeasance on their part resulting in loss to that tent to the Bank

The Sholapur Bank was registered on September 26, 1903, with an authorised capital of Rs. 1,00,000 divided in two thousand shares of Rs. 50 each. The Memorandum of Association and the Articles of Association are Exhibit 53. The object of the Bank was to advance money on substantial personal securities, and securities of all denominations. Messrs K.B Kale and Co. were secretaries, treasurers and agents of the Bank. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and the father of defendants Nos. 3 and 4 were the partners of Messrs K.B Kale and Company. Defendant No. 5, Kakade, the appellant before us, and defendant No. 6, Umberje, were directors from the beginning and defendant No. 7 from October 14, 1906, and defendant No. 8 from April 3, 1904, till April 16, 1913. Defendants Nos. 5, 6 and 8 filed written statements denying fraud or negligence and contesting their liability to make good any amount to the liquidators Defendant No. 7 and another director defendant No. ??? died during the pendency of the application and ??? further steps were taken. Out of the contending defendants Nos. 5, 6 and 8, defendants Nos. 8 and 6 came ??? a settlement with the liquidator with the sanction of the District Court, and were discharged from their liability on paying a sum of Rs. 5,000 and 10,000 respectively ??? the liquidator. The only contending defendants in the lower Court were defendant No. 5, the appellant in the case, and the firm of K.B Kale and Company represented by defendants Nos. 1 to 4.

The learned Judge held that the application under section 235 of the Indian Companies Act was in time and passed a decree against the agents to the extent Rs. 1,02,160-5-0, and a further decree against the agents and defendant No. 5 jointly for a further sum Rs. 12,000.

When the Bank was started there were two branches, one at Sholapur and another at Kolhapur and in 1912 they opened a branch in Bombay. According to the balance sheets, the Bank declared dividends till 1913 and came into trouble after 1914. On April 23, 1914, the Bank temporarily suspended payment. A report of the financial condition was sent to the shareholders and depositors, and a scheme was suggested for recommencing the Bank's business. An application was made to the High Court under section 153 of the Indian Companies Act of 1913. On September 9, 1914, the scheme was sanctioned, and according to the High Court's order there was a meeting of the Bank's creditors and depositors on December 19, 1914, under the presidentship of the District Judge of Sholapur. At that meeting 116 creditors having a claim of Rs. 1,32,622-8-0, agreed in person or by proxy to the scheme proposed for continuing the Bank. The scheme was sanctioned after a reference to the High Court. At a meeting of the shareholders on June 2, 1917, Mr. Rajopadhye, Exhibit 65 and Mr. M.R Godbole, were appointed liquidators of the Sholapur Bank. A meeting of the creditors was called to decide that the liquidation proceedings should be effected through the Court. Accordingly, an application was made to the District Court in 1918, and Mr. D.L Sahasrabudhe was appointed in place of Mr. Godbole. The District Court took over the liquidaion proceedings. The District Judge called meetings of he creditors and of the contributories on September 2, 1918, and appointed Rao Bahadur Shah as the chairman of the meeting of the contributories and Rao Bahadur Sathe of the meeting of the creditors. The meetings were held and reports sent to the District Judge. Exhibit 70 is the report from Rao Bahadur Shah and Exhibit 71 is the report from Rao Bahadur Sathe. After this the matter was referred to the Criminal Investigation Department. The accounts were examined by a certified accountant Mr. Sarangdhar, Exhibit 97, who made a report, Exhibit 72. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were convicted and sentenced in the criminal proceedings. On November 18, 1920, an application was filed under section 235 against the agents and the directors with the result mentioned above. Against the decree of Rs. 12,000 against defendant No. 5 an appeal has been filed in this Court. The agents have not preferred any appeal. We are concerned in this appeal with the liability of one of the directors, defendant No. 5.

