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Bai Shanta v. Umrao Amir Malik
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner, Bai Shanta, a married Brahmin woman residing at Umreth, complained against Umrao Amir in the Court of the Second Class Magistrate, Thasra, under section 354 of the Indian Penal Code for assault with intent to outrage her modesty. Umrao denied the charge and alleged an immoral relationship with Bai Shanta for about a year and a half, supported by witnesses. The Magistrate disbelieved the defence and convicted Umrao, fining him Rs. 151.
Bai Shanta then filed a complaint in the Court of the Resident First Class Magistrate, Nadiad, against Umrao, his four witnesses, and a neighbor, under sections 500 and 506 IPC for defamation and criminal intimidation. She alleged threats and defamation by the accused and witnesses during the pendency of the original case, causing grievous harm to her reputation and marital relations.
The First Class Magistrate dismissed the complaint under section 203 CrPC, holding that Umrao was protected by Exception 9 to section 499 IPC, and the witnesses' statements were protected under some High Courts' views. On revision, the Additional Sessions Judge upheld the dismissal under section 500 IPC but directed the Magistrate to proceed with the section 506 IPC complaint. Bai Shanta applied to this Court to reverse the dismissal regarding section 500 IPC.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether relevant statements made by a witness on oath or solemn affirmation in a judicial proceeding are absolutely protected from prosecution for defamation under section 500, Indian Penal Code, on grounds of public policy or exceptions derived from English Common Law, apart from section 499 IPC?
- Whether such statements can be protected by the proviso to section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act in cases where the witness has not objected to answering the question put to him?
- Whether relevant statements made by an accused person under section 342, Criminal Procedure Code, or contained in a written statement filed with the Court's permission, are absolutely protected from prosecution for defamation under section 500 IPC on similar grounds?
Arguments of the Parties
Applicant's Arguments (U.V Divetia for Bai Shanta)
- Section 499 IPC and Exception 9 are exhaustive; unless an accused or witness falls within these exceptions, they are liable for defamation.
- The English Common Law privilege of absolute protection is not applicable in India.
- The lower Courts' view, relying on Queen-Empress v. Balkrishna Vithal, granting absolute privilege to parties and witnesses, is incorrect.
- Supported by the Full Bench decision in Satish Chandra Chakravarti v. Ram Doyal De.
Opponent's Arguments (S.R Parulekar for the accused and witnesses)
- The English Common Law principle of absolute privilege for parties and witnesses in judicial proceedings should be followed.
- The framers of the Indian Penal Code incorporated English Common Law principles and did not codify existing Indian law.
- On grounds of public policy, persons involved in judicial proceedings should be protected from defamation suits.
- The absence of a qualified privilege exception in section 499 IPC suggests an intention to grant absolute privilege.
- Referenced Privy Council decision Baboo Gunnesh Dutt Singh v. Mugneeram Chowdhry supporting absolute privilege for parties.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Satish Chandra Chakravarti v. Ram Doyal De | Defamatory statements by parties or witnesses in judicial proceedings are not absolutely privileged under IPC; section 499 IPC and Letters Patent clause 30 must be followed strictly. | Adopted by the Court as authoritative; rejected absolute privilege based on Common Law. |
| Queen-Empress v. Babaji | Held that parties and witnesses have absolute privilege in judicial proceedings. | Overruled by this Court in favor of Satish Chandra Chakravarti decision. |
| Queen-Empress v. Balkrishna Vithal | Supported absolute privilege for parties and witnesses in judicial proceedings. | Declined by this Court as wrongly decided, favoring the dissenting opinion of Justice Telang. |
| Emperor v. Chatur Singh | Witnesses compelled to answer relevant questions on oath are protected under section 132 Indian Evidence Act. | Considered in discussion of protection under section 132; Court found the protection limited and subject to objection. |
| Emperor v. Ganga Sahai | Similar to Emperor v. Chatur Singh regarding witness protection under section 132 Indian Evidence Act. | Referred to in evaluating the scope of protection for witnesses' statements. |
| Emperor v. Cunna…Accused | Witness must object to incriminating question to claim protection under section 132 Indian Evidence Act. | Followed by this Court in answering the second question in the negative. |
| Baboo Gunnesh Dutt Singh v. Mugneeram Chowdhry | Parties to judicial proceedings should have absolute privilege; only liable for perjury. | Distinguished as a civil case and not under Indian Penal Code; Court did not adopt absolute privilege. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court examined whether statements made by parties and witnesses in judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged from defamation prosecution beyond the exceptions in section 499 IPC. It noted conflicting judicial precedents and differing High Court views, particularly between Madras and Calcutta High Courts.
