This criminal revision was heard by Arvind Kumar Tripathi (II), J. The narrow question raised was whether the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 ("the Act") is applicable where a statutory provision prescribes a minimum sentence and whether the court can, instead of imposing the minimum sentence, release an offender on probation.

Facts: A crime was registered at Police Station Salwan, District Rae Bareli against opposite parties Nos. 2 to 4 under sections 498A, 323, 504 IPC and section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. After trial, opposite parties Nos. 2 to 10 were convicted under section 498A, section 323 IPC and section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and were acquitted under section 504 IPC and section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Sentences as recorded by the trial court included: Meera Bux and Afsar—2 years RI and ₹1,000 fine under section 498A; several others (Shamshad, Dilsher, Babloo, Chhoti Bitiya, Haddo, Nisar Ahmad, Smt. Noori)—six months SI under section 498A and ₹1,000 fine; multiple accused also directed to undergo six months SI under section 323 and one year SI plus ₹1,000 fine under section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

Procedural history: Criminal Appeal No. 55 of 2013 was filed and partly allowed. The appellate court maintained convictions but granted benefit of section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act and released the accused on their executing one surety of ₹5,000 each on condition of maintaining peace and good conduct for one and a half years. The informant (revisionist) filed the present criminal revision challenging that grant of probation.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 is applicable to offences for which the law prescribes a minimum sentence.
Whether a court can, instead of imposing the minimum sentence prescribed by statute, release the convicted person on probation under the Probation of Offenders Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Revisionist's Arguments

Learned Counsel for the revisionist relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Shyam Lal Verma v. Central Bureau Of Investigation (2013 (81) ACC 470) and submitted that where a specific provision prescribes a minimum sentence, the Probation of Offenders Act cannot be invoked.

Opposite Parties' Arguments

Learned Counsel for opposite parties Nos. 2 to 10 submitted that the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 is applicable to all offences except those punishable with death or imprisonment for life.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Shyam Lal Verma v. Central Bureau Of Investigation.	Held that in cases where a specific provision prescribes a minimum sentence (context: Prevention of Corruption Act), the Probation of Offenders Act cannot be invoked.	The Court acknowledged this holding but observed that the issue in Shyam Lal Verma concerned the Prevention of Corruption Act; the present matter required consideration of other authorities and statutory text before concluding applicability.
State Through Sp, New Delhi v. Ratan Lal Arora.	Followed the principle that where sections prescribing minimum sentences exist (as in Prevention of Corruption Act sections cited), relief under the Probation Act is not permissible.	The Court treated this decision as supporting Shyam Lal Verma's limited proposition but emphasized it was to be read in context.
State Represented by Inspector of Police, Pudukottai, T.N. v. A. Parthiban	Expressed a similar view to the above that where statute prescribes minimum sentence, probation relief may not be available.	The Court noted this consistent line of authority but analyzed its scope against the language of the Probation Act and section 18 thereof.
Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab 1966 (3) ACC 52 (SC) : 1965 Cri.L.J. 360	Described the Probation of Offenders Act as a milestone in penology and explained the Act's distinction between offenders (age and offences punishable with death/imprisonment for life) and the Court's discretion under sections 3 and 4.	The Court relied on this exposition to underline the rehabilitative purpose of the Probation Act and the discretionary power conferred on courts to release offenders on probation where conditions are met.
Ishwar Das v. State of Punjab (1973) 2 SCC 65	Interpreted sub-section (1) of section 4 of the Probation Act (including its non-obstante clause) as having an overriding effect and set out the conditions for invoking section 4; described section 6's protection for offenders under 21 years.	The Court relied on Ishwar Das to hold that section 4's non-obstante clause and specified conditions permit its overriding application where those conditions are fulfilled.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed the limited question as whether the Probation of Offenders Act applies where a minimum sentence is statutorily prescribed and whether courts may release an accused on probation instead of imposing the minimum sentence.

First, the Court examined the line of authority represented by Shyam Lal Verma, Ratan Lal Arora and A. Parthiban, noting that those decisions held that where a statute prescribes a minimum sentence (as in provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act), relief under the Probation Act was not permissible. The Court observed, however, that Shyam Lal Verma's core point was the applicability of the Probation Act to offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act and that the decision must be read in its factual and statutory context.

Next, the Court turned to the language and purpose of the Probation of Offenders Act itself and earlier precedents. Quoting Rattan Lal, the Court emphasized the Act's rehabilitative purpose and the discretionary relief provided by sections 3 and 4. Relying on Ishwar Das, the Court highlighted that sub-section (1) of section 4 contains a non-obstante clause ("notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force") which points to section 4's potential overriding effect when the Act's conditions are satisfied; Ishwar Das also articulated the three conditions for section 4 relief and the special protection for offenders under 21 years (section 6).

