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Vyankatesh Mahadev v. Ramchandra Krishna

Bombay High Court
Jun 25, 1914
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Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

A suit was instituted by the plaintiff against one or more defendants. After institution of the suit, it is alleged that the plaintiff and one defendant entered into an agreement to submit their differences to private arbitration. The defendant moved the Court for a stay of further proceedings in the suit on the basis of that agreement. The original Court refused to stay the suit. On appeal, the learned District Judge also held that the defendant's application could not be sustained and that the suit must proceed. The defendant then sought to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the present Court to set aside the District Judge's order. The two speaking judges in the opinion (Beaman, J. and Hayward, J.) each give reasons for dismissing the application for revision and for confirming the earlier refusal to stay the suit.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an agreement, made after a suit has been instituted, between parties to refer matters in dispute to private arbitration falls within any clause of Schedule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) such that the suit should be stayed.
  2. Whether a private agreement to arbitrate, entered into after institution of suit, can oust the Court's jurisdiction or operate as a bar to the suit (including whether it can be treated as an "adjustment" under Order 23, Rule 3 of the CPC).
  3. Whether the clause in Schedule 2 (Cl. 18) reproducing a portion of Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act (and corresponding provisions in the Arbitration Act) applies where the agreement to refer to arbitration was made after suit was instituted by one party.
  4. Whether the Rules in the first sixteen clauses of Schedule 2 (notably R.3 and R.15) are exclusive as to circumstances under which jurisdiction may be withdrawn from or resumed by the Court during the pendency of a suit.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant / Defendant's Arguments

  • The defendant relied on the private agreement to refer the matters in dispute to arbitration and contended that, on that basis, a stay of the suit and the arbitration process outside Court should be recognized.
  • It was further argued (though not pressed strongly) that the submission to arbitration did amount to a lawful adjustment of the matters in suit so as to fall within Order 23, Rule 3 of the CPC (i.e., an adjustment that the Court could give effect to).
  • More broadly, it was contended that despite pendency of the suit the parties could privately agree to arbitrate without leave of Court and thereafter have that private reference or the resulting award converted into an independent decree of the Court.

Plaintiff / Respondent and Lower Courts' Positions

  • The original Court concluded the private reference had been made under a mistake of fact and in any case did not amount to an "adjustment" within the meaning of Order 23, Rule 3 of the CPC.
  • The first appellate Court held there was no adjustment because there had been no award within the meaning of Order 23, Rule 3, and that the contract to refer was entered into subsequent to the suit and therefore not within the scope of Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act as contemplated (that provision having been effectively replaced by provisions in Schedule 2, CPC).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rukhanbai v. Adamji Shailc Bajbhai Cited concerning whether there was a resulting award and whether a reference amounted to an adjustment under O.23, R.3. The Court treated this authority as supporting the proposition that, in the absence of a resulting award, there is no adjustment within O.23, R.3.
Venkatachellam Beddi v. Rangiah Reddi Also cited on the point of resulting award and adjustment under O.23, R.3. Used with Rukhanbai to show that where no award resulted, the submission did not amount to an adjustment.
Harakhbai v. Jamnabai Authority where there was a resulting award and it was held to be a good adjustment within O.23, R.3 (and within saving provisions of Section 89 CPC). The Court relied on this case to illustrate the contrasting situation in which a resulting award produced an adjustment that the Court could give effect to.
Harivalabdas Kalliandas v. Utamchand Manekchand Cited as a ruling apparently supportive of permitting private arbitration to affect pending suit jurisdiction in some prior authority. The opinion notes caution in relying on this distant authority and treats it as not controlling in view of subsequent authorities (including Privy Council observations).
Pragdas v. Gardhardas Referenced as a case where one Judge appeared to approve a contrary ruling. The Court advised caution in giving weight to such approval, again in light of Privy Council observations.
Gulam Khan v. Muhammad Hassan Privy Council decision interpreted as holding that the rules corresponding to the Code provisions are exclusive and permit arbitration during pendency of a suit only under the specified rules; succeeding rules apply solely to arbitration in matters not previously brought as suits. The Court treated this Privy Council view as authoritative support for the exclusivity of the rules permitting arbitration during pendency and for the limited scope of later rules applicable to matters not already before a Court.
Tincourij Dey v. Fakir Chand Dey Cited as a case interpreting the Privy Council decision and the exclusivity of Code rules. The Court noted that this case (from Calcutta High Court) interpreted the Privy Council decision as supporting exclusivity of the pendency rules.
Venkata chelam Beddi v. Rangiah Beddi Also cited as an interpretation aligning with the Privy Council's view (Madras High Court interpretation). The Court referred to this authority as further support for construing the Code's arbitration rules as exclusive in respect of matters already before Court.
Peruri Suryanarayan & Co. v. Gullapudi Cited concerning the corresponding Section 19 of the Arbitration Act and interpretation that supports the view that a stay is contemplated only where suit is instituted after reference to arbitration. Used to show consistent interpretation under corresponding provisions of the Arbitration Act that a stay under those words applies where suit follows arbitration, not where arbitration follows suit.
Ramjidas Poddar v. Howse Also cited on the point of Section 19 of the Arbitration Act and interpretation of stay provisions. The Court relied on this authority, together with Peruri Suryanarayan, to support the conclusion that a stay would not be available where the reference to arbitration occurred after institution of the suit.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The opinion contains two principal reasoned contributions (Beaman, J. and Hayward, J.), which align in result and complement each other in analysis.

