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Municipal Corporation Of Delhi v. Badri

Delhi High Court
Mar 1, 1966
Smart Summary (Beta)

Judgment Summary: S.B. Capoor, J. (1 March 1966)

Factual and Procedural Background

These four civil revision petitions (Nos. 408-D of 1960, 409-D of 1960, 421-D of 1963 and 422-D of 1963) arise from suits by the Delhi Municipal Committee (now the Delhi Municipal Corporation) as plaintiff seeking eviction of several tenants under Section 17 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 ("the Act").

- In revision petitions Nos. 408-D and 409-D (1960) the defendants were Badri and Murari Lal occupying portions of property in Mohalla Punjabi, Subzi Mandi, Delhi; the Municipal Committee claimed the premises were required to run a child welfare centre.

- In revision petitions Nos. 421-D and 422-D (1963) the defendants were Mohammad Arab and Manzoor Elahi occupying portions of premises at Baradari Sher Afghan Khan, Bazar Ballimaran; the plaintiff claimed the premises were required for starting a school (an object of public utility).

At trial, all four suits were decreed and eviction ordered. On appeal two different appellate judges reached conflicting conclusions: in the appeals by Badri and Murari Lal the appellate judge held the Delhi Municipal Committee was not a "public institution" within Section 17 and dismissed the plaintiff's suit, whereas in the other two appeals the appellate judge upheld the trial court's decrees in favour of the plaintiff. Because of these conflicting appellate decisions, the Single Judge directed disposal by a larger Bench and the matter came before the Court whose opinion is summarized here.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. How is the phrase "public institution" in Section 17 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 to be interpreted — specifically, whether a local authority or body corporate (such as the Delhi Municipal Committee) is excluded from the meaning of "public institution" when that term first appears in Section 17.
  2. Whether the Delhi Municipal Committee (later Delhi Municipal Corporation), being a body corporate and a local authority, can invoke clause (d) of Section 17 (that premises are bona fide required by the public institution for the furtherance of its activities) to obtain eviction.
  3. Relatedly, whether gifts of property to the plaintiff (by deed) and the question of attornment or alleged creation of a trust with possibly uncertain objects affect the plaintiff's right to invoke Section 17.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff (Delhi Municipal Committee / Municipal Corporation)

  • The plaintiff is indisputably a body corporate and a "local authority" (per applicable statutes) and, in ordinary parlance, a "public institution".
  • It can therefore take advantage of Section 17 of the Act where premises are bona fide required for the furtherance of its activities (e.g., opening a child welfare centre or starting a school).
  • Where property has been gifted to the plaintiff, ownership and landlord rights passed to the plaintiff; any attornment by defendants to previous owners is not a bar to the plaintiff's rights.
  • The reference in the gift deed to use of the building "for a school or for other works of public utility" does not render the gift void for uncertainty; charitable/public utility purposes are recognised by statute (Charitable Endowments Act, 1890) and need not be invalidated on that ground alone.

