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Shrinivas Lingo Nadgir v. Secretary Of State For India

Bombay High Court
Sep 16, 1921
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Judgment Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The village of Hebli was granted in jaghir to three branches of a family; the plaintiff (Laxman Rao) and defendants Nos. 12 and 13 were the oldest members of those branches. The Nawab of Savanur granted the jaghir in 1749. Three vatan offices existed in Hebli — Kulkarni, Patil and Nadgir — originally allotted 80, 80 and 40 Mars of land respectively. All three vatans had been resumed by Government for non-payment of the judi before 1733. The plaintiff's family was later granted the vatan land and the offices, which pre-existed the grant. In government records the vatan lands were entered as "Kamavishi" but the jahagirdars' own books omitted that designation.

Administrative proceedings and inquiries followed over many decades. In 1906 the Collector held (and Government affirmed in 1908) under the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, 1874 that the Nadgir claimants were entitled to the Patil and Kulkarni offices and the lands attached; the Collector directed that emoluments be recovered from the jahagirdars. In 1913 the Government levied Rs. 969 from the jahagirdars for payment to the Nadgirs.

The plaintiff (a member of the jahagirdar family) filed suit seeking recovery of Rs. 969 and a declaration that the plaintiff and defendants Nos. 12 and 13 should be declared Vatandar Patils and Kulkarnis by virtue of the 1748/1749 grant or, alternatively, by long and exclusive possession until 1918; the plaintiff also sought cancellation of the Vatan Register entries so that 120 Mars would not be treated as vatan property or liable to contribution. The case proceeded through the civil courts and resulted in appeals considered in the present opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Nadgir family or the Jahagirdar family were the rightful Vatandars (representative holders) of the Patil and Kulkarni offices and the lands attached to those offices.
  2. Whether administrative decisions and recommendations (notably Major Etheridge's recommendation recorded as Exhibit 471 and the Inam Commissioner's actions under Bombay Act XI of 1852) were final and binding on the parties and competent authorities.
  3. Whether the Revenue authorities (Collector, Commissioner S.D., and Government) had power to reverse or modify earlier recommendations/records and to register the vatan lands as such in the Vatan Register.
  4. Whether the plaintiff's suit to recover the Rs. 969 (levied as contribution in 1913 under the administrative orders) was barred by limitation and by statutory bars claimed by defendant No. 1 (including Section 4(a) of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876 and Section 25 of the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, 1874).
  5. Whether the District Judge erred in finding that the jahagirdars had acquired title to the lands and offices by adverse possession and in his view of the binding effect of the 1864 recommendation.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff sought (a) recovery of Rs. 969 levied from the jahagirdars for payment to the Nadgir defendants, (b) a declaration that the plaintiff and defendants Nos. 12 and 13 were Vatandar Patils and Kulkarnis by virtue of the grant of 1748 (1749 in some documents), and (c) alternatively, that long and exclusive possession and enjoyment of the offices until 1918 entitled them to those offices.
  • The plaintiff also sought cancellation of the Vatan Register entries insofar as 120 Mars were entered and treated as vatan property liable to contribution.

