Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Union Of India v. Bhagwant Singh

Delhi High Court
Nov 24, 1964
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent, Bhagwant Singh, enlisted in the Army on 1 August 1939. He served in the Singapore area from 26 September 1945 to 30 January 1946, where he developed diabetes. He was returned on compassionate grounds in February 1946 and held the rank of Subedar. After hospitalisation in April 1946, a specialist and a Medical Board (17 September 1946) assessed him as suffering from diabetes mellitus, unfit for further service, and the Board recommended that the disease was aggravated by war service. A provisional disability pension was sanctioned with effect from 8 November 1946 and later finally accepted at a reduced rate, payable for life, and was drawn by the respondent until 31 May 1954.

The respondent was re-employed as a civilian clerk in the Air Force from 25 September 1950. Following re-employment he was re-examined and a Resurvey Medical Board (date stated in the text as re-examination) reassessed his disability at 20% and concluded diabetes was of a constitutional nature generally not attributable to war service. Pursuant to Army Instructions 388/50 (modifying pension when disability changes), the Controller of Defence Accounts (Pensions) cancelled the pension and by letter dated 23 March 1955 informed that cancellation was effective from the original sanction date (8 November 1946).

The respondent appealed administratively; his appeal was rejected (letter of 10 April 1956). He then filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the legality and validity of the cancellation on grounds that (a) he was not afforded an opportunity of hearing (violating natural justice) and (b) deprivation of pension was deprivation of property without authority of law, violating Article 31(1). The Single Judge accepted the petition, quashed the cancellation order and rejected the delay objection. The Union of India appealed under clause 10 of the Letters Patent; this is the present judgment of the Division Bench.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a pension granted and enjoyed for many years (in this case a disability pension) amounts to "property" within the meaning of Article 31(1) of the Constitution so as to attract protection against deprivation except by authority of law.
  2. Whether the cancellation of the respondent's pension without giving him an opportunity of being heard offended principles of natural justice and rendered the cancellation voidable under Article 226.
  3. Whether the administrative/policy character of pension regulations (Pension Regulations for the Army in India, Part II, 1940, and Army Instructions 388/50) or statutory provisions such as the Pensions Act, 1871, and provisions on assignability preclude treating pension as property or preclude judicial review of its cancellation.
  4. Whether delay in presenting the writ petition barred the respondent's claim.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Union of India)

  • The Army Pension Regulations are administrative in nature and were not shown to have been issued pursuant to any statute; they do not create enforceable legal rights that a Court may protect.
  • The pension granted is a bounty or gratuity (not a statutory or contractual right) and therefore the State has complete power to withdraw it when a misapprehension or mistake in its grant is discovered.
  • Reliance on the Pensions Act, 1871 (Sections 4, 5, 6, 11, 12) to show that jurisdiction of Civil Courts over pension claims is restricted and that pensions are protected from attachment and assignment; this was advanced to support the proposition that pensions are not 'property' in the sense used in Article 31(1).
  • Reference to Section 6(g) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (non-transferability of stipends to pensioners) as further support that pensions lack usual attributes of property.
  • It was asserted that the pension was granted under misapprehension or mistake (the Medical Adviser (Pensions) had advised rejection originally, and the pension was wrongly sanctioned), thus justifying cancellation.
  • Delay in filing the writ petition (first administrative rejection in 1956; writ filed in 1958) was relied on in the first affidavit as a ground for dismissal.

Respondent's Arguments (Bhagwant Singh)