Beaman, J. — Analytical Steps

  1. Structure of Schedule 2 CPC: Beaman, J. analyzes Schedule 2 of the CPC as consisting of discrete classes of cases: (a) the first sixteen clauses govern arbitration when a suit has been instituted and parties desire arbitration "under the control of the Court" — under those rules the Court completely controls the reference and its jurisdiction is not ousted until a valid award is made and, if set aside, the Court resumes jurisdiction; (b) the next class covers cases where no legal proceedings have been instituted but parties desire to submit disputes to arbitration and may bring the agreement into Court; (c) the third class covers parties who were not in Court but have obtained an award and seek to enforce it in Court.
  2. Exceptional Clause (Cl. 18): He explains that Clause 18 is exceptional and re-enacts part of Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act (and corresponds to Section 19 of the Arbitration Act). Clause 18 applies where parties agreed to arbitrate and one in violation of the agreement institutes suit — the other party may set up the agreement in bar of the suit. Crucially, this clause is aimed at cases where the suit was instituted after the agreement to arbitrate.
  3. Application to the Present Case: Beaman, J. concludes the defendant's agreement to privately arbitrate, which was made after the suit had been instituted, does not fall within any clause of Schedule 2, nor within the language or spirit of Clause 18, since Clause 18 is expressly restricted to agreements made prior to suit. Thus the agreement relied upon is not an instrument recognized by Schedule 2 to oust or affect the Court's jurisdiction in the pending suit.
  4. Jurisdictional Principle: He emphasizes a legal principle: once the Court is seised of a cause (i.e., the suit is before the Court), private and secret acts of parties cannot oust the Court's jurisdiction. If parties wish to substitute a private arbitrator for the Court, they must follow the law prescribed by the first sixteen clauses of Schedule 2.
  5. Order 23, Rule 3: Beaman, J. notes that parties may compose their differences by agreement and then apply to the Court under Order 23, Rule 3; however, a mere agreement to refer to arbitration (without an award or the prescribed court procedure) does not amount to the sort of adjustment the Court could give effect to under O.23, R.3.
  6. Conclusion: On this basis, Beaman, J. held there was no ground for interference in revision and dismissed the application with costs.