Defendants' / Government Arguments

  • Defendant No. 1 (Secretary of State for India / Government) contended inter alia that the suit was barred by Section 4(a) of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876, by Section 25 of the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, 1874, and by limitation, since the plaintiff sought to impugn the Collector's order of 28 November 1906.
  • Defendant No. 4 (on behalf of Nadgirs generally) supported defendant No. 1's position.
  • Administrative position (as reflected in the revenue proceedings): the Collector, the Commissioner S.D., and Government in various orders treated the Nadgirs as the original vatan holders for Patil and Kulkarni, directed entry of the whole vatan lands in the register as such, and limited recovery from jahagirdars only so far as necessary to pay emoluments to officiators.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ramchandrarao Raghunath v. Bhisto Shankar Nadgir (R.A. No. 3 of 1876) — reported P.J. 1877, p.47 Interpretation of the term "Kamavishi" and its effect upon vatan rights and entries; the decision addressed whether lands entered as "Kamavishi" carried reservations of former holders' rights. The court examined how the High Court's interpretation in R.A. 3 of 1876 had been relied upon by revenue officers and Government to justify revising earlier administrative recommendations. The opinion finds that much of the revenue decision-making turned on the High Court's interpretation of "Kamavishi" and applies the reasoning of that decision to the 200 Mars in dispute, while also criticizing the District Judge's misapprehension of its effect.
Suit No. 83 of 1868 (trial judgment between a Nadgir plaintiff and Jahagirdar defendants) Determination at trial that the land in dispute (22 Mars) was vatan land of the plaintiff and that it had been held in trust/temporary management by the defendants since about 1832; issues included whether the land formed part of plaintiff's vatan and whether claim was barred by lapse of time. The appellate consideration in the present opinion reviews the trial and the High Court appeal (R.A. 3 of 1876) to assess the weight of various documents, the significance of "Kamavishi" entries, and whether the jahagirdars had thereby acquired absolute title. The appellate court uses these earlier findings to test the correctness of the District Judge's conclusions below.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by reconstructing the administrative and judicial history relevant to the vatan rights in Hebli and then tested the District Judge's conclusions against that history and the legal effect of prior decisions and administrative acts. The key points in the reasoning are:

  1. Historical / documentary background: The court reviewed the 1861–1864 materials (notably Exhibit 471, Major Etheridge's memorandum and recommendation) and explained that Exhibit 471 was made in the context of inquiries under Bombay Act XI of 1852 (Inam Commissioner's inquiry) but that, by rule, adjudication on vatans was expressly excepted from an Inam Commissioner's powers. This contextual analysis explained why Major Etheridge signed as Alienation Settlement Officer and presented recommendations rather than an Inam Commissioner's formal decision.
  2. Administrative sequence and conflicting decisions: The court traced later proceedings (the 1884 District Deputy Collector decision, the Collector's 1890 and 1893 proceedings, the Commissioner's and Collector's later reports, Mr. Moghe's 1905 opinion, the Collector's 28 November 1906 order, the Commissioner's 17 July 1907 confirmation, and Government's 1908 resolution). These steps show that revenue authorities revisited the earlier recommendation and ultimately directed that the Nadgirs be recognized as the representative vatandars and that the whole vatan lands be entered in the register.
  3. Effect of the High Court's decision (R.A. 3 of 1876): The revenue authorities and the Commissioner treated the High Court judgment as pivotal, particularly its treatment of the term "Kamavishi" and the implication that entries as "Kamavishi" could reserve rights for former holders rather than amount to absolute transfer. The court accepted that the High Court decision was applied by the Commissioner and Government as relevant to the overall inquiry.
  4. District Judge's errors identified: The appellate court found the District Judge erred in two principal respects:
    • He had a wrong conclusion about the binding effect of Major Etheridge's 1864 recommendation (Exhibit 471); the appellate court concluded the recommendation did not operate as a conclusive adjudication binding inter se the parties.
    • He misappreciated the facts on which he relied to find that the jahagirdars had acquired title by adverse possession to both the lands and the offices. The appellate court noted there was little or no evidence that the Nadgirs were aware of any alteration in village account-keeping that would have begun the running of limitation against them, and it noted the Nadgirs' 1875 petition asking for preparation of a Vatan Register to admit their rights.
  5. Limitation and finality of administrative order: The court observed that the plaintiff's ability to impugn the Collector's 28 November 1906 order was time-barred as to certain claims. The plaint was filed 16 July 1913; the Collector's order and the framing of the Vatan Register occurred in 1906 (the District Judge had erred in reading a 1908 date), and therefore the plaintiff could not now impugn the 1906 order with respect to the contribution levied in 1913. The consequence was that the contribution could not be recovered by the plaintiff.
  6. Disposition: On reviewing the record and the legal consequences of the errors by the District Judge, the appellate court concluded the District Judge's decision should be reversed. It found in favour of the revenue/defendant position on the principal contested points and allowed the appeal identified as No. 132 of 1918 while dismissing Appeals Nos. 157 and 159 of 1918.

Holding and Implications

The District Judge's decree is reversed; the principal appeal is allowed and the plaintiff's suit is dismissed.

