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Parshotam Ganpat Gujar v. Venichand Ganpat Gujar

Bombay High Court
Sep 1, 1920
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This suit was brought by a posthumous son of Ganapat (the plaintiff) through his next friend, seeking a declaration that the defendant was not an adopted son of Ganapat and that the adoption was invalid because the defendant was an orphan at the time of adoption.

Relevant chronology, as stated in the opinion: Ganapat died in 1906 leaving his widow Mainabai pregnant. On 12th October 1906 Mainabai adopted the defendant. In February 19070 the plaintiff was born. Mainabai died in 1908 leaving a will appointing Vishnu Vinayak as manager during the plaintiff's minority. The suit was filed in 1913 by Vishnu Vinayak as next friend of the then-minor plaintiff (aged six).

The Subordinate Judge found as a matter of fact that the infant's estate had been mismanaged and that the defendant had interfered with the estate's management; the defendant claimed to manage the estate as a co-parcener. The trial Court framed three main issues (set out below) and found all three in the affirmative, dismissing the plaintiff's suit. The first appellate Court confirmed that decision.

In the second appeal the High Court remanded the case to allow the defendant-respondent to adduce additional evidence bearing on the question of the custom alleged (application of 1914 for evidence to be taken on commission), and recast Issue 3 as: "Whether the custom of adopting an orphan among Jains in Western India is established as a valid custom?" Further evidence was taken pursuant to the remand; the Subordinate Judge and thereafter the Assistant Judge held that the custom was duly proved. The matter proceeded through multiple hearings and ultimately came before the present Court for final hearing in second appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Is the adoption of the defendant valid?
  2. If so, is it proved?
  3. Can the defendant set up a custom of Swayamdatta (orphan adoption among Jains), and if yes, is that custom proved? (Recast by the High Court as: "Whether the custom of adopting an orphan among Jains in Western India is established as a valid custom?")

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's (Appellant's) Arguments

  • The adoption was invalid because the defendant was an orphan at the time of adoption, and under the applicable law such an adoption would be a nullity.
  • The plaintiff (through his next friend) challenged the defendant's management of the estate and contended the adoption should not be recognized; there was antagonism between Vishnu Vinayak (next friend/manager) and the defendant which motivated the challenge.
  • The Advocate General for the appellants principally attacked the finding of the lower Courts by arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove the antiquity of the alleged custom permitting orphan adoption among Jains (i.e., the instances were too recent to establish the necessary antiquity).