  • The cancellation was made without giving the respondent any opportunity of hearing and therefore violated principles of natural justice.
  • The pension is 'property' within the meaning of Article 31(1); its deprivation without authority of law is unconstitutional.
  • The deponent claim in the appellant's affidavit that the pension had been granted under misapprehension or mistake was challenged as not being based on personal knowledge and the Medical Adviser (Pensions) report relied upon was not produced; the respondent contested the averment and sought production of the medical report.
  • Even on the re-assessment at 20% disability, the respondent contended his case still fell within Regulation 365 (grant of pension where disability is attributable to field service), or at least that he might have shown his diabetes was aggravated by war service (a fact relevant and potentially determinative if he had been heard).
  • The respondent asserted that deprivation of pension without lawful authority amounted to deprivation of property and could be challenged by writ.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
In re Huggins (1882) 21 Ch. D. 85 (referred to as Huggin's case) Held that a pension, though not assignable and though payable only at the pleasure of a public authority, may nevertheless be 'property' of the recipient; pensions arising from an appointment may constitute property even if not enforceable in courts. The court relied on Huggins as the primary authority supporting the conclusion that the respondent's pension was 'property' protected by Article 31(1). The Division Bench found the present facts comparable and accepted the ratio that a pension can be property despite being non-assignable or not enforceable by the grantor.
Basheshar Nath v. Commissioner of Income-tax, AIR 1959 SC 149 Authority cited in relation to the question of delay in filing petitions — used to show delay objection may be considered and not necessarily fatal. The Single Judge had relied on this authority to repel the delay objection; the Division Bench saw no reason to differ with the Single Judge's view on delay in the circumstances of this case.
Shaukat Husain Beg Mirza v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1959 All. 769 Referenced for the proposition (in that judgment) that pension may be regarded as not constituting a vested property right and is a bounty to assist pensioners. The court distinguished this case on its facts (the Shaukat Husain decision related to a different stage of claim and not to a pension already granted and enjoyed). The Division Bench did not accept it as undermining Huggins or the conclusion that a pension may be property.
Rajah Yenumula Suryanarayana Murthy Dora v. State of Madras, AIR 1959 AP 487 Held that a disputed claim to pension involved basic legal rights; Section 5 of the Pensions Act suggests determination of legal rights in pension cases. The court cited this decision to support the proposition that claims to pension can involve legal rights and are not necessarily mere gratuities; this was used to counter the appellant's submission that pensions are only bounty and not rights.
Vanket Munga Bai v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1955 Hyd. 41 Relied on In re Huggins to support that pensions can be property even where they are gratuities. The Division Bench noted that Vanket Munga Bai followed Huggins and treated pensions as property; the court found Vanket consistent with treating the respondent's pension as property for Article 31(1) purposes.
Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments v. L. T. Swamiar; Dwarkadas Srinivas v. Sholapur Spinning & Weaving Co. Ltd., AIR 1954 SC 109 (referred together) These decisions observe that the word "property" in Article 31 should be construed in the widest sense to include a bundle of rights, both corporeal and incorporeal. The Division Bench cited these Supreme Court observations to support a wide construction of "property" under Article 31 and to reinforce the conclusion that pension can fall within Article 31's protection.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Division Bench proceeded on the admitted factual matrix and focused on two central legal questions: (1) whether the pension constituted "property" under Article 31(1) and (2) whether cancellation without hearing offended principles of natural justice.

On the characterisation of pension as "property", the court considered the appellant's submission that Army pension regulations are merely administrative and not statutory, and that statutory provisions (Pensions Act, 1871; Transfer of Property Act, 1882) and the non‑assignability and protection from attachment of pensions demonstrate that pensions are not property. The court accepted that the regulations were administrative in nature for purposes of argument but rejected the conclusion that this precluded the pension from being "property".

The court analysed authorities. It gave considerable weight to In re Huggins (1882) where the Master of the Rolls held that a pension could be property despite non‑assignability and despite not being enforceable by the grantor. The Division Bench found the present case factually akin to Huggins and agreed with the reasoning that a pension granted and enjoyed may be a constituent of the pensioner's property rights. The court also referred to other decisions (Vanket Munga Bai; Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments; Dwarkadas Srinivas) that supported a broad conception of "property" under Article 31. The court distinguished Shaukat Husain Beg Mirza on its facts and treated Rajah Yenumula as supporting the existence of legal rights in pension claims.

Having concluded that the respondent's pension was "property", the court turned to the procedural fairness of the cancellation. It found that the pension had been cancelled without giving the respondent any opportunity to be heard. The court characterised the act of cancelling a long‑enjoyed pension (which produced deprivation of property) as at least quasi‑judicial in character; accordingly, principles of natural justice required that the respondent be given an opportunity to meet the case against him before the cancellation was made.

