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Vasudeo Atmaram Joshi v. Eknath Balkrishna Thite
Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The land in dispute originally belonged to Namdeo, who died in 1879 leaving two minor sons, Ramchandra (the 3rd defendant) and Dnyaneshwar (father of the 4th defendant). After Namdeo's death, Ambu (described as his mistress) took charge of the minors and entered into possession of the property. When the sons attained majority they claimed the property; Ambu denied their claim and in 1891 the sons sued her for possession.
The suit against Ambu resulted in a decree for possession in favour of Namdeo's sons on 30 August 1892, which was confirmed on 15 June 1894 on appeal. An application to execute that decree was made on 26 June 1897 but dismissed as barred by limitation. Ambu continued in possession until 1898 when she was allegedly ousted by Vithal, who in turn sold the lands to Bhau on 20 July 1898. Bhau mortgaged the lands to Eknath on 1 August 1900.
Separately, Atmaram obtained a money decree in 1900 (decree No. 234 of 1900). In execution he attached the lands in 1901; the attachment was raised on 20 September 1901 after intervention by Eknath claiming title. Atmaram (represented after his death by his sons Vasudeo and Shankar, the appellants) instituted a suit to establish that the lands were liable to attachment and sale in execution of his 1900 money decree and that Vithal, Bhau and Eknath had no interest in the lands. The statement of the statutory provision under which the suit was brought is not uniformly recorded in the opinion: the text refers to sections 283 and 383 of the Civil Procedure Code in different places.
The Subordinate Judge dismissed the plaintiff’s claim, finding that Vithal’s adverse possession began only in 1898 and that a sale by Namdeo to Vithal in 1879 was not proved. The lower appellate Court reversed that decree and restored the judgment of an earlier Subordinate Judge. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 (Eknath and Bhau) then appealed to the High Court. Chief Justice Scott heard the appeal, reversed the lower appellate Court, and dismissed the suit. The plaintiff’s legal representatives (Atmaram’s sons) appealed under the Letters Patent to the larger Bench, leading to the judgments of Chandavarkar, J. and Heaton, J., reported in the text.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the suit brought by the decree-holder to establish the right to attach and sell land in execution of a money decree is, for limitation purposes, governed by Article 142 of Schedule I to the Limitation Act (relating to suits for possession where the plaintiff was dispossessed or discontinued possession) or by Article 144 (a more general article), as expressly posed by Chandavarkar, J.
- Relatedly, whether a prior decree for possession (confirmed on appeal but not executed due to lapse of time) constitutes an assertion of title in Court that can be relied upon in a later suit against third parties (i.e., whether the decree substitutes for actual possession so as to take the suit out of Article 142).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments (counsel: Nadkarni with M. V. Bhat)
- The case is governed by Article 144 (and not Article 142) of the Limitation Act because defendants Nos. 1 and 2 did not set up a defence of dispossession/discontinuance in the sense contemplated by Article 142; therefore Article 144 applies to the suit brought to enforce the decree-holder's rights.
- Authorities were cited in support of the proposition that Article 144, not Article 142, applies; a list of cases was referenced in the printed argument (Talshibhai v. Ranchhod; Ganga v. Nago; Harishankar v. Karsan; Radha Gobind Roy v. Inglis; Rao Karam Singh v. Rajah Bakar Ali Khan; Pandurang Govind v. Balkrishna Hari; Hanmanta v. Mahadev; Faki Abdulla v. Babaji Gungaji; Parmanand v. Sahib Ali; Muhammad v. Ghulam; Gobind Lall v. Debendrouath; Sheikh Sohnur v. Huttman, and others).
- Ambu’s adverse possession (if it can be characterised as adverse) commenced in 1897 when execution of the earlier decree became barred; until then Ambu was effectively acting in relation to the minors and could not be treated as having ousted them. Therefore the judgment-debtors’ ownership remained.
- The defendants who claim through Vithal cannot assert better rights than Ambu herself had; accordingly the article applicable to them is Article 144 and not Article 142.
- In reply the appellants also relied on Jagatjit Singh v. Sarabjit Singh and Amrita Ravji v. Shridhar (as additional supporting authorities).
Respondents' Arguments (counsel: P. P. Khare)
- The judgment appealed against (the decision of the lower appellate Court reversed by Scott, C.J.) is, it was contended, consistent with the Privy Council decision in Mohima Chunder v. Mohesh Chunder.
- The respondents argued that Article 144 is a general article and that Article 142 applies to suits to eject trespassers: in such suits the plaintiff must show that he, or the person under whom he claims, has been in possession within twelve years of the date of the suit.
- It was urged that Ambu’s adverse possession began in 1891 (when she denied the sons' title and had to be sued), making any suit to dispossess her time-barred by 1903; since the judgment-debtors had been out of possession for more than twelve years prior to the 1905 suit, Article 142 would bar their claim.
