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Ranodip Singh v. Parmeshwar Pershad
Factual and Procedural Background
The appeal arises from a decree dated July 15, 1921, of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh, which affirmed a decree dated March 22, 1921, of the Subordinate Judge of Bhairach. The suit was instituted on June 23, 1920, by the four sons of the sixth defendant, Thakur Prithi Singh, claiming possession of a village alleged to be ancestral property of their joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law. The plaintiffs' father purported to sell the village on June 3, 1893, to Manjee Ram, represented by defendants Nos. 1 to 5, while the seventh defendant claims as a mortgagee from some of these defendants. The plaintiffs challenge the sale's validity on the grounds it was not made out of legal necessity and seek possession of the village. Among the issues framed, the court focused on whether the suit was barred by limitation, considering the birth dates of the plaintiffs relative to the date of sale.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the suit for possession is barred by the period of limitation calculated from the date of the alleged sale on June 3, 1893.
- Whether the plaintiffs, particularly the fourth plaintiff born after the sale, are entitled to an extension of the limitation period under Sections 6, 7, and 8 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908.
- Whether the birth of the fourth plaintiff after the cause of action arose creates a fresh cause of action or a new starting point for limitation.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiffs' Arguments
- The sale of the village by their father was not made out of legal necessity and is therefore not binding on them.
- The suit is not barred by limitation because Section 7 of the Indian Limitation Act, read with Sections 6 and 8, extends the limitation period due to the minority of some plaintiffs.
- The fourth plaintiff, born after the sale, is entitled to the extended limitation period provided by these sections, preventing the suit from being time-barred.
Defendants' Arguments
- The period of limitation began to run from June 3, 1893, the date of the sale and possession by the alienees.
- The suit is barred by limitation as the prescribed twelve years expired in 1905.
- The birth of the fourth plaintiff after the sale does not create a new cause of action or extend the limitation period.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analyzed the limitation period starting from June 3, 1893, based on the assumption that the alienees took possession on that date under Article 126 of the First Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. The twelve-year limitation period expired in 1905. The court examined the applicability of Sections 6, 7, and 8 of the Act, which provide for extensions of limitation periods in cases of minority or other disabilities.
The court found that the first and second plaintiffs were alive at the date of sale, while the third and fourth plaintiffs were born subsequently. The crucial issue was whether the fourth plaintiff, born after the cause of action arose, could claim an extension of limitation.
Applying the statutory provisions, the court held that the extended limitation period under Section 7 could only be claimed by a person entitled to institute the suit at the time from which limitation runs. Since the fourth plaintiff was not in existence at that time, he could not claim this extension. Further, the birth of the fourth plaintiff did not create a new cause of action or reset the limitation period.
Consequently, the suit was barred by limitation as to all plaintiffs.
Holding and Implications
The court DISMISSED the appeal, upholding the decree that the suit is barred by limitation.
This decision directly affects the parties by denying possession to the plaintiffs on limitation grounds. The court clarified that the limitation period cannot be extended for a plaintiff born after the cause of action arose, and no new cause of action is created by such subsequent birth. No new legal precedent beyond the application of the existing statutory provisions was established.
1. This is an appeal from a decree dated July IS, 1921, of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh, affirming a decree dated March 22,1921, of the Subordinate Judge of Bhairach.
2. The suit out of which the appeal arises was instituted on June 23, 1920, by the four sons of the sixth defendant, Thakur Prithi Singh, claiming possession of the village described in the plaint. The plaintiffs and their father are a joint Hindu family governed by the law of the Mitakshara, and it is the plaintiffs case that the village is the ancestral property of the joint family.
3. On June 3, 1893, the plaintiffs* father purported to sell the village to Manjee Ram, who is represented in this suit by his descendants defendants Nos. 1 to 5. The seventh defendant claims as a mortgagee from defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 5.
4. The plaintiffs contend that the sale is not binding on them as it was not made for legal necessity, and on this ground they claim a decree for possession.
5. Of the many issues framed in the Court of the Subordinate Judge it is only necessary to consider whether the suit is barred by limitation, and for this purpose the dates at which the several plaintiffs were born become important.
6. Ranodip Singh, plaintiff No. 1, was born on August 23, 1886; Kali Bakah Singh, plaintiff No. 2, on August 4, 1891; Sitla Baksh Singh, plaintiff No. 3, on October 1, 1897; and Parmeshuri Baksh Singh, plaintiff No. 4, on November 30, 1900. It will thus be seen that the first and second plaintiffs were in existence at the date of the sale, but the other two plaintiffs were born after its completion.
7. The time from which the period of limitation began to run has throughout been treated as June 3, 1893, on the assumption that the alienees then took possession of the property within the meaning of Article 126 in the First Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1908.
8. The prescribed period of twelve years from this date expired in 1905, but the plaintiffs contend that limitation is saved by Section 7 of the Indian Limitation Act, read with s&. 6 and 8.
9. These sections so far as material are in these terms :-
6 (1.) Where a person entitled to institute a suit...is at the time from which the period of limitation is to be reckoned minor.. he may institute the suit... within the same period after the disability has ceased as would otherwise have been allowed from the time prescribed therefore in the third column of the first schedule.
7. Where one of several persons jointly entitled to institute a suit...is under any such disability and a discharge can be given without the concurrence of Much person time will run against them nil; but whore no discharge can be given time will not run as against any of thorn until one of them becomes capable of giving such discharge without the concurrence of the others or until Um disability has ceased.
8. Nothing in section 6 or in section 7...shall be deemed to extend for more three years from the cessation of the disability...of the person affected thereby the period within which any suit must be instituted.
9. It is conceded that the suit would not be saved by these sections if brought by the first three plaintiffs alone; but it is contended that the fourth plaintiff' is entitled to the extended period for which the sections provide, and that the suit is therefore not barred, by limitation. Both the Courts in India have decided adversely to this contention.
10. The cause of action arose on June 3, 1898, and it is from that date that the period of limitation in to be reckoned. The fourth plaintiff's subsequent birth on November 30, 1900, did not create a fresh cause of action or a new starting point from which limitation should be reckoned.
11. To the contention that by the cited sections the period of limitation is extended for three years from the cessation of the fourth plaintiff's minority the answer is that by their express terms this extended period can only be claimed by a person entitled to institute the suit at the time from which the period of limitation is to be reckoned. The fourth plaintiff does not come within this description, for at that time he was not in existence. He, therefore, is not entitled to the three years extension, and his suit is consequently barred
12. Their lordships will accordingly humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal ought to be dismissed.
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