The court examined the appellant's asserted basis for cancellation — that the grant had been made through misapprehension or mistake (reliant on a Medical Adviser (Pensions) report). It noted that the pivotal note-sheet/report supporting this misapprehension theory was missing from the record and that the only documentary support offered (an office noting by a dealing assistant) was not a satisfactory substitute for the original document. Given the absence of the original report and the fact that the respondent was never heard on this alleged basis, the court found the explanation for cancellation insufficient to justify depriving the respondent of his pension without notice or hearing.

On the issue of delay, the court considered the Single Judge's view (which relied on Basheshar Nath) that delay did not bar relief in the circumstances; the Division Bench found no reason to take a different view and declined to dismiss the petition on the ground of delay.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed. The Division Bench upheld the Single Judge's conclusion that the cancellation of the respondent's pension was unlawful.

Final Disposition: The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

Implications:

  • The court held that a pension granted and enjoyed over many years can constitute "property" within Article 31(1) of the Constitution and thus cannot be taken away except by authority of law.
  • The cancellation of such a pension without affording the pensioner an opportunity of hearing contravenes principles of natural justice and is vulnerable to judicial review under Article 226.
  • On the specific facts, the appellant's asserted ground of misapprehension/mistake was not adequately supported in the record (the critical medical note-sheet was missing) and the respondent was not given a chance to rebut or explain — this lack of procedural fairness was decisive.
  • Direct effect: the order cancelling the respondent's pension was quashed (as earlier ordered by the Single Judge) and the respondent's challenge under Article 226 succeeded. The Court did not purport to lay down any novel general rule beyond applying existing authorities and principles to the facts of this case.

Note: This summary is strictly confined to the materials and statements contained in the provided opinion and does not add information beyond the text of the judgment.

Show all summary ...

Mehar Singh, J.:-

(24th November 1964)-In this appeal by the Union of India, appellant, from the order, dated January 29, 1962, of Shamsher Bahadur J., the facts are not a matter of controversy between the parties.

2. The respondent, Bhagwant Singh, was enrolled in the Army on August 1, 1939. He was on field service in Singapore Area between September 26, 1945 and January 30, 1946. He developed diabetes during his service in Singapore. On compassionate grounds he was brought back sometime in February 1946. He was holding the rank of Subedar. In April 1946 he was admitted in hospital for treatment. On June 27, 1946, the Specialist expressed this opinion in regard to his condition-

"He is suffering from Diabetes Mellitus-Urine sugar controlled with diet and insulin and he has put on weight 4 lbs. In the last 2 weeks-general condition quite food. (He has completed his anti-syphilitic treatment and is on suveillance). He refuses any further treatment. To be invalided Cate E". The respondent was then examined by the Medical Board on September 17, 1946 and was declared unfit for further service on account of diabetes mellitus, assessed at 50 per cent, incapable of improvement. The Board recommended that the disease, which manifested itself in September 1945 in Singapore and progressively be came worse, was aggravated by war service. This recommendation of the Board having been accepted, a provisional disability pension of Rs. 88/8 per mensem was sanctioned by the Controller of Military Accounts (Pension) with effect from November 8, 1946 Annexure A. Subsequently the respondent's claim for disability pension was finally accepted, though the pension was reduced to Rs. 82/8 per mensem for life, with effect from the very date stated in the prevision order-Annexure C. He continued to draw his pension till May 31,1954. He was re-employed as a civilian clerk in the Air Force-C. O. D., Delhi, with effect from September 25, 1950 and it was in consequence of his re-employment that his case came to be reviewed. He was again examined by the Medical Board on September 30, 1934, when his disability was reassessed at 20 per cent, with effect from September 25, 1950. It was then considered that the disability diabetes Mellitus-was of a constitutional nature generally not attributable to war service. This was done pursuant to Army Instructions 388/50, issued on December 9, 1950, in regard to modification of permanent disability pension when the disability changes in character or degree. The instructions say :--"

" Under Rule 374, Pension Regulations for the Army in India, Part II, 1940, in cases of disablement where the disability is certified to be incapable of improvement, a disability pension is awarded for life. Notwithstanding the provision of this rule, should a competent pension sanctioning authority decide, as a reult of further medical examination of the individual for any purpose, that the disability is reduced or has disappeared or has become capable of improvement, the original disability pension which had been granted for life, will be modified correspondingly.