- The respondents cited authorities (including Gopaul Chunder v. Nilmoney Milter; Rao Karan Singh v. Rajah Bakar Ali Khan; Mahomed Ali Khan v. Khaja Abdul Gunny; Mirza Shamsher Bahadur v. Munshi Kunji Behari Lal) for the proposition that possession within twelve years must be shown in suits of this nature.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For (as stated in the opinion) | Application by the Court (how the opinion used or treated the precedent) |
|---|---|---|
| Hariskankar Jebhai v. Naran Karsan (Harishankar v. Karsan) | Cited for the proposition that in a suit under section 283 of the Code the plaintiff must prove a subsisting right to the property and the suit should be tried as if it were a suit for possession by the judgment-debtors. | Chandavarkar, J. relied on this authority to frame how the present suit should be regarded (i.e., as raising the question of the judgment-debtors' right similar to a suit for possession). |
| Faki Abdulla v. Babaji Gungaji | Cited as explaining the distinction between Articles 142 and 144 of the Limitation Act. | Chandavarkar, J. followed this ruling and used it to justify holding that Article 144 applies rather than Article 142. |
| Bandu v. Naba | Cited for the proposition that a decree-holder can enter by ousting any trespasser notwithstanding that execution of the decree may be time-barred. | Chandavarkar, J. invoked this authority to support the view that the right established by a decree remains and the decree-holders can vindicate it against trespassers. |
| Ganga ayal Nago Kaval Mhatra v. Nagu Dhaya Mhatra (Ganga v. Nago) | Cited as an analogous pleading situation where defendants alleging they acquired title from the plaintiff must prove entitlement by the transactions alleged or adverse possession for twelve years. | Chandavarkar, J. cited this decision as analogous and supportive of the requirement that respondents must prove adverse possession to retain the land. |
| Lallubhai Bapubhai v. Mankuvarbai | Cited to show that in a suit against a person like Ambu, the limitation question would be governed by Article 114 rather than Article 142. | Chandavarkar, J. referred to this authority to support the point that the limitation applicable in a suit directly against Ambu would differ (Article 114). |
| Dadoba v. Krishna | Same context as Lallubhai Bapubhai v. Mankuvarbai: cited regarding appropriate article for limitation in suits against a person like Ambu. | Used alongside Lallubhai to illustrate that Article 142 is not the applicable article when suit is against such a person; Court relied on it for that proposition. |
| Rains v. Buxton | Cited for judicial definitions of "dispossession" and "discontinuance" (Fry, J.'s formulations quoted in the opinion). | Chandavarkar, J. and the text used the definitions in Rains v. Buxton to determine that there had been no dispossession or discontinuance by the judgment-debtors within the meaning of Article 142. |
| Morgan v. Morgan | Cited for the principle (quoted from Lord Hardwick) that a person entering an infant's estate and continuing in possession is to be considered as guardian/bailiff for the infant. | Chandavarkar, J. applied this principle to treat Ambu's possession initially as that of a guardian/agent on behalf of the minors, affecting whether there was dispossession of the minors. |
| Taylor v. Horde | Cited among authorities treating the law on possession of infants and persons entering as guardians/agents; also cited in context of discontinuance/dispossession discussion. | Referred to in the Court's treatment of the nature of Ambu's possession (supporting the view that her possession began as guardian/agent). |
| Smith v. Lloyd | Cited in a list of authorities dealing with dispossession/discontinuance and related topics. | Mentioned by counsel; not specifically applied or elaborated upon in the Court's reasoning beyond being among authorities on dispossession. |
| M' Donnell v. M' Kinty | Cited among authorities concerning dispossession/adverse possession. | Listed by counsel in support of general propositions; the opinion does not record a detailed application of this authority to the facts beyond citation. |
| Leigh v. Jack | Cited among authorities concerning dispossession/adverse possession. | Appeared in counsel's list; no separate, specific application recorded by the Court. |
| Howard v. Earl of Shrewsbury | Cited among authorities concerning dispossession/adverse possession. | Listed by counsel; not separately applied in the Court’s step-by-step reasoning in the opinion. |
| Talshibhai v. Ranchhod | Cited by the appellants to support their contention that Article 144 governs the present case rather than Article 142. | Included in appellants' list of supporting authorities; no specific separate treatment recorded beyond being cited. |
| Radha Gobind Roy v. Inglis | Cited by appellants among cases supporting Article 144 applicability over Article 142. | Listed as authority for the appellants' proposition; not separately analyzed in the Court's text beyond the citation. |
| Rao Karam Singh v. Rajah Bakar Ali Khan (Rao Karan Singh ...) | Cited by both sides in different contexts: listed by appellants for Article 144; referenced by respondents in a group of authorities requiring possession proof in ejectment suits. | Referenced in submissions; not singled out for independent analysis beyond inclusion in counsel lists. |
| Pandurang Govind v. Balkrishna Hari | Cited by appellants among authorities for the proposition that Article 144 applies. | Listed in appellant's citations; the Court did not separately expound on it in the opinion. |
