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Vishvanath Ganesh Javdekar v. G.I.P. Railway

Bombay High Court
Mar 2, 1921
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, a pleader residing at Dhulia, purchased a third-class ticket for Bhusawal on 2 March 1917 and sat in a third-class compartment that, according to the plaint, was reserved for Europeans and Anglo-Indians. The Station Master allegedly asked him to leave the compartment; to avoid disturbance the plaintiff reluctantly left and took a seat in another compartment. He sued the Railway Company for Rs. 5 as damages and for a perpetual injunction preventing the Company from preventing him from entering a compartment reserved for Europeans and Anglo-Indians.

The defendant Railway Company, by written statement, contended that the suit was not maintainable and that the civil Court lacked jurisdiction. The Company admitted some factual allegations but alleged that the plaintiff had entered the compartment intentionally and with companions, asserting that he sought removal in order to bring suit.

At trial, two issues were framed: (1) whether the question of the Railway Company's right to reserve a separate compartment for Europeans and Anglo-Indians could be tried by the Court; and (2) whether the Court's jurisdiction was barred under section 41 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890. The trial Judge found the first issue negatively and the second affirmatively and dismissed the suit. The lower appellate Court confirmed the decree. The appeal to the present Court was dismissed with costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the civil Court could try the question of the defendant Railway Company's right to reserve a separate compartment for Europeans and Anglo-Indians.
  2. Whether the jurisdiction of the civil Court was barred by section 41 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890, insofar as the complaint alleged a contravention of Chapter V (Traffic Facilities) of that Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Section 42(1) of the Indian Railways Act has nothing to do with passenger traffic and deals only with carriage of goods, animals and rolling-stock; i.e., the words "receiving, forwarding, and delivering traffic" should not be applied to human beings.
  • The reservation could not be considered an undue or unreasonable preference because it was not reserved for particular named passengers but for the benefit of any European or Anglo-Indian who might wish to travel; therefore such reservation was legitimate.
  • Reference to sections 64, 67 and 69 and section 109 was made to support the proposition that the Company has express powers to reserve accommodation (including reservations for females under s.64) and to penalize passengers entering reserved compartments (s.109), implying an incidental power to reserve for particular classes who may want to travel.

Respondent (Defendant Railway Company's) Arguments

  • If the plaintiff had any grievance it was in consequence of an undue or unreasonable preference or advantage being given to a particular class of persons under section 42(2), and in that situation the plaintiff's remedy was to apply to the Governor-General in Council to have the matter referred to the Railway Commissioners under section 36 (i.e., procedure in Chapter V), not to sue in ordinary civil Court.
  • The reservation of a compartment for Europeans and Anglo-Indians amounted to giving a preference or advantage to such persons; if that preference was undue or unreasonable, it would be contrary to the powers of a railway administration and thus fall within Chapter V's scheme for administrative redress rather than civil litigation.
  • The Company alleged that the plaintiff intentionally entered the reserved compartment, knowing he had no right to be there, with the desire that he would be removed and thus enable litigation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Emperor v. Brijbasi Lal Discussed the applicability of sections 42 and 43 of the Indian Railways Act to the reservation of a carriage for a particular class of travellers; involved a criminal charge under section 109 for entering a reserved compartment. The present Court considered that case. Although some passages in that decision were cited as suggesting that sections 42 and 43 might not apply to passenger-reservation matters, the Court here concluded that the definition of "traffic" in section 3 includes passengers and therefore section 42 does apply to passenger carriage; the Court rejected a narrow reading that would exclude passenger reservations.
Thradas v. Secretary of State Addressed a directly similar question (removal from a carriage reserved for Europeans) and discussed whether the reservation constituted an undue or unreasonable preference under section 42. The present opinion notes that the question was directly in point in that case and cites a passage indicating a learned Judge held that the Court could consider and express an opinion on whether there had been undue or unreasonable preference under section 42. The present Court considered that authority in its analysis of jurisdiction under Chapter V.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis focuses on the statutory scheme of the Indian Railways Act, 1890, in particular Chapter V (headed "Traffic Facilities"), sections 41 and 42, and the definition of "traffic" in section 3.

