- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Hari Bakhsh v. Babu Lal
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a decree dated 2 July 1917 of the Chief Court of the Punjab, which had reversed a decree of the District Judge of Delhi dated 15 May 1914 and dismissed the plaintiff's suit for partition. The District Judge had earlier granted the plaintiff the decree he sought. The plaintiff (Hari Bakhsh, a minor, suing by his mother and guardian Musammat Basanti) claimed that he and the defendants (Babu Lal and his son Chait Ram) were surviving male members of a joint Hindu family (Bakkal Aggarwall caste) governed by the Mitakshara school and that certain property was joint family property entitling him to partition and accounts.
The pedigree in the opinion traces descent from Devi Dutt through Jodh Raj to his sons (including Jai Narain and Sanahi Ram). It is admitted that after Jodh Raj's death in 1903, Sanahi Ram and his son separated from Jai Narain and his branch, and a division of family shops then took place (referred to in the opinion as the partition of 1903), allocating specified shops to each branch.
The defendants denied that they and the plaintiff constituted a joint family and raised multiple defenses: they asserted prior separations and partitions (including a claimed partition among Jai Narain's own descendants after 1903), and alleged that Sri Ram had adopted Chait Ram. There were related proceedings (a suit filed 7 August 1909 in Cawnpore by Hari Bakhsh, subsequently returned to proper court on 29 August 1910) and documentary evidence in dispute, including statements attributed to Bishan Dayal (in a will and written statement) and a letter produced as Exhibit D14 (purportedly from Bishan/Bishen Dayal dated 22 February 1909).
At first instance the District Judge found for the plaintiff (15 May 1914). The Chief Court of the Punjab, on appeal (2 July 1917), dismissed the suit; on review the Chief Court varied its decree to grant limited relief to the plaintiff (partition of the Maliwara house and a declaration about the Katra Ashrafi house in favour of the family and as to equal rights between the plaintiff and Babu Lal). The Privy Council (their Lordships) considered the appeal, examined evidentiary questions relating to alleged partitions and documents, and advised that the decree of the Chief Court should be set aside and that the District Judge's decree of 15 May 1914 should be restored and affirmed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the plaintiff and the defendants were surviving male members of a joint Hindu family entitled to partition and accounts in respect of the property claimed by the plaintiff.
- Whether the defendants had proved that, after the 1903 partition between Jai Narain and Sanahi Ram, Jai Narain and his sons (including Bishan Dayal, Sri Ram and Babu Lal) had themselves separated from one another, thereby defeating the plaintiff's claim to a half-share.
- Whether statements made by Bishan Dayal (in his will and in a written statement) and the letter produced as Exhibit D14 were admissible and genuine evidence proving a subsequent partition among Jai Narain's descendants.
- Whether, as a matter of law under the Mitakshara, a separation by implication from a partition between two branches (here Jai Narain and Sanahi Ram) gives rise to an assumed separation among the members of one branch (i.e., whether Jai Narain's separation from Sanahi Ram implied that Jai Narain and his sons ceased to be a joint family unless they proved agreement to continue).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Case
- The plaintiff contended that he and the defendants were surviving male members of a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara and that the property claimed was joint family property; he sought partition and accounts and claimed a half-share of the joint property.
- The plaint was presented on 21 November 1910 by Hari Bakhsh (a minor) through his guardian Musammat Basanti (his mother).
Defendants' Arguments
- The defendants denied joint-family status vis-à-vis the plaintiff and denied that the property was joint family property.
- They alleged that Bishan (Bishan/Biahan) Dayal and his sons formed a separate joint family which, they claimed, had partitioned after 1903.
- They argued that in the partition of 1903, Jai Narain and his branch had taken certain shares and that subsequently Jai Narain and his sons had divided that share among themselves (alleged post-1903 partition between Bishan Dayal on one side and Sri Ram and Babu Lal on the other).
