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Hoosein Abdul Rehman v. Lakelmichand Khetsey

Bombay High Court
Aug 1, 1924
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The document in question (Exhibit A), dated 18 October 1922, purported to be a lease of a godown (warehouse) described as "go-down bearing No. three. The Port Trust number of which is … in the New Rice Market at Carnac Bunder, Port Trust, Bombay," from Hussein Abdul Rehman & Co. to Lakhmichand Khetsey for nineteen months. The document was presented for registration on 7 June 1923 with stamp and penalty under section 25. The Sub‑Registrar refused registration twice: first on 7 June 1923 under section 20 (objection that an endorsement referring to cadastral/survey number was not initialled by the executant), and again on 13 August 1923 under section 21 (insufficient description). On appeal to the Registrar, the first order under section 20 was set aside (Registrar's order 26 July 1923) but the Registrar later refused to interfere with the Sub‑Registrar's refusal under section 21 (Registrar's order 25 September 1923). The plaintiff brought suit under section 77 of the Indian Registration Act seeking an order directing registration of the document. The trial judge (Fawcett, J.) held the suit maintainable and directed registration on 21 January 1924. The defendants appealed. The appellate court (Sir Lallubhai Shah, A.C.J., with panel) considered (1) whether the suit was maintainable under section 77 and (2) whether the description in the document was sufficient under section 21. The appellate court confirmed the trial decree and dismissed the appeal with costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit under section 77 of the Indian Registration Act was maintainable against the Registrar's refusal to direct registration (given the Sub‑Registrar's refusal to accept/register the document under sections 20 and 21 and the Registrar's refusal to interfere).
  2. Whether the document (Exhibit A) contained a description of the property sufficient to identify the property within the meaning of section 21 of the Indian Registration Act, read with section 22 and the Bombay rules / notifications.
  3. Whether the Sub‑Registrar's technical objection under section 20 (that a blank regarding the Port Trust number was not initialled by the executant) could properly be insisted on after the Sub‑Registrar had in effect exercised his discretion not to require it.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Defendants') Arguments — as advanced by Campbell

  • The suit was not maintainable under section 77 because the Sub‑Registrar's and Registrar's orders amounted in substance to a refusal to accept the document for registration (a discretionary refusal under section 21 and/or section 20), and such refusals do not fall within the ambit of section 77; reliance was placed on Gangava v. Sayava and observations in Abdool Hoosein v. Goolam Hoosein.
  • Even on the merits, the description of the property was insufficient: from the document itself the property could not be identified with certainty. It was immaterial that local persons might recognise the godown from the description; the description should be sufficient per se and the Sub‑Registrar (with experience) was not satisfied.

Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Arguments — as advanced by Munshi

  • Gangava v. Sayava was distinguishable and possibly wrongly decided; its authority was weakened by other decisions. Abdool Hoosein v. Goolam Hoosein was also distinguishable on its facts (there the matter had advanced beyond acceptance stage and the observations were largely obiter).
  • The evidence showed that the description in the document was sufficient to identify the godown in question (it is generally known as Godown No. 3 in the New Rice Market, Carnac Bunder, on Port Trust property), and therefore it should have been registered.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Durga Singh v. Bisheshar Dayal Authority for the view that the word "house" can be broad enough to include an indigo factory (i.e., non‑dwelling structures used by people). Referred to in considering whether the godown could be a "house"; used to show that some industrial buildings may fall within "house" but distinguished on facts because the godown here was used solely for rice trade under restrictive lease terms and therefore not a "house" for the purposes of sections 21/22.
Dalchand Singhi v. The Secretary of State for India Authority that a godown used as a residence for servants was part of a house. Cited by way of comparison; the court contrasted that fact situation with the present godown (used for rice storage) and concluded the present godown was not a "house".
Kshirode Chunder Ghosal v. Saroda Prosad Mitra and Nabab Mumtazuddoula v. Secretary of State Comparative authorities on when a structure may be treated as part of a house. Mentioned to show circumstances where a structure might be appurtenant to a house; used to explain why the present godown did not fit those categories.
Dayachand Nemchand v. Hemchand Dharamchand Concerned interpretation of "land" juxtaposed with "houses" in section 7 of the Court Fees Act; supports that "land" may not include a house where words are juxtaposed. Cited to support the inference that in sections 21/22 the juxtaposition of "houses" and "lands" suggests "lands" do not include "houses".
Narayanamma v. Kamakshamma Held that "land" in a Madras Act included land covered by buildings. Referred to as authority for the proposition that "land" can include buildings; the court considered this in balancing whether "lands" in sections 21/22 include lands covered by buildings.
Land Acquisition Act (cases cited: Mangaldas Girdhardas v. The Assistant Collector of Prant Ahmedabad; In re Land Acquisition Act) Illustrates distinction between transfer of superstructure and transfer of the site/land (e.g., bungalow on Cantonment land). Used to explain that transfer of a structure and transfer of land/site can be distinct, and that Exhibit A appeared to transfer only the godown (superstructure) and not the plot/site.
Abdool Hoosein v. Goolam Hoosein Earlier Bombay decision holding that very general descriptions (e.g., "my family property") could be sufficient in some circumstances (decision pre‑1907 rule). Distinguished and said to require reconsideration in light of the 1907/1910 rule; the court held such general descriptions cannot prevail where the 1910 rule applies to transfers of land.
Parasharampant v. Rama One of the Bombay cases allowing general descriptions without particulars (pre‑1907/1910 rule). Cited alongside Abdool Hoosein and held not controlling for cases to which the 1910 rule applies.
Saiyed Mahmud v. Muhammad Zubair Refers to a similar rule in the United Provinces holding that a mere general description is not proper where the rule requiring map/survey reference applies. Used to support the proposition that where a local rule requires map reference, a general description is inadequate.
Narasimha Nayanevaru v. Ramalingama Rao Earlier decision upholding broad descriptions; contrasted by the present judge. The present judge expressly differed with that authority on the point of sufficiency of general descriptions for immovable property where the statute requires particulars.
Tilakdhari Lal v. Khedan Lal (Privy Council) Held that registration is not necessarily constructive notice; each case depends on its circumstances. Referred to in the opinion to note that registration does not automatically amount to constructive notice, moderating the significance of registration in notice issues.
Gangava v. Sayava Authority relied upon by appellants for a distinction between refusal to accept for registration and refusal to register (in that case under an older corresponding section). The court treated that decision as inapplicable on its precise point (it dealt with a different statutory provision) and held it did not bind the present case; the court concluded the Sub‑Registrar's order was appealable and the suit maintainable.
Fattechand Anandram v. Umaji Cited as undermining the authority of certain Bombay rulings. Mentioned by respondent's counsel to weaken reliance on some earlier decisions; the court referenced the debate but decided on statutory construction and facts.
Sah Mukhun Lall Panday v. Sah Koondun Lall Referred to in argument (details not fully set out in the opinion). Referred to by counsel in argument; the reported opinion does not record any in‑depth application of this case by the court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds in two main strands: (A) jurisdictional/maintainability question under section 77, and (B) the substantive sufficiency of description under sections 21 and 22 (with interaction with local rules/notifications). The following summarizes the step‑by‑step legal reasoning found in the opinion.