Key steps in the Court's reasoning:

  1. The Court identified the pivotal statutory provision, section 41, which (subject to exceptions in the Act) bars suits or proceedings in respect of anything done or omitted by a railway administration in violation or contravention of any provision of Chapter V or any order made thereunder by the Commissioners or by a High Court. The question whether the Railway Company's reservation of a compartment contravened Chapter V therefore implicated the ouster of civil jurisdiction under section 41.
  2. The Court examined section 42. Section 42(1) imposes a general duty on a railway administration to afford reasonable facilities for receiving, forwarding and delivering traffic. Section 42(2) prohibits making or giving any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person or any particular description of traffic, or subjecting any person or description of traffic to undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage.
  3. The appellant's argument that section 42(1) does not apply to passenger traffic was considered and rejected. The Court relied on the statutory definition of "traffic" in section 3, which includes passengers, and thus held that the wording of section 42 can and does encompass passenger carriage. The Court therefore concluded that section 42's limitation on giving undue or unreasonable preference applies to passenger reservations as well as to goods and rates.
  4. The Court reviewed earlier authorities (including Emperor v. Brijbasi Lal and Thradas v. Secretary of State) cited by the parties. While those authorities were considered, the Court expressly declined to accept a narrow interpretation that would exclude passenger reservations from the scope of section 42.
  5. Given that the plaintiff's substantive complaint was that the Railway Company had no legal right to reserve the compartment for Europeans and Anglo-Indians (a complaint that, if accepted, would mean the reservation constituted an undue or unreasonable preference under section 42), the Court concluded that the proper remedy under the Act is administrative: application to the Governor-General in Council, who may refer complaints to the Railway Commissioners pursuant to the procedures in Chapter V.
  6. Because the plaintiff's claim necessarily raised a question of whether the railway administration had violated Chapter V, the Court held that the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil Courts was ousted by section 41 in respect of that issue. The ancillary question—whether the railway officials were justified in ordering the plaintiff to leave the compartment—depended on the legality of the reservation and thus also fell outside civil jurisdiction.
  7. Both Macleod, C.J., and Shah, J., adopted this statutory and purposive approach: they treated section 42(2) as placing a public-law limitation on railway powers with an administrative remedy, and they rejected arguments that would confine the statutory protection to goods or rate disputes only.

Note: Portions of the source opinion contain transcription gaps or illegible fragments (marked in the source by "???"). This summary does not supply missing wording and confines itself to the intelligible material in the opinion.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The appeal is dismissed with costs.

Direct implications set out in the opinion:

  • The civil Courts lack jurisdiction to try questions that concern alleged violations or contraventions of Chapter V (Traffic Facilities) of the Indian Railways Act, 1890, by a railway administration where the complaint raises the issue of undue or unreasonable preference or advantage under section 42; section 41 operates to bar such suits.
  • The remedy for a person aggrieved by an alleged undue or unreasonable preference or prejudice in respect of railway traffic (including passenger traffic) is to apply to the Governor-General in Council so that the matter may be referred to the Railway Commissioners as provided by Chapter V.
  • Because the question whether the railway administration lawfully reserved the compartment is outside the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil Courts, any related question—such as the legality of an order by railway officials to require the plaintiff to leave the compartment—also falls outside civil jurisdiction and must be addressed through the statutory remedy.

The opinion does not purport to set out a new rule beyond its interpretation and application of the statute; its practical effect in this case is the dismissal of the plaintiff's civil suit and the direction that the statutory administrative route is the appropriate forum for the grievance asserted.

Show all summary ...

Macleod, C.J:— The plaintiff in this case is a pleader residing at Dhulia.

2. On the 2nd March, 1917, he took a third class ticket for Bhusawal at the Dhulia Station. He took his seat naturally, so the plaint says, in the third class compartment reserved for Europeans and Anglo-Indians of the railway train which was to start from Dhulia on the same evening. The Station Mister thereafter illegally asked the plaintiff to quit the carriage on the ground that the said compartment was reserved by the Railway Company foe Europeans and Anglo-Indians. The plaintiff, thereupon, in order to avoid disturbance, reluotanbly gob out of the carriage and took his seat in another compartment. He then filed this suit to recover from the defendant Railway Company Rs. 5 as damages and for a perpetual injunction restraining the Railway Company from preventing the plaintiff from entering a compartment of a railway carriage reserved for Europeans and Anglo-Indians. The defendant Company by its written statement contended that the suit was act maintainable and that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain it. The Company admitted the contents of the first clause of para 1 to the plaint to be substantially correct, but alleged that the plaintiff was in the compartment with two other companions and denied the plaintiff's allegation that he took his seat naturally in the compartment. The Company further alleged that the plaintiff intentionally entered the compartment well knowing that he had no right to go there and with the desire that the railway officials would remove him so as to enable him to bring the suit.

3. The first issue was, whether the question of the defendant Railway Company's right to reserve a separate compartment for Europeans and Anglo-Indians could be tried by the Court. The second issue was, whether the jurisdiction of the Court was barred under section 41 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890. The learned trial Judge found the first issue in the negative, the second issue, in the affirmative, and dismissed the suit. In appeal the decree of the lower Court was confirmed. It will be seen that the only issue in the lower appellate Court was the issue of jurisdiction. The defendant contended that section 41 of the Act did apply. That section says:—

“Except as provided in this Act, no suit shall be instituted of proceeding taken Ion anything done or any omission made by a railway administration in violation or contravention of any provision of this Chapter or of any order made thereunder by the Commissioners or by a High Court.”