Direct consequences (as recorded in the opinion):

  • The appeal No. 132 of 1918 is allowed; Appeals Nos. 157 and 159 of 1918 are dismissed.
  • The plaintiff's suit is dismissed with costs in both Courts. Costs are apportioned: one set of costs to defendant No. 1, another set to defendants Nos. 2 to 7, and defendant No. 13 must pay the costs of his appeal.
  • The plaintiff cannot recover the contribution levied in 1913 (Rs. 969) because he cannot now impugn the Collector's 1906 order.

The opinion does not assert that a broader legal precedent beyond the application of prior judicial interpretation (notably R.A. 3 of 1876) was established; the decision corrects the lower court's treatment of the binding effect of administrative recommendations and its factual appraisal regarding adverse possession.

Judges: Macleod, C.J. (delivering the lead opinion) and Shah, J. (concurring). Decree reversed.

Show all summary ...

Macleod, C.J:— The village of Hebli was granted in Jaghir to the three branches of the family. Laxman Rao, plaintiff and defendants Nos. 12 and 13 were the oldest members of the branches. The Nawab of Savanur granted the Jaghir in the year 1749. There were three Vatan offices in the village, viz., Kulkarni, Patiland Nadgir, of which the first two offices were allotted 80 Mars of land while the latter had 40 Mars of land. All the three Vatan were resumed by the Government for non-payment of the judi before 1733. Plaintiff's family was granted the Vatan land and the offices, which were in existence prior to the grant. The Vatan lands were entered in the Government record as Kamavishi. But the Jahagirdars omitted the designation of Kamavishi in their own books.

2. The Collector in 1906 held and this decision was affirmed by the Government in 1908—under Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, 1874, that the Nadgir defendants were entitled to offices of the Patil and Kulkarni and to the lands attached to the offices. The Collector further held that the emoluments should be recovered from the Jahagirdars. In 1913 the Government levied a sum of Rs. 969 from the Jahagirdars for payment to the Nadgir defendants.

3. The plaintiff, a member of the Jahagirdar family, filed the present suit to recover back the sum of Rs. 969, and for a declaration that the plaintiff and defendants Nos. 12 and 13 should be declared Vatandar Patils and Kulkarnis by virtue of the grant of 1748, and in the alternative by reason of their long and exclusive possession and enjoyment of the offices until 1918; that Vatan Register of Hebli as framed should be cancelled after declaring that, the 120 Mars entered in the Vatan Register were not Vatan property and not liable to contribution. The Secretary of State for India (defendant No. 1) contended inter alia that the suit was barred by Section 4(a) of Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876, by Section 25 of the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, 1874, and by limitation as the plaintiff sought to rely on the order of the Collector of the 28th November, 1906. Defendant 4 on behalf of Nadgirs generally supported defendant No. 1. [After setting out the pleas as indicated above his Lordship continued:] Exhibit 471 is a memorandum, dated the 12th November, 1861, written by Col. Etheridge as Alienation Settlement Officer S.D in reply to the Revenue Commissioner's endorsement of the 6th September. That document is not forthcoming but it would seem as if an inquiry had been made regarding certain lands which are set out in the memo. Items 16 and 17 are the 120 Mars now in suit. The memo para. 4 says

“These items were all settled to be Kadim in 1862 by Major Etheridge upon the evidence then forthcoming which, although defective, was the best procurable. There was no evidence available from the Peshwai records. It is remarked, however, that the land rolls, referred to in the para, preceding, show that the Heblikars at the date of the acquisition of the village did not receive the items 15, 16 and 17 occupying 200 Mars as bona fide Khalsat but as Kamavishi, though, as it appears from an order, dated 1792 from P.R Patwardhan a competent authority to Trimbakrao Anna, the Subedar of Dharwar Taluka, that the Kamavishi management at that date still remained as before and as there is nothing to show that any subsequent period even up to the present time had been altered with the exception of 7½ Mars 13 bighas which, at sometime unknown, had reverted to the Nadgirs, it may be allowed that the Kamavishi management of the remaining 92¼ Mars and 6 bighas has assumed a permanency of tenancy which cannot be justly interfered with.”

4. Major Etheridge then recommended that 7¼ Mars and 3 bighas should be made amenable to settlement as held from Government when the orders for the settlement of alienated villages should be authorised. The remainder, Major Etheridge thought, should belong to the Heblikars.