A. Maintainability under section 77 (Appeal / Suit jurisdiction)

  • Statutory framework: section 72 provides an appeal against a Sub‑Registrar "refusing to admit a document to registration"; section 76 requires a Registrar who refuses to direct registration under section 72/75 to record reasons; and section 77 permits a party to sue where the Registrar refuses to order registration under those provisions.
  • The court examined whether the Sub‑Registrar's and Registrar's orders amounted to a refusal to accept for registration (a discretionary act) or a refusal to register/direct registration. The court read "refusing to admit a document to registration" in section 72 broadly enough to include refusal to accept for registration as well as refusal to register.
  • Gangava v. Sayava (and related older authorities) was considered but distinguished because it arose under an older corresponding provision (section 24 of 1877 Act) and did not control the present question under section 21/72/76 of the present Act.
  • The court further observed that the document had been twice before the Sub‑Registrar and twice before the Registrar and that, for present purposes, the requirements of section 25 (relating to late presentation and penalty) were to be taken as complied with. Given that the Registrar refused to interfere with the Sub‑Registrar's order, the Registrar effectively refused to direct registration under section 72/76, bringing the suit within section 77.
  • Conclusion on maintainability: the suit under section 77 was maintainable; the trial judge was correct on this point.

B. Sufficiency of description under sections 21 and 22 (and local rules)

  • Primary rule: section 21(1) requires a non‑testamentary document relating to immovable property to contain a description sufficient to identify the property.
  • Sections 21(2) (houses in towns) and 21(3) (other houses and lands) prescribe special forms of description; section 22(1) empowers Local Government to require description by reference to government map/survey where practicable, and section 22(2)‑(3) limit the effect of non‑compliance (not disentitling a document if the description suffices to identify the property).
  • The local Bombay notifications (1907 and 1910 rules) required lands in surveyed areas to be described by reference to government map/survey; those rules were directed at "lands" and not (the court held) at "houses in towns".
  • The court analysed the meaning of "house" and "land":
    • Although English and Indian authorities show "house" can be broadly defined (including factories etc.), the lease restrictions and the nature of the godown (erected and used solely for rice storage under Port Trust lease conditions and with use restrictions) meant that this godown was not a "house" within sections 21/22 for the purposes of the statutory scheme.
    • The court held that the juxtaposition of "houses" and "lands" in sections 21/22 supports the inference that "lands" do not include lands covered by houses (i.e., where the property is in substance a house). For buildings other than houses the court held there was no sufficient reason to exclude them from "lands" and so "lands" may include sites covered by non‑house buildings.
  • The court then addressed whether Exhibit A was a document relating to land (which would trigger the 1910 rule requiring map/survey reference) or whether it was a lease of the godown as a structure only. The court concluded Exhibit A was a lease of the godown (superstructure) and did not purport to transfer the plot/site; assignment of the plot would require Port Trust sanction under the main lease (Exhibit M).
  • Consequently, the 1910 rule requiring reference to a Government map/survey did not apply to Exhibit A; sub‑section (3) of section 21 (and the rule under section 22) therefore did not disentitle the document to registration.
  • As to the Sub‑Registrar's insistence on cadastral/survey numbers and the Port Trust rent‑roll number: the court observed that while indexing and administrative convenience may make such particulars desirable, the statutory provisions (sections 21 & 22 and the Inspector‑General's powers under section 55 for index particulars) cannot be stretched to require information inconsistent with sections 21/22. Moreover, the footnote to Exhibit A (though unsigned) contained the cadastral particulars and could serve the registering office's indexing needs.
  • The court considered prior Bombay decisions that allowed very general descriptions (e.g., "my family property") and concluded that they must be reconsidered insofar as the 1907/1910 rule applies; where the rule applies to transfers of land, general descriptions are inadequate (supported by Saiyed Mahmud v. Muhammad Zubair).
  • Turning to the facts and evidence, the court found that the description in Exhibit A (godown No. 3, Port Trust property, New Rice Market, Carnac Bunder) together with evidence that the godown was generally known as "Godown No. 3" was sufficient for identification. The unsigned endorsement (footnote) could not be relied on as binding, but the principal description sufficed.
  • Conclusion on sufficiency: the court answered the substantive issue affirmatively — the document ought to be registered because the description was sufficient to identify the property under section 21.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: Appeal dismissed; the decree of the trial court directing registration of Exhibit A is confirmed.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The document (Exhibit A) should be registered; the defendants' opposition to registration was unsuccessful and the trial court's order directing registration was affirmed.
  • The appeal by the defendants is dismissed with costs and the stay order is discharged.