Defendants

  • Primary interpretive argument: because Section 17 opens with the categories "company or other body corporate or any local authority, or any public institution", the term "public institution" where first used should be read disjunctively — i.e., it must exclude bodies corporate and local authorities. On that basis, a local authority like the plaintiff cannot be a "public institution" for the purposes of clause (d) of Section 17.
  • Reliance on interpretive authorities (as illustrated in Maxwell and in Thursby v. Churchwardens, and other authorities) that when two expressions are used one may exclude the other where one would otherwise embrace the other.
  • In the gift cases (revisions 421-D & 422-D), contention that the gift created a trust with objects stated as "for a school or for other works of public utility", which is vague/uncertain and therefore void; accordingly defendants claimed they could not be evicted on the basis of a defective trust. Also contended that defendants never attorned to the plaintiff so that the plaintiff could not claim eviction grounds under clause (d) based on the donor's rights.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Thursby v. Churchwardens & Co. of Briercliffe with Extwistle, 1895 AC 32 Illustration of the interpretive rule that when a specific subject is mentioned alongside a general term the specific may exclude the general (used to argue that "public institution" should exclude bodies corporate/local authorities). The Court considered the example but rejected its application to Section 17, holding the analogy insufficient to limit "public institution" as urged by defendants.
King v. Vasey and Lally (1905) 2 KB 748; King v. Ettridge (1909) 2 KB 24; Saison v. Dancdmbe, 11 AC 627 Cited (through another authority) for the principle that courts should not allow a statute's manifest intention to be defeated by excessive literalism; avoid interpretations producing absurd results. The Court relied on this principle (cited in B. Udeypal Singh) to argue against a literal exclusion of local authorities from "public institution" where such exclusion would generate absurd consequences.
B. Udeypal Singh v. Lakshmi Chand, AIR 1935 All. 946 Authority for the proposition that manifest legislative intention should not be defeated by too literal adherence to precise language; court may ignore words that render enactment absurd. The Court invoked this authority to support its rejection of the defendants' strict/over-literal interpretation of Section 17 which would lead to absurd results.
Darbari Lal and Others v. Smt. Dharam Vati, AIR 1957 All 541 Explains that "include" in interpretation clauses is used liberally to enlarge meanings declared elsewhere in the statute. The Court relied on this to interpret the Explanation to Section 17, concluding that "public institution" may be given a liberal meaning that covers institutions (including local authorities running educational establishments) and their properties.
Blair v. Dunoan and Another, (1902) AC 37 Authority on trust law: a direction in a will/trust that is too vague may be void for uncertainty. Defendants relied on this to argue the gift creating a trust was void. The Court considered but held that even if the trust were uncertain, that consequence does not entitle the tenants (strangers to the trust) to resist eviction.
Narain Das & Another v. Brij Lal & another, AIR 1933 Lah. 833 Authority cited by defendants concerning uncertainty of trusts and consequences. The Court noted the authority but held that uncertainty of a trust, if it exists, does not confer on third-party tenants the right to defeat eviction by the donee/public institution.
Shadi Ram & Another v. Ramkishan & Others, AIR 1948 East Punj. 49 Authority on requirement that trusts be administered by the Court and not be so uncertain as to be unenforceable. The Court recorded the citation; plaintiff argued the ratio did not nullify the present gift. The Court found it unnecessary to decide that specific argument because it concluded defendants had no locus to derive benefit from any alleged uncertainty.
Knight v. Knight, (1840) 3 Beav. 148 (as cited through Keeton) Sets out three essentials for valid trust: imperative words indicating intention; certainty of subject-matter; certainty of objects/beneficiaries. The Court used this exposition (via Keeton) to explain that even if one of the essentials failed, the effect varies and that a failing trust does not give third-party tenants rights to resist eviction; trustees/donees or settlors are the principal parties affected.
Patel Chhotabhai & Others v. Janan Chandra Basak & Others, AIR 1935 PC 97 Affirms that intention, property and beneficiaries of a trust must be indicated with reasonable certainty so that a court can administer the trust. The Court relied on this to support the proposition that uncertainty affects the trust and its beneficiaries, not unrelated tenants; hence defendants lack locus to resist eviction on that ground.
Messrs J.N. Singh & Co. v. Sardari Mal, Etc. (Civil Revision No. 413 of 1953; decision recorded in the opinion) Bench decision holding that a Digambar Jain Boarding House was not a "public institution" under Section 17; used by defendants to argue their position. The Court distinguished this decision as inapposite because, in the present cases, the plaintiff (Municipal Committee) is indisputably a public institution in ordinary parlance; therefore the earlier decision did not aid the defendants.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds in discrete steps, each grounded in the text of Section 17, statutory classification, interpretive principles and trust law as discussed in the reported authorities:

