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Toyo Menka Kaisha Ltd. v. Chabildas Nathubhai

Bombay High Court
Nov 30, 1921
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a vendors' suit concerning fifty-two bales of yarn, which represented the balance of one hundred bales sold to the defendants on 13th September 1920. Seventy-five bales were for immediate delivery and twenty-five for September delivery. The defendants initially pleaded that the plaintiffs were unable to deliver the balance and that the contracts were cancelled, but this defense was abandoned at trial and breach of contract was admitted. The remaining issue was the measure of damages arising from the breach.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Did the property in the goods pass to the defendants at the time of sale?
  2. What is the correct date of breach of contract for the undelivered goods?
  3. What is the proper measure of damages in light of the breach and subsequent events?
  4. Whether the plaintiffs had the right to resell the goods at the then market price based on express or implied consent of the defendants?
  5. How should the deliveries made in October be appropriated between the contracts?

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • The plaintiffs contended that the property in the goods had passed to the defendants.
  • They argued that the date of breach was either 28th or 18th January based on correspondence and conduct.
  • The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants' broker requested an extension of time for delivery, justifying delays.
  • They relied on the case of Pignataro v. Gilroy to support their position on appropriation and delivery.
  • The plaintiffs asserted a right to rely on an auction sale in March 1921 to mitigate damages.

Defendants' Arguments

  • The defendants initially pleaded inability of plaintiffs to deliver and cancellation of contracts, but later admitted breach.
  • They contended the date of breach was either in September or October.
  • The defendants relied on the unreported case of Phoenix Mills, Ltd. v. Madhavdas Rupchand to argue that no altered contract terms existed and the original contract ended on expiry of the due date.
  • They disputed the plaintiffs' claim of extension of time requested by their broker.
  • The defendants asserted that the plaintiffs could not rely on resale at the then price without express or implied consent.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Pignataro v. Gilroy Delivery order and assent to appropriation of goods necessary to pass property. Distinguished by the court as involving a delivery order and letter, which were absent in the present case, leading to the conclusion that property had not passed.
Ogle v. Earl Vane Understanding that if purchaser ultimately cannot take delivery, vendor may sell at market price with purchaser's consent. The court noted inability to infer such understanding here due to lack of proof of payment of interest or damages for delay.
Mutthaya Maniagarm v. Lekku Rediiar Right to sell at "then price" depends on express or implied consent of purchaser; absent such consent, damages are difference between contract and market rate at due date. Applied to hold that no such consent was proved, so damages measured at market rate on due date.
Phoenix Mills, Ltd. v. Madhavdas Rupchand Contract terms must be clearly altered by mutual consent; absence of such consent ends original contract on expiration of due date. Relied upon to emphasize necessity of certainty in contract alterations and difficulty in inferring new terms from late deliveries.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court found that the property in the goods did not pass to the defendants because there was no appropriation of the fifty-two bales to the contract and no assent by the defendants to such appropriation, distinguishing the facts from the precedent in Pignataro v. Gilroy. The court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the defendants' broker requested an extension of time, noting lack of proof, absence from pleadings and correspondence, and vague witness testimony.

The court examined the deliveries made in October and concluded that both parties regarded these as made under the original contract rather than a new extended contract, as there was no evidence of payment of interest or damages which would indicate a new agreement. The court declined to infer a mutual understanding allowing resale at the then market price without purchaser consent, relying on the principle from Mutthaya Maniagarm v. Lekku Rediiar.

In considering the defendants' reliance on Phoenix Mills, the court agreed with the necessity for clear mutual consent to alter contract terms and found this was not established here. The court therefore held the breach dates as eight days from 13th September for the ready goods and 30th September for the other goods, with the delivered bales appropriated to the ready contract.

Damages were to be calculated based on the September market rates, with interest and costs awarded against the defendants, who had advanced a false story regarding inability to deliver.

Holding and Implications

The court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiffs for damages calculated on the basis that the breach occurred in September and October 1920, with the delivered bales appropriated to the ready contract. Interest on the judgment was awarded at six percent and costs were to be paid by the defendants.

The decision directly affects the parties by establishing the measure of damages and confirming the breach dates, but does not set any new precedent beyond applying established principles regarding appropriation, consent for resale, and contract breach timing.

Show all summary ...

Marten, J.:— This is a vendors' suit in respect of fifty-two bales of yarn, being the balance of one hundred bales sold to the defendants on the 13th September, 1920, of which seventy-five were for ready and twenty-five for September delivery. The defendants pleaded that the plaintiffs were unable to give delivery of this balance, and that consequently the contracts were cancelled. This defence was abandoned at the trial, and the breach of contract admitted.

2. The only remaining question, therefore is the measure of damages, but this? gives rise to questions of some nicety which have been well argued on both sides.