Defendant's (Respondent's) Arguments

  • The defendant asserted that he was validly adopted and relied on a custom (referred to as Swayamdatta) permitting the adoption of orphans among certain Jain communities in Western India.
  • The defendant sought leave (via application in 1914) to have additional evidence taken on commission to prove the custom, and claimed the right to adduce all evidence bearing on that question.
  • The defendant had also asserted a right to manage the estate as a co-parcener and relied on instances and judicial decisions to support recognition of the custom in issue.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bhagvandas Tejmal v. Rajmal Discussed the requirements for establishing a special custom among Jains that deviates from Hindu law—particularly antiquity and invariability and the need for clear and unambiguous evidence. The Court treated the Chief Justice's remarks as pertinent and binding unless modified; used the case as primary authority on the legal attributes required for a special usage to be recognized among Jains.
Sheokuarbai v. Jeoraj Privy Council: Jains generally follow Hindu law and Hindu rules of adoption apply to them in the absence of some contrary usage. Cited to support the proposition that, absent a proved contrary custom, Hindu adoption rules apply to Jains.
Hashim Ali v. Abdul Rahman What is required to establish a special usage is a question of law. Used to frame the inquiry that establishing a special usage is a legal question for the Court.
Ramalakhmi Ammal v. Sivananantha Perumal Privy Council: special usages modifying ordinary law must be ancient, invariable, and established by clear and unambiguous evidence. Quoted as authoritative statement of the high standard of proof ordinarily required to establish a special usage deviating from ordinary law.
Rup Chand v. Jambu Prasad Privy Council: whether a custom is established is principally a question of fact determinable on the evidence in the case; limited local evidence may be unsatisfactory as a precedent but sufficient between the parties. Relied upon to support that modern instances and limited evidence can suffice to prove a custom for the purposes of the parties before the Court, even if the precedent is not ideal for wider application.
Chiman Lal v. Hari Chand Privy Council: evidence supporting a local/customary deviation from Hindu law may be limited but still sufficient to validate an adoption between the parties concerned. Used to show that somewhat limited evidence has been accepted previously as sufficient between parties and to support validation of orphan adoption in a similar context.
King v. Joliffe; Brocklebank v. Thompson Principle that instances of practice over a period can give rise to a presumption that parties acted according to an immemorial usage; linking present practice with past traditions. Cited to support the proposition that repeated instances over time may create a presumption of established custom, reducing the need for textual or expert corroboration in some circumstances.
Sheo Singh Rai v. Dakho Privy Council recognition that Jains could prove customs differing from ordinary Hindu law and that evidence supporting such customs should not be unreasonably excluded. Relied upon to show willingness of higher courts to recognize Jain-specific deviations from Hindu adoption law when properly proved.
Asharfi Kunwar v. Rup Chand Discussed the historical distinctness of Jains from orthodox Hindu practices and the practical difficulty of finding documentary records among certain Jain communities; suggested the onus of proof for restrictions on adoption rests on the party asserting them. Used to justify that lack of documentary records is not fatal and to support treating judicial recognitions of local Jain customs as relevant; assisted the Court in accepting limited, recent instances as probative.
Manak Chand v. Munna Lal Example of judicial recognition of orphan adoption among Jains (Agarwalas of Delhi). Presented as an instance supporting the existence of the custom alleged in the present case.
Harnabh Pershad v. Mandil Dass Held that judicial decisions recognizing a disputed custom among Jains in one place are relevant as evidence of the same custom among Jains in another place, absent showing the customs differ. Applied to justify reliance on decisions from other localities as evidentially relevant to the Jains of the present case.
Muhammad Kamil v. Imtiaz Fatima Privy Council (cited): whether a custom is proved is mainly a question of fact. Supported the Court's view that proof of custom is primarily factual and that appellate interference is limited to legal sufficiency of evidence.
Kailash Chandra Datta v. Padmakisore Roy Held that whether the facts found prove the essential attributes of a custom is a question of law (open in second appeal), while whether such facts are proved is a question of fact. Adopted to limit the scope of inquiry in second appeal to legal sufficiency of evidence for the custom, rather than re-weighing factual findings.
Bai Shirnibai v. Kharshedji Similar proposition (by this Court) regarding the distinction between facts and legal questions in appeals about customs. Used to reinforce the Court's approach to scope of review in the present second appeal.
Manohar Lal v. Banarsi Das An instance where the supporting evidence for a custom did not go back beyond some thirty to thirty-five years. Cited as analogous support showing that customs have been judicially recognized on evidence reaching back a few decades.
Ambalika Dasi v. Aparna Dasi Referenced regarding an older rule (Gray, C.J., 1831) that a usage of twenty years may raise a presumption of existence from time immemorial. Used to support the proposition that evidence of about twenty years (or more) may suffice to infer antiquity in the absence of rebutting evidence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through a sequence of legal and factual analyses, confined strictly to the scope permitted in a second appeal:

