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Tata Iron And Steel Co., Ltd., In Re

Bombay High Court
Dec 20, 1926
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns a petition by the Tata Iron Steel Company Ltd. under Section 153 of the Companies Act. The company has four classes of members: first preference shareholders, second preference shareholders, ordinary shareholders, and deferred shareholders. Dividends are payable in a priority order starting with first preference shareholders, followed by second preference shareholders, then ordinary and deferred shareholders. Due to insufficient profits, no dividend has been paid on second preference shares since 1st April 1922, resulting in arrears up to 31st March 1926.

In 1924, the legislature enacted Act 14 of 1924 to foster the steel industry in British India, providing for bounties to steel manufacturers, including the Tata Iron Steel Company. The Government of India conditioned the continuation of these bounties on the company restructuring its finances so that the bounties would not be used solely to pay arrears to second preference shareholders to the exclusion of ordinary and deferred shareholders.

To meet these conditions, the company devised a scheme under Section 153 of the Companies Act, which involved agreements with three classes of shareholders and court-ordered meetings to consider the scheme. The petition seeks the court’s sanction of this arrangement. The petition is opposed by certain shareholders, resulting in various objections and a hearing lasting six days.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the requirements of Section 153 of the Companies Act have been complied with in proposing and sanctioning the scheme.
  2. Whether a statutory majority approved the scheme at the meetings convened by the Court.
  3. Whether the scheme should be sanctioned on its merits, i.e., whether it is reasonable and bona fide and not oppressive to minority shareholders.

Arguments of the Parties

Objectors' Arguments

  • The persons initiating the proceedings lacked authority from a general meeting to do so.
  • The scheme effects alterations to the memorandum or articles of association without following the statutory procedure required for such alterations.
  • The meetings were not duly called, held, or conducted, including issues of insufficient notice, inadequate explanation of the scheme, and improper classification of shareholders into meeting classes.
  • Votes cast in favor of the scheme included invalid proxies, conditional proxies, proxies signed by unauthorized persons (executors, liquidators, receivers), unstamped or improperly stamped proxies, and proxies not in the form approved by the Court.
  • There was a conflict of interest among second preference shareholders, particularly those who also held ordinary shares.
  • The scheme was not bona fide and unfairly favored certain shareholders, particularly ordinary shareholders, at the expense of second preference shareholders.
  • Questions were raised regarding the financial soundness of the company and the certainty of the continuation of the Government bounties.

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The directors had authority under the articles (specifically Article 122) to initiate the proposal without a prior general meeting resolution.
  • The managing agents had authority to make the application for sanction on behalf of the company under the articles and agency agreement.
  • The scheme does not immediately alter the memorandum or articles; any such alteration would only arise if the scheme is sanctioned by the Court after approval by the statutory majority.
  • The meetings were properly called and conducted in accordance with the Court’s directions and the articles of association where applicable.
  • The classification of shareholders into three classes for meetings was reasonable and practicable given overlapping interests.
  • Votes cast by proxies were valid except where specifically disallowed based on articles or law (e.g., executors, unstamped proxies, proxies not in the Court-approved form).
  • The scheme is a reasonable business arrangement to secure the continuation of Government bounties and thereby the financial health of the company and dividends to all shareholders.
  • The objections regarding proxy validity and stamping were addressed with reference to the evidence and relevant legal principles.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bruce Peebres Co. v. Bain (William) & Co. Directors' power to initiate proposals under statutory provisions analogous to Section 153. Supported the conclusion that directors had power to initiate the scheme proposal without a prior general meeting resolution.
In re Palace Hotel, Ltd. Sanction of schemes involving alteration of memorandum under statutory provisions outside express procedures. Used to reject the objection that statutory procedure for altering memorandum must precede sanction under Section 153.
In re Schweppes, Ltd. Sanction of schemes involving alterations under statutory provisions, even if memorandum alteration involved. Supported the principle that Court can sanction schemes altering memorandum without prior compliance with specific alteration procedures.
In re J.A Nordberg, Ltd. Limits on altering rights conferred by memorandum to avoid consolidation or division of share classes. Guided the Court in assessing the validity of the scheme with respect to alterations affecting share classes.
In re Alabama, New Orleans, Texas and Pacific Junction Railway Co. Requirements for bona fide majority acting in interests of represented persons and scrutiny of conflicting interests. Provided framework for the Court’s assessment of the bona fides of the majority and the scheme’s reasonableness.
Llewellyn v. Kasintoe Rubber Estates, Ltd. Executors’ rights to vote and attend meetings under company law. Distinguished to hold that executors cannot vote if articles prohibit it, thus votes by executors disallowed.
London Joint Stock Bank v. Simmons Determination of factual questions relating to stamp cancellation on proxies. Supported the Court’s approach that cancellation of stamps is a question of fact for the Court’s opinion.
Virbhadrapa v. Bhimaji Requirements for adequate cancellation of stamps on instruments. Distinguished and Court declined to follow its strict dictum, accepting bona fide cancellation methods.
In re Inter-Oceanic Railway, & c. Ltd. Strictness in adherence to Court-approved proxy forms for validity of proxies. Applied to disallow proxies not in the Court-approved form as substantial deviations were found.
In re English, Scottish, and Australian Chartered Bank Authority of Court under company law to settle proxy forms and control meeting conduct. Supported the Court’s power to prescribe proxy form under Section 153 and disallow improper proxies.
Mahadeo Kori v. Sheoraj Ram Teli Stamp cancellation requirements and validity under Indian law. Supported the Court’s factual approach to assessing adequacy of stamp cancellation.
M'Mullen v. “Sir Alfred Hickman” Steamship, Ltd. English law on sufficiency of lines or crosses as stamp cancellation. Supported the view that simple cancellations may be sufficient, influencing the Court’s opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first analyzed the authority of the directors and managing agents to initiate and apply for sanction of the scheme, concluding that Article 122 of the articles of association granted sufficient power to the directors to propose the scheme without a prior general meeting resolution. The managing agents had authority under the articles and their agreement to make the application.