Broader implications discussed or implied in the opinion:

  • The court clarified statutory construction of sections 21 and 22 in the context of (a) distinguishing between "houses" and other buildings for the purposes of the rule requiring map/survey description, and (b) the limited reach of local rules (Bombay notifications) which apply to "lands" and not to "houses in towns".
  • The opinion emphasises that administrative indexing convenience cannot override the statutory requirements of sections 21 and 22; if consistent indexing requires additional particulars, legislative amendment is the proper remedy.
  • The court indicated that certain pre‑1907 Bombay authorities allowing very general descriptions must be read down where the 1907/1910 rule applies; where local rules require map reference for transfers of lands the mere general description is insufficient.
  • No novel general precedent beyond the statutory interpretation and the fact‑driven holding was created: the judgment applies the statute to the facts and confirms registration in the particular circumstances of this godown lease.

Solicitors recorded in the opinion: Appellants — Madhavji & Co.; Respondent — Ardeshir, Kharasji Dinshaw & Co.

Show all summary ...

Fawcett, J.:— The second issue in this suit is whether the document should be ordered to be registered. It was rejected for insufficient description under section 21 of the Registration Act. The reasons for this rejection are given in the Sub-Registrar's orders of June 7, and August 13, 1923, Exhibit F, and they are summarised in the Registrar's order of September 25, 1923, Exhibit H. He there says:—

“The Sub-Registrar states in his reasons for refusal that in the town of Bombay, City Survey is completed and the property is required to be described under the City Survey maps. The schedule of the property subsequently added is not signed by the executant and has no binding effect on the contract. He has accordingly refused to accept the document for registration under section 21 of the Registration Act.”

The main question is whether this view is correct, that is, whether the property is not sufficiently described in accordance with sections 21 and 22 of the Indian Registration Act so that registration of it was properly refused under section 21. Before I proceed to discuss that point, I may mention that Mr. Binning for the defendant also seeks to support the Sub-Registrars refusal to register under section 20 of the Act, on the ground that the blank in the document regarding the Port Trust number has not been initialled by the executant. On this point it is no doubt true that this Sub-Registrar in his evidence in this Court says that he would require this blank to be initialled before allowing the document to be registered. On the other hand no such objection was taken by him when he first rejected the document under section 20; he then only objected about the footnote which gives a farther description of the property not being initialled. The Sub-Registrar's order of refusal under section 20 was subsequently set aside by the Registrar. That being so, as the case stands it appears that the Sub-Registrar in fact exercised his discretion in not requiring this blank to be initialled. Section 20 gives him discretion in the matter and in my opinion the Sub-Registrar cannot now go back on that position. So far as I am in the position of a Registering Officer for the purpose of deciding this suit, I consider in any case that the discretion was rightly exercised. There is no real ground for insisting on such a technical formality in regard to this particular blank which undoubtedly existed at the time that the document was executed. So I refuse to consider farther any objection of this kind under section 20 of the Act.

Going back to the main question, I think it is important first of all to get a clear idea as to what exactly is prescribed in sections 21 and 22. Sub-section (1) of section 21 gives the general provision on the subject of description of property, namely, that—

“No non-testamentary document relating to immoveable property shall be accepted for registration unless it contains a description of such property sufficient to identify the same.”

That is the general rule; then follow special provisions in sub-sections (2) and (3) in regard to particular cases. Those cases are in regard to the description of (1) houses in towns and (2) other houses and lands. As to the latter category of “other houses and lands”, it is provided in sub-section (3) that in addition to the other information mentioned in that sub-section, they shall be described whenever it is practicable by reference tp a Government map or survey. Section 22 relates to this question of practicability. Subsection (7) authorises the Local Government to decide that such reference to a Government map or survey is practicable in the case of houses other than houses in towns and in the case of lands and to prescribe a rule requiring that such houses and lands shall for the purpose of section 21 be described with reference to such Government map or survey. For the Bombay Presidency such a rule has in fact been prescribed by the Local Government. There is first of all the Notification No. 7968 of August 12, 1907, which directed that from the 1st October 1907:—

“In all areas within the Presidency of Bombay to which a survey has been extended, lands shall, for the purpose of section 21 of the Indian Registration Act, 1877, be described by reference to the Government map or survey.”

That Notification it will be seen relates only to lands and to lands in areas to which a survey has been extended. This Notification has been superseded by a later Notification No. 6412 of July 18, 1910, which, however, in its first rule reproduces the old rule of 1907 with the exception that the Indian Registration Act of 1908 is referred to instead of the Indian Registration Act of 1877. The second rule relates to lands of which a map has been prepared under the Bombay Land Record of Rights Act, 1903. That does not in any way affect the present case, while the third rule merely reproduces the provision of sub-section (2) of section 22, namely,

“Failure to comply with the provisions of this rule shall disentitle a document to be registered.”

I have already held in my previous judgment that the rules under section 22 cannot cover houses in towns and in any case this rule does not purport to affect houses; it only purports to affect lands. The resell therefore, is that in regard to houses in towns it is no even necessary to comply with the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 21 about describing them as situate on the north or other side of the street or road, &c., because sub-section (2) of section 22 lays down in the clearest language that failure to comply with those provisions “shall not disentitle a document to be registered if the description of the property to which it relates is sufficient to identify that property”.