Hayward, J. — Analytical Steps

  1. Recap of Facts and Lower Courts' Decisions: Hayward, J. restates that the plaintiff sued defendant 1, they privately referred matters to arbitration without leave of Court, and defendant 1 applied for stay; the original Court refused, finding a mistake of fact and that there was no adjustment under O.23, R.3; the appellate Court held there was no award and the contract to refer was subsequent to suit (not within Section 21 Specific Relief Act), and that Section 21 had been repealed by R.22, Sch.2 CPC.
  2. On "Adjustment" Argument: He finds no substance in the contention that the private submission amounted to a lawful adjustment, noting there was no resulting award, unlike in Harakhbai v. Jamnabai where a resulting award produced a valid adjustment within O.23, R.3.
  3. Exclusivity of the Rules (R.3 and R.15): Hayward, J. focuses on Rules 3 and 15 among the first sixteen rules. He reads R.3 as laying down the condition under which jurisdiction in the suit shall be withdrawn from the Court (an order of reference by the Court itself), and since no other condition is stated, that must be regarded as the only condition. R.15 provides when the Court may resume jurisdiction (when the award becomes void or is set aside). Because these are the only circumstances specified for withdrawal and resumption, he infers exclusivity — there are no other circumstances under which jurisdiction can be removed or resumed.
  4. Consideration of Authoritative Decisions: He notes that a contrary ruling was cited (Harivalabdas Kalliandas), with apparent approval in Pragdas v. Gardhardas, but he advises caution and gives weight to the Privy Council decision in Gulam Khan v. Muhammad Hassan, which treated the corresponding rules as exclusive and distinguished rules applicable to matters not already in Court (Rrs.17–21 Sch.2).
  5. Role of R.18 and Corresponding Statutory Provisions: He observes that Rule 18 (Sch.2 CPC) and the concluding words of Section 21 Specific Relief Act (and Section 19 Arbitration Act) contemplate a stay only when the suit is instituted after the reference to arbitration (i.e., where the reference preceded suit). Cases under the Arbitration Act (Peruri Suryanarayan & Co. v. Gullapudi and Ramjidas Poddar v. Howse) support that interpretation.
  6. Final Conclusion: Because the rules are exclusive and a stay is contemplated only in cases where suit follows arbitration, the application for revision must fail. The appellate Court's order is confirmed; the rule is discharged with costs. He also notes it is unnecessary to consider whether the learned Judge's decision would amount to irregularity under Section 115 CPC.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The Court dismissed the application for revision and confirmed the order of the first appeal Court refusing to stay the suit; the rule was discharged with costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The private agreement to refer the matters to arbitration, made after the suit was instituted, did not bar the suit nor entitle the defendant to a stay. The suit must proceed in the Court that was seised of the cause.
  • On procedural law: The Court treated the rules contained among the first sixteen clauses of Schedule 2 of the CPC (notably R.3 and R.15) as the exclusive means by which jurisdiction in a pending suit may be withdrawn or resumed in connection with arbitration. Clause 18 (and the corresponding statutory provisions) applies only where the agreement to arbitrate preceded institution of the suit.
  • No new precedent beyond this decision was announced by way of changing the law; the Court relied on interpretation of Schedule 2, prior authorities, and Privy Council observations to uphold the exclusivity and limits of the statutory and rule-based regime governing arbitration and suits.

If a particular section of this summary appears abbreviated or absent, that is because the provided opinion did not include additional material on that point; the summary strictly reflects only the information contained in the opinion excerpt supplied.

Show all summary ...

Beaman, J.:— A suit had been instituted, and it is alleged that the plaintiff and one of the defendants after the institution of the suit entered into an agreement to submit the matters in difference between them to arbitration. Thereupon the defendant moved the Court to stay the further progress of the suit. The first Court refused and on appeal the learned District Judge was of opinion that the defendant's application could not be sustained and that the suit must proceed.

