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Bhagwat Koer v. Dhanukdari Prasad Singh
Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
These are consolidated appeals arising from three decrees of the High Court of Calcutta dated 22 May 1913. Two of those decrees affirmed decrees of the First Subordinate Judge of Saran (17 March and 12 May 1910), while the third modified a decree of the same Court dated 18 July 1910.
The disputes arise from the succession to property of three Hindu brothers governed by Mitakshara law: Srikishan Singh, Bachchu Singh and Jugalkishore Singh. Jugalkishore died 5 July 1872 leaving a widow Mussummat Anandi Koer and no issue; Srikishan died 18 July 1872 leaving a widow and two daughters; Bachchu died 9 February 1874 leaving a son Mahabir Singh.
After Jugalkishore's death Bachchu applied under Act XXVII of 1860 for a certificate to collect debts due to Jugalkishore's estate, asserting the brothers were joint and that he was survivor. Anandi opposed on the ground of an alleged 1864 partition. The District Judge decided there had been no partition and granted a certificate to Mahabir. Anandi, through her brother/attorney, accepted that decision and executed an agreement dated 17 May 1874 by which she agreed, in consideration of maintenance allotted to her, not to contest the matter, after which Mahabir took possession.
Mahabir died 21 June 1894 leaving two widows (one posthumous daughter was born to one widow). He left a will dated 20 December 1894. His widows and a purported adoption (17 February 1906) by the surviving widow Bhagwat Koer of Kagheshwar Indar Sahi as son were among the issues later litigated.
The plaintiff in the three suits, Dhanukhdhari Prashad Singh, as nearest reversionary heir, sued in 1907 to establish rights to the estates; the three suits (Nos. 198, 199 and 200 of 1907) raised distinct causes of action concerning (a) validity of the adoption, (b) construction of the will and the plaintiff's right to possession/reversionary relief, and (c) whether an 1864 partition occurred and the legal effect of the 1874 agreements. The First Subordinate Judge decided variously in each suit and the High Court affirmed or modified those decrees; the present opinion is the Board's consideration on appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the power of adoption conferred by paragraph 4 of Mahabir's will ever arose, given the posthumous birth of a daughter, and whether the subsequent adoption of Kagheshwar was valid.
- How paragraph 3 of Mahabir's will should be construed: whether the widows had life estates only (as guardians/managers) or broader proprietory rights, and whether the plaintiff was entitled to immediate possession or to a declaration of reversionary right under the Specific Relief Act.
- Whether the alleged partition of 1864 between the three brothers occurred (including the ownership status of certain Gya properties), and whether the ekrarnamas of 17 May 1874 executed on behalf of Anandi amounted to a valid relinquishment/surrender of her proprietary rights in favour of Mahabir (or were void for want of agent authority or corruption).
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's Arguments
- (Suit No. 200) The plaintiff contended that paragraph 4's power of adoption was contingent on no child (male or female) being born to the testator; because a daughter was born (even posthumously), the power of adoption never arose and the adoption of Kagheshwar was invalid.
- (Suit No. 198) The plaintiff contended that paragraph 3 made the widows guardians/managers only and that, following the will and events, the plaintiff was entitled to immediate possession of Mahabir's estate or at least to a declaration of reversionary right.
- (Suit No. 199) The plaintiff alleged that a partition in 1864 separated the brothers so that Jugalkishore's estate vested separately and upon Anandi's death in 1904 the plaintiff, as next reversionary heir, succeeded; he also alleged certain Gya properties were joint and included in the partition.
Defendants' Arguments
- (Suit No. 200) The defendants (those upholding the adoption) relied on the presumption that a Hindu testator would have desired an adoption by his widow in circumstances where no surviving adult male issue existed, and urged a construction of the will to permit adoption despite the posthumous birth of a daughter.
- (Suit No. 198) The defendants contended that paragraph 3 gave the widows successive life estates and that after the death of the survivor the estate passed to the daughter Ramdulari and thereafter to her reversionary heir, with the plaintiff not having established the title necessary for a declaration.
