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Shantaram Balkrishna v. Waman Gopal Wadekar

Bombay High Court
Aug 9, 1922
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Judgment Summary — Shah, A.C.J. & Crump, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This dispute arises out of land originally owned by Balkrishna and divided by partition among his four sons in 1916 into four plots marked A (Shantaram), B (Vasantrao), C (Janardan) and D (Shivshankar), with a strip of land reserved as a common passage (marked EFHG and related points on the plan).

Subsequent conveyances: on 19 September 1916 Janardan transferred plot C to the present plaintiffs; on 28 September 1916 Shivshankar transferred plot D to the first plaintiff on behalf of both plaintiffs. On 18 June 1919 Vasantrao conveyed plot B, including his interest in the common passage, to Bhagwandas Tapidas (original defendant No. 2). Bhagwandas later conveyed, on 22 August 1919, to the plaintiffs his interest in a small strip OPJL and his right, title and interest in the portion of the common passage marked EFML.

Prior to the last conveyance, the plaintiffs (owners of C and D) had built so as to encroach on the common passage. A suit by Shantaram and Vasantrao resulted in a decree dated 6 August 1918 ordering the plaintiffs to remove the encroachments. In September 1919 the plaintiffs filed the present suit seeking partition of the land described as the common passage so that they would become absolute owners of the southern portion (EFML) and certain other adjustments among co-owners, effectively making the plaintiffs absolute owners of the southern half of the passage.

The trial Judge found for the plaintiffs and directed partition substantially as prayed. The defendants appealed. The appellate court allowed the appeal, discharged the trial Court's decree and dismissed the plaintiffs' suit with costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a strip of land reserved as a common passage at the time of an earlier partition (1916) can now be partitioned so as to make certain co-owners absolute owners of a portion of that passage.
  2. Whether the special rule of Hindu law (as stated in Mitakshara/Manusmriti and related commentaries) that a "common way" is indivisible applies to the passage in question and thus bars the plaintiffs' claim for partition.
  3. Whether, independently of Hindu law, the plaintiff's proposed form of partition (which effectively deprives other co-owners of their practical interest) is permissible in law, and whether the trial Court had jurisdiction to order such a partition in light of the prior partition decree.
  4. As pleaded in issues at trial: (a) whether the portion EFML is of no use to defendants; and (b) whether the plaintiff is entitled to the partition claimed.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant / Defendant No. 1 (owner of plot A) — principal objections

  • Contended that the plaintiffs' suit was an attempt to evade the earlier decree ordering removal of encroachments and to secure a partition that would in effect deprive defendant No. 1 of his co-ownership rights in the common passage.
  • Objected to compelling co-owners to surrender rights previously awarded to them by the 1916 partition decree.

Plaintiffs' arguments

  • Relied on the general rule that a co-owner may seek partition of co-owned land at will.
  • Argued practical distinctions between the right of passage (an easement) and ownership of the soil — attempting to show that some parts could be made absolute owners while preserving passage rights for others.
  • Suggested that the southern owners (plots C and D) had a greater practical interest because the southern end of the passage was closed by a wall and they had less alternative access.

Other respondents (defendant No. 2 / Dwarkadas and defendant No. 3)