- They relied on statements made by Bishan Dayal (in a will and written statement) and a purported letter of Bishan Dayal (Exhibit D14) to prove the alleged intra-branch partition; they also alleged that Sri Ram had adopted Chait Ram (which, if proved, would affect distribution shares).
- On the burden of proof, the defendants argued on appeal that the onus of proving that Jai Narain and his sons had not separated lay on the plaintiff (i.e., that a presumption of separation should operate), contrary to the trial Judge's allocation of burden.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Balabux Ladhuram v. Rukhmabai (1903) L.R. 30 I.A. 130; 5 Bom. I.R. 469 | There is no presumption that when one co-parcener separates the remaining members remain united; an agreement among remaining members to remain united must be proved like any other fact. | The court distinguished the case on its facts, noting the Board there did not consider whether the surviving member and his descendants would cease to be a joint family; the precedent does not support a legal presumption that a partition between branches creates a separation among the members of one branch. |
| Balkishen Das v. Ram Narain Sahu (1903) L.R. 30 I.A. 139; 5 Bom. L.R. 461 | An ikrarnama allocating defined shares effected a separation in estate; subsequent evidence of common enjoyment did not alter tenure or interests. | The court treated the decision as one where an express agreement effected separation; it did not warrant inferring, as a general rule, that a partition between branches implies intra-branch separation without proof. |
| Jatti v. Banwari Lal (1923) L.R. 50 I.A. 192; 28 Bom. L.R. 1256 | On separation of one member, the remaining members ceased to be co-parceners in that case (the facts showed distinct accounts and division); but that does not imply that if a member had sons they would cease to be co-parceners with their father. | The court used the decision to show that even where separation is found among some members, it does not support a general presumption that a partition between branches necessarily dissolves co-parcenary relations among a branch's father and his sons; the precedent was not viewed as establishing the rule defendants sought. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in stages, addressing evidentiary findings first, then the legal question of presumption of separation under Mitakshara law.
-
Findings on particular defenses and evidentiary weight:
- The District Judge's finding on the fourth issue (that there was no proof of the alleged partition between Bishan Dayal and his sons after 1903) was accepted by their Lordships as conclusive in the absence of any successful challenge in the appeal.
- The alleged adoption of Chait Ram by Sri Ram was not proved; both the District Judge and the Chief Court had concurred in this finding, and the Privy Council accepted the concurrent conclusion.
-
Documentary evidence attributed to Bishan Dayal:
- The court examined statements of Bishan Dayal contained in his will and in a written statement (filed in 1909 proceedings). The Privy Council held that those statements, made when Bishan Dayal was an interested party taking a position adverse to Hari Bakhsh, "cannot be regarded as evidence in this suit and are inadmissible" for the defendants' purpose in this suit.
- The single important non-objectionable document put forward by the defendants was Exhibit D14, a letter purporting to be from Bishan Dayal dated "Phagan Sudi 2, Sambat 1965" (22 February 1909) describing a separation on 20 June 1903. The court scrutinised its provenance: only the defendant Babu Lal asserted it was Bishan Dayal's handwriting; witnesses to the letter did not speak to its execution in Bishan Dayal's presence; it had not been filed or produced in earlier Cawnpore proceedings despite an order to file documents; the defendants' pleader (Anand Sarup) who apparently had it was not called to explain non-production.
- The District Judge found Exhibit D14 to be a forgery; the Chief Court found it genuine. After careful consideration the Privy Council concluded Exhibit D14 was not genuine and had been manufactured for use at the Delhi trial, and therefore excluded it.
-
Consequence of excluding contested materials:
- With Bishan Dayal's will-statements and Exhibit D14 excluded, the court found there was no documentary proof that Bishan Dayal and his brothers had separated, and that the remaining evidence was equally consistent with either separation or non-separation.
- Their Lordships accepted the District Judge's factual finding that the brothers had not separated, because the defendants had not proved the alleged intra-branch partition.