On the question of whether the scheme involved alterations to the memorandum or articles requiring statutory procedure, the Court held that while the scheme might result in such alterations if sanctioned, the proposal itself did not effect such changes and thus no prior general meeting resolution was necessary. The Court relied on English precedents to affirm that schemes involving alterations could be sanctioned under the relevant statutory provisions without following the formal alteration procedures, provided statutory requirements were met.

The Court then addressed objections concerning the calling, holding, and conduct of meetings. It found that meetings were properly convened under the Court’s directions, and where no directions were given, the articles of association applied. The classification of shareholders into three classes for separate meetings was held to be reasonable and practicable despite overlapping interests.

Regarding proxy votes, the Court examined each category of objection in detail, applying principles of agency law, company articles, and relevant statutes. Votes cast by proxies where the member was present but did not vote were held valid; votes by executors, liquidators, or receivers were disallowed per the articles; proxies not stamped or not properly cancelled were excluded; proxies not in the Court-approved form were disallowed due to substantial deviations; conditional proxies with vague conditions were upheld as valid; and votes by debtors to the company were disallowed.

The Court emphasized that the validity of votes depended on the facts and evidence presented and that the chairman’s report was prima facie evidence but subject to challenge by counter-proof.

Finally, the Court considered the merits of the scheme, applying the test from In re Alabama, New Orleans, Texas and Pacific Junction Railway Co. that the Court must ensure statutory compliance, bona fide majority action, and that the scheme is one reasonable businessmen could support. The Court found no substantial ground to question the bona fides of the majority or the reasonableness of the scheme. It acknowledged the Government of India’s position requiring second preference shareholders to sacrifice part of their preferential rights to secure the continuation of bounties benefiting all shareholders. The Court declined to engage in speculative financial arguments and accepted that the scheme was a prudent business arrangement.

Subsequent information confirmed the existence of a statutory majority in favor of the scheme, allowing the Court to sanction it.

Holding and Implications

The Court sanctioned the scheme proposed by Tata Iron Steel Company Ltd. under Section 153 of the Companies Act.

This decision validates the directors’ authority to propose such schemes without prior general meeting resolutions, confirms the Court’s power to regulate meetings and proxies under Section 153, and affirms that schemes involving alterations to the memorandum or articles may be sanctioned by the Court without following formal alteration procedures, provided statutory requirements and protections are met.

The immediate effect is that the proposed arrangement for payment of arrears and distribution of dividends among the classes of shareholders is approved, facilitating the continuance of Government bounties. No new precedent beyond the case’s specific facts and statutory interpretation is established.

Show all summary ...

1. This is a petition by the Tata Iron Steel Company Ltd. under Section 153 of the Companies Act. The members of the company are of four kinds: (1) first preference shareholders; (2) second preference shareholders; (3) ordinary shareholders; and (4) deferred shareholders. The first preference share holders are entitled to a fixed cumulative dividend at the rate of six per cent per annum calculative on the profits of the company in any one year. The second preference shareholders are entitled to a similar dividend at the rate of seven and a half per cent per annum. After these dividends have been paid, the ordinary shareholders are entitled to a non-cumulative dividend up to eight per cent and then the deferred share holders come in, and are entitled to a non-cumulative dividend up to 25 per cent per annum. That is to say, the profits, which it is determined to distribute every year, are devoted to paying dividends first to first preference share holders, then to paying the second preference shareholders, and when their claims are satisfied to paying in turn the dividends due to the deferred and the ordinary shareholders. The surplus profits, if any, are to be divided half and half between the holders of the ordinary shares and holders of the deferred shares by way of additional dividends. It may be added that in winding up the preference shares rank in priority to the ordinary and deferred shares of the company both as regards capital and dividend due before the commencement of the winding up. The dividend due to the first preference shares has been practically paid off, and we are not concerned here with those shareholders or their rights. But owing to the failure of the company to earn sufficient profits no dividend has been paid on the second preference shares since 1st April 1922, and the arrears up to 31st March 1926, on such shares amount to Rs. 29-12-4 per share.

2. The facts which led up to the present application are shortly as follows:— In 1924 the legislature enacted Act 14 of 1924 which is expressed to be

An act to provide for the fostering and development of the steal industry in British India.

3. Section 3 of that Act provides for payment of bounties to any company manufacturing steel rails and fish plates. S. 4 provides for similar bounties on railway waggons. In respect of both these bounties, speaking broadly, the condition is that these things should have been manufactured in British India from materials wholly or mainly produced from Indian iron ore or at least that a substantial portion of the component parts should have been manufactured in British India. On 15th September, 1925, the question of granting bounties to the company came before the Legislative Assembly of the Government of India, and pronouncements were made by the Member for Commerce and the Finance Member which will be found set out in the petition. A sum of Rs. 70 lacs odd was sanctioned by the Assembly. But the announcements made by the responsible Members of the Government of India indicate quite clearly that Government is not prepared to continue these bounties unless the company is willing to take such measures as are indicated to place their finances on a sound basis. To put it shortly: the Government of India appear to take the view that they are unwilling to allow these bounties to be devoted entirely to paying off the arrears of dividends due to second preference shares to the complete exclusion of the ordinary and deferred shareholders. It may be noted that by virtue of Section 6 of the Act a statutory inquiry is to be held as to the extent, if any, to which it is necessary to continue the protection of the steel industry and as to the duties and bounties which are necessary for the purpose of conferring such protection. It will also be seen from the terms of Ss. 3 and 4 that the bounties are limited to a period of three years.