  1. Scope of review: The Court emphasized authorities (e.g., Rup Chand v. Jambu Prasad; Muhammad Kamil v. Imtiaz Fatima; Kailash Chandra Datta v. Padmakisore Roy; Bai Shirnibai v. Kharshedji) distinguishing questions of fact from questions of law. It held that while the existence of a custom as a legal attribute may be open to review, whether the evidence proves the facts is largely a factual question. Accordingly, the Court limited its role in second appeal to whether the lower Courts' finding in favour of the custom was based on legally sufficient evidence.
  2. Burden of proof and legal standard: The Court recognized the established principle (drawn from Bhagvandas Tejmal v. Rajmal and Ramalakhmi Ammal v. Sivananantha Perumal) that special usages which modify ordinary law require proof of antiquity and certainty by clear and unambiguous evidence. That rule was acknowledged as the starting point for assessing an alleged Jain custom.
  3. Particularities applicable to Jains: The Court considered later authorities (Sheo Singh Rai v. Dakho; Asharfi Kunwar v. Rup Chand; Chiman Lal v. Hari Chand) which qualify the strictness of Bhagvandas Tejmal by recognizing that Jains have distinct historical and practical characteristics: adoption among Jains is largely secular, Jains may not have ritual or textual bases for adoption customs, and certain Jain communities (e.g., Agarwalas) had been recognized as permitting orphan adoption in prior decisions. The Court considered these authorities relevant to assessing what evidence is realistic and probative in the Jain context.
  4. Evidential sufficiency and factors weighed: The Court weighed the nature and quantity of evidence produced in this case against the legal standards. Key considerations that the Court relied upon included:
    • The instances adduced in evidence went back some thirty-five years at the farthest, and cases in other decisions with similar temporal reach had been accepted (Manohar Lal; Asharfi Kunwar).
    • The small and decreasing population of Jains in the Bombay Presidency (census data cited in the opinion), the scattered nature of the Jain community, and low literacy among the class of Jains to which the parties belonged, made documentary records and earlier written evidence unlikely.
    • Judicial decisions recognizing the custom in one locality (e.g., Delhi, Punjab) are relevant and probative for another Jain locality unless it is shown the customs differ (Harnabh Pershad v. Mandil Dass).
    • Public policy favours the adoption of an orphan, which added weight to recognition of an orphan-adoption custom.
  5. Reconciling competing precedents and standards: The Court noted the tension between the strict requirement of antiquity in Bhagvandas and later decisions accepting more limited, modern instances as sufficient for the parties before the Court. It concluded that in the particular factual matrix (limited but consistent instances, supporting judicial precedents, social/demographic reasons for lack of early records, and public policy), a presumption of antiquity could reasonably be drawn from instances extending over about thirty years. The Court relied upon authorities that accept a twenty-year rule of thumb (Ambalika Dasi referencing Gray, C.J.) and similar holdings where evidence of some decades was deemed adequate.
  6. Final factual-legal synthesis: Applying the above, the Court held that although the evidence was limited and the interlocutory issue as originally framed by this Court was wider than necessary, the evidence adduced in the present case was legally sufficient between the parties to support the lower Courts' finding that a custom permitting orphan adoption among the relevant Jain community had been established, and that the defendant's adoption was valid.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED — The Court dismissed the second appeal and ordered costs against the appellants.

Direct consequences:

  • The finding of the lower Courts that the defendant's adoption was valid is upheld, and the plaintiff's suit is dismissed.
  • The defendant's status as an adopted son (as recognized by the lower Courts) stands for the parties and those claiming through them.

Broader implications noted by the Court:

  • The Court declined to expand its ruling into a broad affirmative finding that the custom exists universally among all Jains in Western India; it stressed the limited nature of the evidence and confined the decision to the sufficiency of evidence between the parties to this suit.
  • The opinion recognizes and applies existing precedent that in contexts where documentary records are unlikely (e.g., scattered or illiterate communities) instances extending over a few decades may suffice to raise a presumption of antiquity, but it does not purport to set a new, generalized precedent beyond this factual context.

This summary is compiled strictly from the text of the provided opinion. No information has been added that is not present in that opinion.

Show all summary ...

Macleod, C.J:— The plaintiff, * a posthumous son of one Ganapat Bhaichand, filed this suit through his next friend praying for a declaration that the defendant was not the adopted son of Ganapat and that his adoption was invalid as he was an orphan at the time of his adoption. Ganapat died in 1906 leaving his widow Mainabai pregnant. On the 12th October, 1906, she adopted the defendant. In February 19070 the plaintiff was born. Mainabai died in 1908 leaving a will whereby she appointed one Vishnu Vinayak at manager during the plaintiff's minority. This suit was filed in 1913 by Vishnu Vinayak purporting to act as next friend of the minor plaintiff then aged six. If Vishnu's allegations are correct, proceedings of some sort had become necessary owing to the conduct of the defendant in interfering with the management of the estate, and the learned Subordinate Judge found that as a matter of fact, whoever was to blame, the babe had been mismanaged. The defendant claimed to manage the estate as a co-parcener and there can be little doubt that the validity of defendants adoption was questioned by Vishnu owing to the antagonism between him and the defendant.

