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State Of U.P & Others v. Mahipal Singh & Another
Structured Summary of the Opinion — Special Appeal concerning sweeper post (SDO, Dhampur)
Factual and Procedural Background
This special appeal challenges a judgment of the Single Judge dated 16 April 2014. The Single Judge directed the State Government to take a decision within two months on the Board of Revenue's letter dated 8 February 1994 recommending creation of a permanent sweeper post in the office of the Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO), Dhampur, Bijnor. The Single Judge further directed that the first respondent (the person engaged as sweeper on a part-time/daily-wage basis) be paid salary, from 8 February 1994 until the creation of the post, equal to the salary at the lowest grade of a sweeper in the State, with arrears to be worked out within three months; and granted continuity of service.
Relevant factual timeline (as stated in the opinion):
- The SDO office was established in 1986 and the first respondent was engaged as a part-time sweeper.
- By letter dated 8 February 1990 the SDO requested the District Magistrate's permission to appoint a sweeper; on 2 March 1990 the District Magistrate directed appointment of the first respondent on a part-time basis on a consolidated payment of Rs. 76 per month (subsequently revised).
- On 24 January 1992 the District Magistrate requested the Board of Revenue to create a permanent sweeper post; correspondence ensued and the Board of Revenue forwarded papers to the State Government on 8 February 1994 recommending creation of the permanent post.
Procedural history (as stated):
- The first respondent filed Claim Petition No. 2135 of 1995 before the State Public Services Tribunal (Mahipal Singh v. State of U.P. & others). It was dismissed on 13 February 1996 at the admission stage as the petitioner was held to be a part-time employee and no post had been created.
- Subsequently Writ Petition No. 10885 of 1996 was filed seeking (a) regularisation as a class-IV sweeper, (b) arrears of salary since 1990 as payable to a regular class-IV employee, and (c) restraint against interference with duties. The Single Judge allowed that writ petition in part by issuing the directions noted above on 16 April 2014.
- The State agitated that judgment by way of the present special appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court (Single Judge) could direct the State Government to take a decision on the Board of Revenue's 8 February 1994 recommendation for creation of a permanent sweeper post for the SDO, Dhampur — and if such a direction amounts to an impermissible order to create or regularize the post.
- Whether a person engaged as a daily-wage/part-time sweeper can be directed, under the writ jurisdiction (Article 226), to be paid salary equal to the minimum of the pay scale of a regular sweeper (and to be paid arrears dating from 8 February 1994), in light of the principles in State of Haryana v. Tilak Raj, Uma Devi (State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi) and related authorities.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments (State)
- The direction to the State to consider the Board of Revenue's request and the direction to allow salary from 8 February 1994 at the lowest grade are both questioned.
- It was urged that no direction can be issued ordering payment of salary at the minimum of a pay scale in respect of a person who is admittedly a daily-wager/part-time employee.
- The principle of 'equal pay for equal work' does not apply where the employee is not borne on the permanent establishment; reliance was placed on State of Haryana and another v. Tilak Raj and others (2003) 6 SCC 123.
Respondent's Arguments (First Respondent)
- Reliance was placed upon Para 55 of the Supreme Court's judgment in Uma Devi (State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi) to support the claim that daily-wage employees should receive wages equal to the salary at the lowest grade of the cadre.
- The senior advocate for the respondent candidly accepted that the Single Judge's direction granting arrears from 8 February 1994 could not be sustained but argued that, consistent with Uma Devi para 55, a direction for payment of salary at the minimum of the pay scale (without other allowances) would be justified.