4. The position, therefore, is that it is doubtful whether the company would continue to get any bounty unless they did something to meet the expressed wishes of the Government of India, and it is out of that position that the present petition has arisen. It will be seen that under the constitution of the company the whole of the bounty would go to paying off partially at least the arrears of dividend due to the second preference shareholders, and nothing would be left for division between the ordinary and deferred share holders. A company faced with such a position as this must carefully consider what is the best course to follow in order to secure a continuance of those bounties. It may be said of course—and it has been said—that there is no guarantee that the bounties will continue. But though in a sense it is true, a businessman in such a case would surely do the utmost in his power to secure that the bounties should continue. The present scheme was devised by the directors of the company to meat this position and it is put forward as an arrangement for the sanction of the Court under Section 153 of the Companies Act.

5. On 3rd August, 1926 the company entered into agreements with one of each of the three classes of shareholders affected. On 16th August, 1926 the Court was moved to convene separate meetings of these three classes of shareholders, and on 19th August, 1919 an order to that effect was made. Meetings were held on 1st October 1926, the Chairman being Sir Dorab Tata who was appointed in that behalf by the Court's order of August 1919. The result of these meetings has been reported to the Court by the Chairman in accordance with the directions given in that order, and the company, by a petition dated 10th November, 1926, asked the Court's sanction to the arrangement. The company are supported at the hearing by two groups of second preference shareholders who have separately engaged counsel, and the petition is opposed by two other groups of shareholders who likewise have separately briefed counsel and by one shareholder who appears in person.

6. A very large number of objections have been formulated to the scheme. They fall broadly under three divisions:

(1) Whether the requirements of the statute are complied with?

(2) Was there a statutory majority.

(3) Ought the scheme to be sanctioned on its merits?

7. Objections have been formulated in two affidavits one by Ratanchand Khimchand Motishaw on 26th November, 1926 and the other by Parashuram Detaram Shamdasani dated 26th November, 1926. An objection has also been taken on the part of those, shareholders who support the scheme to certain votes recorded against the scheme, and that objection has been formulated in the affidavit of E.F Groombridge dated 29th November, 1926. I may say, here that in the course of the hearing a number of objections were suggested by one party or the other but I declined to entertain any point which had not been definitely formulated before the hearing. If in a matter of this kind parties are allowed to put forward objections at any stage of the proceedings the hearing could not be concluded within a reasonable time. As it was, it lasted for some six days.

8. I will first deal with the objection falling under the first head. The general description which I have given of this class of objections is not strictly accurate, and it is necessary to formulate them in detail before they can be considered. They are as follows:

1. Whether the proceedings were competent? The objection taken is that the persons who initiated these proceedings could not do so without authority from the company conferred upon them at a general meeting.

2. Whether a scheme can be sanctioned which effects alterations in the memorandum or articles of association without proceedings having been taken under the Act in the minor laid down by the Act for the purpose of effecting such alterations.

3. Whether the meetings were duly called, held and conducted.

9. The objection taken, so far as I was able to grasp it, was that there was insufficient notice and insufficient explanation of the scheme; also that the three classes into which the members were divided for the purpose of the three separate meetings were not classes into which they ought to have been divided, the reason being that those three classes did not correspond to the real conflicting interests. I am, however, constrained to say here that it was often difficult to understand precisely what Mr. Shamdasani meant to convey.

10. It will be convenient here to set out shortly the nature of the scheme, for what I may call the general objections last set out depend to some extent upon the question of the interests of the various classes of share holders. The scheme is set out in Sch. A of the petition. It provides for a payment of Rs. 3-12-4 per share on account of the arrears of dividend due to the second preference shareholders. The balance Rs. 26 is to carry interest at four per cent. The surplus profits, after paying six per cent, dividend and seven and a half per cent, dividend due to the first and second preference share holders are to be divided half and half. The first half to go to pay off the arrears of the dividend due on the second preference shares amounting to Rs. 26 per share, and the other half to be divided into two equal portions and devoted to paying the dividend on the ordinary and deferred shares. The second preference shareholder gives up his preferential right to the whole of the surplus profits and receives in return interest at four per cent, on the arrears. In all other respects the rights of these three classes of shareholders appear to be unaffected and when the arrears of Rs. 26 per share have been paid off, the parties will stand on precisely the same footing as they stood, apart from the scheme now proposed. The scheme is no doubt adverse to the interests of the second preference shareholders in the sense that they get less than they would get if no such scheme was put forward. The question is whether the sacrifice is one which a prudent businessman would think worthwhile in order to secure the advantage of interest of four per cent on the arrears and in order to meet the wishes of the Government of India, and thus secure, if possible, the continuance of the bounties. I shall refer to this matter later, while considering the merits of the scheme. But it is necessary to understand what it is for the purpose of judging the validity of one of the objections taken to the meeting by which it was considered.

11. As to the first of these three general objections the steps necessary to be taken appear from the section. First, there must be an arrangement proposed between the company and a class of its members. Here the affidavit upon which the Court's order to hold meetings was obtained is accompanied by copies of three agreements one on behalf of each of the three classes of members affected. These agreements bear the common seal of the company and are executed on behalf of the company pursuant to a resolution of the directors passed at a meeting of the Board. Next there must be an application by the company. The application here is based upon an affidavit made by Mr. J.D Ghandy, dated 13th August, 1926, setting out the above proposals. It was upon this affidavit that the Court directed meetings to be held by its order of 19th August, 1926. Then followed the petition of 10th November, 1926, asking the Court to sanction the scheme.