2. The main issues in the trial Court were—

1. Is the adoption of the defendant valid, and, it so

2. Is it proved?

3. Can defendant set up a custom of Swayamdatta, and if yes is it proved?

3. All these issues were found in the affirmative and the plaintiff's suit was dismissed. In first appeal this decision was confirmed.

4. In second appeal the High Court was of the opinion that the defendant-respondent should have an opportunity of adducing all the evidence, which was indicated in his application of 1914 for evidence to be taken on commission, bearing on the question of the custom alleged. This case, therefore, was remanded to the lower appellate Court to allow the defendant-respondent to have that evidence taken, leave being given to the plaintiff-appellant to give rebutting evidence. Issue 3 was recast as follows:—‘Whether the custom of adopting an orphan among Jains in Western India is established as a valid custom?’

5. Further evidence was taken in accordance with orders by the Subordinate Judge who held that the custom alleged was duly proved. The finding being certified to the lower appellate Court, the learned Assistant Judge after hearing arguments and scrutinsing the evidence agreed with the Subordinate Judge. The case after having been beard at different times before six Judges now comes before us for final hearing in second appeal.

6. The parties are Jains. Thera is no need to consider the numerous authorities on the question by what law the Jains are governed or the history of the origin of the Jain community and the nature of their religious belief. I need only refer to the judgment of Westropp, C.J in Bhagvandas Tejmal v. Rajmal (1).

7. As laid down in the most recent Privy Council decision in Sheokuarbai v. Jeoraj (2), “Jains have to generally adopted the Hindu Law that the Hindu rules of adoption are applied to them in the absence of some contrary usage.” What is required to establish a special usage deviating from the ordinary law is a question of law: Hashim Ali v. Abdul Rahman (3).

8. In Bhagvandas Tejmal v. Rajmal the special custom sought to be established was a custom amongst Jains to allow the adoption of a person when both the adoptive parents were dead, and the remarks of the learned Chief Justice on the question of law are binding on us unless it can be shown that by later decisions of a higher authority they have been in some way modified. Reference was made to the rule as to what is required to establish a special usage as laid down in Ramalakhmi Ammal v. Sivananantha Perumal (4) by the Privy Council.

“Their Lordships are folly sensible of the importance and justice of giving effect to long established usages existing in particular districts and families in India, but it is of the essence of special usages, modifying the ordinary law of succession that they should be ancient and invariable; and it is further essential that they should be established to be to by clear and unambiguous evidence 16. It only by means of such evidence that the Courts can be assured of their existence, and that they possess the conditions of antiquity and certainty on which alone their legal title to recognition depends.”

9. The Chief Justice then considered the argument which has been addressed to us that the Jains totally discard the Shradha ceremonies and disbelieve in their efficacy and pay little regard to sacrifice, which was fatal to the existence amongst Jains of the principal reason which rendered adoption almost indispensable to the mere orthodox Hindus when they were soniess, while the perpetuation of the name of the adopter, the only reason for adoption amongst Jains, would be a secondary and worldly motive amongst Hindus. The Chief Justice, therefore, considered there was in the case of Jains a stronger reason for not extending the right of adoption beyond that allowed by preceding and text law to Hindus at large then in the case of the orthodox believers in Hinduism. Then after considering the evidence the Chief Justice said:

“There are then but three perfect instance established in proof, and of these, the most remote happened less than a quarter of a century ago. It is Impossible to regard such cases as proof of an ancient, still less of an immemorial, custom, unsupported as they are, by a single text from any book…amongst the Jains themselves or amongst the Hindus at large, or by any Pandit, yati, priest at other expert. For these reasons, we are of opinion that the plaintiff has failed to prove the existence at any such deviation from the Hindu Law of this Presidency as he has asserted. The proceeding, which he says constituted an adoption, appears to us to have been a complete nullity, and not to be validated by the assent, although given, of the Panch of the caste, or of the senior members of it, in Ahmednagar to the transaction. They had no, power to establish any such custom, and could not clothe it with the antiquity which has not been proved, and which was essential to its legal existence.”