- It was submitted that Para 55 of Uma Devi can be parsed into two parts — (i) grant of minimum of the scale of pay, and (ii) grant of relaxation in respect of permanent engagement — and that only the latter constitutes a direction under Article 142 of the Constitution.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| State of Karnataka & others v. Uma Devi (2006) 4 SCC 1 (Para 55) | Directed that daily-wage earners be paid wages equal to the salary at the lowest grade of employees of their cadre from the date of the High Court Division Bench's judgment; courts should not direct regularization; allowed limited relief under Article 142 in that case. | The court considered Para 55 relied upon by the respondent but distinguished its application. It held that the Single Judge's direction to pay arrears from 8 February 1994 could not be sustained under Article 226; however, the court permitted payment of minimum wages from the date of the Single Judge's decision (16 April 2014), thus limiting retrospective effect. |
| State of Haryana & another v. Tilak Raj and others (2003) 6 SCC 123 | Held that a scale of pay is attached to a definite post and a daily-wager holds no post; the doctrine of 'equal pay for equal work' requires a clear equivalence and does not automatically apply to daily-wage employees. | The court relied on this principle to conclude that the Single Judge's direction to pay salary equivalent to the lowest grade (and arrears from 1994) to a daily-wage worker could not be sustained under Article 226. |
| State of Haryana v. Jasmer Singh (1996) 11 SCC 77 | Earlier articulation of the principle that pay scales attach to posts and the equal-pay doctrine requires clear equivalence. | Cited as reinforcing the Tilak Raj principle; used to support the conclusion that parity with regular employees is not automatic for daily-wage workers. |
| State of Punjab v. Surjit Singh (2009) 9 SCC 514 | Considered Para 55 of Uma Devi and treated the observations therein as directions referable to the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution. | The court noted Surjit Singh's treatment of Para 55 to examine whether the Single Judge's directions could be sustained; the decision was used to analyze the scope and applicability of Uma Devi's Para 55. |
| Orissa University of Agriculture & Technology v. Manoj K. Mohanty (2003) 5 SCC 188 | Reinforces that 'equal pay for equal work' is not attracted merely by the nature of work without regard to qualifications, source of recruitment and other relevant considerations. | Cited among decisions establishing that equal-pay doctrine is not an abstract or automatic rule; supported the court's view limiting applicability to daily-wage employees. |
| Government of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy and others (2004) 1 SCC 347 | Similar support for the proposition that equal pay is not an abstract mathematical formula and depends on specific equivalence. | Cited alongside other authorities to show the settled nature of the principle and to limit the relief available to daily-wage workers under writ jurisdiction. |
| State of Haryana & others v. Charanjit Singh & others (2006) 9 SCC 321 | Also cited for the settled principle limiting equal-pay applications. | Used in the same vein as the other authorities to justify limiting the Single Judge's order for equivalence with regular pay/arrears. |
| Maharashtra Road Transport Corporation v. Casteribe Rajya P. Karmchari Sanghatana (2009) 8 SCC 556 | Where State legislation catalogs unfair labour practices (e.g., engaging employees on daily wage), an industrial remedy may be available and is the appropriate route. | The court noted this as illustrating that statutory/industrial remedies may be appropriate where State legislation provides relief; supported the conclusion that a general direction of the kind issued by the Single Judge cannot be issued under Article 226. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court divided the Single Judge's order into two parts and considered each:
-
On the direction to the State to take a decision regarding creation of the permanent post (Board of Revenue's 8 February 1994 recommendation):
- The court observed that the Single Judge did not direct the State either to create the post or to regularize the first respondent; the order merely required the State to take a decision in accordance with law on the Board of Revenue's recommendation.
- The court held that such a direction to take a decision is unexceptionable because it is not a command to create a post but a direction to decide the request lawfully and expeditiously.
-
On the direction to pay salary equivalent to the lowest grade of a regular sweeper and to award arrears from 8 February 1994:
- The court identified this as the core dispute. It referred to long line of Supreme Court decisions (notably State of Haryana v. Tilak Raj and earlier authorities) establishing that a pay scale attaches to a definite post, while a daily-wager holds no post; hence, parity claims require demonstrable equivalence and are not automatic.
- The court analyzed the respondent's reliance on Para 55 of Uma Devi. It recognized that Uma Devi had directed payment of wages equal to the lowest grade for daily-wage earners from the date of the Division Bench judgment in that case and had, in specific circumstances, exercised powers under Article 142 to grant limited relief (including procedural concessions in future recruitments).
- The court also noted that the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Surjit Singh had treated Para 55 of Uma Devi as referable to Article 142, and it considered those authorities to determine whether similar relief could be granted here under Article 226.
- Balancing these authorities, the court concluded that a general direction under Article 226 to award salary equal to the lowest grade and to pay arrears dating back to 8 February 1994 could not be sustained. The court held that the Single Judge's order in that respect went beyond the remit of writ jurisdiction in the circumstances of this case.
- Consequently, the court set aside that portion of the Single Judge's order which directed payment of salary equal to the lowest grade and payment of arrears from 8 February 1994.