12. This petition sets out the proposals, the result of the meetings ordered by the Court and prays for the Court's sanction. It is signed by Mr. J.D Ghandy, one of the directors of Messrs Tata Sons Limited, the managing agents for the petitioning company. The validity of these proceedings is challenged. It is said that the directors had no power to initiate the proposal, and that the managing agents had no power to make the application. As to the proposal: it is argued that it involves an alteration of the memorandum of association or the articles of association or both and, therefore, a resolution of a general meeting was necessary before it could be initiated by the directors. It is of course a complete error to suppose that the proposal per se effects any change of the kind, and no authority is cited for the proposition that the power of the directors can be limited on any such ground if they have that power aliunde. To decide if they have that power we must look to the articles. In my opinion Article 122 is wide enough to enable the directors to make a proposal such as is contemplated by Section 153 of the Act. It is unnecessary to consider the question of any alteration of the articles or the memorandum. We are not concerned with that at this stage. It may be that the proposal, if the Court decides upon it to direct a meeting and if the statutory majority approves it and if the Court then sanctions it, may in the result involve such alteration.

13. But that consideration cannot be invoked to cut down the wide powers conferred upon the directors by Article 122. I am not impressed by the argument sought to be deduced from the words: “The management of the business of the company.” It may be necessary for the purposes of such management to make a proposal under S. 153. The directors can do whatever the company can do subject to the restrictions expressed in the articles. There is nothing in the articles or in the law to require that a bare proposal to after the memorandum or the articles shall be made by the company in general meeting. Whether without a resolution made at a general meeting the Court can, under S. 153, sanction a scheme which involves an alteration of the memorandum or the articles is a distinct question. I have been referred to Palmer's Precedents, Vol. 2, p. 965, for the procedure to be followed, and I can find no indication that a meeting of the company is a condition precedent to a proposal. Indeed, in a Scotch case (Bruce Peebres Co. v. Bain (William) & Co.(1) it was held that the directors had power to initiate proposals under S. 120 of the Statute of 1908.

14. I hold that the proposal was made by the directors and that they had power to make it on behalf of the company. Therefore, there is a proposal by the company validly made, and placed before a meeting by the order of the Court. The petition for sanction of the scheme is made by the managing agents. Their powers are defined in articles 129 to 132 and in the agreement which is Sch. B to the articles. Para. 4 of that agreement gives them power inter alia to institute, conduct, defend, compromise, refer to arbitration and abandon legal and other proceedings and claims by and against the said company.

15. I see nothing in the constitution of this company or in the law by which companies are governed to deprive these words of any of the force which prima facie they possess. They are amply sufficient to confer upon the managing agents authority to make this petition. It is unnecessary to consider the position of the firm of managing agents or their director Mr. Gandhy as members of the petitioning company and the right to petition in that capacity.

16. I now come to the second of the general objections. It is urged that the company must take proceedings to after the memorandum and the articles before the Court can sanction a scheme involving such alteration. The Act is capable of a construction which may seem to favour this argument, but there is authority so clear Upon the point that it is unnecessary to discuss it at length. It is enough to point out that S. 153 does not contain any express requirement of this nature, and it would be most inconvenient were it terms cut down by S. 10. But to come to the authorities. The case of In re Palace Hotel, Ltd.(2) is one where a scheme was put forward which involved an alteration of the memorandum of association: vide p. 443. The question considered was whether the scheme fell within S. 45 the conditions of which had not been complied with. (The references are to the English statute). That section is identical with Section 54 of the Indian Act. It was held that as S. 45 was inapplicable the scheme could be sanctioned under S. 120. The question whether this could have been done had S. 45 been applicable was left open. The next case upon the point is In re Schweppes, Ltd.(3). Though the scheme did not in fact involve an alteration of the memorandum the Court held that even if an alteration had been involved the scheme could have been sanctioned under S. 120 so long as it was outside S. 45. The last case is In re J.A Nordberg, Ltd.(4).

17. Neville, J., followed the previous decisions. He says (p. 441):

As I understand the authorities you can under S. 120 after the rights conferred by the memorandum upon preference shareholders, provided that in so doing you avoid consolidating shares of different classes or dividing shares into shares of different classes.

18. He regarded S. 45 (p. 441)

not an enabling section as its form would suggest, but a section limiting the generality of the power under S. 120 to make arrangements with regard to capital which after the terms of the memorandum of association.

19. The general result appears to be this: that where the Act lays down an express procedure for altering the memorandum it is doubtful whether it is not necessary to follow that procedure, before applying for sanction under S. 120; but where that is not so the Court can under S. 120 sanction a scheme which alters the memorandum. I have considered the other cases cited, but those discussed are the most recent authorities upon the point. I follow these cases. This objection, therefore, fails.

20. I now turn to the third of the general objections. It is said:

(i) There was not sufficient information given to enable the shareholders to understand the scheme.

(ii) There was no sufficient explanation given at the meeting.

(iii) There was a conflict of interest between the second preference shareholders inter se.

21. There is nothing in all this. Shareholders are presumed to know their own rights. The proposal is not a difficult one to understand. The notice to the shareholders was accompanied by a statement giving sufficient particulars to enable any shareholder to inform himself fully of that which was intended. It was in no way the duty of the chairman appointed by the Court to reply to such queries as Mr. Shamdasani chose to put to him. The chairman made a statement which was sufficient in view of what had already been done. The proceedings followed the ordinary form appropriate to such cases.