  • Resisted the plaintiffs' claim; specific defenses were pleaded though the opinion states it is not necessary to detail them for the purposes of the appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent / Authority Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mitakshara (Chapter I, section iv) Contains the rule (in a section on "Effects not liable to partition") that certain things, including the "common way", are not liable to partition. The court relied on Mitakshara's treatment of "common way" as indivisible and held that the land reserved as common passage at the 1916 partition falls within that rule and is not divisible.
Manusmriti (as quoted — verse cited by Mitakshara and commentators) Manu's enumeration that "the common way" is not liable to distribution (Manu passages quoted in the opinion). The court cited the Manu passages (paragraphs 16 and 25 as reproduced in the Mitakshara commentary) as supporting the indivisibility of common ways.
Vijnaneshwara (commentary cited in Mitakshara — paragraph interpreting "common way") Expresses the opinion that "the common way, or road of ingress and egress ... is also indivisible". The court treated Vijnaneshwara's interpretation, as reproduced in the Mitakshara, as authoritative on the meaning of "common way" and thus binding in application to the facts.
Vyavahara Mayukha (Nilkantha's reference) Also refers to the indivisibility of the common way and accepts both meanings of the word "prachara" (pasture or common way) in context. The court relied on Vyavahara Mayukha's acceptance of the "common way" meaning as corroborating the Mitakshara interpretation; this supported the conclusion that the passage is indivisible.
Mandlik's Hindu Law (textual reference regarding "prachara") Explains the term "prachara" as "way to the house, or the like, as also a pasture-ground for cattle, &c". The court used this commentary to address alternative translations of the term and to justify applying the Mitakshara interpretation (common way) to the passage in question.
Nathubhai Dhirajram v. Bai Hansgavri (case cited) Referred to as an instance where the "common way" rule was applied under different facts; cited to show the rule is not obsolete. The court cited this case to demonstrate that the rule that a common way is indivisible remains a living rule of Hindu law and is capable of application; the court distinguished circumstances but relied on its continued relevance.
Sacred Books of the East (Vol. XXV — translation note) Translation note indicating an alternative rendering of "prachara" as "pasture ground"; acknowledged by the court. The court acknowledged this alternative interpretation but concluded that Mitakshara's interpretation (common way) is binding for the parties and the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in two principal strands: (1) application of the rule of Hindu law that a "common way" is indivisible; and (2) the consequence of the prior partition decree reserving the passage as common.

On the Hindu law point (Shah, A.C.J.): the court identified and quoted the relevant passages in the Mitakshara (which reproduces and comments upon Manu). The passages state that items like the "common way" are exempt from partition, and Vijnaneshwara's commentary expressly describes the common way (road of ingress and egress) as indivisible. The court discussed the lexical issue over the word "prachara" (sometimes translated as "pasture ground" in other sources), but concluded that for purposes of the Mitakshara and Vyavahara Mayukha — authorities binding on the parties — the term is interpreted as "common way". On that basis the court held that land reserved as a common passage at the 1916 partition must be treated as indivisible.

The court considered and rejected the plaintiffs' practical and policy arguments: that modern urban conditions (Bombay) or the fact the southern end was closed by a wall made the rule inapplicable; and the plaintiffs' argument distinguishing ownership of the soil from an easement/right of passage. The Chief Justice found these do not overcome the plain rule of Hindu law or the clear description of the land throughout as "common passage."

The court additionally observed that even setting Hindu law aside, the plaintiffs' proposed partition would have the practical effect of depriving other co-owners of rights that had been fixed by the prior partition; the earlier partition decree of 1916 having reserved the land as a common passage, it could not be reopened. Crump, J.'s concurring reasoning emphasized that the earlier partition was a complete partition, not shown to be erroneous or partial, and therefore the trial court lacked jurisdiction to reopen that matter. Both judges also noted the plaintiffs' motive — an apparent attempt to circumvent the 1918 decree ordering removal of encroachments — which weighed against permitting the extraordinary partition sought.

The trial Judge's basis for ordering partition (that the passage was "absolutely useless" to some proprietors and therefore partition was fit) was characterized by the appellate judges as a convenience-based rationale rather than one grounded in applicable law.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appellate court ALLOWED THE APPEAL, discharged the decree of the trial Court and dismissed the plaintiffs' suit with costs throughout.

Implications and direct consequences:

  • The plaintiffs' claim for partition of the land described as the common passage was rejected on the ground that such a "common way" is indivisible under the rule of Hindu law (as set out in Mitakshara/Manu and related commentaries) and because the earlier partition decree reserved the passage as common and could not be reopened.
  • The immediate effect is that the status quo established by the 1916 partition (the passage remaining common) stands; the trial Court's order effecting the partition is set aside.
  • The court applied established principles of Hindu law and the prior partition decree to the facts; the judgment does not purport to create a new legal principle beyond the application of those existing rules. (The opinion notes the rule is not obsolete and is capable of application; it also observes that a suit of this precise nature appears uncommon.)

Attorneys appearing as recorded in the opinion: for appellant — Messrs. Little & Co.; for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 — Messrs. Amin & Desai; for respondents Nos. 3 and 4 — Messrs. Little & Co.

Disposition: Appeal allowed.

Show all summary ...

