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Emperor Prosecutor v. Balkrishna Vaman Kulkarni Accused-.

Bombay High Court
Jun 26, 1913
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Batchelor, J.; Shah, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Based exclusively on the facts as stated in the opinion.

Dattatraya Anant Kulkarni served as an officiating Kulkarni of a village from February 1908 to September 1911. Between 11 April and 25 July 1911 he collected Rs. 189 from village raiyats purportedly for irrigation cesses, and gave receipts to the payors, but in fact misappropriated the money. Dattatraya was subsequently tried and convicted on a plea of guilty and admitted his guilt when examined as a witness in the respondent's trial.

In September 1911 Dattatraya was transferred and handed over charge to Dattatraya Hari but did not hand over account books and papers. In December 1911 the respondent, Balkrisbna Vaman (a petition-writer known to Dattatraya), learned that the raiyats were about to complain about the misappropriations. The respondent proposed and executed a scheme to forge certain challans: Dattatraya wrote the bodies of the challans while the respondent forged the endorsements and signatures of Taluka Treasury officials. These forged endorsements, if genuine, would operate as receipts acknowledging payments to the Treasury and thus would conceal the prior misappropriation.

The respondent was charged with forgery under section 467 of the Indian Penal Code (among other charges). The learned Sessions Judge acquitted the respondent on the ground—based on an interpretation of section 463—that a person who makes a false document is not guilty of forgery unless he does so "with intent to commit fraud" in the sense of intending a future fraud; in the Sessions Judge's view no such intent exists where the fraud to be concealed has already been fully committed. The Government of Bombay appealed that acquittal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether making a false document (forging endorsements and signatures on challans) with the purpose of concealing an already committed misappropriation amounts to making the document "with intent to commit fraud" within the meaning of section 463 and thus constitutes forgery under section 467 of the Indian Penal Code.
  2. Whether concealment of a past fraud by fabricating documents may be treated as a fraudulent act (i.e., whether the word "fraud" in Penal Code provisions covers the deliberate fabrication of documents to hide previously committed fraudulent acts).

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Empress of India v. Jiwan???1(1) Presented as one of the Allahabad High Court decisions supporting the proposition that no intent to commit fraud (for the purposes of s.463) can be ascribed where the fraud has already been fully committed. The opinion records this case as part of the Allahabad line of authority that the learned Sessions Judge relied on for acquittal; the Court rejected that line of authority for the facts before it.
Empress v. Mazhar Husain Listed among Allahabad decisions said to favour the Sessions Judge's view that concealment of a past fraud does not satisfy 'intent to commit fraud' in s.463. Not followed by Batchelor, J.; the Court considered the contrary Calcutta/Madras authorities preferable on the point.
Quean-Empress v. Girdhari Lal (Edge, C.J.) Also cited as supporting the Allahabad view that there is no intent to commit fraud where the fraud is already completed. Not followed; the Court declined to accept that line of authority for the present facts and reached the opposite conclusion.
Lolit Mohan Sarkar v. Queen-Empress Expressly dissents from the Allahabad reasoning and takes the contrary view that concealment of a past fraud can constitute fraud for purposes of Penal Code provisions. Relied upon by the Court as a supporting authority for the proposition that concealment of a previously committed fraud is itself a fraud and supports conviction under s.467.
Emperor v. Bash Behari Das Contains a statement by Mr. Justice Woodroffe that, in his opinion, intention to conceal a fraudulent or dishonest act previously committed would be 'to defraud' and fall within s.477A (quoted in the opinion). Quoted with approval by Batchelor, J. as persuasive authority for treating concealment of prior fraud as intent to defraud; used to support conviction under s.467.
Queen-Empress v. Sabapati Identified with the Calcutta/Madras view that concealment of a past fraud is within the meaning of fraud for Penal Code purposes. Referred to as part of the Madras/Calcutta line of authority which the Court accepted as correctly interpreting 'intent to commit fraud' and 'fraudulently'.
Queen-Empress v. Ganesh Khanderao Reported case in which Queen-Empress v. Vithal Narayan is reported; cited to show that certain Bombay judges adopted a broad description of 'fraud'. Used to demonstrate that a broad description of 'fraud' (from Haycroft v. Greasy as cited) would encompass the respondent's conduct.
Queen-Empress v. Vithal Narayan Reported in Ganesh Khanderao; shows West and Nanabhai, JJ., adopted Mr. Justice Le Blanc's broad description of 'fraud' (from Haycroft v. Greasy). Relied on to indicate that a broad definition of fraud has been accepted by judges in Bombay and would include the respondent.
Haycroft v. Greasy (quoted via Mr. Justice Le Blanc) A broad description of 'fraud' as an intention to deceive; the passage cited (through judicial adoption) defines fraud as an intention to deceive irrespective of motive. The opinion cites this description as one that would encompass the respondent's conduct and as supportive of a broad understanding of 'fraud'.
Derry v. Peek Referenced in the context of a discussion whether there is a substantial distinction between popular fraud and legal/constructive fraud. The Court notes Derry v. Peek and says it may be open to doubt whether a distinction exists, but ultimately treats 'fraud' in the Penal Code in its ordinary and popular sense for the purposes of the case.
Emperor v. Rash Behari Das Appears in the opinion as another decision aligned with the Madras/Calcutta view that concealment of a past fraud amounts to intent to defraud. Referred to by Batchelor, J. and by Shah, J. as part of the authorities accepting that concealment is fraud; relied on in rejecting the Sessions Judge's construction of s.463.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds from the undisputed facts to legal interpretation and application:

  1. Facts accepted as established: the forging of the endorsements and signatures on the challans by the respondent; these forgeries were performed to enable Dattatraya Anant to conceal the earlier misappropriation of Rs. 189 from the raiyats; the respondent received a fee of Rs. 25 from Dattatraya.
  2. The Sessions Judge's ruling: acquittal was based on an interpretation of section 463 IPC that a person who makes a false document is guilty of forgery only if he makes that document "with intent to commit fraud" in the sense of intending to commit a future fraud; where the fraud has already been completed, the Sessions Judge considered that no such intent can be ascribed.
  3. The Court's initial critique of that view: Batchelor, J. states inability to follow the Allahabad High Court authorities that support the Sessions Judge. He notes that the contrary view has been taken in Lolit Mohan Sarkar v. Queen-Empress and in Emperor v. Bash Behari Das (Woodroffe, J.), both of which treat concealment of a previously committed fraudulent or dishonest act as an intention to defraud.
  4. Use of definitional guidance: the Court cites Sir James Stephen's formulation from the History of Criminal Law of England which identifies two essential elements of 'fraud' in criminal contexts—(a) deceit or an intention to deceive (or in some cases secrecy), and (b) actual or possible injury or exposure to risk of injury to another by that deceit/secrecy. Stephen's "practically conclusive test" asks whether the author of the deceit derived an advantage he could not have obtained if the truth had been known.
  5. Application of that test: the Court finds that the respondent clearly intended to deceive (obvious from fabrication of official endorsements) and that both the respondent and, more significantly, Dattatraya derived advantages from the deceit. The respondent obtained a fee; Dattatraya obtained concealment of his criminal liability and thereby retained illicit gains. Hence the deceit produced an advantage and a corresponding loss or risk to the victims.
  6. Addressing a grammatical/formal objection: Batchelor, J. acknowledges a possible grammatical argument that section 463 contemplates a future fraud, not a past fraud. He rejects that restrictive reading on two grounds—(a) ordinary/popular meaning of 'fraud' includes concealment of a past fraud, and (b) even if a grammatical distinction were insisted upon, the facts here involve measures taken to prevent discovery and thereby enable continuation or preservation of illicit gains (a continuing or future effect), satisfying the requirement of intent to commit fraud.
  7. Conclusion on guilt and sentence: Batchelor, J. holds that the respondent ought to have been convicted under section 467 IPC, convicts him under that section and sentences him to one year's rigorous imprisonment. He notes that the additional charge under sections 218 and 109 was not pressed and the respondent is acquitted on that count.
  8. Concurrence: Shah, J. concurs in allowing the appeal, setting aside the acquittal, and convicting under section 467 IPC. Shah, J. accepts the facts as found and explicitly agrees that fabrication of the documents was done for the purpose of concealing Dattatraya's misappropriation and that such fabrication constituted making documents fraudulently and with intent to commit fraud.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: APPEAL ALLOWED; THE ORDER OF ACQUITTAL IS SET ASIDE; THE RESPONDENT IS CONVICTED UNDER SECTION 467, INDIAN PENAL CODE.