10. These remarks would appear to me most pertinent, but from the later cases which have come before the Courts in which it was sought to establish a custom, it seems to he no longer considered that the evidence of modern instances, which alone can he proved by oral evidence, cannot establish the custom, unless the Court is satisfied by the evidence of texts or experts that those instances have occurred in pursuance of a recognized custom, in order to link the present with the past.

11. In Rup Chand v. Jambu Prasad, (5), their Lordships of the Privy Council said:

“The question in the present case was…whether a custom applicable to the parties concerned and authorising the adoption of a married boy has been established. This is strictly speaking a pure question of fact determinable upon the evidence given in the case. It was strenuously contended that the evidence in the present case, limited as it is to a comparatively small number of centres of Jain population, was insufficient to establish a custom so wide as this, and that no narrower custom was either alleged or proved. In their Lordships' opinion there is great weight in these criticisms enough to make the present case an unsatisfactory precedent, if in any future instance fuller evidence regarding the alleged custom is forthcoming. But with regard to the relative rights of the parties in the present case who have had full opportunity of producing whatever evidence they desired to produce, the case was properly dealt with by the High Court upon the evidence before it.”

12. Again in Chiman Lal v. Hari Chand (6), their Lordships said:

“The evidence upon which it was found that the Agarwal Banias of zira do not in matters of adoption follow the general rules of Hindu Law and that by the custom applicable to them an unequivocal declaration of adoption, followed by subsequent treatment of the person as an adopted son, is sufficient to constitute a valid adoption, appears to their Lordships to have been somewhat limited, but their Lordships consider that, as between the parties to this suit and…appeal and those claiming through or under them, that evidence was sufficient to entitle the Chief Court and the Divisional Judge to find that the adoption was valid.”

13. If then, the evidence shows that for a certain number of years, and some cases appear to lay down as a useful guide a period of twenty years, there have been a number of instances in which the alleged custom has been recognised, the presumption arises that the parties concerned have acted in that manner, not from the desire to set up a new custom, but because they are acting in accordance with the tradition of immemorial usage King v. Joliffe (7) Brocklebank v. Thompson (8), and as long as texts are not cited and experts called to negative the alleged custom, it is unnecessary to cite texts or call experts to support it. I think it was unfortunate that the issue sent down by the High Court prescribed geographical limits which cannot be strictly defined and no doubt there would to some difficulty in holding that the evidence established that all the Jains in Western India, including at any rate the Presidency proper, recognized the custom set up by the defendant, considering that evidence was confined to a few instances in two or three districts in the Southern Mahratta Country and a few instances from the Idar State. On the other hand, it was open to the plaintiffs to call the evidence of Pandits and elders of the Jain community to show that the validity of orphan adoption was not recognized by them, and it is a significant fact that the evidence which they did call to negative the custom was, as pointed out by the learned Assistant Judge, not entitled to any credence whatever. Some of the witnesses had actually attested the adoption deed. The minor of course was too young, when the suit was instituted, to know what was being done in his name, and there is little doubt that the defendant's adoption was challenged owing to his own conduct in dealing with the estate, I do not think, therefore, that it would be safe to say that the issue sent down by the High Court should be found in the affirmative, but I think it may be said that the evidence was sufficient as between the parties to the suit and those claiming through and under them to entitle the Court below to dismiss the plaintiff's suit. The appeal is dismissed with costs.

Fawcett, J.:— In Bhagvandas Tejmal v. Rajmal , it was laid down that, when, in the case of Jains, some custom different from the normal Hindu law and usage is alleged to exist, the burden of establishing its antiquity and invariability is placed on the party averring its existence, and it should be proved by clear and unambiguous evidence above suspicion. This case gave very little encouragement to the idea that Jaine in this Presidency had any custom differing from ordinary Hindu law. But it was pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Sheo Singh Rai v. Dakho (9 & 10) that the custom alleged in Bhagvandas Tejmal v. Rajmal being a custom entirely opposed to the spirit of Hindu law of adoption, would undoubtedly require strong evidence for its support, and that if would be un-reasonable to exclude Jains from the ordinary liberty of proving special customs. Accordingly they held that the question whether among the sect of the Jaine known as Saraogi Agarwalas a sonless widow could adopt without permission from her husband or consent of his kinsmen and whether she could adopt the daughter's son was one which had been rightly held to be proved by the evidence given in that case. It is now fully recognized that among the Jains adoption is a mere temporal or secular arrangement and has no spiritual or religious object or significance; and consequently several variations from the ordinary Hindu law have been judicially upheld as valid among them. In Asharfi Kunwar v. Rup Chand (11) the Court in its judgment says