-
Legal question on presumptions under Mitakshara:
- The court then considered the defendants' submission that, as a matter of law under Mitakshara, the 1903 separation between Jai Narain and Sanahi Ram should be taken to have carried by implication a separation between Jai Narain and his sons unless the plaintiff proved continued unity.
- Their Lordships analyzed the cited authorities (Balabux Ladhuram v. Rukhmabai; Balkishen Das v. Ram Narain Sahu; Jatti v. Banwari Lal) and distinguished them on their facts. They concluded that none of these decisions supports the broad proposition that a partition between branches creates, by implication of law, a separation among the members of a branch (i.e., between a father and his sons) without specific proof.
- The court emphasized the need to examine the facts and points decided in each precedent rather than to extract a general presumption that would introduce a novel principle into Mitakshara joint-family law. They declined to adopt the defendants' proposed presumption as novel and unsupported by authority.
-
Final evaluative step:
- Having found no admissible evidence proving the alleged post-1903 partition among Jai Narain's descendants, and having rejected the defendants' legal presumption argument, their Lordships concluded the District Judge's finding of no separation was correct and should stand.
Holding and Implications
The Privy Council advised that the decree of the Chief Court of the Punjab should be set aside and that the decree of the District Judge of Delhi dated 15 May 1914 should be restored and affirmed.
Implications and immediate effects:
- The plaintiff's original decree for partition (as granted by the District Judge) is restored and remains effective as between the parties.
- The defendants (respondents) were ordered to pay the costs of this appeal and the costs of the appeal to the Chief Court.
- The court expressly refused to introduce a new legal presumption that a partition between branches necessarily implies a separation among members of one branch; the decision therefore affirms the need for fact-specific proof of intra-branch separation and does not set a broad new precedent altering principles of Mitakshara law.
Note: This summary confines itself strictly to the facts, findings, arguments, authorities, and conclusions contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond the text.
1. This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a decree, dated July 2, 1917, of the Chief Court of the Punjab, which reversed a decree, dated May 15, 1914, of the District Judge of Delhi, and dismissed the suit. The suit is for the partition of property alleged by the plaintiff to be joint property of the parties.
2. The parties are Hindus of the Bakkal Aggarwall caste and are subject to the law of the Mitakshara. The following-pedigree shows how the parties are related to each other:--
Devi Dutt = Jodh Raj = Died in 1903 1st wife = Jai Narain = 2nd wife. Sanahi Ram = Died 29th January, 1906.
"4. The plaint in this suit, dated November, 21, 1910, was presented to the Court of the District Judge of Delhi by Hari Bakhsh, a minor, by his guardian and next freind, Musammat Basanti, who is his mother. The defendants to the suit are Babu Lal and his son, Chait Ram"
5. The case of the plaintiff was that he and the defendants are the surviving male members of a joint Hindu family possessed of joint, property, to a half-share of which he claimed to be entitled on partition, and he claimed to be entitled to a decree for partition and for accounts, and other reliefs. The District Judge of Delhi gave the plaintiff the decree which he claimed. The Chief Court of the Punjab, on July 2, 1917, in appeal, dismissed the suit. On an application for review the Chief Court varied its decree dismissing the suit by granting the plaintiff a decree for partition of the Maliwara house and a declaration that the Katra Ashrafi house at Delhi is the property of the family, and that the plaintiff has equal rights in it with the defendant, Babu Lal. To the application for review the two defendants were respondents, and it does not appear why the declaration was not made against Chait Ram as well as against Babu Lal.