22. It is said that some second preference shareholders also held ordinary shares, and it is part of Mr. Shamdasani's grievance that the meeting did not consist of what he terms “pure preference shareholders.” He has cited certain cases where it has been held that it was wrong to place in one class two groups of creditors or members whose interests were obviously in conflict. But in such a case as this there is no clear line of demarcation and no other grouping is practicable, as a very little reflection will show. For instance, is it possible to exclude Second preference shareholders who hold ordinary shares? Are they not entitled to be heard? Is there to be another meeting of those persons? The plain fact is that it is not practically possible to meet such meticulous arguments as these, and Mr. Shamdasani could suggest nothing beyond a meeting of “pure second preference shareholders.” The leading case as to schemes of this nature is In re Alabama, New Orleans, Texas and Pacific Junction Railway Co.(5). At p. 239 Lindley, L.J, says with reference to a similar argument:

Now, it is said, and said with truth, that some of the majority held second debentures; and it is also said that some of the majority were shareholders holding a considerable amount of shares; and it is urged that they voted not simply as first debenture-holders and were not looking at the matter from the point of view of first debenture-holders, but from the point of view of second debenture-holders, and of interested shareholders. That state of complicated interest would not prevent them from voting, but it would necessarily induce the Court to look with caution and air a at the effect of what was done at that meeting.

23. That is all that need be said upon this matter. I would only add that these objections were not urged by Mr. Munshi in his full and careful argument.

24. I now turn to objections of the second class and the question of the statutory majority. I am not concerned here with anything more than a numerical majority. It is conceded that in point of value there is something very much more than the three-fourths required by the statute in favour of the scheme. The majority which I have to consider is the numerical majority at the meeting of the second preference shareholders. The chairman has reported that the majority in favour of the scheme is 24. That majority, according to the requirements of S. 153, must be a majority of those present at the meeting either in person or by proxy. It follows that any person present and not voting counts as a vote against the scheme and if any individual vote of any such person is disallowed that too will count as a vote against the scheme. But where a member is present by proxy only, if a proxy is successfully impeached, the vote given on that proxy simply goes out, for the proxy being invalid the voter is not present at all.

25. The following are the objections raised to the votes given in favour of the scheme:

(a) Persons who were present but did not vote and whose votes were given on their behalf by their proxies.

(b) Persons who voted on the amendment proposed but did not vote on the substantive proposal but whose votes on the substantive proposal were recorded on their behalf by their proxies.

(c) Proxies signed by (1) receivers, (2) executors, and (3) liquidators.

(d) Proxies given by Fazalbhai Ibrahim and Company Limited in favour of Abdula I. Rahimtulla a director of the said company. This also involves the question whether if the proxy be invalid the said company can be held to have recorded a valid vote through its directors.

(e) Proxies which were alleged to be conditional.

(f) Proxies signed by one only of the joint holders of a share.

(g) Proxies given or votes recorded by certain persons holding powers-of-attorney from shareholders.

(h) Undated proxies.

(i) Proxies signed by shareholders who subsequently signed other proxies as explained in para. 18 of Motishaw's affidavit dated 28th November, 1926.

(j) Proxies given by persons who were debtors to the company.

(k) Proxies which are alleged to be not stamped in accordance with the requirements of the Indian Stamp Act.

(l) Proxies which are not in the form approved by the Court.

26. A question arises before these points can be determined, that is to say, how far the articles of association can be invoked as regulating the procedure to be followed at the meeting. Section 153 of the Companies Act, says that the meeting shall be “called, held and conducted in such manner as the Court directs.” In this respect it differs from the corresponding section—section 120 of the english act. The orders of the Court in this case contain certain directions as to the conduct of the meeting, but in many minor matters no directions have been given. On those matters what is the position? For the company it is urged that we must be guided by the articles of association; for the objectors that we should have recourse to the common law. There is no authority upon the point. This is not a case of a creditors' meeting, but of a meeting of the holders of second preference shares. Meetings of this kind are within the scope of the articles being indeed specially provided for in Article 14 and by virtue of Section 21 of the Act the members of the company are bound inter se to observe all the provisions of the articles. This being so, though “Court meetings” are subject to the directions of the Court where no express direction is given the articles must be looked to so far as they ire applicable. Putting the matter Another way: if the Act did not give the Court any power to make directions for the conduct of the meeting what would be the procedure? The answer must, I think, be that the articles must be looked to. That is also what the Court must be taken to intend where no special directions are given. It is no answer to say that certain of the articles cannot be applied to a meeting of this nature. I am of opinion that where they are applicable they should be applied. The bearing of this matter will be apparent when the specific objections come to be considered.

27. I now take the objections in detail.

(a) Persons who were present but did not vote and whose votes were given on their behalf by their proxies.

28. A person to whom a member gives a proxy is that member's agent for the purpose of voting. The authority of an agent may be revoked expressly or by implication, but unless and until it is so revoked that authority continues. Here it is argued that the conduct of the member in being present is an implicit revocation. I am unable to take that view. If a man is present and allows another to act for him presumably he approves what that other does. A vote by a member personally revokes the authority of his proxy: Halsbury, Vol. 5, p. 259. That is a different matter. A member who votes indicates unmistakably that he does not wish any other person to vote for him. These votes are good.

(b) Persons who voted on the amendments proposed but did not vote on the substantive proposition but whose votes on the substantive proposition were recorded by their proxies.

29. The same considerations apply here. There is no authority upon the point. The question is what inference is to be drawn from the member's conduct. The form of proxy gives authority:

To vote for me and in my name for the said scheme either with or without modification as my proxy may approve.

30. The amendments to the scheme were taken en bloc and certain members voted against them; but when the time came to vote on the substantive scheme they abstained from voting. It is not easy to decide what these persons meant, but the same considerations apply as to the last case. Presumably they did not desire to revoke the authority so far as it empowered the proxy to vote on the substantive scheme. I hold these votes are good.

(c) Proxies signed by: (i) Receivers; (ii) Executors; (iii) Liquidators.

31. It would seem that, apart from special provisions to the contrary, the executors or administrators of a deceased member or the trustees in bankruptcy of a bankrupt member may exercise the voting rights of the deceased or bankrupt member (Stiebel's Company Law and Precedents, 2nd edn., (1920), Vol. I, p. 365), Article 84 of the articles of association of this company would appear to confine the right to vote at a general meeting to persons

who have been duly registered for three months previous to such meeting.

