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Kishenprasad And Co. Ltd. v. Rajaram Ramharakh
Factual and Procedural Background
This suit involves members of a joint Hindu family as defendants, with plaintiffs seeking to hold all family members liable for the embezzlement of Rs. 40,000 by Defendant No. 1, aided by Defendant No. 2. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were prosecuted and convicted for the embezzlement; Defendant No. 2 has since died, and his name was struck out at trial. Defendant No. 5, a minor, is liable only to the extent of assets inherited from Defendant No. 2.
The plaintiffs entrusted Defendant No. 1, a recently employed individual on a small salary, with cashing two cheques totaling Rs. 40,000. Defendant No. 1 cashed the cheques but did not remit the money to the plaintiffs, claiming he was robbed while unconscious. This story was suspicious, and subsequent police surveillance revealed the defendants had used the money to pay off mortgages and purchase land. The defendants quarreled over the remaining proceeds, and a village panchayat acknowledged that the money originated from Defendant No. 1 with Defendant No. 2's assistance.
The civil suit is undefended, with much evidence taken on commission. The presiding judge had also tried the related criminal case, in which Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were convicted under sections 408 and 109 of the Indian Penal Code. The judge decided the civil suit independently of the criminal trial evidence except for acknowledging the convictions.
Legal Issues Presented
- Under what legal provision or principle can money stolen by a thief be recovered in a civil suit?
- How can members of a joint Hindu family be held liable for theft if they did not participate in the actual theft?
- Whether liability can be based on conspiracy involving all defendants or on breach of trust and subsequent participation in misapplication of trust property?
- Whether sections 71, 76, and 108 of the Indian Contract Act apply to the recovery of stolen money in this context?
- Whether an equitable remedy exists for breach of trust that extends liability beyond the initial thief and abettor to other family members with notice of the trust breach?
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Case before Mr. Justice Bailhache reported in Justice of the Peace, Vol. 87, p. 817 (Dec 1, 1923) | Liability of multiple defendants jointly involved in theft for damages in civil action after criminal conviction; presumption of joint liability despite inability to trace specific stolen property to individual defendants. | The court referenced this case to support the principle that when multiple persons combine to commit a wrongful act causing damage, judgment can be given against all, even if the stolen property cannot be specifically traced to each. However, the court distinguished the present case as Defendants Nos. 3 and 4 were not shown to be part of the antecedent conspiracy or actual theft. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court carefully analyzed the factual matrix and the applicable law. It acknowledged the criminal convictions of Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 for embezzlement but emphasized that the civil suit must be decided on its own evidence, though the criminal verdicts inform the court's confidence in the plaintiffs' case.
The court found no evidence of an antecedent conspiracy involving Defendants Nos. 3 and 4 and rejected the plaintiffs' conspiracy claim as to these defendants. It also found that certain provisions of the Indian Contract Act (Sections 71, 76, and 108) were inapplicable because the case did not involve “found goods” or a sale of goods, and the plaintiffs were not seeking recovery of specific currency notes but a money claim.
Exploring common law remedies, the court noted the absence of authorities supporting civil remedies against a thief or conspirators beyond criminal prosecution and suggested that an action for money had and received might be possible. However, the primary difficulty was holding other family members liable without participation in the theft.
The court then considered an equitable remedy based on breach of trust. It found that Defendant No. 1 committed a breach of trust, Defendant No. 2 abetted it, and Defendants Nos. 3 and 4, with notice of the trust, participated in the misapplication of the trust property by benefiting from its use in paying off mortgages and purchasing land. The breach extended beyond the initial theft to the misuse of trust property.
On this basis, the court held that Defendants Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 were liable to repay the trust moneys. Defendant No. 5’s liability was limited to assets inherited from Defendant No. 2. The court found this equitable breach of trust theory sufficient to sustain the plaintiffs' civil claim.
Holding and Implications
Judgment was given in favor of the plaintiffs against Defendants Nos. 1, 3, 4, and 5 for Rs. 38,500 plus interest and costs. Defendant No. 5’s liability was limited to the extent of assets received from his deceased father, Defendant No. 2. The attachment before judgment was to continue pending further orders, with liberty to apply.
The decision holds that in cases of embezzlement involving joint Hindu family members, civil liability may extend beyond the initial thief and abettor to other family members who knowingly participate in the misapplication of trust property. This ruling clarifies that equitable principles of breach of trust can impose civil liability even absent direct participation in the original theft or conspiracy. No new precedent beyond the direct effect on these parties was explicitly established.
