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Godavaribai Govindrao Saswadkar v. Deekappa Mallappa
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion concerns the proper date and court for "receipt" of sale-proceeds (assets) realized in execution of decrees, for the purpose of rateable distribution under Section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). Sales in execution of decrees were held by the Hubli Court and the amounts were received by that Court. The Dharwar Court (a superior court relative to Hubli) had earlier intimated that Opponent No. 1 claimed a rateable share in any amounts realized. The applicant contended that the assets were received by the First Class Subordinate Judge at Dharwar within the meaning of Section 73 because that judge had applied to the Court for execution before the receipt of the assets. The opponents contended that, by reason of Section 63 of the CPC and the Dharwar Court's communication to Hubli, the Hubli Court held the amounts as agent or trustee for the Dharwar Court and therefore the receipt should be treated as receipt by the Dharwar Court. The High Court considered the competing contentions, examined the communication (Darkhast No. 123 of 1923) from the Dharwar judge, reviewed authorities and relevant rules (including Sections 63 and 73 CPC, certain Rules of Order 21, and the law of agency), and ultimately set aside the lower court's order on rateable distribution, directing a fresh distribution governed by the Court's view of the proper date of receipt under Section 73. The applicant was awarded costs against the opponents.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the amounts realized by sales held in execution by the Hubli Court should be treated as having been "received" for the purposes of Section 73 of the CPC by the Dharwar Court (the superior Court) when Hubli actually received them, by reason of the Dharwar Court having intimated a claim under Section 63?
- Whether the Hubli Court's receipt of sale-proceeds can be characterized as receipt by the Dharwar Court (i.e., Hubli acting as agent or trustee of Dharwar) under Section 63 or applicable principles of agency and the CPC?
- What is the appropriate date of receipt for the purpose of rateable distribution under Section 73 — the date Hubli received the proceeds, the date an order of transfer/communication took effect, or the date the Dharwar Court actually received the proceeds?
Arguments of the Parties
Applicant's Arguments
- The assets were, in substance, held by the First Class Subordinate Judge at Dharwar and the Dharwar judge had applied to that Court for execution of the decree for payment within the meaning of Section 73 of the CPC before the assets were received.
- Therefore the assets should be treated as received by the Dharwar Court for the purposes of rateable distribution under Section 73.
Opponents' Arguments
- Relying on Section 63 of the CPC, the Hubli Court actually received and held the amounts for and on behalf of the Dharwar Court (a superior court) after Dharwar intimated that Opponent No. 1 claimed rateable distribution; hence the receipt by Hubli should be treated as receipt by Dharwar.
- The decision in Dattatrayya v. Pundalik was relied upon to support the proposition that receipt by an officer or third party (e.g., a Collector) can be treated as receipt by the Court entitled to distribute under the Code.
- Rule 69 of Order 21 (and related rules) was argued to show that where a sale is held by an officer appointed by the Court, the money received by that officer is money received by the Court, and therefore the date of receipt should be the date the officer received it.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Dattatrayya v. Pundalik | Used by opponents to argue that receipt of money by a Collector was receipt by the Court within Section 73; relied on the Collector's role in execution under CPC. | The Court examined the ratio decidendi and held the decision was not based on the Collector being an agent of the Court but on the special provisions for execution by the Collector; therefore the Court found Dattatrayya materially different and not applicable to treat Hubli's receipt as Dharwar's receipt. |
| Pate Naranji Morarji v. Haridas Navalram | Cited as indicating procedure to be followed in cases where properties are under attachment in execution of decrees of more than one Court. | The Court cited this case (with Deekappa) as indicating that money is received by the Court of superior grade when an appropriate order or order of transfer takes effect; it helped frame the procedural alternatives but did not change the Court's conclusion on facts. |
| Deekappa v. Chanbasappa | Cited for procedural points: that an order by the subordinate judge might suffice and that application for transfer may not be necessary; procedure for effecting receipt by superior Court. | The Court relied on the reasoning in Deekappa to explain that whichever course (order by subordinate judge or transfer) is adopted, money is received by the superior Court when such order takes effect, and until then the inferior Court holds it on its own account. |
| Galstaun v. Woomes Chandra Bonnerjee | Distinguished: a sale by a person appointed by the Court under Rule 65, Order 21, where receipt by that person is receipt by the Court (i.e., agent). | Fawcett, J. distinguished that case from the present facts, observing that in Galstaun the receipt was by a person appointed under Rule 65 and so was receipt by the Court; that principle did not apply to Hubli's independent reception on these facts. |
| Visvanathan Chetti v. Arunachelam Chetti | Stated principle that there must be an actual transfer of assets to the credit of the suit concerned. | The Court noted this decision merely requires actual transfer to credit of the suit and observed it did not resolve the present question about whether Hubli's receipt was receipt by Dharwar. |
| Texas Company, Ltd. v. The Bombay Banking Company | Authorities concerning notice/knowledge and when receipt by one person can be imputed as receipt on account of another. | Fawcett, J. invoked the language from this case to explain that, absent circumstances giving Hubli notice that the moneys were those of Dharwar, Hubli could not fairly be treated as agent; the facts did not show such notice or knowledge. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court conducted a statutory and factual analysis focused on Sections 63 and 73 of the CPC and the factual sequence of communications and receipts:
- The Court began by identifying the competing contentions: the applicant's claim that Dharwar (the First Class Subordinate Judge) had applied for execution before receipt and so assets were effectively received by Dharwar for S.73 purposes; and the opponents' claim that Hubli held the proceeds as agent/trustee for Dharwar under S.63.