- However, recognizing the position of the first respondent and the Single Judge's decision date, the court directed that from the date of the Single Judge's decision (16 April 2014) the first respondent would be entitled to payment of minimum wages as applicable in the State under the relevant notification or Government Order then in force.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The special appeal is disposed of in the terms stated by the court: the impugned judgment of the Single Judge is set aside to the extent that it directed the State to grant salary equivalent to the lowest grade of a sweeper and to pay arrears w.e.f. 8 February 1994. The court upheld the direction that the State must take a decision on the Board of Revenue's recommendation (8 February 1994).
Implications and immediate consequences:
- The State Government is directed to take a decision, in accordance with law, on the creation/sanctioning of the permanent sweeper post for the SDO office at Dhampur (this is a direction to decide, not to create or to regularize).
- The Single Judge's direction that the first respondent be paid salary equivalent to the lowest grade and arrears from 8 February 1994 has been set aside; that relief is not available under the circumstances of this writ petition.
- The first respondent is, however, entitled to be paid the minimum wages applicable in the State from the date of the Single Judge's decision (16 April 2014), in accordance with the relevant minimum-wage notification or Government Order then in force.
- No costs were awarded: "There shall be no order as to costs."
Broader precedent: The court applied and relied upon established Supreme Court authorities (Tilak Raj, Jasmer Singh, Uma Devi and subsequent decisions) to delimit the scope of remedial relief available to daily-wage employees under Article 226, and noted that certain remedies may appropriately arise under Article 142 or through statutory/industrial law remedies where applicable. The opinion did not announce a new legal principle but applied existing authorities to the facts before it.
End of summary.
1. This special appeal arises from a judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 16 April 2014 by which the State Government has been directed to take a decision in regard to the creation of a post of sweeper for the office of the Sub-Divisional Officer SDO, Dhampur, Bijnor within two months, on a letter which was addressed by the Board of Revenue on 8 February 1994. The learned Single Judge has also directed that from 8 February 1994 till the creation of the post, the first respondent shall be allowed salary equivalent to the salary at the lowest grade of an employee on the post of sweeper in the State, in the office of the Collector. Arrears have been directed to be worked out within a period of three months and to be paid over to the first respondent. The first respondent has also been granted continuity of service. The first respondent was engaged as a sweeper by the SDO when a new office was established in 1986. By a letter dated 8 February 1990, the SDO requested the District Magistrate to grant him permission to appoint the sweeper. On 2 March 1990, the District Magistrate issued directions for the appointment of the first respondent on a part-time basis as a sweeper on a consolidated salary of Rs. 76/- per month. The consolidated payment has since been revised from time to time. On 24 January 1992, the District Magistrate addressed a communication to the Board of Revenue for the creation of a permanent post of sweeper in the office of the SDO at Dhampur. Correspondence ensued between the Board of Revenue and the District Magistrate. By a letter dated 8 February 1994, the Secretary, Board of Revenue forwarded the papers to the State Government for the creation of a permanent post of sweeper in the office of the SDO at Dhampur.
2. The first respondent had moved the State Public Services Tribunal at Lucknow by filing a claim petition Claim Petition No. 2135 of 1995, Mahipal Singh Vs. State of U.P. & others. The claim petition was dismissed by an order dated 13 February 1996 with the following observations:
"At the time of admission stage, from the record it is clear that he is part time employee and he has worked as such. He cannot show any rule under which a part time employee can be converted into a full time employee. It is also clear from record that no post has been created in which he might be considered as full time employee. It is also clear that the recommendation has been made by the lower authority of the Govt. to create the post so that the petitioner may be considered for appointment as full time employee on that post. No post has been created so far, the petitioner cannot be given a legal right to get a declaration as full time employee.
Thus for the above reasons the claim petition is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed at the admission stage."
3. Eventually, a writ petition Writ Petition No. 10885 of 1996 was filed by the first respondent. In the said writ petition, the reliefs that were claimed were for a direction in the nature of mandamus directing the appellants to regularize the services of the first respondent as a class-IV employee in the post of sweeper; for the payment of arrears of salary since 1990 as payable to a regular class-IV employee; and restraining the appellants from interfering with the discharge of duties by the first respondent.