5. With regard to this document the learned Judge remarks:—

“Exhibit 471 embodies the decision of the loam Commissioner referred to in issue 10. The decision is in the form of a recommendation to Government. The decision is one under Bombay Act XI of 1852; although Col. Etheridge signed as Alienation Settlement Officer, Col. Etheridge was both Inam Commissioner under Act XI of 1852 and Alienation Settlement Officer. The inquiry made under the Act in question related to claims against Government on account of Inam and other estates wholly or partly exempt from the payment of land revenue. It is hardly necessary to observe that the Act applied to the Watan lands of village officers and servants (See Schedule B. rules V. IIIX.”)

6. Unfortunately it is necessary to observe that, by the 5th proviso to Rule VIII, to adjudicate on Vatans such as those in suit was expressly excepted from the powers of the Inam Commissioners, and that is probably the reason why Major Etheridge signed Exhibit 471 as Alienation Settlement Officer, making recommendations for the guidance of the Revenue Commissioner instead of recording a decision as Inam Commissioner of Exhibit 312 which is the decision of the Inam Commissioner that the village of Hebli was Saramjam and not Sarva Inam. Admitting that the advice of Major Etheridge was acted upon and that only 7¼ Mars and 3 bighas were entered as amenable to settlement, the question arises, not only whether Government was right in reversing that decision on the advice of their Revenue Officers in 1903, but also whether Government had the power to do so.

7. The learned Judge considered that advice was based on an erroneous view of the effect of a judgment of the High Court in Civil Suit No. 53 of 1868, App. No. 3 of 1876, Ramchandrarao Ragkunath v. Bhisto Shankar Nadgir (1). He then says: “Upon issue 10 my finding is that the decision of Government upon Exhibit 471 is final.” But the issue was whether the decision of the Inam Commissioner and Alienation Settlement Officer was final. “As far as I can gather from the evidence, that decision was passed not earlier than 1865 and was the only decision in the matter at rived at by Government under Act XI of 1852.”

8. It will now be advisable to turn to the proceedings of the Revenue Authorities which culminated in the final order of 1908 so as to as certain what view was taken by the High Court decision in R.A 3 of 1876, and then I shall consider that decision so as to be able to form an opinion whether that view was correct. In 1875, after the passing of the Vatan Act of 1874, the Nadgirs presented a petition to the District Deputy Collector asking that a Register of the Patilki and Kulkarniki Vatan might be prepared. That officer Mr. Anding gave his decision on the 10th July, 1884 (Exhibit 327). He said:

“The Jahagirdars claim the Patil's and Kulkarni's haks because they say there is no Kadim Vatan for these offices, that the people now claiming cannot show enjoyment of office in their families and that they have carried on the duties through Karkoons employed by themselves. The Nadgirs on the other hand say that they have and hold Kadim Vatan for the Patil and Kulkarniship. The points for consideration are:—

(1) Has thsre been a Kadim Vatan for the Patilki and Kulkarniki office?

(2) Have the individuals now claiming as patils and Kulkarnis enjoyed the offices claimed in their families?

9. The Nadgirs do not produce Sanads or other deeds of grant to show when they received the Vatan claimed, but from the papers recorded in the case it appears that on account of the Nadgirs' Patilki and Kulkarniki of Hebli there was a grant of 200 Mars of land, that of this 7¾ Mars are still held for Patilki and Kulkarniki and that the rest of the land is with the Jahagirdars in Kamavishi because the Vatandars did not pay up the judi due to the Inamdars as Mamool, etc., etc.

10. From the papers recorded it seems to me that the Jahagirdars have conducted the duties of the Patil and Kulkarnis offices for a long time through Karkoons in their pay.

11. For all these reasons I decide that the claims of the Jahagirdars and of the Nadgir claimants are both inadmissible and that the Patilki and Kulkarniki of Hebli are both Amani. The nominations to office should in future be made by Government and the Potagi should be paid by the Jahagirdars from the revenue derived from the Vatan land in their possession.”