Shah, A.C.J:— The facts which have given rise to this appeal are briefly these. A plot of ground, which is shown in the plan, was originally owned by one Balkrishna. He left four sons, Shantaram, Vasantrao, Janardan and Shivshankar, and at a partition which was effected among the four brothers in the year 1916, this plot was divided into four parts. The plot marked A in the plan fell to the share of Shantaram, the plot marked B was assigned to Vasantrao, the plot marked C was assigned to Janardan and the plot marked D was assigned to Shivshankar. There was a common passage left which is shown in the plan and which is marked E F H G. There is no special provision in the decree based upon the award relating to the partition, but it appears from the descriptions of the various plots given in the Schedules that the said land was reserved for the common passage. On September 19, 1916, Janardan conveyed his interest in the plot 0 to the present plaintiffs, and on September 28, 1916, Shivshankar conveyed his interest in the plot D to the first plaintiff on behalf of both the plaintiffs. On June 18, 1919, Vasantrao conveyed the plot B including his right, title and interest in the strip of land called the common passage to Bhagwandas Tapidas, the original defendant No. 2.

It appears that before the date of this last conveyance the present plaintiffs who had become owners of plots C and D built in such a manner as to make some encroachments upon the common passage which are shown in the plan, and a suit was filed by Shantaram and Vasantrao for the removal of those encroachments. In that suit a decree was passed on August 6, 1918, against the present plaintiffs. A copy of that decree was annexed to the plaint but has not been formally put in as an Exhibit. In the course of the argument the decree has been referred to, subject to the appellant putting in a certified copy of the decree as an Exhibit. The result of this decree was that the plaintiffs were required to remove the encroachments which they had made on this common passage.

Then on August 22, 1919, the said Bhagvandas conveyed in favour of the plaintiffs his interest in the small strip of land forming part of the plot B in the south marked OPJL, and his right, title and interest in the portion of the common passage between the plots C and D and marked EFML. In virtue of these conveyances at the date of the present suit, which was filed in September, 1919, the plaintiffs had become owners of the plots C and D, and it may be taken for the purpose of this appeal that they had become owners of ¾ of the interest in that portion of the common passage which is marked EFML, and were interested along with the owners of plots A and B as co-owners in the remaining portion of the land described as common passage, namely LMHG. I may add that the common passage joins the main road at its northern end and is closed by a wall of the adjoining premises at its southern end. As a passage it ends at the line EF. The present suit was filed with a view to seek partition of the land which has been described as common passage, and the prayer was to secure the result — that the partition should be so effected as to make the owners of plots C and D absolute owners of the portion of the passage EFML; to assign the absolute interest in the soil of that part of LMHG towards the line MH so far as the owner of the plot A was concerned, which would represent ¼th of the whole area of this passage, to the first defendant; and to allow to the owner of plot B the absolute interest in the soil of that portion of LMHG towards the line LG to the extent of ¼th interest in, that part of the passage which is marked LMHG. The intermediate narrow strip which would be very small was to remain the absolute property of the owners of the plots C and D with the right of passage in favour of the plaintiffs over the whole of the land marked LMHG subject to such compensation being paid to the owners of plots A and B as the Court might think proper. This would make the plaintiffs the absolute owners of the southern half of the passage, while the remaining half would remain exactly as it was at the date of the suit for the benefit of all the four owners.

During the course of the suit there were various amendments made from time to time which it is not necessary to detail for the purposes of this appeal. The objection taken by defendant No. 1, who is the owner of plot A, was that this was really an attempt to get rid of the clear effect of the decree against the plaintiffs for the removal of the encroachments, and to secure a partition, which in effect would deprive the 1st defendant compulsorily of such right of ownership as he had in the whole of this common passage as a co-owner. Defendant No. 2, Dwarkadas, who purchased the interest of the original defendant No. 2, Bhagvandas, in the plot B, as also defendant No. 3, the original owner of the plot D, resisted the plaintiffs' claim. I need not detail the various defences; but five issues were raised on the pleadings. The first issue is whether the portion of the passage marked EFML is of no use to the defendants as alleged in the plaint, and the other material issue which I need note is the third issue whether the plaintiff is entitled to partition as claimed. The learned trial Judge found in favour of the plaintiffs, and made the following observations:—

“Having regard to all the considerations in the case and having seen the passage this afternoon I am fully convinced that the passage between LM and of is absolutely useless to the proprietors of plots A and B, and this passage was kept open only for the purpose of giving access to the owners of plots C and D as they had no other access except through this passage. I think it is fit that this partition should be ordered and special directions should be given to the Commissioner”.

The learned Judge gave directions as to partition practically as prayed for.