| Hanmanta v. Mahadev | Cited by appellants in support of Article 144 applicability. | Included in appellant's list; no separate application by the Court recorded. |
| Parmanand v. Sahib Ali | Cited by appellants in support of Article 144 applicability. | Listed by appellants; not specifically discussed by the Court. |
| Muhammad v. Ghulam | Cited by appellants among authorities that (by implication) favour Article 144 in cases of this character. | Mentioned in argument list; no discrete application recorded. |
| Gobind Lall v. Debendrouath | Cited by appellants for support that Article 144 applies rather than Article 142. | Listed among appellant authorities; not separately applied by the Court beyond citation. |
| Sheikh Sohnur v. Huttman | Cited by appellants for the same general proposition favouring Article 144. | Included in submissions; no independent application described by the Court. |
| Mohima Chunder v. Mohesh Chunder | Cited by respondents as a Privy Council authority; relied on to support the view that Article 142 requires proof of possession within twelve years in ejectment-type suits. | Referenced by respondents; Chandavarkar, J. considered the respondents' reliance but concluded the facts brought the case under Article 144 instead. |
| Gopaul Chunder v. Nilmoney Milter | Cited by respondents as part of authorities illustrating that possession within twelve years is required in suits to eject trespassers. | Included in respondents' list; the Court discussed the general rule but found the suit to be governed by Article 144 on the facts. |
| Mahomed Ali Khan v. Khaja Abdul Gunny | Cited by respondents among authorities on possession requirement in ejectment suits. | Listed in respondents' submissions; not separately analyzed by the Court beyond the general context. |
| Mirza Shamsher Bahadur v. Munshi Kunji Behari Lal | Cited by respondents among authorities illustrating the possession requirement for ejectment suits. | Referenced in argument lists; no independent application by the Court beyond the general discussion. |
| Bala v. Abai | Cited by appellants to support the proposition that Ambu's possession did not elevate the respondents' title above that of the original owners. | Included in appellant submissions; not separately applied beyond being listed. |
| Rani Hemanta v. Maharaja Jagindra Nath Roy | Cited by appellants in support of the principle that the right of ownership remained despite Ambu’s possession until she took action to convert it into her own. | Listed by appellants; Court did not separately analyze this case beyond citation in argument. |
| Lahshman v. Vibhu (spelled variant in text) | Cited near the opening as part of a group of authorities discussing the effect of prior decree and possession on later suits. | Mentioned in counsel's list at the outset of the opinion; not otherwise specifically applied in the Court's reasoning beyond the general context. |
| Jagatjit Singh v. Sarabjit Singh | Cited by appellants in reply submissions (additional supporting authority). | Referred to in reply; no separate treatment recorded in the Court's reasons. |
| Amrita Ravji v. Shridhar | Cited by appellants in reply submissions (additional supporting authority). | Listed in appellant reply; the opinion does not record a special application of it. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis (principally in the judgment of Chandavarkar, J., with concurring observations by Heaton, J.) proceeded in a sequence of factual findings and legal conclusions:
- Factual findings (accepted by the High Court judges) — Namdeo died in 1879; Ambu entered into possession and looked after the minors; the minors (Ramchandra and Dnyaneshwar) sued Ambu in 1891, obtained a decree in 1892 which was confirmed in 1894; an attempt to execute that decree in 1897 failed as barred by limitation; Vithal wrongfully dispossessed Ambu in 1898 and sold to Bhau, who mortgaged to Eknath.
- Characterisation of Ambu's possession — The Court adopted the principle (citing Morgan v. Morgan and other authority) that when a person enters upon the estate of an infant and continues in possession, the law treats such a person as having entered as guardian/agent for the infant. Therefore Ambu’s possession began as possession on behalf of the minors and continued as such until she did some act to assert an independent title (which the Court placed at 1891 when she denied their title and had to be sued).
- Application of the definitions of dispossession and discontinuance — The Court relied on judicial formulations (for example Rains v. Buxton) defining "dispossession" as someone coming in and driving out others, and "discontinuance" as leaving the land so others can enter. On the facts found, there was no dispossession of the judgment-debtors while they were in possession (because they were not in possession; Ambu had been in possession as guardian/agent), and there was no discontinuance of possession by the judgment-debtors in the sense contemplated by Article 142.
- Distinction between the types of claims covered by Article 142 and Article 144 — The Court emphasised that Article 142 applies to suits "for possession of immoveable property, when the plaintiff, while in possession of the property, has been dispossessed or has discontinued the possession." The present suit was, by its form and substance, a claim to establish title (as judgment-debtors) based on a prior decree made in their favour and hence not a suit falling under Article 142. The Court relied on Faki Abdulla v. Babaji Gungaji as explaining the distinction and held that Article 144, not Article 142, was the applicable article of limitation.