- (Suit No. 199) The defendants denied the 1864 partition or, alternatively, relied on the 1874 ekrarnamas as amounting to Anandi's relinquishment of any proprietary rights in favour of Mahabir; they also contended some Gya properties belonged solely to Bachchu and were not joint.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Rangatami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden (1918) L.R. 46 I.A. 77; 21 Bom. L.R. 640 | Establishes and explains the principle that a Hindu widow can renounce or relinquish her estate in favour of the nearest reversioner by a voluntary, bona fide and total renunciation; such voluntary self-effacement (surrender/relinquishment) is effective to exclude her from succession. | The Board relied on this authority to hold that the 1874 ekrarnamas, together with Anandi's acceptance for thirty years of the stipulated maintenance, amounted to a complete relinquishment by Anandi of her estate in favour of Mahabir; therefore the plaintiff could not now disturb Mahabir's title. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court addressed each suit and issue in sequence, applying textual construction of the will, evaluation of factual findings below, and established principles about relinquishment by Hindu widows.
On the adoption (Suit No. 200):
- The Board examined the will's language. Paragraphs 3 and 4 were read together: paragraph 4 begins with the phrase "If by the will of Providence no male or female child be born to me," and the Board held that these words govern the whole of paragraph 4, including the power to adopt.
- The plaintiff argued that because a daughter was in fact born (posthumously), the contingency specified in paragraph 4 did not occur and therefore the adoption power never arose. The defendants urged a presumption in favour of construing the will to allow adoption, relying on a general Hindu presumption favouring adoption.
- The Board acknowledged the strength of the presumption that a Hindu testator would desire an adoption in such circumstances but concluded that it could not, without unduly straining the will's words or effectively making a will for the testator, read paragraph 4 so as to allow adoption in the actual events that transpired. Consequently, the adoption was set aside.
On the plaintiff's claim for possession and declaration (Suit No. 198):
- The Board construed paragraph 3 of the will as giving the widows successive life estates (proprietors and possessors during their lives), with the daughter Ramdulari becoming proprietress after their deaths.
- Accordingly, Ramdulari acquired a reversionary estate at birth under Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act.
- However, the plaintiff had not adduced sufficient evidence in the suit to prove his asserted entitlement to Ramdulari's estate and therefore was not entitled to a declaration under the Specific Relief Act. The High Court's dismissal of the claim for possession and striking out of the declaration was upheld.
On the partition and the 1874 transactions (Suit No. 199):
- The Subordinate Judge had found on facts (after evidence) that the alleged 1864 partition had in fact taken place and that the Gya properties were included in that partition; the High Court affirmed those findings. The Board treated these as concurrent factual findings that could not be easily disturbed.
- The pivotal legal contention for the appellants focused on the legal effect of the two ekrarnamas of 17 May 1874 executed on behalf of Anandi by her attorney and Mahabir's contemporaneous ekrarnama.
- The Subordinate Judge and High Court considered the instruments were executed without authority and procured by corruption (a payment to the attorney). The Board examined the evidence of payment (Rs. 8,000), noted it was not proved that the sum was not properly the attorney's moneys accounted for to Anandi, and emphasized that Anandi accepted and acted upon the agreements for thirty years, receiving the stipulated maintenance without objection.
- Applying the principle established in Rangatami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden that a widow can effect a bona fide and total renunciation of her rights, the Board held that the ekrarnamas, together with long-continued acceptance of maintenance, amounted to a complete relinquishment by Anandi of her estate in favour of Mahabir. Thus the transaction was binding and could not now be disturbed by the plaintiff.
Outcome of the analysis: The Board concluded that (a) the adoption was invalid because the adoption power in paragraph 4 never arose; (b) the widows had successive life estates and the daughter's reversionary interest existed but the plaintiff had not proved entitlement to a declaration; and (c) the 1874 agreements were binding relinquishments by Anandi and established Mahabir's title.
Holding and Implications
Final Rulings:
- Appeals in respect of Suit No. 200 and Suit No. 198 are dismissed. The adoption is set aside (Suit No. 200) and the High Court's dismissal of the plaintiff's claim for possession and striking out of the declaration is affirmed (Suit No. 198).