“In view of the fact that the Jains dissented from Hinduism more than two and a ball centuries ago, (sic should be “2½ millennia”) at a time when, so far as the authorities go, no trace of the restriction of marriage existed in the matter of adoption, and seeing that in primitive times the practice of adoption bad no religious basis; also in view of the tact, which is admitted, that the practice of adoption amongst the Jains is necessarily unlike that observed amongst the Brahmine and Vaishiyas, as we have already pointed out, it might be thought that the onus at proving the existence of a restriction upon adoption in the case of the Jains such as prevails amongst Hindus proper lay upon the party making this assertion.’

14. Such an assumption cannot of course prevail in view of the ruling of the Privy Council that in the case of Jains it rests on the party alleging a custom or practice at variance with that of orthodox Hindus to prove his allegation. But if the recognition of the different stand-point that governs adoption in the case of Jains from that applying in the case of orthodox Hindus cannot go so far as is suggested in the passage I have just quoted, yet it seems to me that in this case the Court may legitimately give due weight to the fact that the restriction against the adoption of orphans imposed by Hindu law would not naturally operate in the case of Jains. That restriction follows from the rule of Hindu law that only a father or mother can give in adoption and that there must be a giving and taking of the adopted son. But as among the Jains adoption is purely a secular institution, the reason for such a restriction disappears: and the ceremony of giving and taking may be dispensed with: Chiman Lal v. Hari Chand . We have the further fact that in the last mentioned case an adoption of orphans has been recognized as valid in the case of Agarwala Banias by the Chief Court of the Punjab and the Privy Council. As pointed out in the judgment of the lower Court, it is quite clear that the Agarwalas there referred to are Jains; and such Agarwala Jains figure also in Sheo Singh Rai v. Dakho (10) and Asharfi Kunwar v. Rup Chand . Another case in which an orphan adoption has been judicially upheld is that of Manak Chand v. Munna Lal (12) where the parties were Jains of Delhi belonging to the Agarwalas sect. As remarked by the District Judge in the first judgment of the lower Court, it is not improbable that the Jains of Idar State, whence the parties in this suit come, would follow the customs of Delhi rabher then those obtaining in Southern India. Steele in his Law and Custom of Indian Castes, page 97, states that the Jains in the Southern Mahratta Country came originally from near Delhi. These decisions therefore support the customs alleged in this case. The Jains are a scattered community, and in Harnabh Pershad v. Mandil Dass (13), it was held that judicial decisions recognizing the existence of a disputed custom amongst the Jains of one place are very relevant as evidence of the existence of the same custom among the Jains of another place, unless of course it is shown that the customs are different. This applies with considerable force to the present case in view of the probability that the southern Mahratta Jains originally came from the vicinity of the locality where the alleged custom has been held to exist. Also, so are as public policy affects the matter, there can be no question that it favours he adoption of an orphan.