In the appeal the principal point argued is whether the partition of this narrow strip of land, which was reserved at the time of the partition in 1916 as common passage, can be allowed. In the course of the argument a further point that arose in connection with this question was whether as a matter of law such a claim for partition of the common passage was maintainable in view of the rule of Hindu law, by which the parties are governed, that common passages are indivisible.

I shall first deal with the question as to whether in view of the special rule of Hindu law, which undoubtedly is applicable to the parties to this suit, the claim for partition is maintainable. I am of opinion that it is not. The rule to which I refer is to be found in the Mitakshara, Chapter I, section iv, (Stokes' Hindu Law Books, pp. 384, 387 and 389). That section relates to “Effects not liable to partition” and the relevant passages in that section are to be found in paragraphs 16 and 25 which are as follows:—

“16. Other things exempt from partition, have been enumerated by Manu; Clothes, vehicles, ornaments, prepared food, women, sacrifices and pious acts, as well as the common way, are declared not liable to distribution”.

Then the commentator proceeds to deal with each of these items, and the opinion expressed by Vijnaneshwara as to “common way” is to be found in paragraph 25 which is as follows:—

“The common way, or road of ingress and egress to and from the house, garden, or the like, is also indivisible”.

The same rule is referred to by Nilkantha in the Vyavahara Mayukha. The same verse from Manusmriti is quoted in Chapter IV, section vii, and the word “prachara” which has been used for the expression “common way” is thus explained in the same section: “prachara is way to the house, or the like, as also a pasture-ground for cattle, &c”. (See Mandlik's Hindu Law, pp. 70 and 71.)

These passages make it quite clear that if this is to be treated as “common way, or road of ingress and egress”, it is indivisible. I may add here that the word “prachara” which is used in the verse quoted from Manusmriti, and which has been rendered in these translations as “common way” is translated in the Sacred Books of the East Series, Vol. XXV, as “pasture ground”, and I have not overlooked the interpretation which has been put by some commentators upon the word “prachara” as indicating “pasture ground”. In the foot-note on this verse (Manu IX, 219) in the said volume at page 379 it is also indicated that the word “prachara” is understood by some of the commentators on Manusmriti in the sense of “common way”. But what is important is that this word has been interpreted in the Mitakshara in the sense of “common way” and that is how it is interpreted in the Vyavahara Mayukha. The author of the Vyavahara Mayukha gets over the apparent difficulty by accepting both the meanings of the word “prachara”. There is no doubt, therefore, that on the authority of the Mitakshara and the Vyavahara Mayukha, by which we are bound, that the land which was reserved as common passage at the time of partition between the parties in 1916 is not divisible.

It is urged, however, that this rule ought not to be strictly applied, under the modern conditions obtaining in a large city like Bombay. The rule to my mind is so plain that I do not see how it could be said to make any difference whether it is to be applied to any land in the city of Bombay or outside. Further it is urged that the “common way” referred to in the texts would refer to the “common ways” existing prior to partition, but not to such “common passages” as are created for the first time and reserved by agreement between the parties at the time of the partition. I am unable to discover in this contention any real answer to the application of the plain and simple rule to the facts of this case. This point was not raised in the trial Court, and as I have already stated, it was only referred to in the course of the argument before us. But the rule is clear, and I do not see how the plaintiffs can escape the application of that rule. This rule is referred to in Nathubhai Dhirajram v. Bai Hansgavri. No doubt there the facts were different and the rule was referred to under somewhat different circumstances. I refer to that judgment for the purpose of showing that the rule is not an obsolete rule of Hindu law, but a rule which is capable of application, and which ought to be applied, wherever it can properly apply.

In the present case it is clear to my mind that when in 1916 the brothers divided the property and kept this passage common, they really kept it as a common way for the use of all the four brothers; and the attempt which has been made in the course of the argument to show that the owners of the southern plots C and D have greater interest than the owners of plots A and B in the north does not appear to me to derive any support from the words used with reference to this passage in the decree relating to partition. The land which is shown in the plan as passage has been described throughout as “common passage” and the plaintiffs' claim for partition is based on the footing that all the owners of the four plots are co-owners of this land. It may be that the plaintiffs have some greater use of the passage in virtue of the position of the plots C and D than the owners of plots A and B. But I do not see how the accident of the southern end of the passage being closed by a wall could make any difference in law to the rights of the parties, nor can I see how in law they can be said to have any more interest in the passage than the owners of plots A and B. Really the land which is now sought to be partitioned is “common way” and it ought not to be divided according to the rule of Hindu law to which I have referred. That seems to afford a complete answer to the plaintiffs' claim.