  1. Classification of the plaintiff: The Court first observed that the Delhi Municipal Committee is indisputably a body corporate (under Section 18 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, as applied) and a "local authority" (per clause (31) of Section 3 of the General Clauses Act, 1897). Thus the plaintiff falls within the second and third categories named in the opening words of Section 17.
  2. Legal question framed: The pivotal interpretive question is whether, despite being a body corporate/local authority, the plaintiff may also be treated as a "public institution" for the purpose of clause (d) of Section 17 — i.e., whether a local authority may invoke the ground that "the premises are bona fide required by the public institution for the furtherance of its activities."
  3. Defendants' interpretive argument examined: The Court set out the defendants' argument that the first use of "public institution" in Section 17 should be read as excluding those entities already named (company/body corporate/local authority) — relying on interpretive maxims (as presented in Maxwell) and illustrative cases such as Thursby — so that the later uses of "public institution" must have the same narrower meaning.
  4. Review of interpretive principles and analogies: The Court considered the Maxwell principles and the Thursby illustration (and similar examples) but found them inapplicable because (a) the category "public institution" does not necessarily include companies or all bodies corporate, and (b) the categories in Section 17 overlap and intersect in ways that make a rigid exclusionary reading unreasonable.
  5. Prevention of absurd results: The Court accepted the line of authority that a court should avoid an interpretation that produces absurd consequences (citing B. Udeypal Singh and the decisions it follows). It observed that adopting the defendants' construction would produce absurd results — e.g., private bodies running public institutions could rely on Section 17 while a local authority running hundreds of schools could not — a result inconsistent with probable legislative intent.
  6. Liberal interpretation of "includes": The Court emphasized that the Explanation to Section 17 uses the word "includes", which is commonly used in interpretation clauses to enlarge meaning. The Court relied on Darbari Lal to support a liberal construction that allows "public institution" in the section and Explanation to be used in differing but complementary senses — referring both to organized public bodies and to institutions such as colleges or libraries belonging to such bodies.
  7. Conclusion on Section 17: For these reasons the Court rejected the defendants' narrow reading and held that a local authority or body corporate running public institutions is not excluded from the meaning of "public institution" in clause (d) of Section 17; consequently the plaintiff could invoke clause (d) if the premises were bona fide required for furtherance of its activities.
  8. Property-gift/attornment point: The Court addressed the facts that in some suits the property had been conveyed to the plaintiff by gift deeds and the defendants had attorned to the plaintiff. The Court held that where property has been gifted the donee (plaintiff) acquires the rights of the donor and, in addition, the rights conferred on it by Section 17 as a public institution; therefore attornment or previous donor rights did not prevent the plaintiff from invoking Section 17.
  9. Trust-uncertainty issue: The defendants' contention that the gift created a trust with uncertain objects (e.g., "for a school or for other works of public utility") and that such uncertainty rendered the trust void was considered. The Court explained the orthodox trust-law position (citing Keeton/Knight v. Knight, Blair, Patel Chhotabhai) that if a trust fails for uncertainty the consequence is that the trust fails between settlor and donee/beneficiary and does not confer a right on a stranger (such as a tenant) to resist eviction. Section 83 of the Indian Trust Act illustration was cited to show that where a trust is too vague the trustee may hold for the benefit of the settlor or his representatives.
  10. Locus/standing and applicable precedent: The Court held that there was no indication the creators of the alleged trust had contested it, and that the defendants (tenants) therefore lacked locus standi to resist eviction on the basis of alleged uncertainty in the gift's object. The Court distinguished the local Bench decision (Messrs J.N. Singh & Co. v. Sardari Mal) relied upon by defendants because in that case the trust/ institution in question was held not to be a "public institution" under Section 17; that decision did not assist the defendants here because the plaintiff in the present cases is indisputably a public institution in ordinary parlance.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

- Revision petitions Nos. 408-D and 409-D of 1960 are allowed. The judgment of the lower appellate court in those matters is set aside and the judgment of the trial court is restored. The plaintiff shall have its costs throughout.

