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Mir Rafique v. Additional Member, Board Of Revenue, Bihar & Others
Factual and Procedural Background
This application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India challenged an order of the Board of Revenue, Bihar, which allowed a revision application by respondent no. 4 in proceedings initiated under Section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961.
The material facts, as stated in the opinion, are:
- On 14-10-1969 respondent nos. 5 and 6 executed a sale deed in favour of respondent no. 4 (Ajablal Yadav) for 4 kathas of land (west of survey plot no. 2399, Village Bhawanpur). That sale deed was registered on 12-11-1969.
- On 18-12-1969 the petitioner filed an application under Section 16(3) claiming to be a cosharer and an adjoining raiyat of the plot. On the same day respondent no. 4 executed a sale deed transferring the property to Awadhlal Yadav (respondent no. 7); that sale deed was registered on 22-12-1969.
- The Deputy Collector issued notice to respondent no. 4. Respondent no. 4 filed a show cause on 15-6-1970 disputing the petitioner's claim of being a cosharer or adjoining raiyat, and stated that the land had already been transferred to respondent no. 7 and possession delivered.
- The Deputy Collector allowed the petitioner's claim for pre-emption. Respondent no. 4 appealed to the Collector, who dismissed the appeal (order dated 10-1-1977), accepting the view that final registration date mattered and, relying on Ramnath Giri v. Ramsundar Girl, held the sale deed invalid in law for purposes of defeating pre-emption.
- Respondent no. 4 then filed revision before the Board of Revenue. The Board referred to Section 47 of the Registration Act and held that the sale deed in favour of respondent no. 7 became effective from 18-12-1969 and that respondent no. 4 had the right to deal with the property while the pre-emption application was stayed; the Board allowed the revision and set aside the orders below.
- The petitioner brought the matter to this Court challenging the Board's order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the sale by respondent no. 4 to respondent no. 7 was inoperative because it was hit by the doctrine of lis pendens (i.e., whether a pre-emption application filed on the same date as the execution of the sale prevents the transfer's effectiveness).
- Whether the matter should be remitted to the first court to investigate the validity of the transfer on the ground that the sale was effected only to defeat the petitioner's claim (i.e., whether the transaction was fictitious or sham).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's / Applicant's Arguments (as presented through Mr. Mojibul Haque)
- The sale by respondent no. 4 to respondent no. 7 was inoperative because it was hit by the doctrine of lis pendens (pre-emption application and transfer were on the same day).
- Alternatively, the case should be remitted for inquiry into the validity of the transfer because it was entered into solely to defeat the petitioner's pre-emption claim (i.e., the sale was fictitious or sham).
- Substantively, the petitioner claimed to be a cosharer and an adjoining raiyat of the disputed plot and sought pre-emption under Section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act.
Respondent No. 4's (and Board's) Position
- Respondent no. 4 disputed the petitioner's claim to be a cosharer or adjoining raiyat.
- Respondent no. 4 asserted that the land had been transferred to respondent no. 7 and that possession was delivered to respondent no. 7.
- On revision, the Board of Revenue relied on Section 47 of the Registration Act to hold that respondent no. 7 became effective owner from 18-12-1969 (the same date as the pre-emption application), and that respondent no. 4 had a right to deal with the property while the pre-emption application was stayed; accordingly the Board allowed the revision and set aside the orders of the courts below.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ramnath Giri v. Ramsundar Girl (1970 PLJR 8 Rev.) | Support for the view that the date of final registration matters in pre-emption cases (i.e., effect of registration on title and pre-emption rights). | The Additional Collector relied on this case to hold that a sale deed registered after the filing of pre-emption could be invalidated for the purpose of defeating pre-emption; the Collector dismissed respondent no. 4's appeal on that basis. |
| Ramchandra Yadav v. Anutha Yadav (1971 B.L.J.R 994) | Principle that where a second transfer is made and the second transferee became owner (by virtue of Section 47 of the Registration Act) from the date of execution, an application under Section 16(3) against the original transferee may fail; necessity to implead the subsequent transferee. | The Court referred to this case to explain that where the second transferee derives title from an earlier executed document (and Section 47 applies), the pre-emptor must implead the subsequent transferee and seek relief in his presence. |
| Smt. Sudama Devi v. Rajendra Singh (A.I.R. 1973 Patna 199) | Analysis of three situations: (i) second transfer executed and registered before filing (second transferee gets good title); (ii) second sale executed and registered after filing (hit by lis pendens under Section 52 TP Act); (iii) sale executed before filing but registered after—the transferee may nevertheless be owner by virtue of Section 47 of the Registration Act and not necessarily hit by lis pendens. | The Court relied on Sudama Devi to hold that an executed sale, though registered after filing, may not be hit by lis pendens because Section 47 can make the transferee owner from the earlier date; the Court used the principles in that case to address the present difficulty of simultaneity of events. |
| Bishan Singh v. Khazan Singh (A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 838) | Observation that a vendee may defeat a right of pre-emption by selling the property to a rival pre-emptor with preferential or equal right; the pre-emptor must show his right is superior at the time he exercises it. | The Court invoked the passage from Bishan Singh to support the proposition that when a pre-emptor and a vendee (or a person substituted in place of the vendee) stand on equal footing, the weaker right of pre-emption must give way to the vendee's right. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court undertook a stepwise analysis based on the facts and the authorities cited:
- Identification of the key factual difficulty: here the execution of the sale by respondent no. 4 in favour of respondent no. 7 and the filing of the petitioner's application for pre-emption both occurred on the same date (18-12-1969). The Court found it impossible to determine which event preceded the other in time and therefore treated them as simultaneous.