It is urged on behalf of the appellant with reference to Articles 98 and 99 of the Articles of Association Exhibit 53, that defendant No. 5 is indemnified in respect of any act done by him in execution of his office, ??? by reason of any error in judgment on his part ??? only through his wilful fraud or negligence, and that he is responsible only for any liability occasioned by his own personal wilful act, negligence or default. I is further urged that under Article 119 of the Article of Association, the secretaries, treasurers and agent had the general management of the business of the company and they were empowered to make purchases, sales loans, and advances for and on behalf of the company Reliance has been placed on the decision of Romer J. in City Equitable Fire Insurance Co., In re, which lays down the duties of the directors and defines the scope of wilful neglect or default. Reliance is also place on the decision of the House of Lords in Dovey v. Cory and particular stress is laid on the remarks of Lord Macnaghten that when all charges involving ??? obliquity against the director Mr. Cory were withdraw the case was at an end. It is further urged that ??? appellant took all reasonable care in the discharge of his duty and was not responsible for the fradulent conduct of the agents on whom he relied and by whose statements he was misled. It is also urged that the application under section 235 is barred by limitation under Article 36 of the Indian Limitation Act.

The first question in this appeal is whether the appellant, original defendant No. 5, is liable in this case on the ground of breach of trust, negligence and misfeasance resulting in the loss to the Bank. In City Equitable Fire Insurance Co., In re, it was held that, in discharging his duties, a director must act honestly, and must exercise such degree of skill and diligence as would amount to the reasonable care which an ordinary man might be expected to take, in the circumstances, on his own behalf; and that his duties are of an intermittent nature to be performed at periodical board meetings, and at meeting of any committee to which he is appointed, and though not bound to attend all such meetings he ought to attend hem when reasonably able to do so. With regard to wilful neglect or default, it was held that an act, or an mission to do an act, is wilful where the person who acts, or omits to act, knows what he is doing and intends ??? do what he is doing, but if that act or omission amounts ??? a breach of that person's duty, and therefore to negligence he is not guilty of wilful neglect or default unless he knows that he is committing, and intends to commit a breach of his duty, or is recklessly careless ??? the sense of not caring whether his act or omission or is not a breach of his duty. At page 428 it was held that the care which a director is bound to take has been described by Neville J. in Brazilian Rubber Plantions and Estates, Limited, In re, as “reasonable care” to be measured by the care an ordinary man might be expected to take in the circumstances on his own behalf. In City Equitable Fire Insurance Co., In re, the learned Judge was satisfied from the evidence adduced before him that each one of the directors was willing and anxious to give of his best to the company and at all times took as active a part in the work of the board as the circumstances would reasonably permit (p. 444), and at page 426 it was laid down that the duties of a bank director may differ widely from those of an insurance director, and the duties of a director of one insurance company may differ from those of a director of another. The case of City Equitable Fire Insurance Co., In re, related to insurance directors whereas in the present case we are concerned with a bank director.

The duties of a bank director have been considered in In the matter of the Union Bank, Allahabad, Limited. At page 689 it was held:—

“It may well be that a director or a body of directors having ??? an honest manager cannot be, under section 281, called upon to keep constant watch and check upon a fluctuating stock like yarn which is going in and out of the mill and which is being used daily in the handling of the company's business. To impose such a duty upon directors, as the courts have said, would lead honest men to refuse to undertake such a responsibility. But that is a very different thing from a Bank director taking no steps whatever ??? see that the manager does not lend the funds and the depositors' and shareholders' capital to worthless debtors and to persons who offer no security.”

Walsh J. has distinguished the case of Dovey v. Cory and the remarks of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Prefontaine v. Grenier, and held that a director ??? honestly trusted a fraudulent manager is not necessaril free from all liability.

The question of the appellant's liability has to considered on the evidence in the case. Under Article 1 of the Articles of Association the directors are requires to cause true accounts to be kept of all the transactions, and Article 123 requires the directors to lay before the company at least once in every year a statement of income and expenditure. It is urged on behalf of the liquidator that no control was exercised by the directors including the appellant over the agents and the treasurers. A branch was opened at Bombay without any resolution of the directors. From 1915 to 1917 no balance sheet was issued and the debts were allowed to become time-barred, and bad debts were shown at Rs. 81,000. The agents were allowed to advance bad debts to relatives without inquiry, and balance-sheets, Exhibits 62, 63 and 64, were false in fact, and the directors did not exercise proper supervision over the agents of the bank.

Exhibit 66 shows that there were in all 13 meetings held in six years, and though the appellant in his evidence says that he looked to the business and exercised supervision, there is no reliable evidence on the record to establish the truth of his story. Though in August 1912 a list of loans was asked for from the agents, no further steps were taken by the directors although the agents did not supply the list. The number of meetings held by the directors is indicative of the lack of control exercised by them over the agents. In City Equitable Fire Insurance Co., In re, the directors were men of ??? and high business capacity and were willing and anxious to give their best to the company, and at all times took as active a part in the work of he board as circumstances would reasonably permit, the learned District Judge says in his judgment ??? this case (paragraph 28) that the measure of ??? directors' supineness and lack of any attempt to control the agents may be gathered from the fact that the agents even opened a branch at Bombay practically in spite of the directors and yet the directors did nothing.