- Revision petitions Nos. 421-D and 422-D of 1963 are dismissed with costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The decisions reverse or affirm the appellate outcomes as above — in short, in two matters the plaintiff succeeds on reinstatement of trial court decrees; in the other two defendants' appeals (as earlier decided by the appellate court) stand and revisions are dismissed.
  • Interpretive consequence stated by the Court: The Court held that a local authority or body corporate that runs educational or other public institutions may, in appropriate circumstances, be regarded as a "public institution" for clause (d) of Section 17 of the Act and may therefore invoke that clause when the premises are bona fide required for furtherance of its activities. The Court rejected a narrow/exclusionary reading of "public institution" that would bar local authorities from Section 17 protection where doing so would produce absurd results.
  • On trust uncertainty: the Court clarified (in the context of these cases) that alleged uncertainty in the object of a gift-trust does not give third-party tenants a right to resist eviction; any effect of uncertainty operates between the settlor and the donee/beneficiary and the Court relied on established trust-law principles to that effect.
  • No broader novel legal rule was expressly proclaimed beyond the interpretive conclusions reached: the Court applied established principles of statutory interpretation and trust law to the facts before it and set aside or dismissed the particular revisions accordingly.

Order: A.N. Grover, J. concurred and the Court ordered accordingly.

Show all summary ...

S.B. Capoor, J.--

(1st March, 1966) The principal question which arises for decision in these four civil revision petition Nos. 408-D of 1960, 409-D of I960, 421-D of 1963 and 422-D of 1963 is as to the interpretation of Section 17 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 (Act No. 38 of 1952) hereafter to be referred to as the Act, The plaintiff in the four suits giving rise to these revision petitions was the Delhi Municipal Committee (now succeeded by the Delhi Municipal Corporation) and the defendants in each case were persons whom the plaintiff claimed to be its tenants. The defendants in the suits giving rise to revision petitions Nos. 408-D and 409-D of 1960 were respectively Badri and Murari Lal, who occupied different portions of a property situated in Mohalla Punjabi, Subzi Mandi, Delhi, and the plaintiff claimed that it required the premises for running a child welfare centre. The defendants in the suits giving rise to revision petitions Nos. 421-D and 422-D of 1963 were respectively Mohammad Arab and Manzoor Elahi. who occupied different portions of premises No. 2414, Baradari Sher Afghan Khan, Bazar Ballimaran, Delhi, and the case of the plaintiff was that the premises were required for an object of public utility, viz., starting a school. All the four suits were decreed by the trial Courts and eviction of the defendants ordered but the lower appellate Court, viz., Shri Udham Singh, Senior Subordinate Judge, Delhi, to whom the tenants Badri and Murari Lal had appealed, held that the Delhi Municipal Committee was not a public institution within the meaning of Section 17 of the Act and was not, therefore, entitled to evict the defendants. Hence the appeals of Badri and Murari Lal were allowed and the suits of the Delhi Municipal Committee against them dismissed. In the other two cases, the lower appellate Court, viz., Mr. G. R. Luthra, Additional Senior Subordinate Judge, Delhi, upheld the decision of the trial Court and held that the plaintiff as a public institution was entitled to take advantage of Section 17 of the Act. In view of these conflicting decisions, the learned Single Judge, before whom these revision petitions came originally, directed that they be disposed of by a larger Bench.

Section 17 of the Act is as follows:

"Where the landlord in respect of any premises is any company or other body corporate or any local authority, or any public institution and the premises are required for the use of employees of such landlord or in the case of public institution, for the furtherance of its activities then, notwithstanding anything contained in Section 13, the Court may, on an application of such landlord, place him in vacant possession of such premises by evicting the tenant and every other person who may be in occupation thereof, if the Court is satisfied-"

(a) (a) that the tenant, to whom such premises were let for use as a residence at a time when he was in the service or employment of the landlord, has ceased to be in such service or employment, or

(b)

(c) (b) that the tenant has acted in contravention of the terms, express or implied, under which he was authorised to occupy such premises, or

(d)

(e) (c) that any person is in unauthorised occupation of such premises, or

(f)

"(g) (d) that the premises are bona fide required by the public institution for the furtherance of its activities."