32. And by the definition in Article 2 “shareholders or members” means the duly registered holders from time to time of shares of the company. Articles 32 and 33 provide for the registration of the names of executors. There are thus special provisions here which prevent an executor from exercising the voting rights of a deceased shareholder. But it is argued that for the purposes of S. 153 this prohibition does not apply, and that the estate of a deceased shareholder cannot be bound unless the executor is entitled to vote. Reliance is placed upon Llewellyn v. Kasintoe Rubber Estates, Ltd.(6). I do not think that case supports the proposition. The facts there were that there was a meeting for the purpose of Section 192(1) of the English Act. Certain executors did not vote at that meeting, but sought to exercise the power given to members not voting by Cl. (3) of the section. It was held that they could do so. The case is no authority on the right of an executor to vote. Indeed at p. 684 of the Report Swinfen Eady, L.J, says:

It is said in this case that the sub-section can only refer to living members because it provides for the member not voting for the resolutions, and it is said that unless there is a living member there is no right to attend meetings and vote. But the estate of a deceased member can never have voted for the resolution as the executors have no right to attend the meetings.

33. The learned Judge plainly was of opinion that by reason of Article 37 of the articles of that company an executor could not exercise the voting rights of a deceased member, though he could exercise the right to dissent given by sub-Cl. (3) of the section. I have already stated that the articles of association must apply as far as possible to the proceedings at this meeting. The result is that any vote given by an executor on behalf of a deceased member must be disallowed, and, in my opinion, it is not possible to distinguish the case of a liquidator or a receiver.

34. These votes are bad.

(d) Proxies given by Fazalbhai Ebrahim and Company in favour of Abdulla I. Rahimtulla a director of that company.

35. The company styled Fazalbhai Ibrahim and Company is a member of the Tata Iron and Steel Company. Abdulla I. Rahimtulla is a director of the former company. A proxy form was signed by him and on that proxy the vote of Fazalbhai Ibrahim and Company was recorded in favour of the scheme. It is conceded that the proxy is not valid as the seal of the company was not affixed in the presence of the directors. But it is argued that the vote is a good vote nevertheless. The argument is that Abdulla I. Ebrahim could vote for the company of which he was a director on being empowered to do so under Section 80 of the Act. That is to say, by a resolution of the directors of that company. It is conceded that at the date when the vote was recorded (1st October 1926) there was no such resolution. But it is said a resolution was passed on 27th October which validated the vote. The argument is based on the principle of ratification (Contract Act, S. 196). I cannot accede to it. In my opinion a vote is good or bad at the time when it is recorded and no subsequent ratification can cure the defect. Here the vote was void ab initio.

(e) Conditional proxies.

36. The form of proxy was settled by the Court. It contains the words

To vote for me and in my name …. the said scheme either with or without modification as my proxy may approve.

37. In this case the word “for” has been entered by the member signing the proxy and he has added after the word cited,

provided that the modification if any should be favourable to second preference shareholders.

38. There is no question of any modification, and I see no reason for questioning the vote as a vote in favour of the scheme. The added words are too vague to have any meaning. In any view the proxy acted within the authority given to him.

39. The votes are good.

(f) Proxies signed by one only of the joint holders of a share.

40. This objection is met by Article 86, of the articles of association.

(g) Proxies given of votes recorded by persons holding powers-of-attorney from members.

41. A list of eighteen of these powers has been (put in (Ex. 2). In four cases the originals are produced. Three of these are admitted by Mr. Munshi to be adequate. The fourth is No. 504. Power No. 3856. It contains the following words:

Also to appear and to represent me at any meeting of any joint stock company in which I am interested as a shareholder or debenture holder or preference shareholder, or as a member or otherwise and to vote there, and also to grant proxies to any other parson & c. & c.

42. These words are sufficient.

43. As to the remaining fourteen, the originals are not fourth coming. An argument has arisen as to whether secondary evidence is admissible of the contents of the originals. The matter is fairly within Section 65(c) of the Evidence Act, and any secondary evidence is admissible. Here we have the affidavit of D.S Dhabhar and so far as he gives an account or the contents from his own knowledge his evidence is good secondary evidence. In some cases copies are produced. I do not propose to discuss each of these cases in detail. There is one which must be rejected, No. 648, para. 2(g), of Mr. Dhabhar's affidavit. The others are, in my opinion, sufficiently proved and give the right to vote.

(h) Undated proxies.

44. The objection is that certain proxies do not bear the date of execution. I note it, but it hardly requires discussion. The proxy was lodged within the time allowed and before the date of the meeting. I can understand that an omission to state the date of the meeting may be a serious defect, but as for the date of execution I can only say “de minimis”. No authority has been cited for questioning a proxy on such grounds.

(i) Proxies signed by shareholders who subsequently signed other proxies.

45. The case may be stated thus. A signed a proxy in favour of B. The time for lodging proxies ends two days before the meeting. The proxy in favour of B is lodged in time. A then signs a second proxy in favour of C and lodges it after the expiry of the time. This proxy being out of time was rejected without scrutiny. Is the first proxy revoked?

46. In my opinion the first proxy is not revoked unless there is notice of the second proxy. Admittedly there was no express notice. It is urged that there was constructive notice, but there was no duty to scrutinize the proxy to ascertain whether there was an earlier proxy by the same shareholder. In the cases in question the proxies were sent en bloc with a letter, but the letter contained he indication of any intention to revoke any earlier proxies. In these circumstances it is as though A had recorded to himself his intention to revoke the proxy given to B. The objection must fail.

(j) Proxies given by persons who were debtors to the company.

