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Naro Gopal Kulkarni v. Paragauda Bin Basagauda

Bombay High Court
Sep 28, 1916
Important Paras
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Scott, C.J:— This suit was instituted by the plaintiffs as members of a joint Hindu family of which their father the 2nd defendant was the head, to set aside a sale of certain family land being Survey No. 722 measuring 19 acres and 11 gunthas executed by the defendant No. 2 in favour of defendant No. 1 on the 19th of September 1901 and to recover possession thereof from the 1st defendant or in the alternative for their ⅓rd share therein by partition or at least for joint possession with the defendant No. 1: they alleged that the sale deed was taken from the defendant No. 2 by undue influence and for no consideration. The learned Judge of the trial Court held that the consideration for the deed was an antecedent debt which though barred by time was acknowledged by the registered sale-deed and further advances aggregating Rs. 1,500 which he held established. He held that even the antecedent debt would authorise an alienation by the father binding on the sons and he dismissed the suit with costs.

His decree was reversed on appeal the learned appellate Judge holding that as regards the Rs. 1,500 representing the further advances they were not proved to have been made and as regards the Rs. 1,500 in respect of the acknowledged time-barred debt the 2nd defendant must have been influenced unduly by the defendant No. 1 and could not have given his free consent to its inclusion as part of the consideration. He decreed that the plaintiffs and defendant No. 2 should be restored to possession of the property in suit. It may be conceded that the learned trial Judge was in error in thinking that a time-barred debt could support an alienation by a father of joint family property even against his sons: see Subramania Aiyar v. Gopala Aiyar; and as to the Rs. 1,500 representing fresh advances, it may for the purpose of argument be assumed that the appellate Court was right in holding them not proved: the question however still remains whether the time-barred debt acknowledged by the registered deed was not good consideration for the alienation of the defendant No. 2's interest in the property.

Upon the findings of the lower appellate Court the plaintiffs are not, or at all events the adult plaintiff is not, bound by the deed and it may to that extent be treated as a nullity: see Unni v. Kunchi Amma. But it is otherwise with the defendant No. 2 the executing party whose interest is prima facie bound by his deed. Assuming the deed was obtained from him by undue influence it is only voidable at his option. He however has not sought to avoid it. His right to file a suit for such a purpose has long since been barred by limitation. His sons have no right to exercise his option. To hold as has been held by the lower appellate Court that he cannot have done willingly what be has explicitly purported to do in his sale-deed is to make a case which was not open to him and which he never tried to make for himself. The lower appellate Court has not found that no moneys were expended by defendant No. 1 for defendant No. 2 which could be acknowledged. Such a finding would be impossible in view of the defendant No. 2's admission when called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiffs. “I was plaintiff in Suit No. 415 of 1887. Naro Gopal (defendant No. 1) used to assist me with money in that suit. I passed a document for that amount.” The learned Judge says that the documents show that the defendant No. 2 was at least reckless in matters of business and incapable of exercising ordinary prudence. That however is no justification for disregarding the terms of section 19A of the Indian Contract Act and Article 91′ of the Indian Limitation Act. The defendant No. 2 is, therefore, bound by his deed and the defendant No. 1 is entitled to the defendant No. 2's interest in the property.

We have next to consider what is the interest in the property which passed to the purchaser. Is it the half share to which the defendant No. 2 was entitled at the date of the sale or the ⅓rd to which but for the alienation the defendant No. 2 since the birth of his younger son would now be entitled ? As remarked by Sir Charles Farran in Gurlingapa v. Nandapa the decisions in Pandurang Anandrav v. Bhaskar Shadashiv and Mahabalaya v. Timaya point to the period of alienation as that at which the rights of the alienee are to be determined, but the Court nevertheless in Gurlingapa v. Nandapa laid down obiter, following the decision of the Madras High Court in Rangasami v. Krishnayyan, the proposition that a purchaser of a coparcenary share stands in no better position than his alienor and consequently like the latter is liable to have his share diminished before partition by the birth of other coparceners if he stands by and does not insist on partition.

This conclusion appears to be inconsistent with the proposition that an alienation by a joint tenant effects a-severance as a result of which the alienee before division by metes and bounds becomes a tenant-in-common: see Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ram Chund Dutt; Udaram Sitaram v. Ranu Panduji It is also as pointed out in Chimin Pillai v. Kalimuthu Chetti(7) (in which Rangasami v. Krishnayyan was dissented from) inconsistent with the orders passed by the Privy Council in Baboo Hurdey Narain Sahu v. Pundit Baboo Rooder Perkash Misser.(8)

In this state of the authorities we must hold that the defendant No. 1 acquired the half share in the alienated property to which the defendant No. 2 was entitled at the date of the alienation owing to the fact that the minor plaintiff was not then born.

The plaintiffs are interested equally in one moiety only of the property in suit. The defendant No. 2 whose interest is now confined to the other family property, if any, raises no objection to partition being limited to the property in suit. Under the circumstances I do not think the defendant No. 1 as tenant-in-common of one moiety of the suit land can object to partition: Subramanya Chettyar v. Padmanabha Chettyar; Ram Charan v. Ajudhia Prasad.

Heaton, J.:— My only difficulty in the case is this:

If there was no consideration at all for the sale of the property by defendant No. 2 to defendant No. 1 in 1901, the sale is invalid and can be set aside at the instance of the plaintiffs. For a Hindu coparcener can only make a valid alienation of his share or part of his share in an undivided Hindu family property if he does so for valuable consideration. This aspect of the case is one which was presented in this Court, but was not considered by the Court of first appeal. The Judge of that Court dealt with the question of consideration more generally. He asked himself the question whether the consideration stated in the sale-deed was proved. He found that it was not and he further found that it was not proved what the consideration actually was. But he did not ask himself the question whether it was shown that there was not any consideration at all. There are indications in his judgment that he was not of opinion that there was no consideration whatever for the sale. He does not repudiate or contradict the finding of the trial Court that there was or at least had been an antecedent debt payable by the defendant No. 2 to defendant No. 1. Therefore we can find for ourselves that there was valuable consideration. That, I think, is an appropriate way out of the difficulty which confronts me and moreover it is a way which brings about a conclusion consonant with law and justice.

I agree that by the sale, defendant No. 2 acquired a share of one-half not of one-third only in the land sold. But he acquired a right to partition not a right to possession prior to partition. As their Lordships of the Privy Council stated in the case of Baboo Hurdey Narain Sahu v. Pundit Baboo Rooder Perkash Misser. “According to the judgment of their Lordships in Deendyal's case, the decree, which ought properly to have been made would have been that the plaintiff… should recover possession of the whole of the property, with a declaration that the appellant, as purchaser at the execution sale, had acquired the share and interest of Shib Perkash Misser, and was entitled to take proceedings to have it ascertained by partition.” Still in this case the plaintiffs have sued in the alternative for partition, so the theoretical objection to a decree for partition disappears.

There must, therefore, be a decree for partition in equal moieties; each party to bear his own costs throughout.

Decree reversed.
J.G.R