(h)

"Explanation: For the purpose of this section, public institution includes any education institution, library, hospital and charitable dispensary."

2. There can be no manner of doubt that the Delhi Municipal Committee under Section 18 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 (Punjab Act No. 3 of 1911), which was applied to the Delhi Municipal Committee also, was a body corporate. Similarly, by section 3 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (Act No. 66 of 1957) the Municipal Corporation of Delhi was also a body corporate. Equally, there can be no doubt that the plaintiff was a 'local authority' as defined in clause (31) of Section 3 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (Act 10 of 1897). The plaintiff, there fore, came within the second and third categories as mentioned in the opening words of Section 17 and it is not disputed that it could take advantage of Section 17 if it required the premises for the use of its employees. If, however, the plaintiff is to get advantage of clause (d) of Section 17, viz., that the premises were bona fide required by it for the further an of its activities, it had in addition to show that it was a public institution. According to Corpus Juris at pages 942 and 943 of the 32nd Volume, the term “institution” may embrace every person except private individuals or natural persons. The term is sometimes used as descriptive of the establishment or place where the business or operation of a society or association are carried on, at other times it is used to designate the organized body, and sometimes it is used in both of these senses. “Institution” may include not only its property, but also all of its legitimate activities that are consistent with, and in the furtherance of, the purposes for which it was organized. The plaintiff is obviously an institution in the sense that it is an organized body created by a statute. As stated in Corpus Juris, the term “public institution” connotes any organized activity created or established by law or public authority, and as distinguished from a “private institution” carries with it used in its ordinary and well understood meaning, at least prima facie the idea of some public service or use which it is designed to set up. The learned Counsel for the defendants did not, in fact, contend that the plaintiff, with its wide spread public function was not a public institution in ordinary parlance. What was strongly urged on behalf of the defendants was that as the plaintiff fell into two of the preceding categories, viz., “body corporate” and local authority it must, on the principles of interpretation of statutes, be excluded the ambit of the term “public institution” where that term was first used in Section 17, and, in that event, the same term viz., “public institution”-where it is used for the second time must be presumed to have the same meaning, that is, excluding 'local authority' or 'body corporate'. As stated in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes at pages 311 and 312 of the Eleventh Edition, it is reasonable to presume that the same meaning is implied by the use of the same expression in every part of an Act.

3. For the purpose of this argument, however, we have. first to see whether it is possible to restrict, in the sense urged on behalf of the defendants, the term “public institution” where it is first used in the section 'Reliance in this connection is placed on certain observations in Maxwell at page 320. It is stated there that when two words or expression are copied together, one of which generally includes the other, it is obvious that the more general term is used in a meaning excluding the specific one. It was, therefore, argued that the public institutions, which can take advantage of clause (d) of Section 17, cannot be those which fall within the previous three categories, viz., “company body Corporate, or local authority”. In other words, the term “public institution” is to be read disjunctively with the other three categories, which precede the use of that term in the section. By way of illustration of this principle learned Counsel for the defendants cited Thursby v. Churchwardens & Co., of Briercliffe with Extwistle, 1895 AC 32. The point in that appeal was whether under the lighting and watching act (3 & 4 wm. 4c. 90) section 33, a coal mine is to be rated at the higher rate provided for by that section or at the lower rate. The section provides