12. The Collector's decision (Exhibit 326) was not recorded until the Nth February, 1890. He agreed with Mr. Anding that the two offices should be treated as Amani or stipendiary, but he did not think it would be just or equitable to deprive the Jahagirdars altogether of their right of nomination. The parties concerned should be left to establish inter se their respective rights in a Court of law. Until they did so, no right of nomination should be allowed to their party.

13. On the 31st October, 1890, the com missioner S.D (Exhibit 325) forwarded the papers to Government suggesting that they should revise the order of the Collector as it was the duty of the Collector, under section 25 of the vatan act, to determine the custom of the Vatan as to service and what persons should be recognized as representative Vatandars for the purpose of the Act and to register their names.

14. The Commissioner pointed out that there was a Patil and Kulkarni Vatan held at one time by the Nadgir family, consisting of 200 Mars which, with the exception of 7¼ Mars 3 bights, had passed into the possession of the Hebli Inamdars and was entered as Kamavishi. The Nadgirs made several attempts to regain possession of portion of the estate but ineffectually until Bhisto Shankar obtained, by suit, restoration of 22 Mars from the heirs of Ramchandra Raghunath the decision being confirmed by the High Court in R.A 3 of 1876. Their judgment made it superfluous to cite the numerous documents put in the course of many years' correspondence between the applicants, the Commissioner's Office, and that of the Alienation Department which were held to be equally worthless.

15. As the judgment turned chiefly on the interpretation of the term Kamavishi it might be held to apply for the purposes of the then inquiry to the whole of the Vatan which was entered under that heading and it went against the contentions of the Inamdars that the Vatan had passed absolutely into their possession.

16. The Commissioner, therefore, advised that the Collector should be directed to hold a fresh inquiry and to pass an order on the evidence that might be produced before him according to law. Annexed to that letter, was the precis of 38 documents produced by the Nadgirs and 23, produced by the Jahagirdars in support of their respective claims. Exhibit 324 is a Government Resolution of the 22nd November, 1890 that the orders passed should be reversed and the Collector should be directed to hold fresh proceedings.

17. The Collector's decision dated the 30th August, 1893 is Exhibit 323. After setting out the issues for decision No. (1) what is the custom of service? No. (2) who are the representative Vatandars? the Collector proceeds:

“Before addressing myself to decide these issues I must dispose of the preliminary issue, ‘are the Nadgirs or the Jahagirdars, Vatandars?’ This question I am not competent to decide. I refer the parties to a Civil Court for its adjudication. No doubt the High Court's interlocutory decree (in a suit between one families alone of the Nadgirs and one family alone of the Jahagirdars) alluded to above, shows conclusively that the Nadgir family are Vatandars The decision raises a strong presumption that the Jahagirdars as a whole are non Vatandars. But then I cannot leave the questions for the determination of the Civil Court.

18. Then he recorded that the offices of Patil and Kulkarni formed part of one and the same Vatan, and as the village was a large one, four officiators were required.

19. Nothing further appears to have been done until the 13th August, 1904, when the Commissioner S.D wrote (Exhibit 321) to the Collector: “I have the honour to request that you will kindly hold proceedings on the hypothesis that neither side will have recourse to the Civil Court and submit the case with your opinion as to whether either of the two parties is entitled to the Vatan (including lands and right of service) and if so which.”

20. The Collector referred the question to the District Deputy Collector for disposal and that officer on the 30th June, 1905 (Exhibit 319) sent to the Collector the proceedings he had held in the matter with a memorandum (Exhibit 320) which would serve as a report.

21. Mr. Moghe's opinion was that the Nadgirs, and not Jahagirdars, had the Vatan rights of service. In G.R No. 1532 of 8th March, 1900 Government had accepted the opinion of the Commissioner S.D that the decision of the High Court with regard to 22 Mars should be respected and so Government on the basis of that decision might be asked to modify their orders passed on the recommendation of the Alienation Settlement Officer's letter of the 13th November, 1864, and to direct that the whole of the 200 Mars should be recognized as Kadim. If that was done 80 Mars for Patil Vatan and 40 Mars for Kulkarni Vatan would be available for service. The Alienation Settlement Officer's letter alluded to was based on the Sanad produced by the Jahagirdars but that document had been found unreliable by the High Court.