6. The case of the defendants was a denial that they and the plaintiff were members of a joint family, and a denial that the property which the plaintiff claimed to have partitioned was joint family property. Several defences were set up. The defendants alleged that Biahan Dayal and his sons formed a, separate joint family, and that they, after 1903, had separated from each other and had partitioned the property to which they were entitled; they further alleged that Sri Ram had adopted Chait Ram as his son. Their Lordships will at once deal with these allegations before proceeding to consider what was the main and substantial defence, if proved, to the suit, which was that in a separation and partition of 1903, in which Jai Narain and his branch had separated from Sanahi Ram and his branch, Jai Narain and his sons had between themselves separated, and he had partitioned between his son Bishan Dayal on the one side and his sons Sri Ram and Babu Lal on the other side the property which had fallen to him, Jai Narain, and his branch in the partition with Sanahi Lal.
7. The District Judge found that there was absolutely no proof of the alleged partition between Bishan Dayal and his sons after 1903. It was the fourth issue framed by the District Judge. It is not clear that that issue was discussed or considered in the appeal to the Chief Court, but in this appeal nothing was said to suggest that the finding of the District Judge on the fourth issue was wrong, and their Lordships consider that the finding of the District Judge may be accepted as conclusive that there was no separation or partition between Biahan Dayal and his sons after 1903 or at any time,
8. The object of alleging that Chait Ram had been adoptod by Sri Ram is obvious. If that adoption had been proved the plaintiff could not in any event have been entitled on a partition to one-half of the property in question in this suit, or to more than one-third of it, and the defendants would between them have been entitled to two-thirds of it. The District Judge and the Chief Court concurred in finding that the alleged adoption was not proved, Such an adoption by a brother of the only son of his brother would be most unusual, and their lordship's accept that concurrent finding as correct.
9. The first common ancestor of the parties shown in the pedigree is Devi Dutt. He, with his son, Jodh Raj, carried on business as merchants at Basan, in the State of Jaipur. Jodh Raj removed from Basan to Delhi, and at Delhi he and his sons carried on business as cloth merchants They had also branch shops at Calcutta and at Cawnpore. In 1903 the shops which belonged to the joint family, then consisting of Jodh Raj, his sons and grandsons, were known as: (1) Jodh Raj Narain, at Delhi; (2) Jai Narain Khemka, at Delhi; (3) Sri Ram-Ram Lal, in which a stranger was a partner, at Delhi; (4) Murli Dhar Deoki Nandan, in which strangers were partners, at Delhi; (5) Jodh Raj Sanahi Ram, at Calcutta; and (6) Jai Narain Sanahi Ram, at Cawnpoe.
10. It is an admitted fact that at the time when Jodh Raj died in 1903, Jodh Raj, his sons Jai Narain and Sauahi Ram, and their respective descendants constituted a joint Hindu family possessed of the joint property already mentioned. It is also an admitted fact that in 1903, after Jodh Raj had died, Sanahi Ram and his son separated from Jai Narain and his descendants, and that on that separation the: then joint property of the family at Delhi, Calcutta, and Cawnpore was partitioned between the two branches into which the joint family had separated, and that in that partition, which will hereafter be referred to as the partition of 1903, the shops (1), (2) and (3) above mentioned fell to Sanahi Bam and his branch, and the shops (4), (5) and (6) fell to Jai Narain and his branch.
11. The case of the defendants is that in the partition of 1903 Jai Narain and his sons also separated from each other and ceased to constitute a joint family. The District Judge held that the onus of proving that Jai Narain and his sons had separated from each other was upon the defendants, who alleged it. It has been argued on behalf of the defendants before their Lordships in this appeal that the onus of proving that Jai Narain and his sons had separated was not upon the defendants, and that it was for the plaintiff to prove that they had not separated. Their Lordships will presently express their opinion on that question, but they will first consider whether the evidence which was before the District Judge and the Chief Court proves or does not prove that Jai Narain and his sons separated, and for that purpose it is necessary to state some facts which have not so far been referred to by them.