- The appeal in respect of Suit No. 199 is allowed, and the plaintiff's suit (No. 199 of 1907) is dismissed. The Board held the 1874 ekrarnamas amounted to a valid relinquishment by Anandi in favour of Mahabir and therefore the plaintiff cannot recover Jugalkishore's estate.
Consequences and costs:
- The plaintiffs must pay the defendants' costs of the hearing of Suit No. 199 before the Subordinate Judge except the costs of issues 4 and 5 (relating to the partition and the Gya estates) on which the plaintiffs succeeded; and also pay the defendants' costs of the appeal to the High Court in that suit.
- The defendants will pay the plaintiffs' costs of issues 4 and 5, subject to the usual set-off. On the consolidated appeals before the Board, where each party has partly succeeded and partly failed, there will be no costs on either side.
Implications for precedent: The Board applied existing principles (notably the principle in Rangatami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden regarding a widow's capacity to relinquish) to the facts. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new legal principle beyond applying established authority to the circumstances of the case.
1. These are consolidated appeals against throe decrees of the High Court of Calcutta dated the 22nd May, 1913, two of which affirmed decrees of the First Subordinate Judge of Saran dated respectively the 17th March and the 12th May, 1910, while the third modified a decree of the same Court dated the 18th July, 1910.
2. The facts leading up to the litigation may be shortly stated as follows: Srikishan Singh, Bachchu Singh and Jugalkiahore Singh were three Hindu brothers governed by Mitakshara law and possessed of considerable properties in the districts of Saran and Gya and in Oudh. Jugalkishore died on the 5th July, 1872, without issue, leaving a widow Mussummat Anandi Koer; Srikishun died on the 18th July, 1872, without male Issue, leaving a widow and two daughters; and Bachchu died on the 9th February, 1874, leaving a son, Mahabir Singh.
3. After Jugalkishoro's death Bachchu applied to the District Judge of Saran, under Act XXVII of 1860, for a certificate to collect debts due to the estate of Jugalkishore, alleging that the three brothers had been joint in estate and that he was entitled as survivor to Jugalkishore's estate. This application was opposed ; by Jugalkishore's widow, Anandi Koer, who claimed that a partition between the three brothers had been effected in the year 1864 and accordingly that at the date of her husband's death the brothers were separate and she was entitled to succeed to her husband's estate. Bachchu died while this dispute was pending, but in the result the District Judge decided that the alleged partition had not taken place and accordingly that the three brothers were joint, and granted the certificate to Mahabir. This decision, being given only upon a question of representation, did not preclude Anandi Koer from raising the question of title again in a suit properly instituted for that purpose; but in fact Anandi, acting through her brother and attorney, accepted the decision and executed an agreement dated the 17th May, 1874, agreeing, in consideration of certain property being allotted to her for maintenance during her life, not further to contest the matter; and thereupon Mahabir took possession of the estate. This transaction, the effect of which is in dispute, will be referred to at greater length hereafter.
4. Mahabir died on the 21st June, 1894, leaving no issue but leaving two widows, the defendant Mussummat Bhagwat Koer and Mussummat Rupkali Koer, the latter of whom was then enceinte and gave birth, on the 11th October, 1894, to a daughter named Raiudulari Koer. Mahabir before his death executed a will (to be referred to later), probate of which was on the 5th January, 1895, granted to his two widows. The posthumous daughter, Kamdulari, died on the 4th June, 1895, her mother, llupkali, on the 8th February, 1899, and Anandi, the widow of Jugalkishore, on the 4th August, 1904. On the 13th February, 1906, Bhagwat Koer, the surviving widow of Mahabir, purporting to act under a power conferred upon her by her husband's will, adopted the defendant Kagheshwar Indar Sahi as his son and executed in his favour a deed of adoption dated the 17th February, 1906.