Thus the first question that really arises in this ease is whether this particular godown falls within what I may call the privileged category of houses as contemplated by sections 21 and 22. Now the ordinary legal meaning of the word ‘house’ as recognised in England is a structure of permanent character (I miss out immaterial details) that is used or may be used for the habitation of man; see Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Second Edition, Vol. II, page 893. But the word is not merely confined to an ordinary dwelling house, for instance, the definition of the word ‘house’ in the English Public Health Acts lays down that that expression also includes schools, factories and other buildings in which persons are employed. Similarly in India in Durga Singh v. Bisheshar Dayal, it was held that the word ‘house’ was sufficiently comprehensive to include an indigo factory; and that may be said to be consistent with this main definition that I have referred to, for such a factory is of course a place which can be said to be used for human habitation in the day time. Also in Dalchand Singhi v. The Secretary of State for India a godown which was used as a Residence for servants was held to be part of a house; but this particular godown is merely for storing rice, &c., in connection with the Bombay rice trade. This is quite clear from the provisions in the lease Exhibit M. Among these provisions is the condition that the lessee should erect a building with all necessary conveniences for use in connection with the rice trade in the City of Bombay, and there are restrictions as to the use to which the premises are to be put. These provide that the lessee “will not without the previous consent of the Port Trust use or permit the premises or any part thereof or any building thereon to be used, otherwise than in connection with the rice trade of the City of Bombay”. This godown which is the subject of the document, Exhibit A, was erected in accordance with those conditions; and that being so, it cannot in my opinion be properly called a ‘house’. It is not as if it was a case of a structure which might ordinarily be used for a house or which had once been used as a house and had only subsequently come to be used as a godown for storing rice. Nor is this a building in a street of houses such as is contemplated in subsection (2) of section 21. Nor is it a godown appurtenant to a house or adjacent to a house or necessary to its convenient occupation in which case it might be held to fall under the expression ‘house’; compare; Kshirode Chunder Ghosal v. Saroda Prosad Mitra and Nabab Mumtazuddoula v. Secretary of State. It is significant that section 21 only used the word ‘houses’ not the wider word ‘buildings’ as might have been done and as has actually been done in the Bombay Municipal Act, III of 1888 and III of 1901. Accordingly I hold that this particular godown is not a house within the meanings of sections 21 and 22 of the Registration Act.

It follows also that it cannot come under the category of ‘other houses’ in those two sections so as to be affected by a rule under section 22. But the question remains whether the document relates to ‘lands’ and so falls under the rule of 1910 that I have already mentioned. It is quite clear that lands in towns are included in section 22 just as much as lands in villages, for there is no differentiation in regard to lands such as there is in regard to houses. The first question in this connection is whether, the word ‘lands’ includes lands built on, or partly built on, as well as waste Or agricultural lands. Primarily the word ‘lands’ is wide enough to do so. Thus in England, since 1850 under an Act of Parliament ‘land’ includes messuages, tenements and hereditaments, houses, and buildings of any tenure unless where there are words to exclude houses and buildings or to restrict the meaning to tenements of some particular tenure (13 & 14 Viet., c. 21, s. 4); and a similar provision has been made in section 3 of the Interpretation Act (1889, 52 & 53 Vict., c. 63) which says that ‘land’ in any Act of Parliament after 1850 includes buildings, &c., unless the contrary appears. I may also refer to Narayanamma v. Kamakshamma where it was held that the word ‘land’ as used in a Madras Act included land covered by buildings; and of course it is quite ordinary in documents of transfer to describe house, &c., as the lands so and so together with the buildings thereon, &c., for naturally where the sites are also transferred it is appropriate to describe them in this way. Again in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, ‘land’ is actually defined as including things attached to the earth or permanently fastened, to anything attached to the earth; and that of course covers buildings. But there is no such definition in the Indian Registration Act and we have the fact that in sections 21 and 22 the word ‘land’ appears in opposition to the word ‘houses’ so that the inference arises that ‘lands’ at any rate do not include ‘houses’ or lands on which houses have been built. A somewhat similar question arose regarding section 7 of the Indian Court Fees Act, 1870, which speaks of ‘land’, houses and gardens, in Dayachand Nemchand v. Hemchand Dharamchand, it was held by a Full Bench of this Court that the word ‘land’ in clause (viii) of this section 7 did not include a house because of the juxtaposition “of the words, and a similar view is taken in Durga Singh v. Bisheshar Dayal. I hold, therefore, that the word ‘lands’ as used in sections 21 and 22 at any rate does not include lands covered with houses.

The next question is whether the word ‘land’ includes lands covered by buildings other than houses. That is a question which is certainly more open to a difference of opinion. The head-note in Durga Singh v. Bisheshar Dayal, the case I have already referred to, cites the Judges as laying down that “laud does not include buildings” but that goes further than the actual decision, for as already mentioned it was held in that case that the indigo factory which was there in question was a house, so that the ruling only amounted to saying that the word ‘land’ did not include a house. In my opinion there is no sufficient reason for saying that the word ‘lands’ as used in sub-section (3) of section 21 and sub-section (i) of section 22 does not include lands covered by buildings other than houses. The word obviously seems to be intended to be very wide as no other class of immoveable property is mentioned in this section. For instance the word ‘buildings’ has not been used as well as ‘houses’. I can see no sufficient reason to restrict the primarily wide meaning of ‘lands’ as used in the sub-sections except in regard to houses for the reasons I have already mentioned. Therefore I am of opinion that the site of this godown does in fact come under the description ‘lands’ as used in the sub-sections.