22. As the High Court had held that the Jahagirdars had realised all their arrears of judi due on the 22 Mars while in their possession and that the Nadgirs were entitled to recover the land without payment, he suggested that the remaining Mars should be resumed by Government and regranted to the ousted family of Nadgirs.

23. The memorandum makes it clear that although, the Collector in 1893 said he was not competent to decide who were the Vatandars, he had recorded two notes which do not appear in Exhibit 323.

24. In the first he found that in his opinion the Nadgirs alone were Vatandars. Both divisions of the family should serve in future contemporaneously, if they were held to be Vatandars; the heads of families alone to serve inter se in turns. If the Jahagirdars were held to be Vatandars it would appear that the custom was for them to serve by deputy. In the other note he set out who would be the heads of the families according as the Nadgirs or the Jahagirdars were held to be Vatandars.

25. On Mr. Moghe's report the Collector passed an order on the 28th November, 1906, Exhibit 316. It is headed ‘Proceedings held by the Collector of Dharwar for the formation of Hakdar Patraks of the Patilki (both revenue and police) and Kulkarni office Vatan of Kasba Hebli under Bombay Act III of 1874.’ The order with regard to representative Vatandars as decided by Mr. Moghe, as entered in the two Vatan Registers, was admitted to be correct and directions were given as to how the services were to be taken.

26. On the 17th July, 1907, the Commissioner S.D recorded his decision on appeal, Exhibit 315. The points for decision were (1) whether there was a Vatan still existing, (2) if so, who were the Vatandars, the Jahagirdars or the Nadgirs. The Commissioner found that there was originally a Vatan in the Nadgir family and that Vatan had never been conferred on the Jahagirdars. Accordingly he confirmed the Collector's decision in determining members of the Nadgir family to be representative Vatandar. But the entry of only so much of the Vatan land in the register as was thought necessary for the emolument of the officiators was altered and the whole of the Vatan lands was directed to be entered in the register as such, although it would not be necessary to take steps to recover for the Vatan from the Jahagirdars in possession any more than was required for the emolument of the officiators.

27. On the 4th June, 1908, the Jahagirdars petitioned Government that the order of the Collector, confirmed on appeal by the Commissioner S.D might be cancelled. It was answered by G.R 10129 of the 7th October, 1908 (Exhibit 318).

28. Government were of opinion (1) that the Collector could determine whether a particular individual was a Vatandar or not, where a finding on that point was necessary for finally deciding upon the right to officiate. His finding, however, was open to be revised and set aside by the Civil Courts; (2) that it was not a case in which the Collector could take action under Section 6 of the Vatan Act; (3) that the Collector's decision determining members of the Nadgir family to be representative Vatandars should be accepted. The Jahagirdars, if so advised, could file a suit in the Civil Court; (4) that the Commissioner's order that the whole of the Patilki and Kulkarniki Vatan lands shown in the Alienation Settlement Officer's letter of the 9th June, 1864, should be entered as such in the Vatan Register and that so much as was required for the emolument of the officiator should be recovered from the Jahagirdars in possession, should be upheld.

29. The learned Judge says that the Vatan Register was prepared in 1903, and refers to Exhibit 297 which is a copy of the Vatan Register kept in the Mamlatdar's Office. There is a note at the bottom as follows:

“The Vatan Register was framed by the Collector on 28th November, 1906, and was upheld by the Commissioner in appeal on 17th July, 1907.”

30. It is signed by the Mamlatdar and the date is 8th June, 1908. Apparently the Judge must have taken the date on which the Mamlatdar made his note as the date on which the Vatan Register was prepared, but this is an obvious error. It was not until the 12th April, 1913, that a contribution was levied against the Jahagirdars at the rate of Rs. 1-9-0 per Mar. The Judge concludes,

“I think these executive orders were passed under a complete misapprehension of the effect of the decision of the High Court reported in P.J 1877, p. 47 and generally in ignorance of the legal position as it stood in 1884 when the inquiry was started. By that time the Nadgirs had been ousted by adverse possession from both the lands in the possession of the Jahagirdars and the offices of Kulkarni and Revenue Patil. As regards the effect of the Inam Commissioner's recommendation made in 1864 and recorded in Exhibit 471, I have come to a different conclusion from their Lordships because the evidence before me is more ample and proves that the Governor-in-Council upon that decision adjudicated upon the rights of the Jahagirdars and the Nadgirs inter se and that the Inam Commissioner's inquiry was carried on with the full knowledge of the Nadgirs and after giving them every opportunity of leading evidence and putting forward their claims.”