"that owners and occupiers of houses, buildings and property (other than land) ratable to the relief of the poor in any such parish shall be rated at and pay a rate in the pound three times greater than that at which the owners and occupiers of land shall be rated at and pay for the purposes of this Act."
The contention of the appellants was that a coal mine was land, and therefore, falls to be rated at the lower rate. The contention of the respondents, which bad been given effect to by the Court below, was that a coal mine was not land within the meaning of that provision, and therefore was to be rated at the higher rate. In considering this question assistance was derived from the use of the term “land” in the Poor Relief Act, 1601 (c.2) because the earlier part of the section had laid down that the overseers “shall proceed in the same manner” as for levying money for the relief of the poor. Now the Poor Relief Act, 1601 (c.2), Section 1 imposed a poor rate on the occupiers of “lands”, houses, tithes and “coal mines”. A question was raised whether mines other than coal mines were ratable and it was held that they were not, on account of the specific mention of coal mines as a subject of rating, even though the word “lands” was large enough to cover all mines. It was in this context that in the case cited it was held that the category of “lands” would not include coal mines and hence such mines would be assessable at the higher rate. Learned Counsel for the defendants also relied on another illustration as given in Maxwell, which is as follows:

"In the same way, although the word 'person', in the abstract, includes artificial persons, that is, corporations, the Statute of Uses (27 Hen, 8. c.10) which enacted, that when a person 'stood seized of tenants to the use of another 'person or body corporations', the latter 'person or body' should be deemed to be seized of them has understood as using the word 'person' in the former part of the sentence as not including a body corporate. Consequently, the statute did not apply where the legal seisin was in a corporation"
.

4. I do not, however, consider, that the above rule of interpretation can, having regard to the various terms used in Section 17 and its under-lying object, apply to this section. It cannot be said that category of “public institution” includes the other three categories, viz., “company, body corporate or local authority”. For instance, a company need not be, and usually is not, a public institution and there are numerous bodies corporate which do not come within the definition of local authorities. The various categories used in section 17 are to some extent overlapping or intersecting. As stated in Maxwell at page 316 the presumption of a change of intention from a change of language (of no great weight in the construction of any documents) seems entitled to less weight in the construction of a statute then in any other case, for the variation is sometimes to be accounted for by a mere desire to avoid the repeated use of the same words, sometimes by the circumstance that the Act has being complied from different sources, and sometimes by the alternations and additions from various hands which Acts undergo in their progress through Parliament.”

5. If the term “public institution” is to be interpreted as excluding local authorities, absurd results would follow. According to the explanation, Public institution includes any educational institution, library, “public institution” hospital and charitable dispensary. If, therefore, a body of private individuals to running any such institution for the use of the public and requires the premises in the possession of its tenants for the purpose of expanding the institution, advantage could be taken of Section 17 to secure the tenants' eviction, but a local authority, such as the plaintiff, which is perhaps running hundreds of educational institutions, would not be able to have recourse to that section. That could never have been the intention of the Legislature. As observed in B. Udeypal Singh v. Lakshmi Chand, AIR 1935 All. 946. following King v. Vasey and Lally, (1905) 2 KB 748, King v. Ettridge, (1909)2 KB 24 and Saison v. Dancdmbe, 11 AC 627 the manifest intention of a statute must not be defeated by too literal an adhesion to its precise language and it becomes a duty of the Court to ignore the words which have the effect of making the enactment an absurd one.

6. Actually, so far as the plain words and the tenor of section 17 go, the result appears to be the contrary to what is maintained on behalf of the defendants. The explanation, which uses the word “includes”, dotes not give exhaustively the connotation of “public institution”. As observed by a full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Darbari Lal and Others v. Smt. Dharam Vati, AIR 1957 All 541 at p. 545, the word “include” is very liberally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute and when it is so used these word or phrases must be considered as comprehending not only such things which they signify according to their natural import but also these things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. It seems that the term “public institution” as first occurring in Section 17 of the Act refers to a public institution as an organized activity created or established by law or public or authority, while when it is used for the second time as well as in the explanation it may be taken to include also the properly such as a college or library etc. belonging to the institution. As stated at page 312 of Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, the presumption that the same meaning is implied by the Legislature by the use of the same expression in every part of an Act is not of much weight and the same word may be used in different senses in the same statute and even in the same section.