But it does not necessarily follow that Exhibit A is a document relating to land as opposed to the building on the land. It hardly needs authority for saying that the structure on the land and the land itself can be the subject of separate acts of transfer. A very good in-stance is the case of a bungalow in a Cantonment, where the lands belong to Government but the building belongs to somebody who had been allowed to occupy the land under special conditions and to erect a building upon it. For the distinction between the two cases in regard to land acquisition, reference may be made to In re Land Acquisition Act and Mangaldas Girdhardas v. The Assistant Collector of Prant Ahmedabad. In this particular case, if the lease, Exhibit A, was a transfer of the plaintiff's leasehold rights to the plot under the lease, Exhibit M, then no doubt, Exhibit A would be a transfer of land falling under sub-section (3) of section 21 and sub-section (1) of section 22; and the rule of 1910 about making a reference in the description to a Government map or survey would apply to it. But here in my opinion there is no such transfer. The document in its terms is a lease only of the godown and it does not purport to deal with the plot and to transfer the plot in any way. Such a transfer would in fact require the prior sanction of the Port Trust under the provisions in the lease, Exhibit M, under the heading of “Assignment” It is true that no evidence has actually been given on the point, but I think it may safely be presumed that a godown of this kind would have a special flooring of cement or other material attached to the earth so that the godown as leased for occupation is only the actual structure. But in any case the document does not purport to lease the site on which it stands in the sense of being a transfer of this site. For these and other reasons I hold that this is not a case where the document is a transfer of lands so as to bring the rule of 1910 into operation. The net result is that I hold in law it is not necessary to describe this godown by reference to a Government Wap or survey under sub-section (3) of section 21 or under sub-section (i) of section 22. At any rate failure to comply with the provisions of section 21, sub-section (3), does not disentitle the document to be registered if the description of the property to which it relates is sufficient to identify that property as laid down in sub-section (2) of section 22. Therefore the main ground on which the Sub-Registrar acted in refusing to register this document falls to the ground.

The Sub-Registrar in his evidence has given some useful explanation as to the reasons why the cadastral numbers, &c, are required by the Registration Department to be entered in documents relating to immoveable property. Then he says:—

“If the cadastral number is not mentioned we would not accept a document for registration though the street number, &c., in given. We return it to the party presenting the document and the cadastral number entry must be signed by all the executing parties, otherwise we would reject the document.”

That position is not in my opinion justified by sections 21 and 22 except as to a document of transfer relating to lands which are either unbuilt or covered by buildings other than houses. I have already given my reasons for that opinion. It may be noted also that the Collector's letter of 21st of June 1922 (Exhibit 2), which is authority for the present practice in the Registration Department of Bombay, only refers to lands, and paragraph 3 runs:—

“I should be glad if you would insist that in future all land is described according to the latest survey.”

That is a correct position but the Registration Department seems to have extended it further in a manner which I hold is not justified by the terms of the Act.

The question remains whether in fact this godown is in Exhibit A given a description sufficient to identify the same. On this I will first consider whether there are any rulings to guide me in fixing the limits of what is a sufficient description. Thus there are two Bombay cases where it has been laid down that it is quite sufficient in documents relating to immoveable property to refer to them generally as “my family property” or “the property inherited by me from so and so” or “the property transferred by me from so and so” without specifying the details of the property in question. These are Abdool Hoosein v. Goolam Hoosein and Parasharampant v. Rama. I am quite clear that those rulings must be reconsidered with reference to the rule of 1910 and in regard to any document which relates to a transfer of lands falling under the rule. Both these decisions related to documents of dates prior to the rule of 1907. Thus in Abdool Hoosein v. Goolam Hoosein the document in question was one dated October 25, 1895, and in Parasharampant v. Rama the release referred to was dated June 2, 1903; and the rule in question, if a similar rule existed then, appears not to have been cited to the Court or to have been considered by the Court. No ruling of this Court can override the plain provisions of this statute contained in section 22; so that if I had to decide this case upon the basis of this rule applying, I should not consider myself bound by those rulings. I think it is quite clear that, if a document which is brought for registration purports to transfer property which includes lands, then the document is rightly refused registration, if it does not contain a description of these lands with reference to a Government map or survey. In Bombay City a survey has been introduced under the authority of Bombay Act IV of 1915, so that it is an area to which a survey has been extended within the meaning of the rule of 1907 and 1910; accordingly I reject the contention that the description may be of the very general character that is mentioned in those two cases so far as regards transfer of lands. I may refer also in this connection to Saiyed Mahmud v. Muhammad Zubair, which refers to a similar rule in force in the United Provinces and holds that the mere description of property in the general way I have mentioned is not a proper description entitling a document to be registered in cases to which that rule applies. In any case it seems to me that sections 21(1) and 22(3) plainly contemplate that the description of the property shall be sufficient to enable the property to be identified, if not entirely at any rate mainly from that description and not from outside information such as other documents or statements by witnesses. No doubt sections 28, 64 and 65 also, I think, clearly intend that the Sub-Registrar should have the means of ascertaining from the document itself whether the immoveable property to which it relates is wholly or partly situate in his sub-district. Therefore a general description like “my family property” without any details enabling a person to identify from the document itself or a schedule attached to it the particular items of property included in that general expression is not in my opinion sufficient to entitle a document relating to immoveable property to be registered. With due respect, therefore, I venture to differ from the contrary ruling in Narasimha Nayanevaru v. Ramalingama Rao and the cases which follow it. In support of this opinion I may cite the authority of my learned brother, Mulla J., who in his recent commentary on the Indian Registration Act after referring to these cases says at page 104:—

“This decision as well as the decision in the case where the words of description were ‘my family property’ may be supported on the ground that there was nothing on the face of the document to show that the document related to immoveable property.”

Obviously he does not consider those decisions sound and suggests that they can only be supported on a ground which practically deprives them of all relevancy on the point I have been considering.

Returning to the Sub-Registrar's evidence, he mentions an additional reason for the practice in the Registration office which I may usefully notice. He says:—

“My only ground for saying the description is Dot sufficient is because of the Collector's requirement in his letter (that is the letter, Exhibit 2) and of our system of indexing”

and he describes that system. Now no doubt it is desirable for the maintenance of that system that a document relating to immoveable property should contain a reference to the cadastral number, &c., of the property transferred. Rut if one refers to section 55 of the Registration. Act which deals with the question of indexes, sub-section (3) of that section merely says:—

“Index No. ii shall contain such particulars mentioned in section 21 relating to every such document and memorandum as the Inspector-General from time to time directs in that behalf.”