2. We are asked to interfere in the exercise of our revisional jurisdiction and to set aside that order of the learned District Judge. It appears to me that the agreement alleged to have been made between the plaintiff and one of the-defendants does not fall under any of the clauses of Sch. 2 of the CPC. The first sixteen of those clauses exhaust the whole process of arbitration after the suit has been instituted and the parties desired to submit their differences to arbitration under the control of the Court. The Court under those sixteen clauses controls completely the whole course of the reference; indeed the reference is its own, and its jurisdiction is never an any time ousted until a good award has been made. In the event of an award having been made, but being set aside for any reason, the Court immediately resumes its jurisdiction and completes the trial of the action. The next class of cases provided for in Sch. 2 are those in which persons who have not instituted any legal proceedings desire to submit any difference between them to arbitration. Having agreed to do so either party may then bring the agreement into Court, and, if resisted by the other party, his application to have the agreement filed and further action taken upon it will be treated as a suit. Thereafter, again, the Court immediately assumes and retains control of the subsequent arbitration proceedings. The third and the last case provided for in Sch. 2 is where the parties who have not come into Court have not only agreed to refer matters in difference between them to arbitration, but have obtained an award. Here again the party desiring to enforce the award may bring it into Court and upon proper proceedings obtain a decree in conformity with it. There remains only one single clause (Cl. 18) which is of an exceptional character and virtually re-enacts a portion of Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, which is declared to have no applicability to any arbitration proceeding provided for in Sch, 2. That clause, which is also to be found almost in totidem verbis in Section 19 of the Arbitration Act, provides for a special class of cases in which, after parties have agreed to submit matters in difference between them to arbitration, one of them in violation of such agreement institutes a suit in respect of any or all of those matters. Then the other party may set up in bar of the suit the agreement to submit to arbitration. If this analysis be correct, and I think there is no doubt but that it is, it is clear that what the defendant here relies upon is an agreement nowhere provided for in Sch. 2 of the CPC, nor does it fall within the language or the spirit of S. 18, for that section, as I say, is designedly restricted to cases in which the suit complained of has been instituted after the agreement to refer to arbitration. It might be objected that no solid ground in reason can be found for refusing to extend the principle of that section to cases where, after a suit had been instituted, parties had privately agreed to submit the matters in difference between them to arbitration, and in spite of such agreement and in violation of it one of them insists on going on with the suit. The answer to that appears to me to be short and simple, and to cover other objections which might arise upon the other points I have very generally indicated, for, in my opinion, where the Court is seised of a cause its jurisdiction cannot be ousted by the private and secret act of parties, and if they, after having invoked the authority of the Court and placed themselves under its superintendence, desire to alter the tribunal and substitute a private arbitrator for the Court, they must proceed according to the law laid down in the first sixteen clauses of Sch. 2. Therefore it appears to me that there is no force whatever in the applicant's contention that a private agreement of this kind is on the same footing as the private agreement contemplated in Cl. 17 reproducing old S. 523, nor, as I have just explained, will it give him any right to invoke the assistance of Cl. 18. How then could it serve him? Only as a lawful agreement by which the suit had been adjusted wholly or in part. Doubtless any parties litigating in Court have perfect liberty to compose their differences amongst themselves by entering into any lawful agreement, compromise or satisfaction and when this is done, they have only to apply to the Court to act under O. 23, R. 3. But it is equally clear that a mere agreement to refer to arbitration, even though it be in other respects valid, could not be such an adjustment in whole or in part of the suit as the Court could give effect to under O. 23, R. 3.

3. In my opinion therefore the learned Judge below was right and no case whatever has been made out for the exercise of our revisional jurisdiction. I would therefore dismiss this application with all costs.

Hayward, J.:— The plaintiff brought a suit against defendant 1 with regard to a certain matter which was subsequently referred by them to private arbitration without leave of the Court. Defendant 1 thereupon applied for stay of the suit in consequence of the reference to private arbitration outside the Court.

4. The original Court refused to stay the suit, holding that the reference had been made under a mistake of fact, and that in any case it did not amount to art adjustment of the matter in suit within the meaning of O. 23, R. 3 of the CPC.