- Role of the prior decree — Although execution of the prior decree became time-barred, the Court held that the right established by the decree remained (citing Bandu v. Naba). A decree awarding possession creates an assertion of title made in Court; that decree is good against the party-defendants to that suit, and if the same title is reasserted and made good in a later suit, it is effective against other opposing parties as well unless defeated by adverse possession.
- Burden on the respondents (defendants in possession) — Because the earlier sale by Namdeo to Vithal was not proved, the respondents could succeed only by proving that they (or those under whom they claimed) had acquired the land by adverse possession for the statutory period of twelve years. The courts below found that the respondents had not proved such adverse possession (Vithal's possession began only in 1898). Thus they could not defeat the title established by the prior decree simply by asserting a bar under Article 142.
- Conclusion on limitation — On the combined factual findings and legal principles, the Court concluded that Article 144 applied and that the respondents had failed to show title by adverse possession; consequently the decree of the lower appellate Court (which had reversed the subordinate judge) was set aside and the subordinate judge's decree restored.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court's final determination was that the appeal should be allowed and the decree of the lower appellate Court set aside. The decree of the Subordinate Judge with appellate powers was restored. (Expressed in the opinion: Appeal allowed and the subordinate judge's decree restored with costs against respondents Nos. 1 and 2.)
Implications:
- Direct effect: The plaintiff's (Atmaram's representatives') appeal succeeded; the subordinate judge's dismissal of the defendants' claim (in favour of the appellants) was restored and costs of the subsequent appeals were awarded against the respondents who were defendants Nos. 1 and 2 in the original suit.
- On legal principle: The Court clarified (in the facts of this case) that a suit by a judgment-creditor under the Code to establish that land is liable to attachment and sale in execution of a money decree is not necessarily governed by Article 142 of the Limitation Act. Where the plaintiff's right rests on a decree for possession established in Court (even if execution of the decree has become time-barred), that decree is an assertion of title in Court and, unless the opponent proves extinguishment by adverse possession, the later suit is governed by Article 144 rather than Article 142. This was the central legal conclusion reached by the Court in this opinion.
- No novel or broader rule was announced beyond the application of existing distinctions between Article 142 and Article 144 as applied to the facts: the decision rests on established authorities and on the factual findings that the defendants had not made out adverse possession for the statutory period.
Outcome (concise): Appeal allowed; subordinate judge's decree restored; costs awarded against defendants 1 and 2.
Note: This summary is prepared strictly from the content of the provided opinion. Where the opinion itself listed or grouped authorities without expanding on each, this summary records those citations and notes how the opinion used or distinguished them; no additional facts, holdings, or contextual materials have been inferred or introduced beyond the text of the opinion.
Per Heaton, J.:— Article 142 of the Indian Limitation Act (XV of 1877) has no application to claims which neither in terms nor in substance are claims to possession, made necessary by reason of dispossession or discontinuance of possession. It is a general principle that anyone suing in ejectment must prove possession within twelve years: the reason for this, however, is that possession is commonly the effective assertion of title which is relied on; but it is not the only one. There is another which in some cases is equally good, and that is an assertion of title made in Court and established by a decree. That is good against those who are party defendants to the suit; and if the same title is re-asserted and made good in a later suit against other opposing parties, it is good against them, also and entitles to possession whether the title claimant has or has not been in possession within twelve years, unless the opponent can defeat the title by adverse possession.
Appeal under the Letters Patent against the decision of Scott, C.J, which reversed the decree passed by Yaman M. Bodas, First Class Subordinate Judge with Appellate Powers at Sholapur, and restored the decree passed by C.R Karkare, Subordinate Judge at Pandharpur.
This was a suit brought by a decree-holder to establish his right to attach and sell certain property as belonging to his judgment-debtors, brought under the provisions of section 283 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882).
The decree in question was a money decree obtained in 1900 by Atmaram (the plaintiff), who having died was represented in these proceedings by his two sons, Vasudeo and Shankar, the appellants. In execution of this decree, the plaintiff attached certain lands as belonging to his judgment-debtors, Ramchandra (defendant No. 3) and Dnyaneshwar (father of Kondi, defendant No. 4), Ekuath (defendant No. 1) intervened in those proceedings by putting forth his title to the property. The Court consequently raised the attachment on the 20th September 1901.