Three statements were filed by the liquidator, Exhibits 107, 108 and 109. Exhibit 107 is the list of money advanced to bogus companies, minors and relatives and friends of the agents and the agents themselves without security. The total of these loans comes to Rs. 72,906. Exhibit 108 is the list of the items amounting to Rs. 43,408 advanced without any security which could have been recovered with ordinary care and diligence. Exhibit 109 is the list of irrecoverable advances made to persons of no means without any security to the extent of Rs. 11,555. Exhibit 107 represents the list of fraudulent loans, Exhibit 109 is the list of negligent loans or loans advanced without any proper care which could be expected of a prudent manager, and Exhibit 108 represents the list of items which were lost to the company on account of negligence in not recovering them though the amounts were recoverable. In the list Exhibit 107 there is one khata called Mhalsadas Vitha & Co., No. 91. It appears from the evidence that Mhalsa was the name of the wife of defendant No. 2 Dhondo and Vithal was the name of his son, and that the company was a bogus company carried on in the name of the wife and the son of defendant No. 2. It appears from Exhibit 72 at page 135 that between March 1910 an February 1911, within a space of 12 months Rs. 4,08,663-13-0 were advanced to this bogus company. The appellant as the director of the bank ought to have enquired of the standing and the position of a company which was described as Mhalsadas Vithal & Co. to ??? an amount of over four lakhs was advanced during the course of a year. With regard to another bogus company called Triple & Co. the appellant admits in he evidence that the agents explained that Moghe Brothers were the proprietors of Triple & Co. and he was satisfied with that explanation though he knew nothing about Moghe Brothers himself. It appears from the evidence of Sarangdhar, Exhibit 92, at page 48, that no register of references, showing the position and standing of customers, was forthcoming though it is usually kept by banks to ascertain the position of the constituents of the bank. The appellant admits in his evidence at page 65 that as a director he was bound to see that the business of the bank, was conducted in a proper manner and that he was responsible to see that the accounts were properly kept though he was not responsible to see that the loans were made to proper persons. No rules were laid down by the directors as to the persons to whom loans were to be advanced whether on khatas or on promissory notes, and whether acknowledgments of the debts were to be taken within the period of limitation. It appears from the evidence of the liquidator that the major portion of the amount lost was from the Kolhapur accounts and that neither were suits filed nor acknowledgments taken to keep the debts within limitation. It appears from the evidence of Damodar Vaman Lohokare, Exhibit 100, at page 62 that he looked through the books and did not find a single acknowledgment taken on Khatas. It also appears from the evidence that there was total lack of any system under which the agents were allowed to work the affairs of the bank. It appears from Dovey v. Cory that there was no allegation in that case that there was neglect or default by reason of the absence of some system under which, if honestly carried out, the interests of the bank would have been in that respect secured. See also the remarks of Walsh J. in In the matter of the Union Bank, Allahabad, Limited, referred to above. The appellant admits in his evidence, Exhibit 115, at page 70, that the agents were to work on the lines laid down by the directors but they were not to work under their directions in each individual matter, but admits at page 65 that the board of directors had not laid down any general rules of the nature of business to be done by the bank.

It is urged on behalf of the appellant that the bank came to grief in 1913 as there was failure of other banks in Bombay. It appears, however, from the evidence of the liquidator, Exhibit 65, paragraph 54, that the Sholapur Bank had deposits in only two banks that failed during the crisis, viz., the Burma Bank and the Bombay Banking Co., that the deposits were not large, not more than Rs. 10,000 in each, and that the deposit in the Burma Bank was recovered in full, and that in the Bombay Banking Co. was recovered 50 per cent. But if there was a failure of other banks in 1913, there was greater reason for the bank's directors to probe more deeply into the concerns of the Sholapur Bank. But in 1914 when an application was made to the High Court for an order to continue the Bank the appellant stated that the debts were good and recoverable and that the Bank should be continued. The appellant admits in his evidence, Exhibit 115, at page 68, that there was a resolution to the effect that a committee should be appointed to examine the Kolhapur accounts, that there was a committee appointed by the depositors and shareholders to examine the Kolhapur accounts and the committee asked for the accounts for examination, and that the appellants objected to the proposal to examine the accounts by that committee.