4. The learned Single Judge has, after noticing the decision of the Supreme Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka and others v. Uma Devi (3) and others (2006) 4 SCC 1, held that the first respondent was continuously working as a part-time employee since his appointment on 2 March 1990 and had completed ten years of continuous service, the Board of Revenue had also recommended to the State Government for creation of a permanent post, since there is a permanent establishment of the SDO at Dhampur but the State had delayed in taking a decision thereon. In the meantime, the petition which was filed in March 1996 remained pending. On these facts, the learned Single Judge issued the following directions while allowing the aforesaid petition:
"9...State of U.P. is directed to take decision relating to creation of post of 'sweeper' for the office of Sub-Divisional Officer, Dhampur, Bijnor within a period of two months, on the letter of Board of Revenue U.P. at Lucknow dated 08.02.1994. From 08.02.1994 till creation of the post, the petitioner be given salary equal to the salary at the lowest grade of employees of the post of sweeper in State of U.P., in the office of Collector. The arrears be worked out within three months and paid to the petitioner. The petitioner shall be entitled for other benefits of continuity in service."
5. Learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has questioned both the direction to the State to consider the request of the Board of Revenue as well as the direction to allow salary to the first respondent from 8 February 1994 on the lowest grade of an employee in the post of sweeper in the State. It is urged that no direction can be issued for the payment of salary on the minimum of the pay scale in the case of a person who is admittedly a daily wager. It is further urged that the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' has no application where an employee is not borne on the permanent establishment, and in this regard reliance is placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana and another Vs. Tilak Raj and others (2003) 6 SCC 123.
6. On the other hand, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the first respondent relied upon the observations contained in Para-55 of the decision in Uma Devi (supra), to the following effect:
"55...We are, therefore, of the view that, at best, the Division Bench of the High Court should have directed that wages equal to the salary that is being paid to regular employees be paid to these daily-wage employees with effect from the date of its judgment. Hence, that part of the direction of the Division Bench is modified and it is directed that these daily-wage earners be paid wages equal to the salary at the lowest grade of employees of their cadre in the Commercial Taxes Department in government service, from the date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court. Since, they are only daily-wage earners, there would be no question of other allowances being paid to them..."
7. In the first part of the direction which has been issued by the learned Single Judge, the State Government has been directed to take a decision on the request which was made by the Board of Revenue in regard to the creation of a permanent post of sweeper on the establishment of the SDO, Dhampur, Bijnor. On this aspect, the direction of the learned Single Judge, it must be noted, is not a direction either to create the post or to regularize the first respondent. Whether a post should be created or sanctioned, is a matter entirely for the State Government to decide.
8. In the present case, the office of the SDO was established in 1986 and since a sweeper had to be appointed, the respondent workman was engaged on a part-time basis, which arrangement has been continuing since then. The Board of Revenue had written to the State Government as far back as on 8 February 1994 recommending the creation of a permanent post. The State Government had not taken its decision. The direction of the learned Single Judge to the State Government to take a decision, therefore, cannot be faulted since the learned Single Judge has neither directed the creation of the post nor issued a mandamus for regularization of the first respondent. A direction for taking a decision, in fact, is a direction to take a decision in accordance with law and hence that part of the order is unexceptionable.
9. The real bone of contention in the special appeal is in regard to the direction of the learned Single Judge to pay to the first respondent the salary at the lowest grade or, in other words, in the minimum of the salary payable to a regular employee of the State holding the post of sweeper and to pay arrears w.e.f. 8 February 1994. On this direction of the learned Single Judge for payment of arrears, the learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the first respondent fairly stated before the Court that this part of the order for payment of arrears from 8 February 1994 cannot be sustained but it was sought to be submitted that in consistent with the direction contained in Para-55 of the decision in Uma Devi's case (supra), a direction for the payment of salary on the minimum of the pay scale would be justified and in accordance with law. Learned Senior Advocate submitted that the direction of the Supreme Court in Para-55 of the decision in Uma Devi's case can be divided in two parts, the first in regard to the grant of minimum of the scale of pay and the second in regard to the grant of relaxation in the matter of permanent engagement Hence, it was urged that only the latter part constitutes a direction under Article 142 of the Constitution.
10. Before we deal with the submissions, we must, at this stage, take due note of the position which was laid down in a judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana Vs. Tilak Raj (supra), which has been followed since in several decisions of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that a scale of pay is attached to a definite post, whereas a daily wager does not hold a post. Moreover, it was held that the doctrine of 'equal pay for equal work' applies as between equivalents and would have no application where a parity is sought by a daily wager with permanent employees. In that context, the following principles were laid down:
"11. A scale of pay is attached to a definite post and in case of a daily-wager, he holds no posts. The respondent workers cannot be held to hold any posts to claim even any comparison with the regular and permanent staff for any or all purposes including a claim for equal pay and allowances. To claim a relief on the basis of equality, it is for the claimants to substantiate a clear-cut basis of equivalence and a resultant hostile discrimination before becoming eligible to claim rights on a par with the other group vis-a-vis an alleged discrimination. No material was placed before the High Court as to the nature of the duties of either categories and it is not possible to hold that the principle of "equal pay for equal work" is an abstract one.