The claim which Eknath advanced against the property in dispute arose under the following circumstances. The property originally belonged to one Namdeo (father of Ramchandra and Dnyaneshwar). He died in 1879 leaving him surviving his two minor song above named, and a mistress by name Ambu. After his death, Ambu brought up the minors and managed their property. When both the minors attained majority, they asked Ambu to deliver the property to them. She declined to do so claiming the property in her own right. The two sons, Ram-chandraand Dnyaneshwar, sued her in 1891 to recover possession of the property, which included the lands now in dispute. The suit terminated in a decree passed in the plaintiff's favour on the 30th August 1892. It was confirmed on the 15th June 1894 by the appellate Court. The decree-holders Ramchandra and Dnyaneshwar applied to execute this decree on the 26th June 1897, but it was dismissed as barred by limitation having been made more than three years after the date of the decree. Ambu meanwhile continued in possession till 1898, when she was wrongfully dispossessed by a trespasser one Vithal, a cousin of Ramchandra and Dnyaneshwar. Vithal sold the lands to Bhau (defendant No. 2) on the 20th July 1898. Bhau mortgaged the same with Eknath (defendant No. 1) on the 1st August 1900.
The plaintiff Atmaram filed this suit on the 3rd July 1905 under the provisions of section 383 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) to obtain a declaration that the lands in suit were liable to attachment and sale in execution of his money decree against Ramchandra and Dnyaneshwar, and that Vithal, Bhau and Eknath had no interest in the lands.
Ramchandra and Dnyaneshwar's son Kondi (defendants Nos. 3 and 4) were absent.
Eknath and Bhau (defendants Nos. 1 and 2) contended in their written statement that Vithal had purchased the lands from Namdeo and was in possession of them as owner since 1879; that they themselves were in possession from 1898; and that as Ramchandra and Dnyaneshwar were out of possession from 1879, their claim was extinguished and the right of the plaintiff was barred by limitation.
The Subordinate Judge held that the sale by Namdeo to Vithal in 1879 was not proved, and that Vithal was not shown to have been in possession since 1879. He further held that Vithal's adverse possession commenced in 1898, when he stepped into possession by wrongfully ousting Ambu, and dismissed the plaintiff's claim.
This decree was reversed on appeal by the lower appellate Court.
The defendants Nos. 1 and 2 appealed to the High Court.
The appeal was heard by Scott, C.J, who reversed the decree passed by the lower appellate Court and dismissed the suit. The judgment delivered by his Lordship ran as follows:
Scott, C.J:— This is a suit brought by the plaintiff under the provisions of section 283 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1882 for the purpose of determining the respective rights of the 3rd and 4th defendants, the plaintiff's judgment-debtors, on the one hand and the 1st and 2nd defendants, the persons in possession, on the other hand in certain immoveable property attached by the plaintiff.
The material facts arc that the property belonged to one Namdeo, father of the 3rd, and grandfather of the 4th, defendant till his death in 1879; thereafter it remained in the possession of Ambu who was his mistress and who attended to the wants of the 3rd defendant and Dnyaneshwar, father of defendant 4, during their minority. In 1891 the 3rd defendant and Dnyaneshwar sued Ambu for possession of eight survey numbers, five of which, she alleged, had been bequeathed to her by Namdeo and three of which including the land, the subject of this suit, she alleged that she held as tenant of Namdeo's brother Appaji. The first Court decided against Ambu as regards all the plots. She appealed as to the plots alleged to have been bequeathed to her but did not press her claim as to the other plots. The appellate Court in 1894 confirmed the decreee as to these plots but dismissed the suit as regards the plots claimed by bequest.
The plaintiffs in that suit had, therefore, a decree for possession of three survey numbers, which included the land, the subject of this suit. They, however, failed to execute the decree within three years and their remedy against Ambu thus became barred in 1897. In 1898 Vithal Appaji, a nephew of Namdeo, wrongfully dispossessed Ambu and sold the land to defendant No. 2. The defendant No. 1 is mortgagee of defendant No. 2.
The plaintiff, a judgment-creditor of defendants Nos. 3 and 4, attached the land but on the application of defendants Nos. 1 and 2 it was released under section 280 of the Code of 1883.
The plaintiff now sues for a declaration that the land in suit, described in the plaint, is liable to attachment and sale, in execution of decree No. 234 of 1900, obtained by him, against the defendant No. 3 and deceased Dnyaneshwar, the father of defendant No. 4, and that the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and their vendor, Vithal Appaji Velapure, have no interest in that land, together with cost of suit.
This in substance raises the question which could arise, on a purchaser under a Court-sale under plaintiff's decree trying to obtain possession of the land in suit from the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 who are admittedly in possession and, it is contended by the appellants’ pleader that this suit must be tried as if it were a suit for possession between the defendants Nos. 3 and 4 and defendants Nos, 1 and 2 falling under article 142 of the Limitation Act. This contention is, I think, correct as the title of the judgment-debtors comes from Namdeo and the defendant No. 3 and his brother Dnyaneshwar were out of possession when they sued Ambu in 1891.