31. I am now in a position to deal with the proceedings in Suit No. 83 of 1868 and R.A No. 3 of 1876. The plaintiff Nadgir claimed that 22 Mars appertained to his Vatan in the village of Hebli of which 3¾ Mars were in his possession the remaining 18¼ being held in trust by the defendants Jahagirdars since 1832. The defendants replied that they were in possession of the land ever since the grant of the village in Jahgir to their ancestors.

32. The issues and the answers thereto were:—

(1) Is the land in dispute part of the Vatan property of the plaintiff? Answer—yes.

(2) Is it held in trust by the defendants? Answer—yes.

(3) Has the suit been properly valued? Answer—yes.

(4) Is the claim barred by lapse of time? Answer—No.

33. The trial Judge said on issues 1 and 2:

“The fact, that the plaintiff is the Vatandar Nadgir Patil and Kulkarni of Hebli, is not denied by the defendants. From the documents (numbered) it is conclusively proved that the land in dispute is Vatan judi land belonging to the plaintiff, that in consequence either of the plaintiff's minority or his inability to pay the judi due thereon it was taken charge of by the defendants or their ancestors for temporary management about 1832 and that the plaintiff is entitled to claim restoration.”

34. It does not appear as if the defendant in the trial Court placed any reliance on Major Etheridge's recommendation of 1364.

35. In the judgment of the High Court on appeal the defendants' case is stated as being that the village was granted to their family in Jahgir in 1748 and that the Vatan of the Patil had previously been confiscated by the then Government, that the land so confiscated was included in the grant and had ever since been in the enjoyment of the defendants' family.

36. It being admitted by the plaintiff that the defendants were Jahagirdars and it being admitted by the defendants that the land in dispute originally formed the Vatan of the plaintiff's family and it being agreed between the parties that the land was in possession of the defendants because the plaintiff or his ancestors failed to pay the judi, the point in dispute was whether the plaintiff's rights had become absolutely forfeited or whether he could still re-assert these rights on certain conditions.

37. Very little reliance could be placed on the greater portions of the documentary evidence produced, but the plaintiff's case really rested upon two grounds: first, that the land in dispute had, ever since it had been in the defendant's possession, been entered in their account as ‘Kamavishi’ a term said to indicate temporary or provisional arrangement, and, secondly, that the late defendant Ramachandra, the natural father and adoptive uncle, had made certain admissions amounting to a recognition, of the plaintiff's right. With regard to the. Sanad of 1748 of which only a copy was produced, the judgment says:

“The Sanad appears to us to be of no real value. It is most probably a forgery. If it be genuine it does not really dispose of the question in dispute. The word translated ‘confiscated’ is ‘jupti’ or ‘zupti’ which may mean temporarily attached and not absolutely confiscated.”

38. What purports to be the original has now been produced by the Jahagirdar plaintiffs, but their case is no further advanced thereby than it was when the copy was produced more than forty years ago.

39. Then, after various other documents are considered, the judgment says:—

“The most that can be said is that the plaintiff's documents appear to be worth as much as those of the defendants. If reliance is to be placed upon them the conclusion to be arrived at is that between 1748, when the village is alleged to have been granted to the defendants' family and the year 1832 the land in dispute was some time in the possession of the Patils, but that at any rate whenever it was in the possession of the Jahagirdars, it was entered in the village accounts as ‘Kamavishi,’ etc. It seems very clear that land entered as ‘Kamavishi,’ is land which for some reason or other had come under the management of government or its assignee, for the purpose of collecting revenue but which has not been incorporated with the Khalsat land which is the absolute property of Government or its assignee. So long as such land continues to be entered in the accounts as ‘Kamavishi’ and to be distinguished from ‘Khalsat’ the inference fairly arises that some reservation of the rights of the former holders of the land must have been intended.”