47. This is covered by Article 83. I see no reason to exclude the operation of this article. Such votes must be disallowed whether given in person or by proxy.

(k) Proxies which are alleged not to be stamped in accordance with the requirements of the Stamp Act.

48. It is conceded that a proxy is chargeable with a duty of two annas by reason of Section 3 of the Stamp Act, and Article 52 of the Schedule to that Act. That is, I think the correct view. The objection taken is that on certain proxies the stamp has not been “cancelled so that it cannot be used again” and that, therefore, these proxies must be deemed to be unstamped as provided by S. 12(2). Therefore, it is urged that by virtue of para. 1, S. 35, such proxies cannot be admitted in evidence or acted upon. The reply sought to be made is two fold. First, it is argued that it is unnecessary for the company to put the proxies in evidence, or to ask the Court to act upon them. Secondly, that in fact the stamps have been cancelled in an effectual manner.

49. The first part of the argument is over-subtle. As I understand it, it proceeds thus: By Article 94-B the chairman is sole Judge of the validity of every vote. Section 35 of the Stamp Act, does not apply to the conduct of the chairman in admitting a vote. The only question for the Court is whether the votes were rightly allowed by the chairman, and in deciding that point the Court need not prima facie consider whether the proxies are stamped or not. Prima facie the chairman is right. Therefore, the company is not seeking to put the proxies in evidence or to ask the Court to act on them. The burden of proving that the votes were wrongly admitted is on the objectors, and they must make out their objection. It is they who seek to put the proxies in evidence.

50. It may be that I have not fully grasped the point but if it is, as I believe it to be, the plain answer appears to me to be this. The scheme of Section 153 of the Companies Act, is that the Court directs a meeting and appoints such person as it thinks fit to be chairman. After the meeting is hold it is for the Court to determine on the materials before it whether the arrangement is approved by a statutory majority. In so doing the Court will consider all the matters before it. It is not very profitable to consider on whom the burden of proof lies, but it may be conceded that the chairman's report is prima facie proof though I must not be taken to concede that Article 94-B applies to a chairman appointed by the Court. But, so soon as the report is challenged by counter-proof, it is for those who seek to support it to do so. Here I have an affidavit that such and such votes are invalid on the ground that the proxy is invalid. If I hold that such votes are valid and proceed to sanction the scheme I do in effect act on the proxy. That is the plain position. The objector says on oath:

The vote of A is invalid because the proxy which he signed is unstamped.

51. Should that objection be sustained or not? It depends on the evidence offered in rebuttal. The company may offer none but without putting the proxy in evidence it is difficult to see how the objection can be met. What other evidence can be given except the best evidence, the proxy itself? and if they rely on the proxy they ask the Court to act on it.

52. The second question is, as I understand it, a question of fact:

Have these stamps been cancelled so that they cannot be used again? vide Section 12(2) of the Stamp Act.

53. I fail to see how this can be in any sense a question of law.

If, as I believe, it be accurate that the question is one which is to be determined upon the facts of the case, no one can be an authority for another: London Joint Stock Bank v. Simmons(7).

54. The legislature, I take it, says what it means and that is that the stamp in its cancelled condition cannot be used again. It does not say that the process must be so thorough that no evilly-disposed person can in any manner render the stamp fit for further use. Indeed the process which the legislature declares to be adequate in S. 12(3) might be defeated by criminal ingenuity. There is no doubt a decision of a Bench of this Court, Virbhadrapa v. Bhimaji(8), which contains this dictum (p. 438):

Two parallel lines drawn over a stamp are not sufficient to carry out that object (of the legislature), because mere lines would not be effective for the purpose in view.

55. That is the ground of the decision and, with all respect, I cannot conceive that I am bound by it. I am glad to be able to come to that conclusion, for in this case there can be no doubt whatever that the persons who cancelled these stamps did so in the bona fide belief that they were doing all that was necessary, and the means which they adopted are those which are employed by thousands of persons in commercial transactions. I may note that the decisions in Anandrao v. Daolatrao(9) is less than obiter so far as this point goes. The Judges did not pronounce any opinion on the point. In S.A Ralli v. Caramalli Fazal(10) there was “a small ink line upon the right side of the stamp”. Again I must point out that it is a question of fact in such case, and I am entitled to my own opinion whatever dicta may be found in the cases. In England the law is substantially the same, yet in M'Mullen v. “Sir Alfred Hickman” Steamship, Lim.(11) Joyce, J. was of opinion that lines or a cross on the stamp might amount to sufficient cancellation. In Mahadeo Kori v. Sheoraj Ram Teli(12) the Allahabad High Court have held that a single line drawn across the stamp is sufficient. It is a matter of opinion on the facts of each case; and Lord Halsbury's dictum, which is so often cited, is apposite.

56. It is unnecessary to consider whether here, as in England, a proxy, which as such is unstamped, can be regarded as a power-of-attorney and admitted on payment of the appropriate penalty. Probably not; for the scheme of the English Act differs materially upon this point. I note, however, that the company were willing to pay the penalty upon that basis.

57. Of the challenged proxies four have by consent been selected as typical. I have examined them. One has a single line drawn across the face of both stamps, the second has two parallel lines, the third three parellel lines, and the fourth two lines crossing each other at an angle. In my opinion these stamps have been cancelled so that they cannot be used again.

58. I would only add that those proxies which are unstamped, or upon which the stamps have not been cancelled must be excluded. Any votes recorded on the authority of such proxies go out.

(1) Proxies which are not in the form approved by the Court.—

The Court has ample power under S. 153 to settle a form of proxy. As I have said S. 153 is wider in its terms than section 120 of the english act. Any substantial failure to comply with the Court's direction would, in my opinion, invalidate the proxy. The form which is objected to departs in several matters from the authorized form.