It is clear law that defendants Nos. 1 and 2 cannot tack to their seven years’ possession the possession of Ambu whom they have dispossessed. See Pollock and Wright on Possession, page 98, and Lahshman v. Vibhu —but although they cannot prove adverse possession for twelve years they are entitled to insist that the plaintiff should establish possession by the defendants Nos. 3 and 4 within twelve years of suit. The plaintiff's pleader seeks to satisfy this condition by pointing to the abandonment by Ambu in her appeal of her contention with regard to the property in suit. That, however, is not proof of the possession of the plaintiff's judgment-debtors in 1894. Her surrender upon that point resulted in the affirmation of their decree for possession as regards the property now in question, hut the facts found show that they never got possession by executing their decree. They and those claiming under them would, therefore, fail in a suit for possession falling under article 142 and this suit for the same reason must be dismissed.
I, therefore, reverse the decree of the lower appellate Court and dismiss the suit with costs throughout.
The plaintiff's legal representatives, his sons, appealed from this decision under the Letters Patent.
Nadkarni, with M.V Bhat, for the appellants:—
The case is governed by article 144, not by article 142, of the Limitation Act, 1877, as defendants Nos. 1 and 2 did not set up a case of possession and dispossession by way of defence. See Talshibhai v. Ranchhod; Ganga v. Nago; Harishankar v. Karsan; Radha Gobind Roy v. Inglis; Rao Karam Singh v. Rajah Bakar Ali Khan; Pandurang Govind v. Balkrishna Hari(6); Hanmanta v. Mahadev(7); Faki Abdulla v. Babaji Gungaji(8); Parmanand v. Sahib Ali(9); and Muhammad v. Ghulam(10). The view taken in the decision appealed against us to the applicability of article 142 is opposed to the weight of authorities. See Gobind Lall v. Debendrouath(11); Sheikh Sohnur v. Huttman(12). On the question of dispossession or discontinuance of possession the following cases were cited: Rains v. Buxton(13); Morgan v. Morgan(14); Howard v. Earl of Shrewsbury(15); Taylor v. Horde(16); Leigh v. Jack(17); M' Donnell v. M' Kinty(18); Smith v. Lloyd(19)
Ambu's adverse possession commenced, if at all, in 1897, when the decree for possession obtained against her became barred by time. Nevertheless the right of ownership remained and the title continued with the owners Ramchandra and Dnyaneshwar.
See Bala v. Abai; Rani Hemanta v. Maharaja Jagindra Nath Roy. The defendants Nos. 1 and 2 cannot get higher rights than Ambu against whom the article applicable would be article 144 and not article 142 of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877). See Lallnbhai Bapubhai v. Mankuvarlai and Dadoba v. Krishna.
P.P Khare, for the respondents:—
The decision appealed against is in accord with the Privy Council case of Mohima Chunder v. Mohesh Chunder Article 144 is a general article and applies only where no other article applies to the case. In a suit to eject trespassers, the plaintiff, in order to succeed, has to show that he, or the person under whom he claims, has been in possession of the property within twelve years of the date of the suit. See Gopaul Chunder v. Nilmoney Milter; Rao Karan Singh v. Rajah Bakar Ali Khan; Mahomed Ali Khan v. Khaja Abdul Gunny; Mirza Shamsher Bahadur v. Munshi Kunji Behari Lal.
The judgment-debtors’ title was questioned by Ambu in 1891, when they instituted a suit against her to recover possession of the property. Her adverse possession dated therefore from 1891; and any suit to dispossess her would become time-barred in 1903. Ever since 1891, Ambu claimed and retained the property in her own right. The judgment-debtors having been out of possession for more than 12 years before suit, they were barred by article 142 from putting forth any claim to the lands in dispute.
Nadkarat, in reply, cited Jagatjit Singh v. Sarabjit Singh and Amrita Ravji v. Shridhar.
Chandavarkar, J.:— The question of law for determination in this appeal is whether the suit brought by the father of the appellants, since deceased, to establish his right to attach and sell the property in dispute in execution of a money decree is, for the purposes of limitation, governed by article 142 or article 144 of Schedule I to the Limitation Act.
That question turns upon the following facts, which are not in dispute.
The father of the appellants, having obtained a decree for money against the 3rd respondent Ramchandra Namdeo and his brother Dnyaneshwar Namdeo, deceased, represented by his son Kondi, in suit No. 234 of 1900, attached the lands in dispute in execution as belonging to his judgment-debtors.
The 1st respondent, Eknath Balkrishna, thereupon intervened and applied to have the attachment raised on the ground that the land had belonged originally to one Vithal, who had sold it to the 2nd respondent, and that the latter had mortgaged it to the intervenor (the 1st respondent). The application having been allowed, the appellants’ father brought the suit, which has given rise to the present appeal, for a declaration that the lands in dispute were liable to be attached as those of his judgment-debtors, the 1st respondent and Dnyaneshwar.