Marten, J.:— This is a very peculiar suit. The defendants are all members of a joint Hindu family, and in effect the plaintiffs are seeking to mike all the members of this family liable for the embezzlement by Defendant No. 1 with the and of Defendant No. 2 of a sum of Rs. 40,000 belonging to his employers, the plaintiffs. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 have both been prosecuted to conviction for this embezzlement. Defendant No. 2 has since died, and his name was struck out at the trial. As regards Defendant No. 5, who is a minor, it is conceded that his only liability is to the extent of the assets received by him from his deceased father, Defendant No. 2.
2. The details of the else are lengthy, but shortly stated these are the main outlines: the plaintiffs were foolish enough to entrust the first defendant with the cashing of two cheques of Rs. 30,000, and Rs. 10,000 respectively. I say foolish because the first defendant was only an employee of a few weeks, standing on a salary of Rs. 17 per mensem. He had come from Kudanpur in the Allahabad district, and at that time Defendant No. 2, the brother of Defendant No. 1, was also in Bombay. It is common ground that Defendant No. 1 cashed the two cheques for Rs. 40,000 at the bank, but never gave the proceeds to his masters as he ought to have done. His story was that on his return from the bank he was taken ill in the street, and that while he lay unconscious, he must have been robbed of the money in question. This was clearly a suspicious story but at the time the police thought there was insufficient evidence to convict him, and accordingly he was allowed to return to his native country. The plaintiffs, however, had a watch kept through the Allahabad police over the defendants' movements and after some time this led to further discoveries. The defendants were apparently misled into thinking that the whole affair has blown over. At any rate much accession of prosperity appears to have come to the joint family. For instance, heavy mortgages of many thousands of rupees on their family lands were paid off, and other lands purchased. I may say at once that though various tales to the contrary were put forward, there is no satisfactory evidence to show where the money came from, apart from the proceeds of the Rs. 40,000 cheques. I am quite satisfied that was the true source from which these family mortgages were paid off and the lands purchased. But what is even more important is that the defendants proceeded to quarrel as to how the balance of the proceeds of the stolen moneys should be dealt with, and they actually summoned their village panchayat to settle their differences on this point. It is clear from the plaintiffs' evidence that at that panchayet meeting it was common ground that the money had been brought by the first defendant from Bombay with the aid of the second defendant, and that the first defendant claimed that he was entitled to a larger share of it than the rest of the family, because he was the person who had secured the money. Naturally one does not accept such a story without closely criticizing it. In the present case I am satisfied that what the plaintiffs' witnesses have said about that panchayat is true.
3. In this civil suit practically all the evidence is taken on commission, and at the trial the suit is undefended. But it so happens that I was the Sessions Judge who tried the criminal charges against Defendant No. 1 under S. 408 and against Defendant No. 2 under Ss. 408 and 109 of the Indian Penal Code, which resulted in an unanimous verdict of guilty against No. 1 and by a majority of 7 to 2 against No. 2, and I sentenced each of them to three years rigorous imprisonment and a fine on November 11, 1921. At that trial the plaintiffs' witnesses were closely cross-examined, and in addition I had the benefit of tearing the oral statement of the accused from the dock and the argument of their counsel. I was quite satisfied at that trial that the story of the first and second defendant was a false one, and that in fact Defendant No. 1 had embezzled the money with the and of Defendant No. 2, he being the person who actually took the money out of Bombay after it had been handed to him by Defendant No. 1.
4. But to avoid any misunderstanding I should state that I decide this present civil suit solely on the evidence of the civil suit and not on that of the criminal proceedings, except that I am entitled to know that Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 have been prosecuted to conviction for the embezzlement of these moneys. I think I am also entitled to take into consideration that there is nothing in that criminal trial which should give me any hesitation in accepting the plaintiffs' evidence in the present civil suit.
5. So much for the more material facts. I do not propose to go into further details. The real difficulty arises as to the law. In this respect I regret that the case is undefended, and that the difficulties I have felt have not been met by counsel, although I gave an express adjournment for the purpose. The point is this: Under what particular section of what Code or under what proposition of law can one recover in a civil suit money stolen by a thief, and how can the members of this joint Hindu family be made liable for the theft, if they did not actually participate in it? In the plaint the plaintiffs' case is based on conspiracy, viz., that the first defendant in conspiracy with the other defendants intended to misappropriate and did in fact misappropriate the Rs. 40,000, and that the second defendant actually took the money from Bombay in furtherance of the conspiracy. That there was a conspiracy between Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 is clear, but there is not the slightest evidence to show that Defendants Nos. 3, 4 and 5 were guilty of any conspiracy prior to the actual theft. On the contrary it would seem quite improbable that Defendants Nos? 3 and 4 could anticipate that anybody would be so foolish as to entrust Defendant No. 1 with Rs. 40,000 or any other large sum. However that may be, I find as a fact that the alleged antecedent conspiracy so far as regards Defendants Nos. 3, 4 and 5 is not proved. Consequently the plaintiffs' case in so far as it depends on any such antecedent conspiracy fails.