2. This instruction had effect from the 28th July, 1948 and supersedes A. I. No. 175 of 1949."

Consequently his pension was cancelled and he was informed by a letter of March 23, 1955,- Annexure D by the Controller of Defence Accounts (Pension) that the cancellation of his pension was effective from the date of its sanction, that is to say November 8, 1946. He, however, was not informed of the cancellation of his pension, On enquiry he was directed by the Controller of Defence Accounts (Pensions) to seek the reason for the cancellation of his pension from the Officer in-charge Records of the Unit with which he had last served. On reference to that officer, he was informed by a letter of May 27, 1955- Annexure G-that his pension had been cancelled as the Resurver Medical Board had re-assessed his disability at 20 per cent final. The respondent then preferred an appeal to the Adjutant General, General Headquarters, New Delhi, which on being referred to the Ministry of Defence, he was informed by a letter of April 10, 1956,- Annexure H- that there was no reason for alteration of the decision qua his pension. The respondent then in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution questioned the legality and validity of the order cancelling his pension-broadly on the grounds that the order had been made contrary to principles of natural justice as he was given no opportunity of hearing before the adverse order was made depriving him of his pension and that the deprivation of his pension is deprivation of property without authority of law and hence is violative of Article 31 (1) of the Constitution.

3. A return was made to the petition by way of an affidavit of an Under Secretary of the Ministry of Defence in which it was first stated that the appeal on the respondent having been rejected on April 10, 1956, the petition made on March 3, 1958, was delayed and should be dismissed on this account. Then it was pointed out that diabetes mellitus is a disability of constitutional nature and is generally not accepted as due to service and the Resurvey Medical Board having re-assessed the respondent's disability at 20 per cent final, incapable of improvement, with effect from September 25, 1950, the Controller of Defence Accounts (Pensions) became suspicious. On that he made reference to the pension file of the respondent and found that the Medical Adviser (Pensions) had advised the rejection of the claim of the respondent, but the disability pension was sanctioned to him under some misapprehension or mistake. The return did not go into the details of the misapprehension or mistake nor did it reproduce the form of the advice given by the Medical Adviser (Pensions). The last position taken was that the grant of pension to the respondent is under administrative regulations-pension Regulations for the Army in India, Part II, 1940 and not under any statutory rule or regulation, it is a grant in the nature of bounty and the appellant has full and complete power to withdraw it when misapprehension or mistake in the grant of the same is discovered at a later date as has been the case in regard to the pension granted to the respondent. It was also said that the pension granted to the respondent is not properly or right in property, obviously with the approach that Article 131(1) of the Constitution has no application to this case. It was pointed out that claim to pension under the said Army Pension Regulation is not as of right and as it savours of a gift or a bounty by the State so the respondent has no right which he can pursue in a petition under Article 226, the appellant having compete and absolute right to withdraw the pension at any time and without assigning any reasons. In the circumstance there was no question of violation of any principles of natural justice and there was no occasion which called for any opportunity to the respondent to say anything before the order of cancellation of his pension was made. The further position taken was that this Court in a petition like the present could not possibly sit in appeal against the order made by the proper authority cancelling the pension of the respondent. This was followed by an application by the respondent saving that the averment of the Under Secretary in the affidavit that the Medical Adviser (Pensions) had advised rejection of the respondent's claim to pension and that the disability pension was sanctioned to him under some misapprehension or mistake could not have been made by the deponent from personal knowledge and that this averment was absolutely incorrect. The respondent further said that the deponent should have filed a copy of the report of the Medical Adviser (Pensions) and should have at least stated in the affidavit that the averment in this behalf in it was based on such a report. After that the Under Secretary filed a second affidavit pursuant to an order of this Court made on November 17, 1958. It was in this affidavit that the Under Secretary explained that when in March 1956 the appeal of the respondent was considered in the Ministry of Defence, all the relevant service and medical documents were obtained from the