5. The plaintiff Dhanukhdhari Prashad Singh is the nearest reversionary heir to Jugalkishore and Mahabir, and claims to be entitled to their estates; and on the 20th August, 1907, he instituted the three suits out of which these appeals arise against the surviving widow and the alleged adopted son of Mahabir in the Court of the First Subordinate Judge at Saran. One Ambika Frahacl Singh, the purchaser of a part of the property, joined as co-plaintiff in two of the suits, but need not be further referred to. The causes of action in the three suits are different, and it will be convenient to deal with them separately.
6. In Suit No. 200 of 1907 (out of which Appeal No. 100 of 1916 arises) the plaintiff Dhanukhdhari sued to set aside the adoption of the defendant Eagheshwar as invalid and contended that the power of adoption conferred by the will of Mahabir had, in the events which had happened, no operation. The terms of that will must now be referred to in detail.
7. The will of Mahabir, which was dated the 20th December 1894, was divided into paragraphs. By paragraph 1 the testator, after reciting that he had then no male issue but had two wives living, directed that if any child should be born of either wife, or if children should be born of both wives, they should after his death become possessors of all his movable and immovable properties, whether ancestral or self-acquired, whereby the name and reputation of his ancestors might be perpetuated and the religious merit of his family might be preserved. By paragraph 2 he directed that if at the time of his death his children should be minors his wives successively should act as their guardians and manage the estate. It was contended that, although the word "children" (aidad) is used in the above two paragraphs they were in fact intended to operate in favour of male children only ; but it is unnecessary to determine this question, as in any event the first two paragraphs are controlled, so far as female issue are concerned, by the third paragraph of the will. The third and fourth paragraphs of the will are in the following terms:-
3. If there be no son born of either of my wives and only (a) daughter be born, in such a case also the management of the reaaat shall be conducted by either the senior or the junior wife whoever may be existing and her (the daughter's) guardianship and training and education shall be conducted as provided in paragraph ii. She will have the daughter married in a good family as is the custom in my family. My wives up to the terms of their respective lives shall remain proprietresses and possessors as provided in paragraph 2. After the death of both of them my daughter shall become the proprietress, and she shall perpetuate the name and reputation of my family by residing in my house and maintaining the same as the absolute proprietress.
4, If by the will of Providence no male or female child be born to me, in that case both my wives, one after another as provided in paragraph g, shall remain, in concord, proprietors and managers and perpetuate the name and reputation of the family up to into terms of their lives. I also authorize my wives that, if both of them exist, they in concurrence, or if either of them die, the surviving wife alone shall select according to her choice some worthy boy from my family or the families of my relatives and adopt him, who shall remain obedient and dutiful as a son up to the terms of the lives of my wives ; and the said adopted son after the death of my two wives shall remain absolute proprietor in my place as my son, and he shall have all authority such as is possessed by me.
8. In the suit now under consideration it was contended by the plaintiff that under the express terms of the will the power of adoption conferred by paragraph 4 was contingent on no male or female child being born to the testator, and that as a daughter was born to him (although after his death) the power of adoption never arose. He also contended that Ragheshwar was not a member of the class, consisting of the testator's family (khandan) or the families of his relatives, from which alone any adoption could be made. Both these contentions were upheld by the Subordinate Judge, who accordingly set the adoption aside; and on appeal the High Court, while holding that Kagheshwar was within the class described in the will, agreed with the Subordinate Judge in holding that in the events which had happened the power of adoption did not arise, and accordingly dismissed the appeal.
9. On appeal by the defendants to this Board the appellants relied on the strong presumption that the testator, a Hindu, would have desired that, in the event (which happened) of his having no child who survived him and attained maturity, a son should be adopted to him by his widow, and contended that the will must be construed as having that effect. The presumption is no doubt strong, and in a case of this kind the Courts would not be astute to defeat an adoption not clearly in excess of the power ; but in the present case it appears to their Lordships to be impossible, without unduly straining the words of the will, to put upon it the construction contended for on behalf of the defendants. The words "if no male or female child be born to me" clearly govern the whole of paragraph 4 of the will, including the power of adoption; and it is impossible without going outside the terms of the will and in fact making a will for the testator, to hold that in the events which happened the power took effect.