12. Bishan Dayal lived in Cawnpore and had been in charge of and had managed the shop there. Bishan Dayal married twice, and after his second marriage he and his daughter-in law, Musammat Basanti, had quarrelled and he offered, through her brother, Rs. 30,000 as an inducement to her to hand over to him the custody of his grandson, Hari Bakhsh, the plaintiff. That offer was refused, and Bishan Dayal determined to oppose a claim which Musammat Basanti was making on behalf of her son, Hari Bakhsh, for the partition of the property now in re question in this suit. On August 7, 1909, a suit was instituted in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Cawnpore on behalf of Hari Bakhsh by his mother, Musammat Basanti, against Babu Lal, his son Chait Ram, and Bishan Dayal for the partition of the property now in question in this suit. Subsequently Musammat Basanti was added as a plaintiff in that suit, and Musammat Sarasuti, the widow of Sri Ram, and Musammat Indri, the widow of Brij Mohan, were added as defendants. The Additional Subordinate Judge of Cawnpore, before whom that suit was, on April 15, 1910, framed the issues for trial and ordered that the parties should file all their documents on that day. The Additional Subordinate Judge probably considered the evidence which the parties had brought before him, and having come to a conclusion that the Court of the Subordinate Judge had not jurisdiction to hear and determine that suit for partition, he, on August 29, 1910, returned the plaint to be presented in the proper Court. It is not now necessary for their lordships to consider whether the Additional Subordinate Judge had or had not jurisdiction to hear and determine that suit. They refer to it with an object which will presently appear.
13. As has been already mentioned, Bishan Dayal was a defendant to the suit for partition which was brought in the Court of Cawnpore on August 7, 1909. He made his will on November 2ft, 1909, and in it stated that in Sambat 1960, his step-brothers, Sri Ram and Babu Lal, had separated from him In that suit of 1909 Bishan Dayal filed a written statement on November 30, 1909, in which he alleged that Jai Narain in the partition of 1903 had divided the property which had fallen to his share between him, Bishan Dayal, on the one side and Sri Ram and Babu Lal on the other side. Bishan Dayal died on December 5, 1909. On the part of the defendants, it has been contended in this appeal that the statements of Bishan Dayal in his will and written statement, above mentioned, are admissible in evidence in this suit as against the plaintiff, and prove that Sri Ram and Babu Lal had separated in 1903 from Bishan Dayal, that the family then ceased to be a joint family, and that the share of the joint family which fell to Jai Narain and his descendants in the partition of 1903 was partitioned between Bishan Dayal on the one side and Sri Ram and Babu Lal on the other It appears to their lordships that these statements of Babu Lal, who was then an interested party in the disputes and was then taking a position adverse to Hari Bakhsh, cannot be regarded as evidence in this suit and are inadmissible.
14. Excluding from consideration the statements of Bishan Dayal in his will and written statements, the only admissible evidence not open to objection and not ambiguous and inconclusive is, if genuine, a letter which purports to have been written by Bishan Dayal to his brother Babu Lal, dated "Phagan Sudi 2, Sambat 1965" (February 22, 1909), which was for the first time produced by the defendant Babu Lal on October, 14, 1911. That letter (Exhibit D 14) as translated is as follows:--
Compliments from Bishan Dial to Sri Ram-Babu Lal.
Jai Narain in your presence separated us, the three brothers, on Asarh Badi 10, Sambat 1960. The whole work of Delhi remained with you, the two brothers, and the work at Cawnpore fell to my lot. This partition was effected by Jai Narain. We, the three brothers, agreed to his settlement and do not object to it. But the account of Sambat 1960 is not yet settled. Whatever is due under that account will be paid by you, the two brothers. I have nothing to do with it. The property situate at Basan and the houses in Delhi will remain joint. We of our own accord have written this. No one can object to it.
Dated Phagan Sudi 2, Sambat 1965.
What is written above is correct.
"(Sd.) BISHEN DIAL.
"(In Hindi characters.) "Witnessed by--
"CHHOTE LAL, Khemka.
"(In Hindi characters.) "Witnessed by--
"GANGA RAM, Bhob.
"(In Hindi characters.) "Witnessed by--
"SUNDER MAL, Khemka.