individual's Record Officer and the Controller of Defence Accounts (Pensions), Allahabad. These documents contained the original case file of the Controller of Defence Accounts (Pensions), Allahabad in which the claim to disability pension was decided by him. This case file also contained one note-sheet, on which the original medical report, referred to in my previous affidavit flied in C. W. 98-D/58, was recorded." Then he averred that after the disposal of the appeal of the respondent, all the documents were returned to the Record Officer, Army Ordinance Corps, Secunderabad, by the Ministry of Defence on January 28, 1957 and further said-Presumably, the note sheet on which the original medical report was recorded, was also sent along with the above-mentioned documents. Afterwards on the 13th September, 1958 these documents were again forwarded by the Record Office to the Controller of Defence Accounts (Pensions), Allahabad, for considering the individual's gratuity claim." After the order of this Court of November 17, 1958, when an effort was made to trace the note-sheet on which was the medical report, it was not available either with the Controllor of Defence Accounts (Pensions), Allahabad, or in the Record Office, or the records of the Ministry of Defense. The Under Secretary proffers an opinion that the note-sheet has either been mislaid or lost while it was with the Ministry of Defence or in transit the Ministry of Defence to the Record Office, Secunderabad, or from the Record Office to the office of the Controller of Defence Accounts (pensions), Allahabad. The affidavit then refers to office noting, a copy of which was filed with the affidavit and is at page 43 of the paper-book, made at the time of the review of the pension case of the respondent: It is pointed out that at that time the dealing Assistant L. D. Chopra. made a note that the Medical Adviser (pensions) had made this report on the pension case of the respondent- "NO W/S factor has aggravated this constitutional I/D." The copy of the noting by this officer shows that he was of the opinion that while the form of the original report of the Medical Adviser (Pensions) was as he had reproduced in the shape as above, but it was misread by somebody as-The W/S factor has aggravated this constitution I/D." It is stated in the affidavit of the Under Secretary that this noting by the dealing Assistant was secrutinised by the then concerned Under Secretary. It appears that this ingenious change of tire word The into 'No' has been the undoing of the respondent. The original report, a piece of paper, obviously has now been missed. At the hearing it has not been actually suggested but there was a tendency towards considering that the respondent might have been responsible for the removal of that paper; however, that seems to be not quite possible because all the time the record remained either with the Ministry of Defence or in the Record Office or with the Controller of Defence Accounts (Pensions). This was the most crucial document in the case and it is surprising that it should be found missing, when the basis of the order of cancellation is that very report of the Medical Adviser (Pensions). It is at this stage that thus an explanation is rendered about what is meant by misapprehension and mistake under which the pension was granted to the respondent and which led to the cancellation order, as referred to in the first affidavit of the Under Secretary. It is not quite clear why the * * * * out this information from the Officer of the appellant. The original report not having been produced in this Court, I am not convinced that copy of the office noting of the dealing Assistant is any material that is helpful in this respect or is a sufficient explanation in support of the order cancelling the pension of the respondent.

4. The learned Single Judge following ex parte huggings. In re huggins (1882) 21 Ch. D. 85. came to the conclusion that the pension granted to the respondent is 'property' and so he has a fundamental right under Article 31(1) of the Constitution of not being deprived of the same save by authority of law and consequently he can maintain the petition under Article 226 of the protection of that right. With regard to the argument on the side of the appellant that the respondent had no statutory right to receive pension in view of Army Instructions 388/50, revision Regulation 374 of the Pension Regulations for the Army in India, Part II, 1940, the learned Judge observed that those instructions could not apply to the present case because the respondent was in enjoyment of the pension as a matter of right, a right which according to old regulations, as stood before July 28, 1948, could not even be modified. The learned judge also repelled the objection on the side of the appellant in regard to the delay in making of the petition following Basheshar Nath v Commissioner of Income-tax, AIR 1959 SC 149. In the result the learned judge accepted the petition and quashed the order cancelling the pension of the respondent. It is against this order that the appellant has come in appeal under clause 10 of Letters Patent.