10. The result is that the decision of the High Court in this suit is right and that this appeal must fail.
11. In the Suit No. 198 of 1907 (out of which Appeal No. 131 of 1916 arises) the plaintiff Dhanuklidhari sued for a declaration that under the terms of the will of Mahabir and in the events which had happened the plaintiff was entitled to immediate possession of Mahabir's estate. He based his claim on the contention that on the true construction of paragraph 3 of the will the widows were only entitled to be guardians of the testator's daughter arid to manage the estate during her lifetime, and that upon her death the estate passed to her mother Rupkali and on the death of the latter to the plaintiff. The Subordinate Judge held that, on the true construction of paragraph 3, the widows took life estates in succession and that on the death of the surviving widow the property passed to Ramdulari or her representatives under Section 106 of the Succession Act. He therefore dismissed the claim for possession, but added to his judgment a declaration, under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, of the right of the plaintiff as heir of Ramdulari to succeed to the estate of the testator after the death of the surviving widow Bhagwat Koer. Both sides having appealed to the High Court, that Court affirmed the decree of the Subordinate Judge dismissing the suit for possession, bub struck out the declaration as to the plaintiff's reversionary right, holding that his plaint contained no claim for such a declaration and that the plaintiff had not made out his title to succeed to the estate of Ramdulari. The plaintiff thereupon appealed for this Board. Their Lordships agree with the decision of the High Court in this case. They are satisfied that on the true construction of the will and in the events which happened the estate was given to the testator's widows successively for life, and after the death of the survivor to Ramdulari, so that Ramdulari became entitled at birth to a reversionary estate under Section 106 of the Indian Succession Act; but the plaintiff has not in this suit adduced evidence proving his claim to be entitled to her estate, and accordingly no declaration should be made in his favour under the Specific Relief Act. This appeal, therefore, also fails.
12. In the Suit No. 199 of 1907 (out of which Appeal No. 117 of 1917 arises) the plaintiff sued to recover the estate of Jugal-kishore, alleging that in the year 1864 the three brothers, Srikishun, Bachchu and Jugalkishore separated and partitioned their properties between them, and that accordingly on the death of Anandi in 1904 the plaintiff as the next reversionary heir succeeded to Jugalkishore's estate. The plaintiff' also alleged in this suit that certain properties in Gya held under mokurrari leases in favour of Bachchu alone in fact belonged to the three brothers jointly and were partitioned with the other properties. The defendants denied the alleged partition and as an alternative relied upon the agreement of 1874 above referred to as amounting to a relinquishment by Anandi of her estate to the next reversionary heir Mahabir so as to vest the whole proprietary right in the latter. They also alleged that the Gya properties belonged to Bachchu alone.
13. Upon the issues so raised a large amount of oral and documentary evidence was adduced, and in the result the Subordinate Judge was satisfied, notwithstanding the decision in 1874, that the alleged partition had in fact taken place, and accordingly that Jugalkishore at his death was separate in estate. He also held that the Gya properties belonged to the three brothers and were included in the partition. With regard to the transaction in 1874, the learned Judge held that the agreement executed on behalf of Anandi was not within the authority of her agent and was obtained by corruption, and that such agreement was never ratified by Anandi. He accordingly made a decree in favour of the plaintiff. An appeal to the High Court against this decision was dismissed. On the appeal by the defendants to the Board it at once appeared that upon the question of the partition and upon the question of the ownership of the Gya properties there were concurrent findings of fact in favour of the respondents which could not well be questioned; and accordingly the argument of the appellants turned on the legal effect of the transactions of 1874. which must now be morefully stated.