Direct Consequences

  • The respondent, Balkrisbna Vaman, is convicted under section 467 IPC for forgery (forging endorsements and signatures on challans to conceal prior misappropriation) and sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment (per Batchelor, J.).
  • The additional charge under sections 218 and 109 was not pressed and the respondent is acquitted on that charge.

Broader Implications Noted in the Opinion

The Court expressly prefers the interpretation adopted by the Madras and Calcutta High Courts (and by certain other authorities) that concealment of a previously committed fraud by making false documents is itself fraudulent and falls within the relevant Penal Code provisions. The opinion does not state that it is laying down a novel legal doctrine beyond applying these authorities; it confines its reasoning to the facts and the interpretation of statutory language in question.

Note: The opinion does not explicitly characterize this decision as establishing a new, general precedent beyond resolving the appeal before the Court. The immediate effect is the conviction and sentence of the respondent and the setting aside of the Sessions Judge's acquittal.


This summary has been prepared solely from the text of the provided opinion. No information has been added or inferred beyond the content of that opinion.

Show all summary ...

Batchelor, J.:— This is an appeal by the Government of Bombay, and the appeal arises in the following circumstances:—

One Dattatraya Anant Kulkarni was an officiating Kulkarni of a certain village between February 1908 and September 1911. Between 11th April and 25th July, 1911 he collected a sum of Rs. 189 from the village raiyats for certain irrigation cesses. Receipts were given by Dattatraya Anant to the paying raiyats, but in fact Dattatraya misappropriated these moneys. He has been on his own trial convicted on his plea of guilty. He admits his guilt also when examined as a witness in the trial of this respondent.