"5. The learned Counsel for the appellant refers to Pension Regulations for the Army in India, Part II, 1940 and first points out that there is nothing in those regulations which shows that the same have been issued by the appellant persuant to any statute. He presses that those regulations are merely administrative in nature having no statutory backing. We have not been referred by the opposite side to any statutory provision pursuant to which those regulations have been made. Subject to this limitation of approach of both sides to these regulations, the consideration of the appeal of the appellant has proceeded on the assumption that those regulations have not been made persuant to any statutory provision and are thus correctly described by the learned Counsel for the appellant as administrative regulations. The obvious effect of this is that the regulations are not law in the strict sense in that no enforceable right can emerge out of the Application or non-application of them in house regulations, it is Regulation 365 which deals with the grant of pension in case of disability attributable to military service in a field service area. The main part of the regulation provides that an Indian Commissioner Officer…………whose disability is 20 per cent or over and is certified to be attributable to military service in a field service area may be granted a disability pension and then follow the elements forming basis of such a pension. Obviously the regulation is couched in a discretionary language, but considering the nature of those regulations, even if it was couched in an imperative language, nothing pursuant to this regulation could possibly be enforced through a Court. This respondent points out in the petition that, in any case even after the report of the Resurvey Medical Board, his disability was still found to be 20 per cent and so his pension should not have been cancelled. To this the reply in the return is that this was a discretionary matter with the appellant and the respondent has no rights and then emphasis is laid on the misapprehension and mistake under which the pension was initially granted to the respondent. It has already been shown that the material to support the last referred to matter is not available and for that blame can hardly be directed towards the respondent. The object of the learned Counsel for the appellant in pressing that there is no right under the regulations to a pension has been to stress that the pension granted to the respondent was in the nature of a gift or a bounty. The learned Counsel for the appellant has then made reference to the Pensions Act, 1871 (Act 23 of 1871). Section 4, 5 and 6 to show that jurisdiction of a Civil Court to entertain any suit relating to any pension is expressly barred and that, though a claim to pension can be preferred to the Collector or other officer named in Section 5, a Civil Court is not competent to try such a claim and can only take cognizance of it on a certificate from the Collector or such officer that it be tried, with this express provision in section 6 that it "shall not make any order or decree in any suit whatever by which the liability of Government to pay any such pension………..as aforesaid is affected directly or indirectly." section 11 of this very act exempts a pension from liability to seizure, attachment or sequestration by process of any Court and Section 12 declares assignment of it null and void. In this connection there has also been reference to Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, (Act 4 of 1882), which provides that property of any kind may be transferred except as otherwise provided by that Act or by any other law for the time being in force. In this section there follow ten clauses and one of those clauses is (g) that reads-"Stipends allowed to military, naval, airforce and civil pensioners of the Government and political pensions cannot be transferred." The object of the learned Counsel for the appellant in making reference to these statutes has been that as (a) no right to pension can be enforced through a Civil Court, (b) a pension cannot be attached and (c) it cannot be transferred, so it follows that a pensioner has no title or right to pension and it cannot possibly be `property' as that word is used in Article 31(1) of the Constitution, because, according to the learned Counsel, all the usual attributes of `property' do not exist in relations to a pension. In this respect reliance is also placed on Shaukat Husain Beg Mirza v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1959 All. 769., in which, after referring to the provisions of Sections 4 and 11 of Act 23 of 1871, the learned Judge observes-"These provisions clearly show that the pension of a person is nit his property and he has no vested right over it. It is given by way of a bounty for past services mainly to assists the pensioner in providing for his daily needs."