- The Court examined the decision in Dattatrayya v. Pundalik relied on by opponents and determined that that decision rested on special provisions applicable where a decree is transferred to a Collector for execution. The ratio was that money received by a Collector under the CPC is distributable under orders of the Court and held subject to those orders. The Court concluded Dattatrayya does not support treating Hubli's receipt as receipt by Dharwar in the present circumstances.
- The Court considered Rule 69 of Order 21 (and by reference Rule 65 of Order 21) but found that the rule deals with the specific case where the Court conducts a sale through an officer; such receipts may be treated as receipts by the Court in that narrow context. The Court said this rule did not help the opponents in the present factual matrix where Hubli conducted the sales and received the proceeds on its own account.
- The Court set out Section 63 CPC (sub-sections (1) and (2)) and emphasized the distinction between the superior Court's power to receive/realize property under attachment and the effect of sub-section (2), which preserves certain powers of an inferior Court. The Court observed that although Dharwar, as the higher Court, could have exercised its power under S.63 to effect the sale and receive proceeds, mere intimation by Dharwar that Opponent No.1 claimed rateable distribution did not automatically make Hubli an agent or trustee for Dharwar.
- The factual finding was that the Hubli Court acted on its own account when it received the amounts. The Dharwar Court had not in fact purported to exercise the powers under S.63(1) prior to the receipt; Dharwar did not intend to act as if it had received the amounts until a transfer order or other operative order took effect.
- The Court addressed the possible dates which might count as the date of receipt for S.73 purposes: (a) when this Court's communication to Dharwar transferring sale-proceeds took effect, or (b) the actual date when Hubli sent up the sale-proceeds to Dharwar pursuant to the transfer order. The Court held that on either view the applicant here was entitled to rateable distribution because he had applied to the Dharwar Court in April 1925 and his application was pending at the relevant time.
- The Court reaffirmed that an inferior Court holds the proceeds on its own account until a proper order definitely appropriates the amount to the superior Court; accordingly, on the facts the Dharwar Court received the money within Section 73 only after Darkhast No. 47 of 1925 was filed and the appropriate transfer/effect took place.
- On this basis the Court concluded that the lower Court's order treating the date of receipt as the dates when Hubli received the amounts was incorrect and must be set aside; the First Class Subordinate Judge at Dharwar was directed to redistribute the amounts on the basis indicated in this judgment.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: Application allowed; the order of the lower Court (First Class Subordinate Judge at Dharwar) as regards rateable distribution is set aside, and that Court is directed to redistribute the amounts on the basis of the date of receipt indicated in this judgment under Section 73 of the CPC.
Immediate consequences and directions ordered by the Court:
- The lower Court's order that had treated the dates on which Hubli received the amounts as the dates of receipt for rateable distribution purposes is overturned.
- The Dharwar Court is directed to make a fresh rateable distribution of the sale-proceeds in accordance with the view expressed in this judgment about the appropriate date(s) of receipt under Section 73.
- The applicant is declared to be one of the persons entitled to rateable distribution (his application to the Dharwar Court was pending in April 1925) and is awarded the costs of this application to be paid by the opponents.
- The Court observed that some applicants before the Dharwar Court who did not apply to this Court for revision might be entitled to claim shares at the fresh rateable distribution; the lower Court must deal with such matters in the course of redistribution.