7. I cannot, therefore, see any conceivable reason why locals authority, which runs educational and other institutions, does not come within the purview of the explanation, or why the plaintiff, which itself is indisputably a public institution in ordinary parlance, should be debarred from obtaining eviction of its tenants from the premises which are bona fide required for the expansion of the services it renders to the public by way of opening a child welfare centre, as in revision petitions Nos. 401-D, 408-D and 409-D of I960, and by starting a new school, as in revision petition Nos. 421-D and 422-D of 1963.

8. Accordingly, the interpretation sought to be placed by learned Counsel for the defendants on section 17 of the Act is rebelled.

9. So far as the suits, out of which revision petition Nos. 408-D and 409-D of I960 have arisen, are concerned, it appears that the property in dispute was gifted to the plaintiff by its owners. Om Parkash and Jiwan Lal, by a gift deed dated 26th of July, 1951, and thereafter the defendants in these suits had atoned to the plaintiff. In the other two cases, one Ram Lal Khemka executed a deed of gift dated 3rd of September, 1954, of the property vide deed Exhibit P. 1. Annexed to the gift deed as Schedule 'B' is a copy of the resolution of the plaintiff-Commit-tee whereby the gift stated inter alia that the donee as a public body was running and managing various Municipal Schools for children of the citizens of Delhi and the donor had great love and interest for promoting the cause of their education. The donee was to have and to hold the building in question forever subject to the various conditions, one of which was that the said building would be used for a school or for other works of public utility, and the other that the donee would not be able to sell it. One of the pleas raised by these defendants was that Ram Lal Khemka was not the owner of the property, but, at the same time, in a subsequent paragraph of their written-statements they admitted that they were the tenants of Ram Lal of various portions. So, quite rightly, the Courts below did not enter into the question whether Ram Lal was the owner of the property or not.

10. A further plea on behalf of these two defendants was that they never attorned to the plaintiff and since Ram Lal could not have availed of the ground of eviction mentioned in clause (d) of Section 17 of the Act, the plaintiff-donee also could not avail of that ground. This argument does not require serious consideration because once the property was gifted by Ram Lal to the plaintiff the latter, as landlord, automatically got all the rights of ownership which Ram Lal had, and, in addition, the further rights which were conferred on the plaintiff as a public institution by Section 17 of the Act.

11. The last contention on behalf of these defendants was that by the gift deed. Exhibit P.1. a trust was created, the object of which was that the property to which the trust pertained be used. “For a school or for other works of public utility”, and such a was bad on account of uncertainty. Vide section 3 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882,

"a trust' is an obligation annexed to the ownership of property, and arising out of a confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner or declared and accepted by him, for the benefit of another, or of another and the owner."
In view of this definition, it was alleged that the gift deed created a trust, and then reliance was place on a number of authorities in which it had been held that if the purpose of the trust was vague and uncertain the trust would be unenforceable. The first case is Blair v. Dunoan and Another, (1902) AC 37. In that case the testatrix by codicil in her own handwriting directed her trustee that in the events which happened-one-half of the residue of her estate should be applied for “such charitable or public purposes as may trustee thinks proper.” It was held that the direction was void for uncertainty, and it is argued that on the same reasoning the purpose in the two cases giving rise to revision petitions Nos. 421-D and 422-D of 1963-viz., that the building would be used “for a school or for other works of public utility” was also void on the ground of uncertainty. The other cases cited are-Narain Das and Another v. Brij Lal and another, AIR 1933 Lah. 833 and Shadi Ram and Another v. Ramkishan and Other AIR 1948 East Punj. 49.