But the case has to be understood and appreciated in the light of its own facts, as the claim in that case by the petitioner in a writ petition under Article 226 was not qua a pension but at a stage before the grant of pension questioning an order fixing his salary which was expected to affect the ultimate pension that was going to be granted to the petitioner. So in that case the nature of a pension granted was not in question. In my opinion, the provisions of Act 23 of 1871 do not advance the argument for the appellant because but for the express provisions of that Act a claim to pension would have been subject of lis before an ordinary Civil Court and that could only have been on the basis of a pensioner having a right to pension. If it was not so, it would not have been necessary to enact that statute. It is too much to accept an approach by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the whole act 23 of 1871 was enacted as a measure of abundant caution. This is obviously not so. Similarly Section 6 of Act 4 of 1882 deals with the transfer of property and in this clause (g) to which reference has been made by the learned Counsel for the appellant deals with stipends and political pensions barring the transfer of the same. But merely because assignability of pensions is barred by statute that is no ground that it is not property if it is otherwise so. In Section 6, clause (c) refers to a bar on the transfer of an easement and nobody will deny that, whether or not an easement is a property, it certainly is a right in or over property. It does not case to be so merely because it cannot be assigned subject to the provisions of Section 6 of Act 4 of 1882. The list of rights and properties that are not assignable in Section 6 of this Act itself speaks that but for such negative express provision those properties and rights would have been transferable. A restriction imposed by Section 12 of Act 23 of 1871 is of the same nature as negative provision in Section 6 of Act 4 of 1871 S/c No 231 does not derogate from a pension being property, if it otherwise is so. In Rajah Yenumula Suryanarayana Murthy Dora v State of Madras AIR 1959 AP 487., the disputed claim to pension was among the members of the family, but the learned Judges, with reference to Section 5 of Act 23 of 1871, have held that such a claim involved a basic element of a legal right. Therefore, the statutory duty cast on the officers enumerated in that section is to determine the legal rights of persons concerned. It is true that in that case the claim was not against the State Government, but on principle how can such a claim be of a different nature. The learned Counsel for the appellant has relied upon this case in another connection, which is that when a pension is not in recognition of any right but as a matter of grace of bounty, an order with regard to it originally made can be reconsidered if the original order proceeded on a misapprehension as to basic facts. The object of the learned Counsel has been that in this case also the grant of pension to the respondent had proceeded on misapprehension of mistake, but while if this was so, this Court would not go into the merit of question in a petition of this type in the present case the original record in which was given the opinion of the Medical Adviser (Pensions) has not been available and reference has already been made to circumstances in which it came to be missing, there is the question of the respondent not having been given an opportunity to meet the basis for cancellation of his pension. So in this respect this case does not advance the argument on behalf of the appellants. The whole scope of argument then turns upon one and one question only, whether or not the pension granted to the respondent and enjoyed by him for many years is 'property' as that word is used in Article 31(1) of the Constitution?