14. After the decree of the District Judge delivered on the 18th April, 1874, by which he held that the three brothers were joint in estate and accordingly that Mahabir was entitled to a certificate, negotiations were entered into between Mahabir and the attorney of Anandi, her brother, Babu Dukharan Singh, and on the 17th May, 1874, two ekrarnamas or agreements were executed. By one of these ekrarnamas, which was executed by the attorney on Anandi's behalf, after a recital of the recent litigation and the grant of the certificate to Mahabir, it was stated that Anaudi, "in admission and acceptance of the judgment and order of the District Judge," and in consideration of the fact that Mahabir was the heir, proprietor and possessor of the estate of the three brothers, and that she had no proprietary interest therein and was entitled to maintenance according to the position of the family, "ceased from litigation," and that Mahabir, as the heir of the three brothers, had given her an 8-anrias share of a certain mouzah out of the joint estate of all the three brothers for her maintenance during her life; and after reciting that Mahabir had on the same day executed an ekrarnama to the same effect, the agreement concluded: "Now contrary to the terms of these ekrarnamats my principal shall have no right, claim, dispute or demand in respect of the estates of the deceased persons against Balm Mahabir Prashad , Singh." On the same day Mahabir executed another ekrarnama in similar terms, whereby he secured the agreed maintenance to Anandi during her life. In pursuance of these documents Mahabir was forthwith let into possession of the whole property of the three brothers; and from the date of these documents until her death in 1904 Anandi duly received the agreed maintenance without dispute or objection.
15. It was considered both by the Subordinate Judge and the High Court that these documents were executed by the agent of Anandi without authority and in consideration of the payment of a bribe to him. Their Lordships cannot accept that view. There was indeed some evidence to show that a sum of Rs. 8000 was paid by Mahabir to the attorney some time after the execution of the documents; but it was not proved that this sum was not paid in due course to the attorney as agent for Anandi and duly accounted for to her. In any case, the agreement having been accepted and acted upon by both parties for a period of thirty years without objection, and the stipulated maintenance having been duly received by Anandi during the whole of that period, it is not open to the plaintiff now to dispute the authority which was plainly admitted by Anandi herself during her lifetime; and in view of this circumstance it appears to the Board that the agreements in question must be treated for all purposes as binding upon Anandi and the transaction cannot now be disturbed. In this aspect of the matter it became necessary for their Lordships to consider what was the true legal effect of the transactions referred to.
16. The power of a Hindu widow to surrender or relinquish her interest in her husband's estate in favour of the nearest rever-sioner at the time has often been considered and was fully 'dealt with by the Board in the recent case of Rangatiami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden (1918) L.R. 46 I.A. 77 : 21 Bom. L.R. 640. As pointed out in that ease, it is settled by long practice and confirmed by a series of decisions that a Hindu widow can renounce the estate in favour of the nearest reversioner, and by a voluntary act efface herself from the succession as effectively as if she had then died. This voluntary self-effacement is sometimes referred to as a surrender, sometimes as a relinquishment or abandonment of her rights; and it may be effected by any process having that effect, provided that there is a bona fide and total renunciation of the widow's right to hold the property. In the present case there was indeed no formal surrender by the widow of her estate; but there was an express agreement, binding upon her, that for considerations which appeared to her sufficient she would abandon the claim which at the time she had a a good right to make and would have no right, claim or demand in respect of the estate of her late husband. It is true that the documents were drawn up on the footing, not of a surrender of an acknowledged right, but of an admission that the right did not exist; but in substance, and disregarding the form, there was a complete self- effacement by the widow which precluded her from asserting any further claim to the estate. The question is no doubt one of difficulty, but upon the whole their Lordships have come to the conclusion that the execution of the two ekrarnamas, followed by the acceptance for thirty years of maintenance under the terms of those documents, amounted to a complete relinquishment by Anandi Koer of her estate in favour of Mahabir, and accordingly that the title of Mahabir's representatives is established and the plaintiff's action should have been dismissed on this ground.
17. Their Lordships will accordingly humbly advise His Majesty that the appeals in suits 200 and 198 be dismissed and the appeal in suit 199 allowed and that the last mentioned suit be accordingly dismissed. The plaintiffs will pay to the defendants their costs of the hearing of suit 199 before the Subordinate Judge except the costs of issues 4 and 5 (relating to the partition and the Gya estates) on which they succeeded, and will also pay to them their costs of the appeal to the High Court in that suit. The defendants will pay the plaintiffs' costs of issues 4 and 5, with the usual set-off. Upon those consolidated appeals to the Board, in which each party has partly succeeded and partly failed, there will be no costs on either side.
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