12. "Equal pay for equal work" is a concept which requires for its applicability complete and wholesale identity between a group of employees claiming identical pay scales and the other group of employees who have already earned such pay scales. The problem about equal pay cannot always be translated in a mathematical formula."
11. The same principle, it must be noted, was laid down in an earlier decision in State of Haryana Vs. Jasmer Singh (1996) 11 SCC 77.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Uma Devi's case, more specifically Para-55, has been considered in State of Punjab Vs. Surjit Singh (2009) 9 SCC 514 by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has considered the entirety of the observations contained in Para-55, as extracted therein, as constituting directions which are referable to the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution. This is clear from the following extracts contained in Paragraphs 29 & 30 of the decision:
"29. It is in the aforementioned factual backdrop, this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, directed: (Umadevi case State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L & S) 753 25 (1990) 2 SCC 396 : 1990 SCC (L & S) 274 : (1990) 12 ATC 902, SCC p. 43, para 55)
"55 ..... Hence, that part of the direction of the Division Bench is modified and it is directed that these daily-wage earners be paid wages equal to the salary at the lowest grade of employees of their cadre in the Commercial Taxes Department in government service, from the date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court. Since, they are only daily-wage earners, there would be no question of other allowances being paid to them. In view of our conclusion, that the courts are not expected to issue directions for making such persons permanent in service, we set aside that part of the direction of the High Court directing the Government to consider their cases for regularisation. We also notice that the High Court has not adverted to the aspect as to whether it was regularization or it was giving permanency that was being directed by the High Court. In such a situation, the direction in that regard will stand deleted and the appeals filed by the State would stand allowed to that extent. If sanctioned posts are vacant (they are said to be vacant) the State will take immediate steps for filling those posts by a regular process of selection. But when regular recruitment is undertaken, the respondents in CAs Nos. 3595-612 and those in the Commercial Taxes Department similarly situated, will be allowed to compete, waiving the age restriction imposed for the recruitment and giving some weightage for their having been engaged for work in the Department for a significant period of time. That would be the extent of the exercise of power by this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution to do justice to them.
30. We, therefore, do not see that any law has been laid down in para 55 of the judgement in Umadevi (3) case State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L & S) 753. Directions were issued in view of the limited controversy. As indicated, the State's grievances were limited."
12. In several judgments of the Supreme Court, it has been held that the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' cannot be attracted merely on the nature of the work, irrespective of the educational qualifications attached to a post or irrespective of the source of recruitment and other relevant considerations. Hence, it is now a well settled principle of law that the doctrine of 'equal pay for equal work' is not a matter of abstract application or a mathematical formula that can be applied to a case.
13. In this regard we may only refer, at this stage, to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Orissa University of Agriculture & Technology and another Vs. Manoj K. Mohanty (2003) 5 SCC 188, Government of W.B. Vs. Tarun K. Roy and others (2004) 1 SCC 347, and State of Haryana and others Vs. Charanjit Singh and others (2006) 9 SCC 321.
14. We may also note that where State legislation, such as the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 provides for a catalogue of unfair labour practices, such as engaging employees on daily wage, casual or temporary basis, the remedy under the industrial law would, in such cases, be available, as held by the Supreme Court in Maharashtra Road Transport Corporation Vs. Casteribe Rajya P. Karmchari Sanghatana (2009) 8 SCC 556. However, a general direction of the nature which was issued by the learned Single Judge in the present case cannot be issued in exercise of the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For these reasons, we are of the view that the impugned judgment and order of the learned Single Judge would have to be set aside and is set aside to the extent it directs the State to grant to the first respondent salary equivalent to the salary payable to the lowest grade of an employee holding the post of sweeper in the State and for the payment of arrears w.e.f. 8 February 1994. We, however, direct that from the date of the decision of the learned Single Judge, namely 16 April 2014, the first respondent would be entitled to the payment of minimum wages as applicable in the State under the relevant notification, or as the case may be, Government Order holding the field.
The special appeal is, accordingly, disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
There shall be no order as to costs.
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