The particular rules which the Inspector General has drawn up under that provision have not been referred to, but in any case it is clear that the Inspector General cannot legally prescribe anything which is inconsistent with sections 21 and 22 of the Act. He cannot override the clear provisions of sub-section (2) of section 22, so that any consideration of the desirability of good indexing must yield to the provisions of that sub-section; and if it is essential for the proper maintenance of indexing that these particulars should invariably be given, then the only remedy is to have the Act amended. Further it may be noted that the S footnote which has been added to Exhibit A gives the necessary information about the cadastral number &c., and would enable the Registration Office to index this document in the way they want to. The fact that that footnote is not binding on the executant is not material in connection with the actual indexing. The information is presumably correct and might be safely acted upon by the Registration Department; but in any case that is a point which does not affect the question whether the document was properly refused registration.

[The learned Judge here dealt with the foot-note to Exhibit A, and held that, inasmuch as it was not signed by the executant, it could not properly be taken into account in considering whether the property was sufficiently described in the document.]

But the question remains whether, apart from the footnote, Exhibit A contains a description of the property sufficient to identify it. For the reasons I have already given I hold it is not necessary that that description should contain the cadastral or survey number of the land on which the godown stands. The actual description given in the document is a godown bearing No. 3 the Port Trust Number of which is [………………] in the New Rice Market at Carnac Bunder, Port Trust, Bombay. The number given by the Port Trust to the plot on which this godown has been built is 3 and evidence has been given on behalf of the plaintiff that the godown is generally known, as “Go down No. 3”. It is in fact so described in the defendant's solicitor's letter of March 7, 1923, Exhibit N. The description of the godown in the document shows clearly that it is on the Port Trust property in Carnac Bunder in the New Rice Market and the evidence in my opinion shows that this is the only godown on that property which is generally known “No. 3 godown”. The witness Lakhamsey has no doubt mentioned another godown No. 3 of which he is a tenant or owner. This godown is, he says, on land called “Volkhart Land” or “Volkhart Lines,” (I am not sure which is correct) and he says that whenever this godown is meant, it is referred as godown No. 3 on Volkhart Lan (di or Volkhart Lines. I can see no sufficient reason to disbelieve that evidence. Then comment has been made on the fact that the Port Trust give a rent roll number to every plot and fix a plate on the building showing that number. It was apparently intended to insert this rent-roll number in the description contained in Exhibit A but the number in question was left blank. In my opinion that is immaterial. I believe the evidence of the witness Karsondas that people generally identify these go downs by the plot numbers, and not by such plate numbers. It also seems to me immaterial that no Municipal or survey number is given in the description. That is not necessary, for its identification, in my opinion, having regard to the other information given and the fact that this godown is on Port Trust property and not Municipal or Government Land. It may be true that persons who are not rice merchants might not know the identity of the godown at once on seeing this description. But on the other hand, I think any body dealing with godown on Port Trust property in this New Rice Market would be able to identify the property far sooner from the actual description given than by reference to any cadastral or survey number. In my opinion on the evidence the description of the property is sufficient to identify the same and I do not think there are any real merits in the defendant's opposition to the registration of this document; he merely seems to be wanting to back out of his bargain. Therefore I answer the second issue in the affirmative, that is that the document ought to be registered.

I may add that the question of the amount of information that should be given in the description of immoveable property is not now so important in this Presidency as it used to be. The view previously taken by this Court that registration was in itself constructive notice has been overruled by the Privy Council decision in Tilakdhari Lal v. Khedan Lal, where it is laid down that registration is not necessarily constructive notice but every case depends upon its own circumstances.

The defendants appealed.

Campbell, for the appellants:— The case does not fall within section 77. A refusal of the Sub-Registrar under section 20 or 21 is a refusal to accept far registration; a refusal, on the other hand, under, say, section 19 or 35, is a refusal to register,—the material distinction in the result being that in the first class of cases his discretion is final, whereas, in the second class, his refusal is subject to appeal. See the observations in Abdool Hoosein v. Goolam Hoosein. Here, upon a proper appreciation of the facts and of the several orders passed, it is clear that the final order was a refusal to accept for registration. See also Gangava v. Sayava.

In any events even if the suit lies, the Sub-Registrar was right in holding that the description of the property was insufficient. From the document itself the property could not in fact be identified with certainty. It is immaterial that, as suggested in evidence, persons acquainted with the locality in question might recognize the property from the description. It should be sufficient per se. The registering officer, with his special experience, was not satisfied. There is no valid reason for this Court to come to a contrary conclusion.

Munshi, for the respondent:—Gangava v. Sayava is distinguishable, the point there arising under another section altogether. It is further very doubtful whether that case was rightly decided. See the Madras case of Narasimha Nayanevaru v. Ramalingama Rao. Its authority is further shaken by Fattechand Anandram v. Umaji. In Abdool Hoosein v. Goolam Hoosein the matter had passed beyond the stage of acceptance the registration fee having been paid and a commission issued to take evidence. Too much weight should not be attached to the observations at page 313, as they were really obiter, the Court in fact holding that, as the property there referred to was not immoveable property, section 21 did not apply and the discretion of the Registering Officer was not in question. [Sah Mukhun Lall Panday v. Sah Koondun Lall was also referred to.]

As to the description of the property being sufficient, the evidence before the lower Court shows that it was so.