The defence was that the 2nd respondent's predecessor in title, one Vithal, had acquired a title to them by purchase from the father of the appellants’ judgment-debtors in 1878, and that the title of the latter was barred by limitation.
The Courts below have found the purchase not proved. So the other defence, that of limitation, alone remains.
On that question it is found as a fact by those Courts that Vithal got into possession without any title only in 1898, so that the respondents, who claim under him and resist the appellants’ right to attach and sell the property as belonging to their judgment-debtors, are mere trespassers. But it is contended for those respondents that, though they have acquired no title to the property by adverse possession for the statutory period of 12 years, the appellants are not entitled to succeed and recover possession unless they prove possession within twelve years next preceding this suit brought in 1905.
And they maintain that, on the facts found by the lower Courts, the appellants were not in possession either by themselves or through their predecessors in title within the 12 years contemplated by article 142 of Schedule I to the Limitation Act. The facts are these. The property belonged to Namdeo, who died in 1879, leaving two sons, the 3rd respondent and his brother Dnyaneshwar (represented now by the 4th respondent), who were then minors. On Namdeo's death, his mistress Ambu, who had lived with him, took charge of his minor sons, administered to their wants, and entered into possession of the property, including that now in dispute, which they had inherited from their father. When they arrived at the age of majority, they found that Ambu claimed the property in her own right.
In 1891 the 3rd respondent and his brother Dnyaneshwar sued Ambu for possession of the lands and obtained a decree on the 30th of August 1892, That decree was confirmed in appeal on the loth of June 1894, On the 26th of June 1897 the appellants’ father applied for its execution, but the application was dismissed as barred by limitation and execution was refused.
Relying on these facts, the 1st and 2nd respondents urge that, from at least 1891 to 1897, Ambu was in possession; that from 1898 Vithal and after him they have been in possession; and that, therefore, the appellants’ judgment-debtors have been out of possession for more than 12 years next preceding the suit.
That would be so, if article 142 of Schedule I to the Limitation Act applied. That article contemplates a suit “for possession of immoveable property, when the plaintiff, while in possession of the property, has been dispossessed or has discontinued the possession.” The present suit has been brought by the appellants, under section 283 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1832), to establish their right to attach and sell the property in dispute as that of their judgment-debtors, the 1st respondent and Dnyaneshwar (father of the 4th respondent), in execution of their money decree. In such a suit the appellants must prove that on the date of the attachment, which was subsequently raised by order of the Court on the application of the 1st respondent, their judgment-debtors had a subsisting right to the property: Hariskankar Jebhai v. Naran Karsan. The suit must then be tried as if it were a suit for possession by the judgment-debtors.
So regarded, it is not the case here of the judgment-debtors having been dispossessed or having discontinued possession while in possession of the property. The allegation, which has been found proved, is that when Namdeo, father of the judgment-debtors, died, leaving them minors, his mistress Ambu looked after them by administering to their wants and entered into possession of their property.
The Subordinate Judge, who tried the suit, held that Ambu's possession had been from the beginning wrongful and he negatived the plea of the appellants’ father that she had commenced her Varivax on behalf of his judgment-debtors, who had then been minors. The Subordinate Judge with appellate powers has recorded no finding on that plea. But the law is, as pointed out by Lord Hardwick in Morgan v. Morgan “where any person, whether a father or a stranger, enters upon the estate of an infant, and continues in possession, this Court will consider such person entering as a guardian to the infant”: (see other decisions to the same effect collated in the notes to the case of Taylor v. Horde, Smiths’ Leading Cases, Vol. II, 10th Edn., pp. 644 and 645). Ambu's possession must, therefore, be deemed to have begun as that of bailiff or agent for the minors and to have continued as such until, after the minors had arrived at the age of majority, she did something to convert it into a wrongful possession on her own account.
It was only in 1891 that she denied their title and in consequence she had to be sued. Bat there had never been any dispossession by Ambu of the appellants’ judgment-debtors while they had been in possession, because it was she who had been in possession. “Dispossession is where a person comes in and drives out the others from possession” (per Fry, J., in Rains v. Buxton.
In a suit against her, her plea of limitation would be decide 1 by the application, not of article 142, but of article 114 (Lallubhai Bapubhai v. Mankuvarbai; Dadoba v. Krishna.
On the fact alleged and found proved, Ambu herself was wrongfully dispossessed in 1898 by Vithal, under whom the 1st respondent claims. The appellants’ judgment-debtors do not claim under or through Ambu; rather they claim against and in spite of her; and it is found in the judgment under appeal that the respondents claiming under Vithal cannot tack on the period of their possession to Ambu's. That is not contested before us. So it cannot be said that the dispossession of Ambu by Vithal in 1898, when she was in possession of the property, was dispossession of the appellants’ judgment-debtors. Article 142 is out of place in this respect also.