6. At the second hearing Mr. B.J Desai based the plaintiffs' case on another ground. He relied on Sections 71, 76 and 108, illustration (a) of the Indian Contract Act. S. 71 provides that a person who finds goods belonging to another, and takes them into his custody, is subject to the same responsibility as a bailee. But in the present case there is no question of any goods being “found,” nor can it be said that any of the other defendants have “found” any money. The cheques were given to Defendant No. 1 to cash, and he obtained cash, viz., currency notes from the bankers. So I fail to see how S. 71 has any relevance. Next, turning to Ss. 76 and 108, these sections appear under the chapter dealing with the sale of goods. It was said that, having regard to the definition of S. 76, goods would include a cheque or cash. But assuming that to be so, I am far from satisfied that S. 108 affects the question. The plaintiffs are not seeking to recover here any specific goods or the actual currency notes which the Bank landed over to the first defendant. They are merely making a money claim against the defendants; and it was expressly admitted at the trial that, the plaintiffs are not seeking to follow the specific moneys in order to obtain any charge on the property which may now represent such moneys. Illustration (a), therefore, which deals with a stolen cow which A had bought from B in good faith, would hardly seem to cover the present case. The true owner might recover the cow, but could he recover damage from A, supposing the cow had died or had been resold? As regards Chapter IX, which deals with bailees, even if one assumes that Defendant No. 1 was a bailee and accordingly liable to the plaintiffs the remaining defendants were not bailees, for the plaintiffs had never entrusted them with anything.
7. I next invited counsel to consider whether under the common law of England there was not an appropriate civil remedy against a thief who had stolen property. It would seem contrary to common sense that an action would lie, say for breach of contract for payment of a certain sum of money, or in tort for trespass or for injury by negligence to a chattel, and yet that no action would lie for theft. But counsel were unable, to refer me to any authority on that proposition either in England or in India, though I suggested that in a case like the present an action would lie for money had and received. But the difficulty here is not so much as regards the actual thief but as regards the alleged liability of the remaining members of his family. I accordingly do not propose to go into the possible remedies which might be open at common law but will consider whether a remedy does not lie in equity.
8. I accordingly suggested further to counsel that the plaintiffs' case might be put in this way viz., that the initial embezzlement was a breach of trust by Defendant No. 1, that Defendant No. 2 aided and abetted that breach of trust, and that Defendants Nos. 3 and 4 were also guilty of that breach of trust inasmuch as with notice of the trust they participated in the improper division of the stolen moneys amongst, or for the benefit of, the members of the joint Hindu family. But this point had not been considered by counsel, and accordingly I reserved judgment; for the mere fact that the case was undefended would not entitle the plaintiffs to judgment unless they could satisfy the Court that their claim was sound in law.
9. Shortly thereafter I came across a short paragraph in an English newspaper referring to a somewhat similar case which Mr. Justice Bailhache had tried, and which he was reported to have described as being “the most puzzling he had experienced in forty years study of the law.” I accordingly waited for the case to be reported, and subsequently when I was home on leave I wrote to the learned Judge, who was kind enough to inform me that the case was only reported in the Justice of the Peace, Vol. 87, p. 817, dated December, 1, 1923, and that the report was a very imperfect one. Shortly stated, in that case four defendants had broken into a jeweller's shop, and articles were stolen to the value of £ 443. Articles to the value of £ 188 were recovered, and the subject of the action was a claim by the jeweller for damages in respect of the un-recovered property against the four thieves who were then serving terms of imprisonment in respect of the robbery. The learned Judge held that the wrong against the State must first be vindicated which had been done by a criminal conviction. Next as regards the injury done to the plaintiff in his private capacity, if there had been only one individual concerned in the theft, there would be no difficulty in vindicating the plaintiff so far as trespass was concerned. But the action was complicated as there were four defendants. Further the stolen, property was not treed to one individual, and the unrecovered goods could not be traced to any of the defendants. The learned Judge, however, held that he was entitled to presume that the missing articles were, stolen by the four defendants, and that the fact that the property could not be traced made no difference. He accordingly held that if two or three people complained to commit a wrongful act and damage was done, judgment could be given against them. Accordingly the same principle applied as if there was only one defendant; and judgment was given against every one of the Defendants as regards the stolen property which had not been restored. It was not essential whether the damage-could be divided or not, as each of the defendants were liable. It will, however, be seen that in that case the defendants were the actual trespassers and thieves, or at any rate were all engaged in the conspiracy to trespass and steal. Here, as I have already held, there is no evidence to show that defendants Nos. 3 and 4 entered into any antecedent conspiracy in connexion with the suit theft. Nor was it a case of trespass on the plaintiffs' premises.