Sir Lallubhai Shah, A.C.J:— This is an appeal from the judgment of Mr. Justice Fawcett in a suit brought under section 77 of the Indian Registration Act. The plaintiff filed the suit for an order under section 77 for registration of the document in question, dated October 18, 1922 (Exhibit A). It purports to have been executed by Hussein Abdul Rehman & Co. to Lakhmichand Khetsey. The material portion of that document is in these terms:—

“We have taken from you on rent a godown bearing No. three. The Port Trust number of which is…… in the New Rice Market at Carnac Bunder, Port Trust, Bombay. We have taken the same on rent by fixing the rent thereof at Rs. 601 per month. We are duly to pay you the said rent as accrues due each month. The period in respect of the said godown is fixed to be from the 1st of Kartak Sud and of the Samvat year 1979 to the 30th of Chaitar Vad of the Samvat year 1980 (i.e, from October 21, 1922, to May 3, 1924), i.e, nineteen months including the intercalary month”

Apparently the executant took possession of the godown and remained in possession for some time, but in March 1923 he seems to have given up the idea of retaining it in pursuance of this document. There after the document was presented for registration for the first time on June 7, 1923, after paying the necessary stamp and penalty. The Sub-Registrar on that day made an order refusing registration of the document under section 20 of the Indian Registration Act. He refused to accept it on the ground that the endorsement on the document made after it was executed referring to the cadastral survey number was not signed by the executant but was signed only by the person to whom the document was executed. The ???casons for this order are stated in Exhibit F which show that the document was presented by Lakhmichand Khetsey on payment of penalty under section 25. Lakhmichand Khetsey appealed to the Registrar from this order. The Registrar made the following order on July 26:—

“The order of refusal by the Sub-Registrar is not proper under the section, and I therefore set it aside.”

The document came again before the Sub-Registrar who made an order on August 13, 1923, refusing registration of the deed under section 21 of the Indian Registration Act. In that order also the Sub-Registrar refers to the fact that “the schedule of the property subsequently added is not signed by the executant and has no binding effect on the contract”. The said Lakhmichand Khetsey again appealed to the Registrar who made the following order on September 25:—

“In the present case the Sub-Registrar has exercised his discretion given to him by section 21 of the Registration Act and has refused to accept the lease for registration. I cannot therefore, interfere with the order of refusal.”

I have taken the substance of these orders from the register kept as required by the Indian Registration Act. The document also is endorsed by the Sub-Registrar on both occasions that “Registration is refused”, as required apparently by section 71 of the Indian Registration Act.

On this refusal of the Registrar to interfere with the order of the Sub-Registrar the present suit was filed on October 26, 1923. The defendants, who are the executants of the document, raised two pleas by way of answer to the suit, first, that the suit was not maintainable as it did not fall within the scope of section 77 of the Indian Registration Act; and, secondly, that the description of the property was not sufficient to identify it within the meaning of section 21 of the Indian Registration Act.

The learned trial Judge dealt with the first issue in his judgment, dated December 20, 1923, and held that the suit was maintainable. After that on January 21, 1924, the learned Judge on a consideration of the evidence came to the conclusion on the second question that the description was sufficient to identify the property, and directed registration of the document on the basis of that conclusion.

The defendants have appealed from this decree, and the same two points have been argued in support of this appeal. The first question, therefore, that we have to consider is whether the suit is maintainable under section 77 of the Indian Registration Act. It is urged that it is not maintainable because under section 21 what the Sub-Registrar and the Registrar have in effect done, is, not to have refused registration, but to have refused to accept the document for registration, and that where that is the nature of the order passed by the Sub-Registrar and the Registrar, the suit is not within the scope of section 77, In support of this contention reliance is placed upon the decision in Gangava v. Sayava and the observations of Mr. Justice Chandavarkar, in Abdool Hoosein v. Goolam Hoosein. On behalf of the respondent it is urged that this case does not fall under section 25, corresponding to section 24; of the Indian Registration Act of 1877, under which the case of Gangava v. Sayava was decided, that for the purposes of section 77 really there is no difference between refusal to accept for registration and refusal to register a document, that in effect it amounts to a refusal to register the document, and that, therefore, the suit is within the scope of section 77.

After a consideration of the arguments on both sides, we have come to the conclusion that the view taken by the teamed trial Judge on this point is perfectly correct. Under section 77 a party may institute a Suit when the Registrar refuses to order the document to be registered under section 72 or under section 76. Under section 76 it is provided that:—

“Every Registrar refusing… to direct the registration of a document under section 72 or section 75, shall make an order o£ refusal and record the reasons for such order….”

I have omitted to refer to clause (a) in section 76 because it has no application to the facts of the present case. In order to determine whether the Registrar in this case has refused to direct the registration of this document under section 72, we must turn to the wording of section 72 and see whether his order falls under that section. It provides that:—

“Except where the refusal is made on the ground of denial of execution, an appeal shall lie against an order of a Sub-Registrar refusing to admit a document to registration (whether the registration of such document is compulsory or optional) to the Registrar to whom such Sub-Registrar its subordinate.”

In the present case the Sub-Registrar refused registration under section 21. Apparently he did not make the distinction upon which reliance is placed between refusal to accept for registration and refusing to register, at any rate he did not state it, and endorsed the order refusing registration on the document. But whether under section 21 he refused ill fact to accept the document for registration, or refused to register it, it seems to us that the order was appealable under-section 72, because the expression in section 72 is “refusing to admit a document to registration” which, appears to be comprehensive enough to include not only a refusal to register, but a refusal to accept a document for registration. Looking to the words off section 72 the order was appealable and when the Registrar refused to interfere he in effect refused to direct registration under that section.

Turning to the wording of section 2.1 it provides:—

“No non-testamentary document relating to immoveable property shall be accepted for registration unless it contains a description of such property sufficient to identify the same.”

Then there are provisions in that section as to what kind of description should ordinarily be given with respect to houses in towns and other houses and lands. But from the mere fact that a document is not accepted for registration on account of the objection which in the opinion of the Sub-Registrar exists with reference to the description in a given document, it does not follow that there is no refusal to register the document.