It is urged on behalf of the appellant that he too such care of the affairs of the Bank as he would have taken of his own property, that he took part in filing suit against Valsankar for recovery of the money an in paying off creditors under Rs. 10, that he moved a resolution to place the matter in the hands of the Criminal Investigation Department for inquiry into the Bank's affairs, and that as a proof of his bona fides he kept his own deposits in the Bank and that of a minor under his control. It appears from the evidence of the liquidator, Exhibit 65, paragraph 37, that the opponent deposited Rs. 800 on February 1, 1913, for four months but the deposit was not renewed, and that he had a current account which showed a balance of Rs. 19-9-7 on April 28, 1913, and that the money remained unpaid. The appellant admits in his evidence, Exhibit 115, at page 70, that his own deposits were a few hundreds only, and the amount was withdrawn before the crisis began, that the funds of the Vaktrutvottejak Mandal were withdrawn about the panic time, and that only the minor Thite's money remained in the Bank. It appears also from the evidence of Sharangdhar, Exhibit 97, at page 57, that if the directors had taken ordinary care, there would not have been any difficulty for them to have ascertained that moneys were being advanced to relatives and friends of agents and to bogus khatas.

It is further urged on behalf of the liquidator that ??? balance sheets were false in two particulars (1) in showing an exaggerated amount of debts for which securities were held, and (2) in showing debts as good which ??? really not so. Exhibit 62 is the balance-sheet from ??? 1, 1912, to May 31, 1913, and Exhibit 63 the balance-sheet from June 1, 1913, to August ???, 1914. It appears from Exhibit 62 that the total amount of debts due to the Bank was Rs. 3,67,209-4-5 ??? consisted of Rs. 2,24,271-0-7 as debts considered ??? for which the bank held securities and ??? 1,19,207-2-7 as debts considered good for which the ??? held no securities. In Exhibit 63 the total amount comes to Rs. 2,41,034-9-10 which shows a recovery of Rs. 1,26,174-10-7 of debts during the period covered by Exhibit 63. It appears from the evidence of the accountant and auditor Sharangdhar, Exhibit 97, at page 56, and the statement produced by him that the Bank paid about Rs. 2,20,000 to its creditors in the period covered by the balance sheet of 1914. This was made up by (i) recovering the loans to the extent of Rs. 1,26,000 and odd; (ii) by reduction of the assets in column 15, Government Promissory Notes by Rs. 29,000 and odd; (iii) by reduction of cash with bankers in column 18 by over Rs. 56,000; and (iv) by reduction of cash in hand in column 19 by Rs. 25,000. These items total up to Rs. 2,36,000 and odd which was more than the amount paid to the creditors. He further deposes that if the item of Rs. 2,24,000 in the balance-sheet of 1913 had been really fully secured as stated in it, it could have been realised within a period of 15 months. He, therefore infers that the item of Rs. 2,24,000 in the balance-sheet of 1913 could not have been secured debts because only Rs. 21,000 appear as secured debts in 1914 and the total realization in the interval did not amount to more that Rs. 1,26,000, and that no one could have realised secure debts and given out unsecured loans at such a time ??? crisis. In Exhibit 62 the secured debts are said to ??? Rs. 2,24,271 while in Exhibit 63 for the succeeding ??? the secured debts are Rs. 21,352, whereas the amount ??? debts considered good for which no security was he was reduced from Rs. 1,19,207 to Rs. 36,212, and a ??? item of debts considered bad or doubtful was entered the balance-sheet, Exhibit 63, as amounting Rs. 81,926. The learned Judge has discussed the effect of the balance-sheets and has correctly drawn an ??? that the item shown in Exhibit 62 as debts ??? which the bank holds security was fictitious and ??? by something like Rs. 80,000 at the very least, and that most of the debts shown in Exhibit 62 as loans without security, amounting to Rs. 1,19,000 were not good debts as stated in the balance-sheets. He, therefore, came to the conclusion that he was satisfied that the balance-sheet of 1913 was false in at least two particulars, namely, in showing an exaggerated amount of debts for which securities were held and as showing debts as good which really were not so, and that the agents must have known and the directors could have with ordinary care ascertained that the balance sheet was false in these respects. It appears that no certified auditors and accountants were engaged to audit the accounts. It appears from the evidence of the liquidator, Exhibit 65, in paragraph 40, that it was in 1913 only that there was an audit by a professional auditor and subsequently in 1914 by Sahasrabudhe who is a certified accountant. Most of the debts were prior to 1913 as would appear from the evidence of the liquidator in para. 10. Therefore, there was no adequate reason for describing the debts differently in the different balance-sheets. The liquidator in is evidence, paragraph 25, says that the debts unsecured amounting to about Rs. 40,000 had become time-barred by the time the balance-sheet for 1912-1913 ??? published, and he has put in Exhibit 79, a statement to that effect. It would, therefore, follow that the description in the balance-sheet for 1912-1913 that the debts considered good for which the bank held securities amounted to Rs. 2,24,271 and that the debts considered ??? for which the Bank held no securities amounted to Rs. 1,19,207, was not justified, and that the directors ??? have satisfied themselves that those statements ??? correct. The defendant No. 5 in his evidence at page 66 admits that he made no inquiries at that timeout the figures shown in the balance-sheet, Exhibit 62, as due to the Bank, and that he signed the balance-sheet showing that the amount of good debts was Rs. 3,67,000. He also did not make inquiries when he signed the balance-sheet, Exhibit 63, for 1913-1914. The only explanation which he has given with regard to the amount of Rs. 81,926 shown as bad debts is that he was satisfied with the explanation of the agents that owing to crisis it was feared that the debtors would fail to pay.