The Court then analyzed section 18 of the Probation Act, which—per the opinion—states that the Probation Act shall not affect the provision of section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The Court noted that section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act prescribes, in the absence of special reasons, a minimum sentence of imprisonment of not less than six months. The Court reasoned that if the legislature intended the Probation Act to be inapplicable to all offences carrying a minimum sentence, there would have been no reason to single out section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in section 18 of the Probation Act. The fact that only section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is mentioned in section 18 (and not all minimum-sentence offences) indicates that the Probation Act may still be invoked in respect of other offences for which minimum sentence is prescribed.

Applying these authorities and statutory provisions to the present facts, the Court concluded that the Sessions Judge did not err in granting the benefit of section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act to respondents Nos. 2 to 10.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED

Holding: The criminal revision filed by the informant was dismissed. The Court held that the Sessions Judge was not in error in granting relief under section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act to opposite party Nos. 2 to 10.

Implications: The immediate effect is that the appellate order granting probation (execution of one surety of ₹5,000 and conditions of peace and good conduct for one and a half years) stands and the convicted persons retain the benefit granted by the appellate court. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel general rule beyond its application to the statutory and precedential materials discussed; it treats the cited authorities and the language of section 18 as determinative in the present context.

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Arvind Kumar Tripathi (II), J.

1. Heard Shri Amitabh Tripathi, learned Counsel for the revisionist, learned AGA for the State respondent and Shri S.H. Ibrahim, learned Counsel for opposite party Nos. 2 to 10. A very short question is involved in this criminal revision as to whether cases of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (for short the Act) will be applicable or not to the cases where minimum sentence is provided, and whether the Court can, instead of granting minimum sentence, release him on probation?

2. As factual matrix of the case, a case under sections 498A, 323, 504 IPC and section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 was registered against opposite party Nos. 2 to 4 in Police Station Salwan, District Rae Bareli. After investigation, charge-sheet was submitted and charges were framed. The prosecution witnesses were examined and opposite party Nos. 2 to 10 were convicted under section 498A, 323 IPC and section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. They were acquitted under section 504 IPC and section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Meera Bux and Afsar were directed to undergo 2 years RI and ` 1000/- fine under section 498A IPC. Shamshad, Dilsher, Babloo, Chhoti Bitiya, Haddo, Nisar Ahmad, Smt. Noori were directed to undergo six months SI under section 498A and were also directed to pay ` 1000/- each as fine. Meera Bux, Shamshad, Dilsher, Babloo, Chhoti Bitiya, Haddo, Afsar, Nisar Ahmad, Smt. Noori were also directed to undergo six months SI under section 323 IPC. Meera Bux, Shamshad, Dilsher, Babloo, Chhoti Bitiya, Haddo, Afsar, Nisar Ahmad, Smt. Noori were directed to undergo one year SI and were also directed to pay fine of ` 1000/- under section4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Feeling aggrieved, Criminal Appeal No. 55 of 2013 was filed, which was partly allowed, and conviction of accused persons was maintained, by giving benefit of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 and were released on their executing one surety of `5000/- on condition that they will maintain peace and good conduct for one and half year. The informant feeling aggrieved filed this criminal revision.

3. Learned Counsel for the revisionist relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Shyam Lal Verma v. Central Bureau Of Investigation. of Investigation 2013 (81) ACC 470, and submitted that the Apex Court has held that in cases where specific provisions prescribed minimum sentence, Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 cannot be invoked.

4. Learned Counsel for opposite party No. 2 to 10 submitted that Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 is applicable to all the offences barring death or imprisonment for life.

5. The only point for consideration before the Apex Court while deciding the case of Shyam Lal Verma (supra) was that whether the provision of the Act was applicable to offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act?

6. The Apex Court, in the case of Shyam Lal Verma (supra), has held that "It is not in dispute that the issue raised in this appeal has been considered by this Court in State Through Sp, New Delhi v. Ratan Lal Arora. 2004 (4) SCC 590, wherein in similar circumstances, this Court held that since section 7 as well as section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act provide for a minimum sentence of six months and one year respectively in addition to the maximum sentences as well as imposition of fine, in such circumstances claim for granting relief under the Probation of Offenders Act is not permissible. In other words, in cases where a specific provision prescribed a minimum sentence, the provisions of the probation act cannot be invoked. Similar view has been expressed in State Represented by Inspector of Police, Pudukottai, T.N. v. A. Parthiban 2006 (56) ACC 465.