"(In Hindi characters.) "Witnessed by--
"HARI HAM, Kanodia.
"(IN Hindi characters.) "Witnessed by -
"SHEO NARAIN.
"(In Hindi characters.)
15. Their Lordships are informed by counsel engaged in this appeal that Asarh Badi 10, Sambat 1960, was June 20, 1903.
16. The only witness at the trial who said that the letter was in the writing of Bishan Dayal was the defendant, Babu Lal. The only witnesses of the five to the letter who spoke to it at the trial were Chota Lal, Hari Ram and Sheo Narain, and not one of them said that it was written or executed in his presence. Sheo Narain in his evidence at the trial said that Bishan Dayal told him that it was a farkhati--that is, a release. At the trial before the District Judge Babu Lal said as to it (Exhibit D 14):--
The release to which (I) certified yesterday was with me. I have given it (I gave it) to my pleader, Anand Sarup for production (at the trial at Cawnpore). They said they would produce it when necessary I cannot say if they produced it or not. After the close of the case I got back the release from my pleader.
17. Anand Sarup was the defendants' pleader at the hearing of the suit before the Additional Subordinate Judge at Cawnpore. Exhibit D 14 was, if a genuine letter, one which should have been filed on behalf of the defendants in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Cawnpore on April 15, 1910, in obedience to his order of that date. It was, if genuine, a most important document--in fact, the most important document for their case. It never was filed or produced at the trial before the Additional Subordinate Judge. If it was in the possession of Anand Sarup at any time, he should have been called as a witness at the trial before the District Judge of Delhi to speak to the fact and to explain why it was not filed or produced in the Court of the Additional Subordinate Judge. He was not called as a witness before the District Judge of Delhi and no explanation of his absence was offered. The District Judge found, as a fact, that Exhibit D 14 was a forgery, The Chief Court, on the contrary, held that Exhibit D 14 was a genuine document executed by Bishan Dayal. Their Lordships, after a careful consideration, find that Exhibit D 14 is not a genuine document, and was manufactured for the purpose of being used in evidence at the trial before the District Judge of Delhi.
18. Excluding Exhibit D 14 and the statements in the will and Written statement of Bishan Dayal, which have been already mentioned, from evidence which can be considered in this suit, there is no documentary evidence which proves either that Bishan Dayal and his brothers, Sri Ram and Babu Lal, had or had not separated. The learned and able counsel engaged in this appeal have been compelled to admit that fact, and that all the other evidence in the suit is as consistent with the brothers never having separated as with the brothers having separated. The District Judge found that the brothers had not separated; The Chief Court, which treated Exhibit D 14 as evidence, found that they had separated Their lordships agree with the District Judge that it is not proved that the brothers ever did separate.
19. It remains to be considered whether on the separation and partition between Jai Narain and his brother Sanahi Ram in 1903, it is to be presumed, unless the contrary is proved by the plaintiff, that Jai Narain and his sons, Bishan Dayal, Sri Ram and Babulal, and Jai Narain's grandsons, Brij Mohan and Murli Dhar, all of whom had then been born and were then living, ceased to be amongst themselves members of a Hindu joint family consisting of Jai Narain and his descendants then living. It must be remembered that they were Hindus governed by the law of the Mitakshara, and that each of them had on his birth become a co-parcener in any ancestral property which had come to Jai Narain. The share which Jai Narain took as the share of him and his branch on his separation from his brother, Sanahi Ram, was ancestral property.