The Court emphasized adherence to the Indian Penal Code and the Letters Patent provisions, rejecting the extension of absolute privilege based on English Common Law or public policy. It relied heavily on the Full Bench decision in Satish Chandra Chakravarti v. Ram Doyal De, which held that defamatory statements, even on oath, are subject to IPC provisions.
Regarding witness protection under section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act, the Court analyzed judicial opinions and concluded that protection applies only if the witness objects to answering and is compelled by the Court. Voluntary incriminating statements do not enjoy protection.
For accused persons, the Court found no absolute privilege for defamatory statements made under section 342 CrPC, aligning with the reasoning rejecting absolute privilege for parties and witnesses.
The Court thus answered the referred questions negatively, holding that neither witnesses nor accused persons have absolute privilege from defamation prosecution beyond the statutory exceptions, and that protection under section 132 Evidence Act is limited to compelled answers following objection.
Holding and Implications
The Court's final ruling answers all three referred questions in the negative:
- Relevant statements by witnesses in judicial proceedings are not absolutely privileged from defamation prosecution under section 500 IPC beyond statutory exceptions.
- Protection under section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act applies only where the witness objects and is compelled to answer; voluntary statements are not protected.
- Relevant statements by an accused person under section 342 CrPC are not absolutely privileged from defamation prosecution.
This decision directly affects the parties by rejecting claims of absolute privilege for defamatory statements made in judicial proceedings and clarifies the limited scope of protection under the Indian Evidence Act. The Court did not establish new precedent beyond affirming adherence to existing statutory provisions and prior authoritative rulings.
Fawcett, J.:— The petitioner, Bai Shanta, a married Brahmin woman, residing at Umreth, made a complaint against one Umrao Amir in the Court of the Second Class Magistrate, Thasra, under section 354, Indian Penal Code, for assaulting her, with intent to outrage her modesty. The accused Umrao, when examined by the Magistrate under section 342, Criminal Procedure Code, put in a written statement, alleging that he had connection (i.e, immoral relations) with Bai Shanta for about a year and a half. He cited witnesses, who supported this allegation in their evidence in Court. The Magistrate disbelieved the defence and convicted Umrao, sentencing him to pay a fine of Rs. 151. Thereupon Bai Shanta brought a complaint in the Court of the Resident First Class Magistrate, Nadiad, against Umrao, opponent No. 1, his four witnesses in the previous criminal case (opponents Nos. 2, 3, 5 and 6) and opponent No. 4, a neighbour of Umrao, under sections 500 and 506, Indian Penal Code, i.e, for defamation and criminal intimidation. She alleges that while the case was pending, they threatened that, unless she withdrew the complaint, they would make a charge against her that would seriously prejudice her reputation; and that, as she did not comply, they contrived to defame her in the manner already mentioned. She says her reputation has grievously suffered, people laugh at her, and she fears that, until she is re-habilitated by proceedings against the accused for defamation, her husband will not resume marital relations with her.
The First Class Magistrate, after issuing notice to the opponents in regard to the charge under section 500, Indian Penal Code, dismissed her complaint under section 203, Criminal Procedure Code, holding that Umrao was protected by Exception 9 to section 499, Indian Penal Code, and the witnesses had made relevant statements which were protected under the view taken by some of the High Courts.
On revision, the Additional Sessions Judge refused to interfere with the order of the Magistrate dismissing the complaint under section 500, Indian Penal Code, but directed him to dispose of the complaint under section 506, Indian Penal Code, according to law.