15. In the case before us the two lower Courts have held the alleged custom pernitting the adoption of orphans to be stablished as a valid one. The main question is whether there is sufficient round for our interfering with this finding ??? second appeal. The Privy Council have fore than once held that, whether a ??? is proved, is mainly a question of act. Cf. Muhammad Kamil v. Imtiaz Fatima (14) and Rup Chand v. Jambu Prasad . Accordingly in Kailash Chandra Datta v. Padmakisore Roy (15) it was held, on a review of all the authorities, that the question whether the facts found in any given instance prove the existence of the essential attributes of the custom or usage is a question of law which might bediscussed in second appeal, while the question; whether such a state of facts has been proved by the evidence is merely a question of fact. A case in which the same view was taken by this Court is that of Bai Shirnibai v. Kharshedji (16). Therefore, in my opinion, the only question we can enter into in this appeal is whether the finding in favour of the custom is based on legal and sufficient evidence. The legal attributes of a custom on which stress is laid in Bhagvandas v. Rajmal, (9) are antiquity and invariability; but the later of these has no application to the present case. As is pointed cut in the first judgment of the lower Court, Jaine do not invariably adopt orphans, and there is no question of an invariable custom such as, for instance, primogeniture. The learned Advocate General for the appellants has mainly attacked the finding of the lower Courts on the grounds that the evidence is not sufficient to prove the antiquity of the alleged custom. The oldest instance of adoption regarding which evidence has been given in this case is one that book place some thirty-five years ago, and it is contended that the instances were boa recent to establish the alleged custom. But in dealing with this question there are two circumstances which must be given due weight. The first is that the Jains in the Bombay Presidency are a small community whose number has been decreasing of recent years. In the Census of India, 1911, Vol. VII, Part I, page 56, it is stated that the followers of Jainism showed a decrease in numbers of 20,000 in the decade of 1891–1901 and this falling of has continued and appreciably increased so that they then numbered 44,000 less than in 1901, a decrement of 9 per cent. As already mentioned Jains are not obliged to adopt orphans, and therefore I agree with the learned District Judge in the Court below that it is unreasonable to expect numerous instances in support of the alleged custom. Then we have the further fact that the class of Jains to which the parties in this suit belong consists of petty traders or oultivatora, who are generally illiterate. In the Census Report, to which I have already referred, it is stated, at page 140, that the ratio of liberate Jains in the Karnatak is only 188 males and 7 females par thousand of each sex, and it is added that “the Jains in the Karnatak are indistinguishable both in appearance and dress from the local cultivators, and the comparatively low ratio of literacy is due to racial causes.” It follows that they are not likely to keep records of family matters such as adoption in past generations; and in Asharfi Kunwar v. Rup Chand , the Court pointed out that it could not expect to find records of adoptions in the case of Jains such as might be met with in the case of Iand-owners. Therefore it is not surprising that the only evidence in support of the custom adduced in the present case consists of instances that have occurred within the present generation. Similarly in the cases of Manohar Lal v. Banarsi Das (17) and Asharfi Kunwar v. Rup Chand , where the custom of adoption of a married man was held established, the instances adduced do not appear from the judgment to have gone back beyond some thirty to thirty-five years. In Chiman Lal v. Hari Chand , where the adoption of the plaintiff who was an orphan and married was held valid, the evidence is stated in their Lordships judgment to be “somewhat limited,” Halsbury's Laws of England Vol. X, Article 442, at page 234 says that as a general rule proof of the existence of the custom, as far back as living witnesses can remember, is treated, in the absence of any sufficient rebutting evidence, as proving the existence of the custom from time immemorial, and that evidence of the existence of the alleged custom for a period of twenty years may be sufficient to warrant a Court in finding as a fact the existence of the custom from time immemorial. A similar rule was applied to Hindu usages by Gray, C.J in a judgment delivered so long ago as 1831, a quotation from which is given in Boy's Customs and Customary Law, in British India at pages 27 and 28, and which is referred to in Ambalika Dasi v. Aparna Dasi (18). In that case he held that it was sufficient in Calcutta to go back to 1773, and that “a usage for twenty years may raise a presumption, in the absence of direct evidence, of a usage existing beyond the period of legal memory.” Accordingly and in view of the strong antecedent probability in favour of the adoption of such a custom by for reasons already given, I think, a presumption arises in favour of the antiquity of a custom, of which instances extending over a period of some thirty years are forth coming, I agree, therefore, with the learned Chief Justice in holding that there is no sufficient ground for our differing from the view taken by the two lower Courts that the adoption of the defendant was valid. In view, however, of the limited nature of the evidence adduced in the present case, I also agree that the issue which was framed in this Court's interlocutory judgment of 18th November 1918, which is unnecessarily wide for the purpose of deciding this case, cannot be answered entirely in the affirmative. But as the evidence adduced in the present casa was sufficient as between the parties to the suit to entitle the Courts below to dismiss the plaintiff's suit, I concur in dismissing the appeal with costs.

16. Appeal dismissed.