Note: The Court's directions are confined to setting aside and directing fresh distribution on the basis of the date of receipt as determined in this opinion; the Court distinguished prior authorities where the facts involved receipts by persons appointed under specific rules (e.g., Rule 65/69 Order 21) or where execution by a Collector was in issue.
Shah, J.:— (After setting out the facts as stated above the judgment proceeded.) It has been urged on behalf of the applicant before us that the assets were held by the First Class Subordinate Judge, and before the receipt of the assets in question he had applied to the Court for execution of the decree for payment of the money passed against the judgment-debtor within the meaning of S. 73 o' the Code. In short the applicant's contention is that the assets were received for the purposes of section 73 of the code by the First Class Subordinate Judge at Dharwar when the money was Actually sent by the Hubli Court to the Dharwar Court in pursuance of the order made by the Hubli Court.
2. On behalf of the opponents who have appeared before us, it has been urged that having regard to the provisions of S. 63 of the Code, the Court at Hubli really received the amounts for and on behalf of the Court at Dharwar and held them as agent or trustee for the Dharwar Court after the Court at Dharwar intimated to the Court at Hubli that Opponent No. 1 was claiming rateable distribution in the amount that would be realized by that Court. In support of this contention the decision in Dattatrayya v. Pundalik(1) has been relied upon, and it is urged that just as the receipt of the money by the Collector in that case was held to be receipt by the Court within the meaning of S. 73 of the Code, similarly here the receipt of the assets by the Hubli Court should be held to be receipt by the Dharwar Court within the meaning of section 73 of the cpc. We have considered the arguments urged on both sides. We have also called for the necessary papers to know exactly what the nature of the communication by the First Class Subordinate Judge at Dharwar in Darkhast No. 123 of 1923 was, in order to be able to deal with the contentions of the parties. The position of the Collector, to whom a decree is transferred for execution, with reference to the Court which has transferred its decree for execution to the Collector, is regulated by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure including the provisions of the Third Schedule of the Code. When the ratio decidendi of the case in Dattatrayya v. Pundlik is examined, it would appear that the decision is not based upon the view that the Collector is an agent of the Court, but that the money received by the Collector under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure is distributable under the orders of the Court, and is held by the Collector subject to the orders of the Court. It is clear, therefore, that case is quite different from the present case and that the decision is based upon the special provisions relating to execution of decrees by the Collector.
3. Mr. Coyajee for the opponents also relied upon the provisions of R. 69 of O. 21 as indicating that the sale may be held not by the Court, but by an officer appointed by the Court to conduct such a sale, that in such a sale the money received by the officer would be money received by the Court, and that the date of the receipt would be the date of the receipt by the officer. I do not think that this rule can help the opponents in any way. That is a specific case of the Court holding a sale through its officer; and it is not necessary for the purposes of this application to determine as to what the date of the receipt would be in a given case under Rule 69. But even assuming in favour of the opponents that the date would be as indicated in the argument, it could not help us in determining as to what is the proper date of the receipt of the assets within the meaning of S. 73 of the Code under the circumstances of this case.
4. In considering that point it is necessary to refer to section 63 of the cpc, which provides as follows:
(1) Where property not in the custody of any Court is under attachment in execution of decrees of more Courts than one, the Court which shall receive or realize such property and shall determine any claim thereto and any objection to the attachment thereof shall be the Court of highest grade…
(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to invalidate any proceeding taken by a Court executing one of such decrees.”
5. In the present case it was the Court at Hubli that held the sales in execution of the decrees passed by the Court and received the amounts. It is true that before the amounts were received the properties had been under attachment in execution of the decree of the Opponent No. 1 in the Dharwar Court, which was the Court of superior grade with relation to the Hubli Court, and the fact was intimated to the Court at Hubli that Opponent; No. 1 was claiming rateable distribution to the amounts that might be received. It is also true that, if the Court at Dharwar was minded to exercise the power which was vested in it under S. 63 of the Code, it could have proceeded to effect the sale itself and to receive the sale proceeds. But the intimation by the Court at Dharwar merely that Opponent No. 1 was claiming his share in the rateable distribution was not by itself sufficient to alter the nature of the proceedings before the Hubli Court. That Court was acting on its own account when they were received, and it cannot be said that when the amounts were received, they were received by that Court as agent or trustee of the Court at Dharwar.