Having regard to these facts, I am not prepared to differ from the conclusion of the learned Judge that the appellant did not exercise reasonable care which was to be measured by the care an ordinary man might be expected to take in the circumstances on his own behalf Though there is no allegation of any complicity in the fraud of the agents, it cannot be held in the circumstances disclosed in the evidence in this case that the appellant acted both honestly and reasonably, but on the other hand the evidence shows that he was recklessly careless.

The next question is whether the application of the liquidator under section 235 of the Indian Companies Act on November 18, 1920, is within time. Under clause (3) of section 235 the Indian Limitation Act ??? apply to an application under this section as if ??? application were a suit. The appellant contends that the application is barred by Article 36 of the India Limitation Act and relies on the remarks in the case of Mangun Jha v. Dolhin Golab Koer. and the decision of the Lahore High Court in Bhim Singh v. Liquidator Union Bank of India. The remarks in the case Mangun Jha v. Dolhin Golab Koer were obiter as ??? point did not arise for decision in that case. In Bhim Singh v. Liquidator, Union Bank of India, it was he that section 235 of the Indian Companies Act does ??? create new rights, but merely provides a summary remedy of enforcing existing rights, which apart from that section might have been vindicated by means of a suit, and that an application under that section, made more than two years after the act of misfeasance complained of is alleged to have taken place, is barred by Article 36 of the Indian Limitation Act. Article 36 of the Indian Limitation Act refers to a suit for compensation for any malfeasance, misfeasance or nonfeasance independent of contract and would refer to actions founded on torts or such wrongs as are distinguishable from breaches of contract. In In the matter of the Union Bank, Allahabad, Limited, it was held that the liquidator's application to make the directors liable for the sums which the manager, through their negligence, has been enabled to make away with, is governed as to limitation by Article 120 of the Indian Limitation Act, and that the time begins to run from the date when the liquidation takes place, that is, when the liquidator first has a right vested ??? him. It was held that Article 36 would not apply as the claim is not independent of contract, and Articles 115 and 116 would not apply when there was no specific breach of a specific contract made by one or more individuals with the person making the claim, and that Article 115 refers to successive breaches or continuing reaches and it was difficult to apply the Article to a claim by a liquidator. It was further held that if the legislature intended that the liability of a director for breach of trust and misapplication of funds should be years, either from the point of view of tort after two years, or from the point of view of breach of contract after three years, they might just as well not have enact-section 235 at all. In the case of Kathiawar Trading company v. Virchand Dipchand it was suggested that article 120 would apply to such a suit as the present. In The New Fleming Spinning and Weaving Company, Limited v. Kessowji Naik, Scott, J. held (p. 398):—

“Misfeasance of a director constitutes a breach of trust. It is more than mere negligence, which consists in the omission to do something which a reasonable man would do, or the doing something which a reasonable man would not do. Negligence depends upon the public duty which is incumbent upon every one to exercise due care in his daily life; but a breach of trust depends upon the neglect of some special duty undertaken in regard to some specified person or body of persons.”