7. The Probation of Offenders Act, as observed by the Apex Court in the case of Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab 1966 (3) ACC 52 (SC) : 1965 Cri.L.J. 360, is a milestone in the progress of the modern liberal trend of reform in the field of penology. It is the result of the recognition of the doctrine that the object of Criminal Law is more to reform the individual offender than to punish him. Broadly stated, the Act distinguishes offenders below 21 years of age and those above that age, and offenders who are guilty of having committed an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life and those who are guilty of a lesser offence. While in the case of offenders who are above the age of 21 years absolute discretion is given to the Court to release them after admonition or on probation of good conduct, subject to the conditions laid down in the appropriate provisions of the Act, in the case of offenders below the age of 21 years, an injunction is issued to the Court not to sentence them to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that, having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the offence and the character of the offenders, it is not desirable to deal with them under sections 3 and 4 of the Act.

8. It is manifest from plain reading of Sub-section 1 of section 4 of the Act that it makes no distinction between persons of the age of more than 21 years and those of the age of less than 21 years. On the contrary, the said subsection is applicable to persons of all ages subject to certain conditions which have been specified therein. Once those conditions are fulfilled and the other formalities which are mentioned in section 4 are complied with, power is given to the Court to release the accused on probation of good conduct. Section 6 of the Act deals specifically with persons under twenty-one years of age convicted by a Court for an offence punishable with imprisonment other than imprisonment for life. In such a case an injunction is issued to the Court not to sentence the young offender to imprisonment, unless the Court is of the view that having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender (it would not be desirable to release him, after admonition under section3 or on probation of good conduct under section 4 of the Act.

9. The fact that out of various offences in which minimum sentence is prescribed only the offence under sub section (2) of section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act has been mentioned, in section 18 of the Probation of Offenders Act and not the other offences for which the minimum sentence is prescribed shows that even in case of other offences, the provisions of Probation of Offenders Act can be invoked. Reference may be made to Ishwar Das v. State of Punjab (1973) 2 SCC 65.

10. In the case of Ishwar Das (supra) it has been held by the Apex Court that "we find that sub-section 1 of section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act contains the words "notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force". The above non-obstante clause points to the conclusion that the provisions of section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act would have overriding effect and shall prevail if the other conditions prescribed are fulfilled. Those conditions are: (1) the accused is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life, (2) the Court finding him guilty is of the opinion that having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient to release him on probation of good conduct, and (3) the accused in such an event enters into a bond with or without sureties to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period not exceeding three years as the Court may direct and, in the meantime, to keep the peace and be of good behavior. Sub-section 1 of section 6 of the above mentioned Act, as stated earlier, imposes a duty upon the Court when it finds a person under 21 years of age, guilty of an offence punishable with imprisonment other than imprisonment for life, not to sentence him to imprisonment unless the Court is satisfied that, having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it would not be desirable to deal with him under sections 3 or 4 of the Act but to award a sentence of imprisonment to him. The underlying object of the above provisions obviously is that an accused person should be given a chance of reformation which he would lose in case he is incarcerated in prison and associates with hardened criminals. So far as persons who are less than 21 years of age are concerned, special provisions have been enacted to prevent their confinement in jail at young age with a view to obviate the possibility of their being subjected to the pernicious influence of hardened criminals. It has accordingly been enacted that in the case of a person who is less than 21 years of age and is convicted for an offence not punishable with imprisonment for life, he shall not be sentenced to imprisonment unless there exist reasons which justify such a course. Such reasons have to be recorded in writing."

11. According to section 18 of the Probation of Offenders Act, the aforesaid Act shall not affect the provision of section 4 of the Dowry of Prohibition Act. The last mentioned provision, namely, section 4 of the Dowry of Prohibition Act, prescribes, in the absence of special reasons, a minimum sentence of imprisonment for a term of not less than six months for those convicted under section 4 of the Dowry of Prohibition Act. If the object of the legislature was that the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act should not apply to all cases where a minimum sentence of imprisonment is prescribed by the statute, there was no reason to, specify section 4 of the Dowry of Prohibition Act in section 18 of the Probation of Offenders Act. The fact that out of the various offences for which the minimum sentence is prescribed, only the offence under section 4 of the Dowry of Prohibition Act has been mentioned in section 18 of the Probation of Offenders Act and not the other offences for which the minimum sentence is prescribed, shows that in case of such other offences the provisions of Probation of Offenders Act can be invoked.

12. In view of settled legal position, this Court is of the view that the learned Sessions Judge, Rae Bareli has not erred in granting benefit of section 4of the Act to respondent Nos. 2 to 10. Consequently, in view of foregone conclusion, the criminal revision is liable to be dismissed, and is hereby dismissed.

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