20. It has been contended in this case on behalf of the defendants that the effect of the separation and partition between Jai Narain and his brother Sanahi Ram, in 1903, after the death of their father, Jodh Raj, was to cause, by implication of law, a separation between Jai Narain and his descendants and to make them cease to constitute amongst themselves a joint family unless it was proved that they had agreed to continue to be a joint Hindu family, and it was contended on behalf of the defendants that that proposition is to be inferred from the decisions of the Board in Balabux Ladhuram v. Rukhmabai (1903) L.R. 30 I.A. 130; 5 Bom. I.R. 469; Balkishen Das v. Ram Narain Sahu (1903) L.R. 30 I.A. 139; 5 Bom. L.R. 461; and Jatti v. Banwari Lal (1923) L.R. 50 I.A. 192; 28 Bom. L.R. 1256. It appears to their lordships that the proposition contended for is a proposition which cannot reasonably be inferred from the decisions of the Board or any of them which have been cited. To understand and apply a decision of the Board or of any Court it is necessary to see what were the facts of the case, in which the decision was given, and what was the point which had to be decided. In Balabux Ladhuram v. Rukhmabai it appears that three Hindu brothers, Girdhari Lall, Kunyaram and Ladhuram, owned a shop which had been founded by their father, and that in 1869 or 1870 Kunyaram separated from his brothers, took out his "share, amounting to to about Rs. 11,000, and started a shop of his own. In that case Lord Davey, in delivering the judgment of the Board, said (p.472):--
It appears to their Lordships that there is no presumption, when one co-parcener separates from the others, that the latter remain united. . . . Their Lordships think that an agreement amongst the remaining members of a joint family to remain united or to re-unite must be proved like any other fact.
21. The remaining member of the joint family in that case were the brothers, Girdhari Lall and Ladhuram. The Board was not considering, and had not to consider, whether, if Girdhari Lall, for example, had sons living when Kunyaram separated from his brothers, Girdhari Lall and his sons would cease to be as between themselves a joint family. That was not the case and did not arise in the case before the Board.
22. In Balkishen Das v. Ram Narain Sahu the four members of a Hindu joint family, who were cousins, entered into an ikrarnama which stated that defined shares in the whole estate of the joint family had been allotted to the several co-parceners. It was there held that the agreement defining the shares effected a separation in estate, and that evidence of some of the coparceners having continued to enjoy their shares in common would not affect their tenure of their property or their interest in it.
23. In Jatti v. Banwari Lal four Hindu brothers who were living as a joint Hindu family executed a deed by which the assets of the family were described and divided between them, and one of the four brothers, Ishar Das, was finally paid out, and thereafter the business was carried on by the three remaining brothers, to whose separate accounts the profits of the business were carried in equal shares. In that case Lord Dunedin in delivering the judgment of the Board, after quoting the passage above set out from Lord Davey's judgment, approved of and adopted the statement of the trial Judge in the said suit, who said (p. 1258):--
There is absolutely no material on the file from which it can be inferred that the three brothers continued united or re-united as co-parcenary members of a joint Hindu family, while defendants' own books show the contrary. ... I have therefore not the last hesitation in finding that on the separation of Ishar Das the family of the parties ceased to be a joint Hindu family in the strictest sense of the term; or, in other words, its members ceased to be co parceners.
24. The members ceased to be co-parceners of each other, but it is not suggested that if one of those members happened to have had sons who were his co-parceners when Ishar Daw separated from his brothers, such sons and their father would cease to be co-parceners constituting together joint and undivided family.
25. If their lordships were to hold in this case that it is to be presumed in law that the separation and partition effected in 1903 by Jai Narain and his brother, Sanahi Ram, involved necessarily a separation between Jai Narain and his sons, their lordships would, it appears to them, be introducing a novel principle into the law of joint Hindu families governed by the law of the Mitakshara, for' which, no authority has been brought to the attention of their lordships.
26. In conclusion, their lordships find that Jai Narain and his sons did not separate, that no separation between Bishan Dayal and his brothers, Sri Earn and Babu Lal, or between any of them, has been proved, and they will humbly advise His Majesty that the decree of the Chief Court of the Punjab should be set aside, and the decree of the District Judge of Delhi of May 15, 1914, should be restored and affirmed. The defendants (respondents) must pay the costs of this appeal and of the appeal to the Chief Court.
Alert