2. In September 1911, this Dattatraya Anant was transferred to another village. He handed over charge to one Dattatraya Hari, who is a witness in the respondent's case. He did not hand over the account books and other papers. In December 1911 the present respondent, Balkrisbna Vaman, who was a petition-writer known to Dattatraya Anant, learnt that the raiyats, whose money had been misappropriated, were on the point of complaining against Dattatraya Anant in regard to the misappropriations. He, therefore, warned Dattatraya Anant and proposed that he, the respondent, should forge certain challans in order to protect the fraud which Dattatraya Anant had committed. The point about these challans was that, in the essential parts of them, they constituted receipts from the Taluka Treasury acknowledging payments made into the Treasury by the village Kulkarni. In pursuance of this arrangement, Dattatraya Anant wrote the body of the challans, while the endorsements and signatures of the Taluka Treasury Officials were forged by the respondent. It is these endorsements and signatures which, if genuine, constitute a receipt in the hands of the village Kulkarni. Mr. Bodas for the respondent has addressed us on the questions of fact but it appears to me that the facts as I have stated them are upon the evidence so unquestionably established that I do not think it necessary to discuss them. The learned Sessions Judge and both the Assessors agreed that these facts were established and it appears to me impossible to contend otherwise. On the footing, therefore, that these are the facts proved, we have to consider what should be the result in law. The respondent was charged with having forged these acquittances by making false endorsements on the challans and with forging the signatures of the Taluka Officials. There was another charge, but with that we are not now concerned. On this charge of forgery under section 467, the learned Sessions Judge was of opinion that the respondent was, in spite of the facts proved as stated, entitled to an acquittal, and he based that view on the requirement contained in the defining section 463 that if a person, who makes a false document, is to be guilty of forgery, he must makethat document, inter alia, ‘with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed.” The learned Judge's view is that no such intent can be ascribed in a case where the fraud has already been fully committed. Though the Sessions Judge does not appear to have made any examination of the Indian authorities on this point, the decisions of the Allahabad High Court undoubtedly favour his opinion. I refer particularly to Empress of India v. Jiwan???1(1), Empress v. Mazhar Husain(2), and to the decision by Edge, C.J, in Quean-Empress v. Girdhari Lal(3). For my own part, however, I am, with very great respect unable to follow the Allahabad High Court in these decisions. Exactly the contrary view has been taken in Lolit Mohan Sarkar v. Queen-Empress(4), where the learned Judges expressly dissent from the reasoning of the Allahabad Court, and also in Emperor v. Bash Behari Das(5), where Mr. Justice Woodroffe said: “In my opinion, even if the intention, with which the false entries were made, was to conceal a fraudulent or dishonest act previously committed, the intention would be to defraud, and the case would fall within section 477A of the Indian Penal Code.” For myself, I should be content to base my judgment on my agreement with Mr. Justice Woodroffe, and to say that I concur in thinking that the concealment of an already practised fraud is a fraud. Since, however, the authorities are in this direct conflict, it may be desirable to pursue the matter a little further. The Calcutta view has also commended itself to the High Court of Madras: see Queen-Empress v. Sabapati(6). In Bombay, I do not find that there is any authority precisely covering the point now in issue. In Queen-Empress v. Ganesh Khanderao(7), the case of Queen-Empress v. Vithal Narayan(8) is reported and that at least shows that West and Nanabhai, JJ., adopted that description of fraud which was given by Mr. Justice Le Blanc in Haycroft v. Greasy(9), that is to say: “By ‘fraud’ is meant an intention to deceive; whether it be from any expectation of advantage to the party himself, or from ill-will towards the other is immaterial.” A description as broad as that would, undoubtedly, bring the present respondent within its scope.

3. A somewhat more restricted description of the term fraud, which there is a very natural reluctance to attempt to define, is given by Sir James Stephen in his History of Criminal Law of England where the learned Judge observes: “There is little danger in saying that whenever the words ‘fraud’ or intent to defraud’ or ‘fraudulently’ occur in the definition of a crime, two elements at least are essential to the commission of the crime, viz, first, deceit or an intention to deceive or in some cases mere secrecy; and, secondly, either actual injury or possible injury or an intent to expose some person either to actual injury or to a risk of possible injury by means of that deceit or secrecy. This intent, I may add, is very seldom the only or the principal intention entertained by the fraudulent person, whose principal object in nearly every case is his own advantage…A practically conclusive test as to the fraudulent character of a deception for criminal purposes is this: Did the author of the deceit derive any advantage from it which he could not have had if the truth had been known? If so, it is hardly possible that that advantage should not have had an equivalent in loss, or risk of loss, to some one else: and if so, there was fraud.” In practice” says the learned author in words which seem particularly apt to our present purpose people hardly ever intentionally deceive each other in matters of business for a purpose which is not fraudulent.” (Vol. II, p. 121).