3. Turning to the facts, in my judgment the property in the goods did not pass to the defendants. At the date of the sale the plaintiffs had two hundred bales in their godown, and though one hundred were delivered the next day to another party, I think there was no appropriation of the suit fifty-two bales to the suit contract, and no assent by the defendants to any such appropriation. The case of Pignataro v. Gilroy (1), on which the plaintiffs relied, is, I think, clearly distinguishable, for there a delivery order was sent and also a letter pointing out where the goods were. On the above finding, it follows that the plaintiffs cannot rely on the auction sale in March, 1921. Is then the date of breach in September or October as the defendants contend, or the 28th or 18th January as the plaintiffs contend? Deliveries were taken and paid for by defendants as under:—17th September.—24 bales,: 4th October —12 bales: 21st October—12 bales: Total 48 bales leaving a balance of fifty-two. Letters calling upon the defendants to take delivery were sent by the plaintiffs on the 13th October, the 9th and 21st December, and the 12th and 25th January. The only written reply is that of the 18th January in which the defendants set up their false cancellation story. The plaintiffs account for the delay by saying that the time was extended at the express request of the defendants' broker Dharamsey.

4. But this they have not proved to my satisfaction. Such request is not pleaded. It is not mentioned in the correspondence. The plaintiffs' solicitors were not even told of it. Dharamsey is not called; his authority is questionable: and the plaintiffs' witnesses appeared so vague in their recollection that I cannot place any real reliance on this part of the plaintiffs' case. At most, according to them, no definite period was fixed. Only “some time.”

5. How then am I to regard the two deliveries in October, and to which of the two contracts—if in fact there are two and not one—are the deliveries to be appropriated? I think that on the pleadings both parties regarded these October deliveres as being made under the suit contract or contracts, and not under some new contract for extension of time and so on.

6. It is not proved, for instance, that any interest, godown rent, or insurance premium, as from the due date was paid as set forth in the letter of 13th October. Nor were any damages paid for the difference in price at the two dates. I am unable, therefore, to infer, as Blackburn and Lush, JJ. were able to do in Ogle v. Earl Vane (2). that the understanding between the parties was that if the purchasers were ultimately unable to take delivery the vendors would be entitled to go into the market and sell “at the then price” (see p. 284). That was the converse case of a vendor unable to give delivery at due date and purchaser waiting, but I will assume in favour of the plaintiffs that there is no distinction in principle between the two.

7. In the present case the plaintiffs' difficulty is, I think, with reference to “the then price.” That there was some forbearance by the plaintiffs, I can under, stand, viz. what Mr. Justice Blackburn describes as waiting but not binding oneself to wait (see p. 282). On the other hand it is clear from Mutthaya Maniagarm v. Lekku Rediiar (3) that this right to sell at “the then price” is based on the express or implied consent of the purchaser (see p. 415), and that, in the absence of such consent, the measure of damages is the difference between the contract rate and the market rate at the due date for delivery under the original contract. In the present case I do not think that such express or implied consent is proved.

8. The defendants have relied on the unreported case of Phoenix Mills, Ltd. v. Madhavdas Rupchand (4). That was a much stronger case than the present, for there the goods were to be manufactured by the Mills and nothing at all was done at the expiration of the due date. The Court there held that the plaintiffs could only succeed if the terms of the contract had clearly been altered by mutual consent, and as that was not shown, the original contract came to an end when nothing was done under it within the contract period. The judgment of Macleod, J. is particularly valuable in pointing out the necessity for certainty as to the terms of any new contract, and as to the difficulty of inferring from mere delivery after due date what the altered rights of the parties are to be with reference to the undelivered goods. That difficulty I have felt to the full here.

9. In the result, therefore, I hold that the date of breach was eight days from the 13th September as regards the ready goods and the 30th September as regards the other goods, and that the whole of the forty-eight bales of which delivery was taken must be taken to be appropriated to the ready contract, as indeed is done in the particulars, Exhibit D to the plaint. I understand that the parties are agreed upon the September market rates. There will, therefore be a decree for the plaintiffs for damages to be calculated on the above basis. There will be interest on judgment at six per cent, and the defendants will pay the costs of the suit. The latter have put forward a deliberately false story as to the inability of the plaintiffs to give delivery of the suit bales, and their Mehta hag only done his masters a disservice by going into the witness-box and repeating this false story.

10. I should perhaps mention that neither party relied on the words “as per usual Mill terms” in the two contracts of 13th September, nor was any evidence led to explain what those words actually mean in the present case. The case, therefore, proceeded as if those words were not in the contract, though it is possible that they may afford some clue as to why the plaintiffs demanded interest, etc., in the correspondence see for instance the contract in the Phoenix Mills case.

11. Suit decreed.