40. Then various other documents are dealt with, which appeared to support the plaintiff's case, including Exhibit 152, a statement made by the defendants' agent before the Inam Commissioner in 1855 to the effect that the land in dispute was entered as ‘Kamavishi’ though it was managed like Khalsat. On this the judgment says:—

“The Inam Commissioner in his report, Exhibit 3367 (sic), entered the land accordingly, not under the head of alienated land but as land of which the proceeds formed part of the Jahagirdar's income. This entry no doubt correctly described the existing state of facts and it is not clear that the Inam Commissioner arrived at the conclusion that the land was absolutely the property of the Jahagirdars. But even if such were his conclusions, the plaintiff is not bound by a decision made in an inquiry to which he was not a party and the object of which was simply to settle the respective rights of the Government and the Jahagirdars.”

41. Evidently here the decision of 1858 is referred to and not the recommendation of the Alienation Settlement Officer in 1864. Though that document was exhibited it does not appear that any reliance, was placed upon it or that the Court came to any conclusion as to its binding character as the learned Judge seems to think. If it was conclusive, it is difficult to imagine that the Court would have ignored it.

42. In those days the proceedings of the Inam Commissioner would be far more familiar to the Courts than they are now, and the proper inference to draw, in my opinion, is that it was realised that Major Etheridge's recommendation in Exhibit 471 had no bearing whatever to help the defendants' case, while it would seem very unsafe to suggest that the Court in this case has better materials before it on which it can come to a better conclusion as to its effect on the question at issue.

43. No doubt we are concerned in this case with the remaining 90 and odd Mars, but the entries in the village accounts showed that all the 200 Mars were entered as ‘Kamavishi,’ and therefore everything that was said by the Court in R.A 3 of 1876 is applicable to the land in this case. But the learned Judge has held that before the Revenue officers began their inquiry in 1884 the Jahagirdars had acquired a title by their adverse possession not only to the Patilki and Kulkarniki Vatan but also to the offices of the Kulkarni and Revenue Patil, since, whatever the High Court may have held as to the suit land in the suit of 1868, the Jahagirdars in 1868 left off entering the Vatan land as 1 Kamavishi.’

44. But assuming that the Nadgirs were entitled either by agreement or by custom to get back their Vatan lands on payment of judi, time would not begin to run against them until they were made aware that the Jahagirdars were setting up a title to hold the Vatan lands in their own right land there is no evidence that the Nadgirs were aware of any alteration in the method of keeping the village accounts. Nor is it easy to see how the Jahagirdars could acquire the offices of Patil and Kulkarni by adverse possession. In any event the learned Judge has omitted to notice that the Nadgirs in 1875, petitioned the District Deputy Collector to prepare the Vatan Register of Hebli (see Exhibit 315) and to admit their rights to serve as Patils and Kulkarnis although no proceedings were held on that petition until 1884.

45. On the other hand it would appear as if the plaintiff's suit, except as regards the claim to recover the money paid to the defendant No. 1, was barred by limitation as the plaint was filed on the 16th July, 1913 and the Collector's order was passed on the 28th November, 1906 and the Vatan Register was framed on the same day. I have already pointed out that the learned Judge was in error in thinking that it was framed in 1908.

46. As the plaintiff cannot, therefore, now impugn the order passed in 1906 the contribution, levied in 1913 in consequence of that order, cannot be recovered. It may be noted that the plaint refers to the Commissioner's order of 1907 and not to the Collector's order of 1906 while the suit is filed just within six years of the Commissioner's order.

47. In my opinion the decision of the learned District Judge must be reversed. It was based on a wrong conclusion as to the binding effect of Major Etheridge's recommendations in 1864, and a wrong appreciation of the facts on which he found that the Jahagirdars had acquired a title to the lands and the offices by adverse possession. The Appeal No. 132 of 1918, must be allowed and Appeals No. 157 and 159 of 1918, dismissed. The result will be that the plaintiffs suit is dismissed with costs in both Courts. One set of costs to defendant No. 1 and one to the other defendants Nos. 2 to 7. Defendant No. 13 must pay the costs of his appeal.

Shah, J.:— I agree.

48. Decree reversed.