5. The first appeal Court did not decide the question as to mistake of fact, but held that there was no adjustment inasmuch as there had been no award within the meaning of O. 23, R. 3, and that further the suit could not be held to be barred by the contract to refer, as that contract was entered into subsequent to suit, and was not prior to suit as contemplated by Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act Moreover, it pointed out that provision had been repealed by R. 22, Sch. 2 of the CPC.

6. On this application for revision it has-been contended, though the contention has not been very seriously pressed, that the submission to arbitration did, as a matter of fact, amount to a lawful adjustment, but there does not seem to me to be any substance in that contention, as there was no resulting award as explained in the case of Rukhanbai v. Adamji Shailc Bajbhai (1) and Venkatachellam Beddi v. Rangiah Reddi (2). It is to be observed that there was a resulting award in Harakhbai v. Jamnabai (3) in which case it was held by the present learned Acting Chief Justice that there was a good adjustment within the meaning of O. 23, R. 3, to which effect could be given under the saving provisions of section 89 of the CPC.

7. But it has been contended, and strenuously contended, that a stay ought to have been granted of the suit. It has been argued that notwithstanding the pendency of the suit it was open to the parties to enter into an agreement to arbitrate privately, without leave of the Court, and to proceed to have that private reference to arbitration or the resulting award converted into an independent decree of the Court.

8. It appears to me however that the matter is concluded by the wording of R. 3 and R. 15 occurring among the first sixteen rules referring to arbitration during pendency of a suit with the consent of the Court. R. 3 lays down the conditions upon which jurisdiction in the suit shall be withdrawn from the Court and that condition is that there has been an order of reference under that rule by the Court. As no other condition is stated it must be presumed that is the only condition under which the suit could be removed from the jurisdiction of the Court. Then again R. 15 expressly provides the conditions under which jurisdiction in the suit can be resumed by the Court. It states that can occur when the award either becomes void or has been set aside by order of the Court. Again, as these are the only circumstances under which jurisdiction can again be resumed by the Court it must be presumed that there are no other circumstances under which such jurisdiction could be resumed by the Court. A ruling to the contrary has been quoted to us in the case of Harivalabdas Kalliandas v. Utamchand Manekchand (4) and it has been pointed out that ruling was apparently approved of by one of the Judges in the case of Pragdas v. Gardhardas (5); but it seems to me that caution must be observed in giving weight to that distant authority in view of the observations of the Privy Council in the case of Gulam Khan v. Muhammad Hassan (6). The Privy Council there appear to have taken the view that the rules corresponding to the present rules of the Code were exclusive and only rules permitting arbitration during the pendency of a suit before a Court, and that the succeeding rules corresponding to Rr. 17 to 21, Sch. 2 of the Code applied solely to arbitration in matters which had not come as suits before the Court. The Privy Council's decision has been so interpreted both by the Calcutta and Madras High Courts in the cases of Tincourij Dey v. Fakir Chand Dey (7) and Venkata chelam Beddi v. Rangiah Beddi .

9. It has also to be observed that stay of a suit instituted after the reference so arbitration would alone appear to be contemplated by the wording of R. 18, Sch. 2, which is almost identical with the concluding thirty-seven words of Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, and that interpretation is borne out by the cases of Peruri Suryanarayan & Co. v. Gullapudi (8) and Ramjidas Poddar v. Howse (9) dealing with the corresponding Section 19 of the Arbitration Act. So that this application would have been bound to fail whether it had been possible to have recourse to R. 18, Sch. 2 of the CPC, or the concluding words of Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, or Section 19 of the Arbitration Act. It appears to me therefore that this application must be dismissed, and the order of the first appeal Court confirmed and it is therefore unnecessary to discuss the further question raised whether the decision of the learned Judge would or would not have amounted to irregularity in the exercise of the jurisdiction within the meaning of Section 115 of the CPC. Rule discharged with costs.

G.P/R.K

10. Rule discharged.