10. I subsequently waited to see whether the case was to be reported fully as the judgment of the late Mr. Justice Bailhache on this branch of the law, of which he was a complete master, would have been particularly valuable to me. But no further report is forthcoming, and accordingly, as I have already intimated, I do not propose to consider the possible remedies open to the plaintiffs at common law, but will consider the above equitable remedy for breach of trust which I have already referred to.
11. In this connexion I should state that in my opinion the pleadings are sufficient to cover the point, although the precise words “breach of trust” are not mentioned. The facts pleaded clearly shows the fiduciary relationship between the plaintiffs and the first defendant. The allegation of a conspiracy to misappropriate the moneys after they had been stolen is I think a sufficient allegation of a wilful participation in the breach of trust. In this connexion it must be borne in mind that the breach of trust was not necessarily concluded when Defendant No. 1 handed the money to Defendant No. 2, nor when Defendant No. 2 took it away out of Bombay. It at any rate extended up to the time when the trust property was actually applied in pacing off the mortgages and in buying property.
12. Now, in the first place, it is abundantly clear that there was a breach of trust by the first defendant in which Defendant No. 2 was an abettor. That indeed is what they were convicted of, viz., criminal breach of trust. The only question, therefore, is whether Defendants Nos. 3 and 4 having notice of the trust were afterwards parties to a misapplication of the trust property in breach of the trust. In my judgment, on the evidence before me, it is clear that question should be answered in the affirmative. Accordingly in my judgment Defendants Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 were all liable to replace these trust moneys. It follows then that in the view which I take the plaintiffs' case can and does succeed on that ground. I say nothing further as to whether it could also be based on some other ground.
13. Counsel informs me that the plaintiffs have recovered Rs. 1,500 found on Defendant No. 1, but have received nothing of the fines imposed by me. There will, accordingly, be judgment against Defendants Nos. 1, 3, 4 and 5 for Rs. 38,500 (being the balance of the Rs. 40,000) had interest at nine per cent. per annum from July 5, 1918, to judgment. Costs and interest on judgment at six per cent. But so far as regards Defendant No. 5 his liability is to be limited to the extent of the, assets received by him from his father Defendant No. 2 since deceased. The attachment before judgment will continue pending the further orders of the Court, and there will be general liberty to apply.
14. As the Justice of the Peace newspaper is not, I think, in the local law libraries, a print containing the above brief report of the case before the late Mr. Justice Bailhache can be annexed to this judgment for convenience of reference.
15. Note: Case reported in the Justice of the Peace, Vol. 87, at p. 817 under date December 1, 1923.
16. An important judgment against convicted housebreakers was given by Mr. Justice Bailhache at the Glamorgan Assizes held at Cardiff on the 20th ultimo, in a case his Lordship had previously described as being the most puzzling he had experienced in forty years study of the law.
17. The plaintiff in the action was Thomas Liddle Ainsley, of 19, West Butestreet, Cardiff, a jeweller and nautical instrument maker. It will be recalled that his premises were broken into some time ago and articles stolen to the value of £443-13-6. Articles to the value of £188-14s were recovered and the subject of the action was a claim by plaintiff for damages in respect of the unrecovered property against Joseph Preeth, Thomas Freeth, Gordon Thomas, and Victor Sydney Rowlands, now serving terms of imprisonment in respect of the robbery.
18. Mr. Kirkhouse Jenkins (instructed by Messrs Gilbert Robertson and Co.) appeared for the plaintiff. Defendants were not present in Court when judgment was given, neither were they represented.
19. His Lordship, in giving judgment for plaintiff, assessed the amount of damages liable to be claimed from defendants at £202-19-6, and that judgment for that amount could be enforced against either of the defendants.
20. His Lordship said: “By breaking into these premises defendants had committed two wrongs—one was against the State and the other was a violation of public law, and before any individual could take any steps to redress the injury he had sustained, the violation of the public law had to be sufficiently vindicated.
21. In this case that had been done, and there now remained the injury done to plaintiff in his private capacity. If there had only been one individual in this civil action there would be no difficulty in the way of vindicating plaintiff so far as trespass was concerned. The present action, however, was somewhat complicated, as there were four defendants.
22. It was true that the stolen property was not traced to one individual, and that the unrecovered goods could not be traced to any of the defendants, but he was entitled to assume that the missing articles were stolen by any, or the four defendants. The fact that the property could not be traced made no difference. He thought that if two or three people combined to commit a wrongful act and damage was done, judgment could be given against them.
23. The same principle applied as if there were only one defendant, and judgment would be given against every one of the defendants in respect of the stolen property which had not been restored. It was not essential, his Lordship concluded, whether the damage could be divided or not, as each of the defendants was liable.]
24. Suit decreed.
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