6. In fact the Darwar Court never purported to or intended to exercise the powers vested in it under Section 63, sub-Section (1) of the CPC; and, until the assets came to be transferred to the Dharwar Court as liable to be distributed by that Court, it is difficult to see how the assets could be said to have been received within the meaning of S. 73 of the Code by the Court entitled to make the rateable distribution. The question as to whether the money must be treated to have been received after this Court finally communicated to the Dharwar Court its order transferring the sale-proceeds and the Darkhasts from the Court at Hubli to the Court at Dharwar or when the money was actually received by the Dharwar Court, may be open to argument. But in the present case whether we take the date of communication of the order of this Court as the date on which the Dharwar Court received the assets within the meaning of S. 73 of the Code, or whether we take the actual date on which in pursuance of that order the Hubli Court actually sent up the sale-proceeds to that Court as the date of the receipt, the present applicant is one of the persons entitled to rateable distribution, as he had in fact applied to that Court in April 1925 and his application was then pending.
7. It is true that there is no express provision of the Code as to whether the money received by the Court at Hubli in execution of its decrees, could be said to be held on behalf of the Court of superior grade, like Dharwar Court in this case, on the ground of the power to receive or realize the property under attachment having been given by S. 63 to the Court of superior grade. Sub-section (2) of S. 63 suggests that the power of the Court of inferior grade is not altogether negatived and at any rate it does not support the theory of agency or trust on behalf of the superior Court. The procedure to be followed in such cases indicated by decided cases like Pate Naranji Morarji v. Haridas Navalram(2) and Deekappa v. Chanbasappa(3). It may be that if the First Class Subordinate Judge at Dharwar had made the? order, which apparently he had made on the application of Deekappa in the first instance as pointed out in the report of the case at p. 659, the assets might have been received earlier by that Court; and, as pointed out in the same judgment; at p. 661 of the report, such an order may be sufficient and the procedure of applying for transfer may not be necessary. But whichever course is adopted, the money is received by the Court of superior grade when such an order or the order of transfer takes effect, and definitely takes away the amount from the hands of the Court of inferior grade which has in the first instance received it on its own account, and which continues to hold it in that capacity until it is definitely appropriated to the use of the Court of superior grade by a proper order to that effect. On the facts of this case the money was received by the Dharwar Court within the meaning of Section 73 of the CPC, after Darkhast No. 47 of 1925 was filed by the present applicant.
8. In this view of the matter it is clear that the order of the lower Court on the basis that the amounts were received on the dates on which they were received by the Hubli Court must be set aside and that Court should be directed to make a distribution on the basis of the view which we take in this case.
9. This might entitle some of the applicants before the Dharwar Court for rateable distribution, who have not applied to this Court for revision of that order, to claim their shares at the fresh rateable distribution. That is a matter which must be dealt with by the lower Court. I would accordingly make Rule absolute, set aside the order passed by the First Class Subordinate Judge at Dharwar as regards the rateable distribution, and direct that Court to redistribute the amounts on the basis of the date of the receipt of the assets as indicated in this judgment within the meaning of section 73 of the cpc. The applicant to get the costs of this application from the opponents.
10. Fawcett, J.:— I agree in the conclusion and the main reasoning of my learned brother's judgment. The present case is quite a different one from that of Galstaun v. Woomes Chandra Bonnerjee(4), which was a case of a sale by a person appointed by the Court under Rule 65 of Order 21 of the CPC. In such a case the receipt by that person was obviously a receipt as an agent of the Court, and so a receipt by a Court. Visvanathan Chetti v. Arunachelam Chetti(5) was referred to, but that merely rules that there must be an actual transfer of assets to the credit of the suit concerned, and it does not really help in the present question. In fact it does not deal with a case like the present. The Hubli Court can only be regarded as an agent of the Dharwar Court, if in fact it was either an agent, as defined in. Section 182 of the Indian Contract Act, or an agent under the general law in regard to agency. Under this latter law, as stated in ‘Bowstead on Agency,’ 7th Edition p. 16, the Hubli Court could be an agent, if
the relationship of principal and agent [was] constituted…by implication of law from the conduct or situation of the parties, or from the necessity of the case. But it certainly cannot be said here that relationship was established. There was nothing which indicated be the Hubli Court that it was in fact acting as an agent of the Dharwar Court, at any rate until the decision in Deekappa v. Chanbasappa was communicated to it by this Court, Nor can it be said that the money realized by the sale of the attached property was received by it under circumstances that gave it notice that it was money received on account of the Dharwar Court, or under circumstances that could fairly impute to it knowledge that the moneys were those of the Dharwar Court, to use the language of the judgment in Texas Company, Ltd. v. The Bombay Banking Company(6).
11. Consequently, I think, the application should be allowed and the order proposed by my learned brother be passed.
12. Application allowed.
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