4. The following sections in Chapter V are headed “Traffic Facilities.”

5. Under section 42 (1):—

“Every railway administration shall, according to its powers, afford all reasonable facilities foe the receiving, forwarding and delivering of traffic upon and from the several railways belonging to or worked, by it and for the return of rolling-stook.”

6. Under section 42(2)

“A railway administration shall not make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to or in favour of any particular person or railway administration, or any particular description of traffic, in any expect whatsoever; or subject any particular person or railway administration or any particular description of traffic to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever.”

7. The defendant Company contended that if the plaintiff had any grievance at all it was on account of undue or unreasonable preference or advantage being given to a particular class of persons and in that case the plaintiff's only remedy was to apply to the Governor General in Council to refer the case to the Commissioners appointed by the act under section 36. It would certainly seem clear that the Railway Company by reserving a compartment for the use of any European or Anglo India who might wish to travel by that trail would be giving a preference or advantage to such persons, and if that advantage cl preference could be considered undue ??? unreasonable, then it would be contrary the powers given to the railway administration. Then the provisions of section 4 come into operation and the jurisdiction the Court to try that question is barred.

8. The appellant's pleader endeavored get out of that difficulty by arguing the section 42(1) has nothing whatever to with passenger traffic. It only deals we the traffic consisting of the carriage animals and goods because the ??? “receiving, forwarding, and delivering traffic” are not words which can or ought be applied to human beings.

9. However if we burn to section 3, term ‘traffic’ includes rolling-stook every description—passengers, as well animals and goods. Therefore section clearly deals with the carriage of passing it would appear from the decision Emperor v. Brijbasi Lal (1) that learned Judges were of opinion 1 sections 42 and 43 of the Act have application to the case of the reserve of a particular carriage for the use of particular class of the travelling ??? That, however, was a criminal case which the accused was charged having wilfully entered a third compartment which was reserved be railway authorities for Europeans Anglo-Indians only. The accused convicted under section 109 of the in Railways Act. There the question which now before as did ??? arise although is be argument a point was taken that such reservation was a “preference” forbidden ??? sections 42 and 43 of the Act. Mr. ??? Walsh in his judgment says: “In our view this contention is hardly worthy ??? notice. The sections referred to belong ??? a chapter of the Act which deals with ??? traffic and rates charged upon traders, ??? a special tribunal is appointed for the ??? of the questions thereunder.” Piggott, J., at page 333 says:— “As regards he argument addressed to us based upon he wording of section 42(2) of the same lob, I think it is to be noted that this action occurs in a chapter specially ??? to the question of the duties ??? upon railway companies and the ??? of the ??? to be exercised over job companies by the Government the country,” As I have pointed out, with all due respect, it does seem that section 42 deals not only with goods ??? the rates charged to traders bob also with the traffic by the carriage of human ???. I may also point out that the ??? “rate” which is used in section 42 defined in section 3 as including any ??? charged or payment made for any ??? animals or goods. The argent, therefore, that section 42 does not ??? to the reservation by the railway ??? of a compartment for a ??? class of passengers must fail.

10. ??? question was directly in point in thradas v. Secretary of State (2). This were exactly similar except that in the case the plaintiff had to be removed a the carriage. At page 45 appears the ??? passage:

We have no doubt that the learned Judge was ??? fight in holding section to be a but ay consideration by him of the question that the reservation of the second class ??? for Europeans was or was not undue or reasonable preference under Section 42 of the Railways Act IX of 1890. The Railway ??? as carriers of passengers would no doubt been at liberty to set apart whatever ??? they might choose for the carriage various classes of their passengers apart limitation imposed by Statute…It is clearly open to this Court either in its jurisdiction district or a High Court in view of the above Ions contained in sections 26 to 41 of the ??? to consider or express any opinion what ??? the question whether there has been any or unreasonable preference within the meaning of section 42 of Chapter V of the Railways Act IX of 1890.”

11. The only other point argued for the appellant is that this reservation of a compartment by the Railway company could not be considered as an act of undue or unreasonable preference, because it was not reserved for any particular passengers but only reserved for the benefit of any European or Anglo-Indian who might happen to be travelling or might want to travel by that ??? from some intermediate station. A reference has been made to sections 64, 67 and 69. Undoubtedly under section 64 the company is given express power to reserve in every train carrying passengers one compartment at least for the exclusive use of females. Bab farther the company has power to reserve accommodation for the case of particular passengers. Because under section 109, a passenger having entered a compartment which is so reserved may be punished with a fine, and unless it can be said that the company has no power to reserve accommodation for such passengers as have already informed the company that they wish to travel by a particular brain, then it must follow that the company have the power to reserve accommodation for a particular class of passengers who may want to travel on the line. The only question would be whether such reservation was an undue or unreasonable preference or advantage in favour of a particular class. It seems to me, therefore, perfectly clear that the decisions of the lower Courts on the issue with regard to jurisdiction were correct and that the plaintiff's suit must fail.