Bai Shanta now applies to this Court, asking that the Magistrate's order of dismissal be also reversed in regard to the charge under section 500, Indian Penal Code. We have heard all the parties, except opponent No. 2, who has not been served. The petitioner has agreed to drop her, and her name should be struck out accordingly. Of the remaining live opponents, No. 4 is not alleged to have made any defamatory statement before the Second Class Magistrate, Thasra. We are, therefore, only concerned with opponents Nos. 1, 3, 5 and 6. The oral and written statements of opponent No. 1, Umrao, and the depositions of the other three opponents, have been translated. Umrao's statement was clearly relevant for the purposes of his defence, and not an unnecessary and uncalled for attack on the person defamed, of the kind referred to in. Dinshaji v. Jehangir and Haidar Ali v. Abru Mia so as to take such statement outside rulings like those in Queen-Empress v. Babaji and Queen-Empress v. Bal-krishna Vitha. The other three have made direct relevant statements supporting Umrao's allegation against the petitioner. The question, therefore, arises whether we should follow the view that a party or a witness is absolutely protected from prosecution for defamation, apart from the provisions of the Indian Penal Code on the subject (as has been held by the two lower Courts) or the view that the provisions of the Code must be followed and the Court cannot engraft thereon exceptions derived from the Common Law of England or based on public policy.
It is unnecessary to go into a detailed discussion of the case law on the subject. A full examination of it will be found in the judgment of Mookerjee, Acting C.J, in Satish Chandra Chakravarti v. Ram Doyal De(5) As regards the case of witnesses like opponents Nos. 3, 5 and 6, we could of coarse follow the view taken in the two Bombay cases already mentioned, although personally I prefer the contrary view taken by Mookerjee J. But our attention has been drawn to the fact that in Criminal Application for Revision No. 336 of 1907, Chandavarkar and Knight JJ. referred to a Full Bench the question whether statements made by a witness in a judicial proceeding render him liable to prosecution for defamation under section 499, Indian Penal Code. The referring judgment is reproduced in a foot-note at page 1087 of Ratanlal's “Law of Crimes,” 9th Edn. It refers to the doubts expressed by other Judges of this Court as to the soundness of the view taken in Queen-Empress v. Bahaji and Queen-Empress v. Balkrishna Vithal in favour of the absolute privilege of a witness, as regards prosecution under section 500, Indian Penal Code. I believe I am correct in saying that that view has not been taken elsewhere in India, except in Madras. The reference to the Full Bench in 1907 fell through owing to the parties having compounded the case before the reference came on for hearing. In the circumstances, I think, a similar reference should be made in the present case.
The question has been raised before us whether in any case the proviso to section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act does not protect opponents Nos. 2, 5 and 6 from prosecution under section 500, Indian Penal Code. This enactment only protects an answer to a question which a witness is “compelled” to give. In Emperor v. Chatur Singh it was held by Tudball J. that an answer given by a witness in a criminal case on oath to a question put to him either by the Court or by counsel on either side, especially when the question is on a point which is relevant to the case, is within this protection, whether or not the witness has objected to the question asked him. A similar view was taken by Walsh J. in Emperor v. Ganga Sahai. On the other hand in The Queen v. Gopal Doss; Queen-Empress v. Moss and Kalla v. Sital, it was held that to get the protection afforded by section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act, the witness must show that he asked to be excused from answering the question and the Court obliged him to answer it. This view was adopted by a majority in Queen-Empress v. Ganu Sonta, as also by Shah J. and Hayward J. in Emperor v. Cunna…Accused.(6). But having regard to the difference of judicial opinion on the point, I think it should also be referred to the Full Bench for specific decision.