So much for the dispossession required to bring the case under article 142. But the article also contemplates discontinuance of possession by the person suing. As was said by Fry, J., in Rains v. Buxton, “discontinuance is where the person goes out and is followed into possession by other persons.” It implies that the person discontinuing has given up the land and left it to be possessed by anyone choosing to come in. In the present case there was, whether on the allegations in the pleadings or on the facts found, no such abandonment. It is not the case of any party and it is not the finding of the Courts below that the appellants’ judgment-debtors, while in possession, relinquished it as if they did not care for it, and that in consequence the respondents followed them into possession.
The decree for possession obtained by the appellants’ judgment-debtors (the 3rd respondent and Dnyaneshwar) against Ambu has no doubt become incapable of execution by reason of their failure to apply to the Court for its execution within the period prescribed by he law of limitation. But nevertheless the right established by it remains; and though that right cannot be enforced as against Ambu by execution through the Court, the decree-holders can enter by ousting any trespasser, Ambu included: Bandu v. Naba.
Under these circumstances, there being no allegation of possession in the appellants' judgment-debtors lost by dispossession or discontinuance of possession, but the case put forward being a title in them established by their decree against Ambu and a wrongful possession obtained from her after the decree by Vithal, under whom the 1st and 2nd respondents claim, the limitation applicable to the suit is that provided by article 144, not article 142 of the statute, according to the ruling of this Court in Faki Abdulla v. Babaji Gungaji, where the distinction between the two articles is explained. The first two respondents admitted in their written statement the original title of Namdeo, from whom as heirs the appellants’ judgment-debtors derive their ownership, bat they pleaded that the title had become extinct by reason of the alleged purchase by Vithal from Namdeo in 1878 and of Vithal's adverse possession for 12 years from that year. The purchase being found not proved, the respondents in question can succeed only by proving their right by adverse possession for 12 years. They have failed to prove it. In this respect the case resembles in its pleadings Ganga ayal Nago Kaval Mhatra v. Nagu Dhaya Mhatra. There the plaintiff, who sued for possession on the strength of her title and defendants’ tenancy under her, was met by the defence that the defendants had obtained the land from her, first, under a certain agreement, and afterwards under a mortgage, and that they had been in adverse possession for more than 12 years. This Court held that, though the plaintiff had failed to prove the tenancy of the defendants set up by her, yet, as the defendants had admitted the plaintiff's title but alleged having come into possession under her, the defendants “cannot claim to retain the land except by proving that they are entitled to do so in virtue of one or other of the alleged transactions with the plaintiff or that their possession has been in fact adverse for twelve years.”
For these reasons the decree appealed from must be set aside and that of the Subordinate Judge with appellate powers restored, with the costs of the second appeal and this appeal under the Letters Patent on the 1st and the 2nd respondent, who were respectively defendants 1 and 2 in the suit.
Heaton, J.:— The facts are recited in the judgment of the Teamed Chief Justice from whose decision this is an appeal tinder the Letters Patent.
The plaintiff's claim is to make good the ownership of defendants 3 and 4 over the land in suit. It was opposed by defendants 1 and 2 who claimed independent ownership. It was objected that the claim to establish the title of defendants 3 and 4 was barred by article 142 of the Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act. But it seems to me that neither in form nor in substance is this claim of the kind contemplated by article 142. It is a claim by an owner for his land, against a trespasser; and the cause of action is not based on dispossession or discontinuance of possession, but simply on the allegations that defendants 3 and 4 are the owners of the land and that defendants 1 and 2 have no right to be there. It is established that defendants 3 and 4 are the owners and that defendants 1 and 2 have no right to be there. It is also established that defendants 1 and 2 first came into possession within 12 years of the institution of the suit and that there is no title made good by adverse possession against defendants 3 and 4. These defendants have the title and their title still subsisted when this suit was brought: it had not been extinguished.
I do not think that article 142 has any application to claims which neither in terms nor in substance are claims to possession, made necessary by reason of dispossession or discontinuance of possession. It was indeed urged that it is a general principle that anyone suing in ejectment must prove possession within twelve years and the authorities seem to bear out that contention: but the reason for this is that possession is commonly the effective assertion of title which is relied on and the cases accordingly deal with that particular kind of assertion of title. But it is not the only one; there is another which in some cases is equally good; and that is an assertion of title made in Court and established by a decree. That is good against those who are party defendants to the suit, and if the same title is reasserted and made good, as here in a later suit against other opposing parties, it is good against them also and entitles to possession whether the title-claimant has or has not been in possession within twelve years; unless the opponent can defeat the title by adverse possession. There is no such defeat in this case.
Therefore I am of opinion that the appeal must succeed.
Appeal allowed,
R.R
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