In Huggin's case, a retiring pension was granted to Mr. H.J. Huggins on his retirement form the position of Chief Justice of the colony of Sierra Leone. Afterwards he having been unsuccessful in business was adjudicated a bankrupt. Thereupon the trustee in the bankruptcy applied to the Court for an order declaring that the bankrupt's pension vested in the trustee as part of the property of the bankrupt, or in the alternative, that the trustee should receive from the Treasury or the Crown agents for the colonies the amount of the quarterly installment of pension immediately falling due or such part thereof as the Court should deem just and reasonable and that the trustee should receive until the further order of the Court the future quarterly instalments of the pension, as they might from time to time become due and the payable, or such portion of each such quarterly instalment as to the Court might see just and reasonable. In answer to a request by the Court, the Secretary of

State for the Colonies stated that there was no statute or ordinance of the colony regulating the grant of pensions to persons having held offices in its service but that retiring pensions and compensation allowances on abolition or resignation of office were payable out of the revenue of the colony as awarded by the Secretary of the State, who declined to recognize assignments of such colonial pensions. In considering the argument that the pension of Mr. H.J. Huggins not being assignable and neither the colonial office nor the Government of the colony being compellable to pay it, it did not vest in the trustee because nothing passed to a trustee in bankruptcy but that which was assignable at law and recoverable by legal process and the position urged on the opposite side being that the pension was the property of Mr. H. J. Huggins, Jessel, M.R. observed -"When a man is appointed to an office of this kind he is told that he will receive a salary such an amount and that on his retirement he will be entitled to a pension and he accepts the office on those terms. Possibly the exact amount of the pension may not have been mentioned in this case, but the appellant accepted the office partly in consideration of the pension. It has been argued, first, that this pension is not 'property' of the bankrupt. I think it is. It is true that the contract under which he accepted the office may not be enforceable in the Courts either of this country or of Sierra Leone. I think that is so. But that does not decide the question. There are many cases in which property arises from the contract, quite independently of the fact that no judicial tribunal can enforce it." The learned Master of the Rolls then proceeds to give a number of instances in support of this and one of the instances referred to is in this observation -"Just in the same way the salaries and pensions of the servants of the Crown in this country cannot be paid until they are voted by Parliament and yet no one would say that they are not the property of the persons who receive them. There are no doubt, some salaries and pensions which are not assignable. But when this is so it is always referable to one of two grounds. It is said to be contrary to public policy that payments made to induce persons to keep themselves ready for the service of the Crown, as the half pay of officers in the army or navy, or payments for actual service rendered to the Crown, should be assigned. The other class of cases is that of pensions, like the retiring allowance of a beneficed clergyman, which are by statute expressly made not assignable. But still I think these are all property." In that case the grant of pension had no basis either in a statute or in any statutory rule, it was a grant as a matter of grace or bounty and a claim to it was neither enforceable through a Court nor assignable and yet the learned Master of the Rolls held the pension to be 'property'. The present case of the respondent is not a whit different even on facts from that case. The ratio of that case was relied upon by the learned Judges in Vanket Munga Bai v. State of Hydrabad, AIR 1955 Hyd. 41, in facts and circumstances not substantially different and the learned Judges found support for their opinion in this respect by two decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court reported as Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments v. L. T. Swamiar and Dwarkadas Srinivas v. Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd, AIR 1954 SC 109, in the letter of which their Lordships have observed that the word 'property' in Article 31 of the Constitution be construed in the widest sense as connoting a bundle of rights exercisable by the owner in respect thereof and embracing within its purview both corporeal and incorporeal rights. The learned Counsel for the Appellant, in the face of these two cases, has contended that in neither case was claim to pension denied by the Government or the granter and the observations made by the learned Judges only deal with cases in which there was a dispute about pension or the right to it between private parties. He contends that as soon as there is a denial of right to pension, as in this case by the cancellation of the pension of the respondent, on the mere denial or cancellation of the pension, the pension cases to be 'property'. The contention is apparently untenable, the character of the pension as 'property' cannot possibly undergo such mutation at the whim of a particular person or authority. It is in fact the very act whereby the pension of the respondent has been cancelled that has been the subject of challenge in the petition by the respondent under article 226. So the pension granted to the respondent and enjoyed by him for many years is his property. It has been the admitted stand on the side of the appellant that the cancellation of the pension of the respondent has not been pursuant to any law and what has been stressed is that as it was a gift or a bounty it could just be taken away because the respondent had no right to it. The pension of the respondent is 'property' and according to Article 31(1) he can only be deprived of it by authority of law and that is what has not happened in the case of the respondent. In this respect there is no reason whatsoever of interference with the approach of the learned Judge.

6. It is not denied that the respondent was given no opportunity of hearing before the order of cancellation of his pension was made. The consequence of the order has been deprivation of the pension to the respondent so that the act cannot be said to be administrative and is at least quasi-judicial. The respondent was entitled hearing before such an adverse order was made depriving him of his pension. If he had been given an opportunity of the hearing, he might well have shown that the report of the medical Adviser (Pensions) was being misread and that in fact the word with which that report started was 'The' and not 'no'. He would have also pressed, as he does in the petition, that in any case, even if his disability has been reduced to 20 per cent, his case for pensions still comes under Regulation 365 of the Army Pension Regulations. The Return merely show that generally diabetes mellitus is a constitutional disease, but the respondent may have succeeded in showing that his was a special case and his condition was aggravated by the stress and anxiety of war conditions in Singapore. It cannot be said that such a consideration is not relevant in this respect. If the respondent had been given an opportunity of hearing he might well have convinced the appropriate authority that there was really no ground for the cancellation of his pension. So the order of cancellation of the pension of the respondent has been made contrary to principles of natural justice.

7. There is the question of the delay in the respondent filing the petition, but the learned Single Judge was not disposed to dismiss the petition on this ground and, in the circumstances of the case, there is no substantial reason why we should take a different view in this appeal.

8. The consequences is that this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

Capoor, J-Iagree.

Appeal dismissed.