Laxmava Huchappa Nasipudi v. Rachappa Chanbasappa Karveershetti

1. We think that the plaintiff's suit is clearly time barred. At the time of the sale by his mother he was a minor and she was his natural guardian. She sold in that character. The plaintiff did not bring his suit within three years after attaining majority (I might add that the actual plaintiff was the as signee of the minor just mentioned). In these circumstances, but for certain decisions of this Court to which we have been referred, we should have entertained no doubt whatever but that the suit was time barred under Article 44 Sch. 1 of the Lim. Act. The case of Balappa Dundappa v. Chanbasappa Shivalingappa(1) and the case of Anandappa v. Totappa(2), with which we have been especially pressed, are, we think, easily distinguishable. We need only mention the first of these cases and point out that the transferor was not the natural guardian of the minor at all but his step mother. The decision can then be put: on the ground that the alienation was not by a guardian strictly speaking so at all, but at the highest by a de facto guardian who was not authorized to deal in any way with the minor's property. This would make it conform to the principle of the Privy Council decision in the case of Mata Din v. Ahmad Ali(3), which is cited with approval in their Lordships' judgment. There appears to have been a slight error in quoting the conclusion of their Lordships of the Privy Council, for a reference to that case will show that the limitation point under Article 44 was disposed of on the simple ground that the alienation complained of was made by a person who was not a guardian and who was not authorized to make it. As far as it goes therefore by implication that decision of the Privy Council supports the view to which we give effect in this judgment.

2. We take the words of Article 44 as they stand in their plain and natural sense and so taken, they seem to us to cover every fact in this case beyond the reach of argument.

3. We might add, without unnecessarily extending this discussion, that we were also referred to a decision of this Court in the case of Bhagvant Govind v. Kondi(4), the facts of which closely resemble the facts before us. It is sufficient to say however that so much of that judgment as is relevant for our present purposes is very distinctly disaproved, if not impliedly overruled, by the Privy Council in Malkarjun's case [Malkarjun v. Narhari(5)]. We would therefore reverse the decree of the lower appellate Court and restore the decree of the trial Court with all costs upon the plaintiff throughout.

G.P/R.K

4. Decree reversed.