As regards an accused person like opponent No. 1, he cannot be prosecuted for giving false evidence in respect of his anwers to the Court under section 342, sub-sections (2) and (4); so the argument based on the liability of a complainant or witness to such punishment does not apply. In Nathji Muleshvar v. Lalbhai Ravidat(7) the Court left open the question of the liability of a party to a judicial proceeding to criminal prosecution for defamation. The ruling in Esuffalli Abdul Hussein…Accused Applicant; v. Emperor…Opposite Party.(8) does not touch the question of absolute privilege, apart from the protection afforded by the Exceptions to section 499, Indian Penal Code. There appears to be no direct ruling of this Court on the subject, and it is doubtful how far the view taken in Queen-Empress v. Babaji(9) and Queen-Empress v. Balkrishna Vithal(10) should be held applicable to an accused person. Some of the arguments are equally applicable, while others are not. There is also a difference of judicial authority on the point. The Madras High Court have held in In re Venkatas Reddy that the statement of an accused person under section 312, Criminal Procedure Code, is absolutely privileged. The Calcutta High Court in Satish Chandra Chakravarti v. Ram Doyal De have held the contrary. The Allahabad High Court, and the former Chief Courts of Punjab and Lower Burma, seem to have taken the same view as the Calcutta High Court, see the cases cited in foot-notes 9 and 10 at page 1090 and foot-note 1 at page 1091 of Ratanlal's “Law of Crimes” 9th Edn. The latter decisions are opposed to the reasoning on which Queen-Empress v. Babaji and Queen-Empress v. Balkrislma Vithal are based. I think, therefore, this point should also be referred to the Full Bench. I would accordingly refer the following questions:—
(1) Whether relevant statements made by a witness on oath or solemn affirmation in a judicial proceeding are absolutely protected from being made the subject of a prosecution for defamation under section 500, Indian Penal Code, on grounds of public policy or exceptions derived from the Common Law of England, apart from the provisions of section 499, Indian Penal Code?
(2) Whether such statements can be held to be protected by the proviso to section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act, in cases where the witness has not objected to answering the question put to him and been obliged by the Court in spite of his objection to answer it?
(3) Whether relevant statements made by an accused person under section 342, Criminal Procedure Code, or contained in a written statement filed by him with the Court's permission, are absolutely protected from being the subject of a prosecution for defamation under section 500, Indian Penal Code, on the grounds, &c., referred to in question (1)?
Madgavkar, J.:— I agree.
The reference was heard by a Full Bench consisting of Macleod C.J and Crump J. and Coyajee J.
U.V Divetia, for the applicant:— Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code itself and also Exception 9 of the section are exhaustive and unless the accused and the witnesses come within the Exception they are liable for defamation. The English Common Law privilege is not applicable. The view of the lower Court, relying on Queen-Empress v. Balkrishna Vithal, that parties and witnesses are absolutely privileged is, it is submitted, wrong: Satish Chandra Chakravarti v. Ram Doyal De.
S.R Parulekar, for the opponent:— The common law principle which allows absolute privilege should be followed. The framers of the Indian Penal Code drew upon English Common Law principles in framing the Code. They did not codify any existing law in India.
[Sir Norman Macleod, C.J:— Why should we apply Common Law principles to the Penal Code.]
On the ground of public policy a person to a judicial proceeding should be protected and, therefore, the Common Law principle should be applied. Whenever the framers of the Code have dissented from English Common Law principle they have so stated in the Code itself, eg., in case of slander of private person it is punishable under Indian Penal Code whereas it is not so in England. The fact that the exceptions and illustrations to Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code nowhere mention a case of a qualified privilege in the case of a judicial proceeding shows that the framers intended that an absolute privilege was intended.
The principle laid down in the Privy Council decision of Baboo Gunnesh Dutt Singh v. Mugneeram Chowdhry is this, that parties should be given absolute privilege, and the only indictment they should be subjected to is that for perjury.
[Macleod C.J:— That is not a case under the Indian Penal Code.]
It is no doubt a civil case. It was, however, decided in 1872 when the Indian Penal Code was already in existence and their Lordships of the Judicial Committee must have been aware of the provisions of the Code.
[Macleod C.J:— The point is fully dealt with in the case of Satish Chandra Chakvavarti v. Ram Doyal De, where the Court dissented from the view expressed in Queen-Empress v. Balkrislina Vithal.
The Full Bench of the Madras High Court in In re Venkata Reddy however, have followed the principle expressed in Queen-Empress v. Balkrishna Vithal.