(i) It omits the marginal note (a). “If any other proxy is preferred strike out names here inserted and add name of proxy preferred and initial the alteration.”

(ii) It omits the marginal note (b). If “for” insert “for” if “against” insert “against.”

(iii) In place of the blank left for insertion of the words “for;” or “against” as the case may be, the word “against” is printed.

(iv) It omits foot-notes (3) and (4) and inserts a new foot-note.

59. Are these substantial alterations? The case of In re Inter-Oceanic Railway, & c. Limd.(13) shows how strictly the Courts in England deal with such matters. The alterations from the Court form in that case were less material than in the case here. Yet it is fairly clear that Williams, J., would not have sanctioned the scheme had there been any real contest in the matter as he was of opinion that: “It is of the utmost importance that these proxies should be in the regular form.” The same point was considered by Eve, J., in a later case (In re the Magadi Soda Co., Ltd.(14). The form authorized there was the same as in this case, but certain proxies were sent out with the words “for or against” inserted thereby conferring a discretion upon the party named to use them either for or against the scheme. The learned Judge held that those proxies were rightly rejected. He said, pp. 51, 52:

The object of this settled form was that the share-holders should be compelled to exercise their own judgment by informing the proxy how he was to vote. It was found to be almost impossible to save the shareholders from them serves. It was, therefore, of great importance that the protection, should be upheld in all available ways, and that the form settled by the Court for the sole purpose of protecting shareholders against their own neglect should be adhered to.

60. The challanged form without the marginal note (b) and with the word “against” in place of the blank space leaves no room to the shareholder to exercise his own judgment and if that defect is fatal in England a fortiori it should be so here where the forms are sent out in a language with which many of the shareholders are imperfectly acquainted, and of which some of them are totally ignorant. I hold that these proxies must be disallowed, for I see no reason for being less strict upon this matter than are the English Courts. It was suggested that the Court had no power to settle a form of proxy, but, however that may be under Section 120 of the English Act, the words “to be called, held and conducted in such manner as the Court directs in Section 153 of the Indian Act are wide enough to cover directions of this nature. In the case of In re English, Scottish, and Australian Chartered Bank(15), Lindley, L.J, construed similar words in Section 91 of the Companies Act, 1862, as giving the Court authority to settle a form of proxy: vide pp. 410 and 411. It seems to me plain that the form of proxy is part of the conduct of the meeting.

61. The sole question which remains is, whether the scheme is one which the Court ought to sanction. The duty of the Court in these cases has been laid down by Lindley, L.J, in In re Alabama, New Orleans, Texas and Pacific Junction Railway Co. as follows, p. 238:

What the Court has to do is to see, first of all that the provisions of that statute have been complied with; and, secondly, that the majority has been acting bona fide. The Court also has to see that the minority is not being overridden by a majority having interests of its own clashing with those of the minority whom they seek to coerce. Further than that, the Court has to look at the scheme and see whether it is one as to which persons acting honestly, and viewing the scheme laid before them in the interests of those whom they represent, take a view which can be reasonably taken by businessmen.

62. That statement of the law was re-affirmed in a later case by the same learned Judge in In re English, Scottish and Ausralian Chartered Bank.

63. In this case Mr. Shamadasani has attacked the bona fides of those who have supported the scheme, but on no substantial ground, so far as I could follow him. He suggested that the majority were primarily concerned with their interests as ordinary shareholders. It may be remarked that was precisely the position in the first of the two cases last cited, and I have already drawn attention to Lindley, L.J's remarks upon that aspect of the matter. However narrowly the scheme is scrutinized, I see no reason to say that it is not one which can reasonably be supported by businessmen. The matter lies in a nutshell. Without the bounties there is no prospect of any dividend on the second preference shares. The Government of India say in plain terms that they are not prepared to continue the bounties unless part at least of the benefit goes to the ordinary and deferred shares. The proposition is:

Let the second preference shareholders give up part of the bounty in the present in order to secure its continuance in the future.

64. Is it reasonable from the point of view of the holder of second preference shares who has no other interests whatever? A businessman might reasonably say: “Yes.” That is enough. I decline to enter into Mr. Shamdasani's speculations as to the financial soundness of the company. Those speculations do no more than obscure the real issue. I am aware that there is force in Mr. Munshi's argument that the continuance of the bounties is in no case certain, but that is a chance which must be taken. Where I myself a holder of second preference shares I should be disposed to vote for the scheme. I may add that Mr. Munshi suggested that the second preference shareholders might reasonably be satisfied with 70 per cent, of the surplus profits leaving 30 per cent, for the ordinary and deferred shareholders. If the difference of opinion is merely as to the division of the surplus profits it is obvious that one man may reasonably accept 50 per cent while another may ask for 70 per cent. I see no reason to refuse to sanction the scheme.

65. The judgment just pronounced contains no final statement on the question whether there is or is not a statutory majority as I have preferred to deal with the principle involved without embarrassing myself by any considerations of that kind. I am now informed by those concerned on either side that the result is that there is a statutory majority in favour of the scheme, and the scheme is, therefore, sanctioned.

66. On the question of costs, the parties have arrived at an understanding which is embodied in the following order: On the respondents undertaking not to appeal, the taxed costs of R.K Motishaw, including costs of the correspondence and inspection and counsel's fees at the hearing of this petition and of Merwanji Kaikhsuru and R.D Sethna and the Court-fees paid by Shamdasani and the charges paid by him of typing and copying affidavits shall be paid by the petitioning company. This order includes costs reserved.

67. As regards costs of Mr. Jinnah's client and the client of the Advocate General, in spite of Shamdasani's argument to the contrary, they have been of material assistance to the Court in deciding the matter and their costs also should come out of the company's funds.

68. Order accordingly.