4. Applying this canon to the facts disclosed in this trial, there can, I think, be but one result. The intention to deceive is too obvious to need further explanation; and it is, at least to my mind, equally indisputable that the author of the deceit derived from it an advantage which he would not have had if the truth had been known. The respondent himself took the benefit of the Rs. 25 fee which was paid to him by Dattatraya Anant. I mention that rather to complete the narrative than because I consider the circumstance material. What is material, in my view is to consider what, if any, advantage accrued to Dattatraya Anant from the deceit, since the respondent's object was rather to further Dattatraya Anant's interests than his own. In this aspect, the illicit or undue advantage is, I think, apparent. The truth was the series of misappropriations by the Kulkarni, and had they been known his criminal liability was established; the advantage derived from the deceit was the concealment of this criminal liability.

5. Moreover, having regard to the observations in Derry v. Peek(10), it may be open to doubt whether there is any substantial distinction between what is popularly meant by fraud and what has sometimes been termed legal or constructive fraud; but, however that may be, I am of opinion that the word ‘fraud’ as used in the Penal Code, is used in its ordinary and popular acceptations, and if that is so, it seems to me that, unless plain words are to be argued out of all meaning, a man who deliberately makes a false document with false signatures in order to shield and conceal an already perpetrated fraud is himself acting with intent to commit fraud. But if as a matter of the grammatical interpretation of the words of section 463, it be absolutely essential to supply the notion of a future fraud as opposed to a past fraud, then, in my opinion, the facts in the present case suffice to furnish us with that requirement. For, in my view, it is a fraud to take deliberate measures in order to prevent persons already defrauded from ascertaining the fraud practised on them and thus to secure the culprit who practised the fraud in the illicit gains which be secured by the fraud.

6. I am, therefore, of opinion that on the facts of the present case, the respondent ought to have been convicted under section 467 of the Indian Penal Code. I would convict him under that section, and sentence him to one year's rigorous imprisonment.

7. The additional charge under sections 218 and 109 has not been pressed against the present respondent, and upon that he is, therefore, acquitted.

Shah, J.:— I agree that this appeal should be allowed, that the order of acquittal in favour of the respondent should be set aside, and that he should be convicted under section 467, Indian Penal Code.

8. I accept the facts as found by the Sessions Judge and the Assessors, and in spite of the criticism offered by the learned Pleader for the accused, I am satisfied on the evidence in the case that the endorsements on the Chilians, Exhibits 6A., 6B and 6C, were written by the present respondent. It is also clear on the fact that the challans were fabricated for the purpose of concealing the fraud which Dattalraya Anant had committed by mis-. appropriating the moneys which he had already received from the raiyats. It is also clear that the fabrication of these documents would enable Dattatraya Anant to conceal the fraud by making his successor Dattatraya Hari believe that the remittances were made to the Taluka Treasury though they were not in fact made. This was a clear advantage to Dattatraya Anant and in securing him that advantage, the respondent, on the facts proved, clearly helped him by making the false documents. The learned Sessions Judge has based his conclusion of acquittal on the ground that under section 463 there is no intent to commit fraud if the intention is merely to conceal the fraud which has already been committed.

9. In this view, he is supported by the decisions of the Allahabad High Court: see Empress of India v. Jiwanand; Empress v. Mazhar Husain; Queen-Empress v. Girdhari Lal. On this point, however, the Madras and Calcutta High Courts have taken a different view: see the cases of Queen-Empress v. Sabapati; Lolit Mohan Sarkar v. Queen-Empress and Emperor v. Rash Behari Das. After considering these cases, I agree with my learned brother in thinking that the cases in Madras and Calcutta have been rightly decided, and I am prepared to accept the interpretation therein put upon the expression intent to commit fraud” and the word “fraudulently.” I think that it is a fraud to conceal a fraud and to make the party concerned believe that no fraud has been committed. Any document made with the intention of advancing such a purpose is made fraudulently and with intent to commit fraud. The document in question were clearly madeforthe purpose of concealing the fraud committed by Dattatraya Anant and witha view to induce a belief in the mind of Dattatraya Hari that no fraud had been committed. The accused is therefore, clearly guilty under section 467, Indian Penal Code.

10. Appeal allowed.