The liability, therefore, of a director of a bank is of a person whose relations with the company were not independent of contract and who occupies the position of a quasi trustee. A suit, therefore, for any misfeasance, against a director would not fall under Article 36 nor would it fall under Article 115 or 116 for the suit is not for a specific breach of any specific contract with the person making the claim, i.e, the Liquidator. The liability of the defendant is based not on a breach of contract but on a breach of duty amounting to a breach of trust. It is not, therefore, necessary to go into the question whether the word “Registered” in Article 116 means registered according to the Indian Registration Act. I think, therefore, that the residuary Article ??? would apply. This view is supported by the decision in In the matter of the Union Bank, Allahabad Limited.

The next question is when the right to sue or apple under section 235 under the Indian Companies ??? accrued in the present case. If under clause 3 of section 235 of the Indian Companies Act, the Indian Limitation Act would apply to an application under that section as if such application were a suit, I am not prepared to follow the view of the Allahabad High Court in In the matter of the Union Bank, Allahabad Limited, that time begins to run from the date ??? the liquidator first has the right vested in him. In City Equitable Fire Insurance Co., In re, it was held that section 215 of the Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908 (8 Edw. 7, c. 69), corresponding to section 235 of the Indian Companies Act was a procedure section only and created no new or additional liability, and that it provided a summary mode of enforcing existing rights. See the judgment of Pollock M.R at page 507, following the cases in Coventry and Dixon's Case; Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates, Limited, In re and Cavendish Bentinck v. Fenn. In the last case Lord Herschell, at page 661, observes:—

“I think that in order to establish a claim to relief it would be necessary not only to show a breach of duty but to show a breach of duty which resulted in pecuniary loss to the company.”

In Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. V, page 479, paragraphs 814 and 815, it is laid down:—

“The statutory provision [relating to misfeasance] … does not ??? create any new liability or new right; it only provides a summary mode of enforcing rights which must otherwise have been enforced by the ordinary jurisdiction of the court.

Misfeasance includes a breach by an officer of his duty to the company, the direct consequence of which has been a misapplication or loss of its assets for which he could be made responsible in an action. A misfeasance summons, however, cannot be sustained even where nominal damages could be recovered ??? an action for the breach of duty alleged, unless the breach has resulted in ??? to the company's funds and assets, and the applicant has a direct pecuniary interest in the success of the application. Nor can it be sustained ??? the case of non-feasance, even where it is a breach of trust, unless loss to the assets has resulted therefrom, although the court may order the respondents ??? a misfeasance summons, even where the liquidator establishes no money ??? against them, to pay the costs.”

Under section 24 of the Indian Limitation Act in the case of a suit for compensation for an act which does not ??? rise to a cause of action unless some specific injury actually results therefrom, the period of limitation runs ??? the time when the injury results.

The question, therefore, in this case is when the loss as occasioned to the Company by misfeasance on the part of the appellant. It is clear on the evidence that dividends were declared up to the year 1913. It was not, therefore, possible for the shareholders or the Company to know that any loss had resulted to the company by the action of the directors. It is only when the balance-sheet for 1914 was published that the shareholders could be in a position to know that the company sustained a loss. Exhibit 64 shows that the meeting of the directors to consider the balance-sheet for the year 1914 was held on February 28, 1915, and it must have been published thereafter, and that the balance-sheet for the year ending on August 31, 1915, was considered at the meeting held on July 11, 1916. It was only in the balance-sheet for the year 1914 that Rs. 81,000 were shown as bad debts. Even taking the earliest period at which the company could have known of the loss to the company on account of the misfeasance on the part of the directors, the date could not have been earlier than February 28, 1915, the date on which the meeting of the directors was held to consider the balance-sheet for the year ending in August 1914. The present application was made on November 18, 1920, that is, within six years from that date. I think, therefore, that the application by the liquidator in the present case under section 235 of the Indian Companies Act against the appellant is within time. If the appellant is guilty of wilful default and if the claim of the liquidator under section 235 is within time, it is not contended before us that the amount of Rs. 12,000 awarded against the appellant is excessive.

On these grounds, I would confirm the decree of the lower Court and dismiss the appeal with costs.

Decree confirmed.
B.G.R