12. The appeal is dismissed with costs.

Shah, J.:— I desire to state briefly the grounds upon which, I think, the jurisdiction of the civil Courts is ousted in this case. The plaintiff filed this suit to recover Rs. 5 as damages and for an injunction against the Railway Company on the ground that he was illegally asked by the Railway Company to leave the compartment, which was reserved for Europeans and Anglo-Indians, and which, he alleged, he had lawfully entered. His main complaint in the suit was that the Bail way Company had no legal right to reserve the compartment in the manner in which it had been reserved on that particular occasion.

13. It is common ground that there is do rule framed under section 47 of the Indian Railways Act, entitling the Railway Company to reserve the compartment in that manner.

14. If there had been each a rule there would have been no question an to the legality of the act of the Railway Company in reserving the compartment. In the absence of any such rule, the question as to whether the Railway Company has any power to reserve a compartment for the advantage of any particular class of passengers would necessarily arise. It appears from the provisions of section 41 of the Indian Railways Act that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is ousted where the act or omission of the railway administration in question is said to be in violation or contravention of any provision of Chapter V of the Act. In the Chapter under the sub-heading “Traffic Facilities”, by section 42(2) it is provided that:

“A railway administration shall not make of give any endue or unreasonable preference or advantage to of in favour of any particular person or railway administration, or any particular description of traffic, in any respect whatsoever, or subject any particular person or railway administration or any particular description of traffic to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever.”

15. Under the definition of the word “traffic” “passenger traffic” is included; and according to the grammatical and plain meaning of the words used, it seems to me that section 42(2) clearly lays down a limitation upon the general powers of the railway administration, and requires the administration not to show any such unreasonable or undue preference as is referred to in that sub-section.

16. The principal question in this suit in substance is whether in reserving the compartment in the manner in which it was reserved, the railway administration showed any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular description of passenger traffic. That is a question in respect of which, the provisions of this Chapter of the Indian Railways Act show that the proper remedy for the person aggrieved is to apply to the Governor General in Council, who can refer the complaint to the Railway Commission as provided in that Chapter.

17. It has been argued on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant here in the hope of saving this suit that section 42 does not apply to passenger traffic. It seems to me that agreement cannot be allowed. Sub-section (2) of section 42 lays down, in my opinion, a limitation in the interests of the public at large upon the powers of the railway administration; and it would not be right to restrict the scope of that limitation unless it were clearly justified by the words of the section. In Emperor v. Brijbasi Lal it is suggested that section 42 would not apply to such reservation for controlling the passenger traffic. But after a careful consideration of the arguments advanced in this case and of the provisions of the Act I am unable to accept the view. It is not justified by the definition of the word “traffic” as used in the Act, and it may involve an undue restriction of the proper scope of the limitation contained in sub-section (2) upon the powers of the railway administration.

18. In this case the question which the plaintiff seeks to raise is whether the railway administration had power to show any preference for a particular class ??? passengers. It is his case that the preference shown to Europeans and Anglo Indians was either undue or unreasonabl and that there was a corresponding prejudice or disadvantage to him and other passengers. That is a question, in respect of which the jurisdiction of the ordinal Civil Courts is taken away by the Act, are I express no opinion whatever as to the merits of that question. If the plaint really thinks that in reserving the compartment for Europeans and Anglo-Indian an undue or unreasonable preference advantage was given to a class of passenge his proper remedy is, as I have stated, apply to the Governor-General in Corn in order that the complaint may be de with by the Commissioners under Chapter. The further question as to the power the railway authorities to call upon plaintiff to leave the compartment, ??? according to him, be had lawfully ??? in the suit. This question re depends upon the other question ??? the Railway administration had power reserve the compartment. If the ??? was legal, undoubtedly the order leave the compartment was legal. If the other hand, the railway administer had no legal power to reserve the compartment, the order by the railway ??? to the plaintiff to leave the compartment would not be legal. As I have ??? out, the question as to the legality of reservation is outside the scope of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts. It follows that the question whether the railway administration acted within its legal rights is asking the plaintiff to leave the compartment also must be taken to fall outside the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts.

19. I may add that where any such conflict between any member of the travelling public and the railway administration arises, as in the present case, it is desirable for the railway administration, apart from the remedy which a particular individual may have under Chapter V, to have proper rates under section 47 with a view to put an end to the possibility of any difference arising between the administration and the public as to its legal powers. I agree that the appeal should be dismissed with costs.

20. Appeal dismissed.