Regarding the second question which deals with section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act, that section exonerates a witness from liability for incriminating statements relevant to the matter in issue. This section replaces section 32 of Act X of 1855. Before this Act was passed the law of privilege was existing in this country and the party in order to take advantage of it had to set it up, and the Court was to decide whether the privilege should be afforded or withheld on hearing the reasons as to how the answer would incriminate him. In order to avoid this difficulty and to help the cause of justice, the law of privilege was repealed by exonerating a witness from any liability with regard to statements relevant to inquiry as provided by section 32 of Act X of 1855 which is the same as the present section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
[Crump J.:— The words “shall not be exeuscd” in section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act presuppose objection raised by the party.]
It is submitted not. It refers to the repealing of the law of privilege and a witness is exonerated with regard to a relevant answer.
[Macleod C.J:— If you want privilege yon must seek it.]
That was the old law before 1855. The framers of the Indian Evidence Act, however, thought it wise to exonerate a witness absolutely with regard to relevant answers.
[Coyajee J.:— The proviso to section 132 uses the word “such answer” which means answer to relevant question.]
That is so. If the answer is relevant he is protected; but if it is irrelevant and uncalled for the witness is not exonerated. Further, section 148 of the Indian Evidence Act states that when such question relates to a matter not relevant to a suit, the Court may warn a witness that he is not obliged to answer the question. So under this section duty is cast upon the Court by the Legislature but such is not the case under section 132. The section itself exonerates witness as he is compelled to answer by force of circumstances in the course of examination. This is more so in the case of a witness who is not trained in the procedure of law and he can be said to be “compelled” by the Court by reason of the situation in which he finds himself. It would be too much to expect an ordinary layman to know all the terms of section 132 and to be prepared to protest against every question put to him in order to ensure protection under that section. Emperor v. Ganga Sahai and Emperor v. Chatur Singh were also referred to.
S.S Patkar, Government Pleader, for the Crown:— The ease ought to be governed by Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code and section 30 of the Letters Patent. section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act gives sufficient protection to the witnesses. As for the accused he has already the privilege of lying. He should not be given the privilege of defaming.
[Coyajee J.:— Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code gives some privilege to the accused.]
That is because an accused person is not examined and, therefore, not prosecuted for perjury. This High Court has held that if an accused insults a Judge he is liable to punishment: Emperor v. Venkatrao.
Macleod, C.J:— We answer the first question referred to us by the Bench in the negative. In Satish Chandra Chakravarti v. Ram Doyal De, it whs held by a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court that “a defamatory statement, on oath or otherwise, by a party to a judicial proceeding falls within Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code, and is not absolutely privileged. Under clause 30 of the Letters Patent, 1865, the provisions of such Code mast be followed, and the Court cannot engraft thereon exceptions derived from the Common Law of England or based on public policy”. Every case on the subject has been most exhaustively dealt with by the learned Acting Chief Justice and it would be superfluous for us to add anything to what has been said in that case. We think accordingly that Queen-Empress v. Babaji was wrongly decided, and that Queen-Empress v. Balkrishna Vithal should have been decided according to the opinion of Mr. Justice Telang.
We also think that the third question should be answered in the negative, as the decision I have already referred to applies to this question also. There is nothing in Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code which gives an accused person an absolute privilege as regards defamatory statements made by him in his examination.
With regard to the second question, we think that the words at the end of the question “and been obliged by the Court in spite of his objection to answer it” must have been put in by inadvertence, as the question propounded for our opinion should be “Whether relevant statements made by a witness on oath or solemn affirmation in a judicial proceeding can be held to be protected by the proviso to section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act, in cases where the witness has not objected to answering the question put to him?” It was hardly necessary to refer that question to a Full Bench, as there is no decision of this Court that such statements can be protected where the witness has not objected to answering them. On the contrary it was decided in Emperor v. Cunna…Accused. that unless a person objects to any question the answer to which is likely to incriminate him, he cannot be said to have been compelled to give such answer within the meaning of the proviso. On page 1271 Mr. Justice Hayward said:—
“If a man voluntarily makes an incriminating, statement, he must take the consequences for it. He can only plead protection if he has specifically declined to make the statement, and has been specifically compelled to do so by the Court.”
The decisions referred to of the Allahabad High Court in Emperor v. Ganga Sahai and Emperor v. Chatur Singh, are decisions of a single Judge.
We answer the second question in the negative.
Answers accordingly
R.R
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