As regards the decision in Gangava v. Sayava which was relied upon, it is sufficient to point out that that was a decision, not with reference to an order under section 21, but in respect of an order which was made under section 24 of the Act of 1877, corresponding to section 25 of the present act. There is no decision which goes the length of accepting the distinction which has been relied upon on behalf of the appellant in respect of an order made under section 21. The ratio decidendi in Gangava v. Sayava may lend some support to the contention. But after all it is a decision with reference to section 24, and does not touch the point in the present case. We do not think that in dealing with the point which arises in this case we are bound by this decision.

As regards section 25, which no doubt applies to this case, because the document was not presented for registration within four months from the date of its execution, it is enough to refer to the fact mentioned in the first order of the Sub-Registar that, the penalty was paid and the document was accepted. It does not appear on the record of this case whether the document was sent tip to the Registrar as required by sub-section (2) of section 25 for his directions. Having regard to the fact that this document has been twice before the Sab-Registrar and twice before the Registrar, it must be taken now that the provisions of section 25 were duly complied with, and that the necessary direction was given, or must be taken to have been given, and that the document would have been registered, but for the objection which the Sub-Registrar thought existed under section 21 of the Indian Registration Act. It is not disputed before us that the document must be deemed to have been properly accepted under section 25, That fact itself presents an additional difficulty in the way of the appellant. For instance, if in this case the document has been accepted under section 25, and subsequently for one reason or another registration is refused, even though the order may purport to have been under section 21, the net effect is that the registration is refused. In the present case, we are quite satisfied that the registration was refused tinder section 21, that the order made by the Sub-Registrar was appealable under section 72, and that when the Registrar refused to interfere with that order he in effect refused to direct the registration of the document within the meaning of section 76(2)(6), and that the suit is maintainable under section 77.

The second point as to whether the document contained sufficient description for the purpose of identifying the property is really a question to be determined with reference to the nature and terms of the document and the circumstances of each case. It is not, in my opinion, desirable, nor is it necessary to attempt to define what may be sufficient and what may not be sufficient description of the property. In the preseat case we have the fact that it is a “go-down” which was let to the appellant. It was let for a period of nineteen months, and the document contains not a very full description, but an apparently sufficient description. It appears from the orders passed by the Sub-Registrar, as also from his evidence that he refused registration because the endorsement referring to the cadastral survey number of the land on which this godown was constructed was not signed by the executants. So far the position is perfectly correct. That endorsement is of no use as it is not signed by the executants in determining whether the document contains a sufficient description of the property or not. But the Sab-Registrar seems to have assumed that if the land on which the godown stood was not described by its cadastral survey number the description could not be sufficient within the meaning of section 21. On that point the terms of sections 21 and 22 afford a complete answer. Sub-section (2) of section 21, with which we are concerned, provides that:—

“Houses in towns shall tie describe as situate on the north or other side of the street or road (which should be specified) to which they front, and by their existing and former occupancies, and by their numbers if the houses in such street or road are numbered.”

sub-section (3) of that section relates to other houses and lands, and the essential requirement of section 21, is given in sub-section (1), namely, that the document must contain a description of the property sufficient to identify the same Section 22, provides that:—

“Where it is, in the opinion of the Local Government, practicable to describe houses, not being houses in towns, and lands by reference to a Government map or Survey, the Local-Government may, by rule made under this Act require that such houses and lands as aforesaid shall, for the purposes of section 21, be so described,”

It may be mentioned that the Local Government have made rules under this sub-section which are to be found in the Bombay Government Gazette, Part I, 1910 (Notification No. 6412 of July 18, 1910), p. 1065. The sub-section itself provides, and the rules clearly indicate, that they are applicable to houses not in towns and lands, and it is conceded before us that the rules made by the Local Government under sub-section (1) of section 22 cannot apply to this property, because it is a house in a town with reference to which under sub-section (2) of section 22, Government have no power to make rules and in reference to which no rules have been made. It may be that for the purpose of indexing the property as required by the Indian Registration Act it is desirable, and even necessary to a certain extent, that the cadastral survey numbers of the land on which any particular house stands in the town should be stated in the document. But the provisions of law are clear, and there is no requirement of law that such numbers should be stated in describing houses in towns. sub-section (2) of section 22 provides as follows:—

“Save as otherwise provided by any role made under sub-section (1), failure to comply with the provisions of section 21, sub-section (2) or sub-section (3), shall not disentitle a document to be registered if the description of the property to which it relates is sufficient to identify that property.”

Therefore the whole question is whether the description given in this document, apart from the endorsement, which must be left out of account, is sufficient to identify the property. The nature of the property here, as the learned Judge has rightly held, is that it is a superstructure on land, and the document makes no reference to the land itself. The question is whether the description given in the document is sufficient to identify that superstructure. The learned trial Judge has drawn a distinction between houses and buildings which may or may not be justified for the purpose of sub-section (2) of section 21. We do not consider it necessary to follow that distinction for the purposes of this case. Treating the superstructure to be a house within; the meaning of section the question is whether the house is sufficiently described. Both parties before us have argued the case on the footing that the godown is a house within the meaning Of section 21, and we are prepared to accept that position so far as the decision in this case is concerned. Taking the go-down to be a house, the description in the document, such as it is, appears to be sufficient. The learned Judge, after a careful consideration of the circumstances of the case came to the conclusion that it was sufficient to identify the property and we accept that conclusion.

The result, therefore, is that both the contentions urged in support of this appeal fail. We confirm the decree of the trial Court and dismiss the appeal with costs. We discharge the stay order.

Solicitors for appellant: Madhavji & Co.

Solicitors for respondent: Ardeshir, harmasji Dinshaw & Co.

Appeal dismissed.
K.MCI.K
Indian Registration Act