But apart from this rule of Hindu law the point has been raised on behalf of the appellant that such a partition which has practically the effect of depriving one co-owner of his interest in the property ought not to be allowed. On the other hand on behalf of the plaintiffs reliance is placed upon the rule, about which there can be no doubt, that a co-owner of any land is entitled to seek partition of the land at his will. But in the present case it is not a simple partition by metes and bounds that the plaintiffs seek, but a partition on certain lines without which the partition would obviously be of no use to the plaintiffs. The strip of land which is marked as common passage varies in width from eight to ten feet throughout the whole length, and as a strip of land it is absolutely inconvenient to divide it by metes and bounds.

But the way in which the plaintiffs seek to get over the difficulty is by drawing a distinction between the right of passage as an easement and the right of ownership over the land as distinguished from the right of passage. The argument is somewhat ingenious and I shall not attempt to state it in detail. In the case of land which is owned by certain persons, it ought to be divided in the ordinary way if it is capable of division. If it is incapable of division it must be kept as the common property of the co-owners. It is not suggested that the alternative remedy of sale under certain circumstances as provided by the Partition Act is applicable to this case nor is it suggested that such a remedy is suited to the present case. The very nature of the prayer shows that the plaintiffs do not desire a simple partition, which obviously is not possible under the circumstances of the case, but a peculiar partition to serve their own interests without due regard to the interests of the co-owners. In view of the rule of Hindu law upon which I base my decision, it is not necessary for me to arrive at any final conclusion on the general question whether, apart from that rule, such a partition as is claimed by the plaintiffs is permissible in law, and even if it be permissible in law whether under the circumstances of the case it would be right to direct such a partition.

It is difficult to escape the inference that soon after the decree was passed for the removal of the encroachments, in 1918, against the plaintiffs, they filed this suit with a view to circumvent, if possible, that decree. If it be open to them in law to do so, they are entitled to that remedy. But in my opinion it is not open to them to do so.

I would, therefore, allow the appeal, discharge the decree of the trial Court and dismiss the plaintiffs' suit with costs throughout.

Crump, J.:— As I agree that the decree of the trial Court cannot stand, I wish to indicate briefly my reasons for that conclusion. The parties to this case stand in the shoes of the four sons of Balkrishna who were parties to the original division of this property. That partition by virtue of the decree in Suit No. 337 of 1910 was a complete partition, and I cannot see any ground on which it can now be reopened. It is not suggested that there was any bona fide error there, or that the partition was of a partial nature. The effect of the decree clearly was to decide that the property of which partition is now sought should be reserved as a common passage to the houses of the four parties. That being so, it would follow from the decree itself that that passage is not property such as can be the subject of a further partition. Therefore even apart from the rule of Hindu law, as to which it is unnecessary for me to add anything in view of the judgment of the learned Chief Justice, it does appear to me that the suit is not maintainable, and that the jurisdiction which the Judge of the trial Court has exercised is a jurisdiction which he did not possess. The ingenuity of counsel has failed to discover any precedent for such a suit as this, the reason obviously being that it is probably the first suit of its nature. If I felt any doubt as to the correctness of our view of the law, that doubt would be removed by a consideration of the motive which has impelled the plaintiffs to file the present suit. They do not in reality desire partition of this common way. What they really desire to do is to get rid of the effect of the decree against them whereby they were ordered by this Court to remove a certain encroachment on that way. It is an ingenious course, but one which. I do not think could possibly be permitted to succeed. The grounds on which the trial Judge has proceeded are those of convenience rather than law. It may be true that the portion of the passage which has been assigned to the plaintiffs is of no value to the other parties, but then they are the best judges, and they cannot be compelled to surrender the rights which were awarded to them by the partition decree in the previous suit without their own consent. Therefore it seems to me that the suit must of necessity fail, whether it be approached on the basis of the rule of Hindu law or on the basis of any other system of law which could conceivably be applicable to the present case. I agree, therefore, that the appeal should be allowed and the suit dismissed with costs. Attorneys for appellant: Messrs. Little & Co.

Attorneys for respondents Nos. 1 and 2: Messrs. Amin & Desai.

Attorneys for respondents Nos. 3 and 4: Messrs. Little & Co.

Appeal allowed.
G.G.N