12. Assuming, however, that the object of the trust is vague and uncertain, I do not see how the defendants can derive any advantage from that circumstance. In the law of Trusts by Keeton at pages 83 to 94 of the Sixth Edition, it is stated on the basis of Knight v. Knight, (1840) 3 Beav. 148 that for a trust to be validly created three things were necessary, (1) The words employed must be so couched that, taken as a whole, they could be deemed to be imperative; (2) the subject-matter of the trust must be certain; (3) the objects, or persons intended to be benefited must also be certain. At pages 93 and 9 the effect of uncertainty is stated as follows:

“It is important to notice that the effect of uncertainty in respect of one of the three essentials of trust is not always the same. When the words of a trust are too uncertain, then no intention to create a trust at all has been established, and the donee, therefore, takes the property beneficiaty. Similarly, the donee takes beneficially where the trust fails for uncertainty of property, since although it may have been clear in this case that there was an intention to create a “trust, there is no property to which it can be annexed, In the third case, however, assuming that the other two requisites are fulfilled, the donee holds on trust for the settler, residuary legatee or devisee, or interstate successor.”

13. In neither of these cases can a stranger to the trust derive any advantage. Section 83 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882, vide illustration (a) lays down that where a trust is too vague to be executed the trustee hold the land for the benefit of the author of the trust or his legal representatives. There is nothing whatever to show that the creators of the trust in question had at any time challenged the validity of the trust and the defendants in revision petition Nos. 421-D and 422-D of 1953 would appear to have no locus standi to resist eviction on account of the supposed uncertainty in the object the trust. As held by the Privy Council in Patel Chhotabhai and Others v. Janan Chandra Basak and Other, AIR 1935 PC 97.

"the intention to create a trust must be indicated by words or acts with reasonable certainty. The purpose of the trust, the trust property, and the beneficiaries must be indicated and in such a way that the trust could be administered by the Court if the occasions arose."
If there is no such certainty in the object the only consequence would be that there would be no trust and not that the tenants in the property would, merely on the ground of uncertainty of the object of the trust, be entitled to resist evict ion. To meet this argument reliance was placed on behalf of the defendants on a Bench decision of this Court in Messrs J.N. Singh & Co. v. Sardari Mal, Etc, CR No. 413 of 1953 decided on 2nd December, 1905. Civil Revision No. 413 of 19 decided on 2nd of December, 1955. In that case the plaintiffs had created a trust, namely, “Sardari Mal Rattan Lal Jain trust” and sought eviction of the tenant on the ground that the premises in dispute were required for a Jain Boarding House. The trust was created for the purposes of Jain Dharamshala or for the construction of a Digambar Jain Boarding House, It was held by the learned judges that a Digamber Jain Boarding House was not a public institution within the meaning of Section 17 of the Act and that is why the suit of the plaintiffs was dismissed. The case cited, therefore, is of no assistance for the decision of the present case where there can be no doubt as to the plaintiff being a public institution.

14. According to Section 2 of the Charitable Endowments Act, 1890 (Act VI of 1890),

"Charitable purpose' includes relief of the poor, education medical relief and the advancement of any other object of general public utility, but does not include a purpose which relates exclusively to religious teaching or worship."
It has been argued on the basis of this definition by Mr. K.K. Raizada, learned counsel for the plaintiff, that the gift does not become void merely by reference in one of the conditions of the gift to the building being use for “other works of public utility”. It is, therefore submitted that the ratio in Shadi Ram v. Ram Kishan viz, that trust in order to be valid must be of such a nature that its execution and administration could be controlled by the Court, would not apply to make the trust void in the present case. However, in view of what has been stated above, it is unnecessary to consider this argument.

15. As a result of the above discussion, revision petitions Nos. 408-D and, 4C9-D of 1960 are allowed, the judgment of the lower appellate court is set aside and that of the trial Court restored. The plaintiff shall have its costs throughout. Revisions Mos. 421-D and 422-D of 1963 are dismissed with costs.

A.N. Grover, J.-I agree.

Order accordingly.