- Consideration of lis pendens and the relevance of "cognizance": the Court observed that the fact that the Deputy Collector took "cognizance" was not relevant in light of the explanation to Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, which deems pendency of a proceeding to commence from the date of presentation of the plaint or institution of the proceeding. That led the Court away from focusing on initial cognizance timings.
- Application of Section 47 of the Registration Act and prior authorities: relying on authorities (notably Ramchandra Yadav and Sudama Devi), the Court emphasized that Section 47 can make the transferee the owner from the date of execution even if registration occurs later. In the factual matrix where execution and filing occurred simultaneously, the Court accepted that respondent no. 7 "undisputed became the owner of the property on 18-12-1969."
- Resolution by comparison of competing rights: the Court then applied the reasoning in Bishan Singh (quoted in the opinion) that a pre-emptor's right is a weaker right and that a plaintiff must show a right superior to that of the vendee at the time of exercising pre-emption. Where both contestants stood on equal footing (simultaneity), the pre-emptor's weaker right must yield to the vendee's right.
- Rejection of the contention to remit for inquiry into sham/farzi transaction: the Court rejected the second point because the petitioner never pleaded that the transfer to respondent no. 7 was sham or farzi; the petitioner's contention was limited to motive (that the transfer was made to defeat his claim). The Court noted that even bona fide vendees may take lawful steps to defeat pre-emption and that the petitioner had not impleaded respondent no. 7 in the original proceedings despite being aware of the assignment.
- Conclusion from these steps: both points raised by Mr. Haque were found to be without merit in light of the simultaneity, Section 47 principles, and precedents emphasizing the comparative weakness of pre-emptive rights.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
Application dismissed.
The Court dismissed the petition challenging the Board of Revenue's order and made no order as to costs.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The Board of Revenue's allowance of respondent no. 4's revision stands; respondent no. 7 is treated as having become owner on 18-12-1969 and the petitioner's claim for pre-emption fails.
- Broader implications: The opinion grounds its decision on existing statutory provisions (Section 47 of the Registration Act; Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act) and established case law (as cited). The Court did not purport to lay down a novel precedent beyond applying these authorities to the unusual factual circumstance of simultaneous execution and filing; accordingly, no new legal principle distinct from the cited authorities was announced by the Court in this opinion.
Application dismissed.
Hari Lal Agrawal, J.:— This application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against an order of the Board of Revenue, Bihar, allowing a revision application of respondent no. 4 in a proceeding initiated under the provisions of Section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Celling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961.
2. The relevant facts, briefly stated, are that on 14-10-1969 a sale deed was executed by respondent nos. 5 and 6 in favour of respondent no. 4 (Ajablal Yadav) with respect to 4 kathas from west of survey plot no. 2399, situate in Village Bhawanpur, Police Station Madhubanl. The sale deed was registered on 12.11.1969 The petitioner Sled an application under Section 16(3) of the Act before the Deputy Collector Land Reforms, Madhubanl on 18-12-1969, claiming to be the cosharer as well as an adjoining raiyat of the plot in question. On the same day respondent no. 4 had executed a sale deed selling the property in question to Awadhlal Yadav, respondent no. 7. This sale deed was registered on 22-12-1969.
3. Notice of this proceeding was Issued by the Deputy Collector to respondent no. 4 who filed his show cause on 15.6.1970 disputing the claim of the petitioner that he was a cosharer or an adjoining raiyat of the land in question. It was further said by him that the land in question was already transferred in favour, of Awadhlal Yadav and possession was also delivered to him. It may be mentioned that in spite of this disclosure the petitioner did not Implead the second transferee, the said Awadhlal Yadav, in the proceeding and for the first time he has been Impleaded in this court as respondent No. 7. It may also be usefully mentioned that it has not been the stand of the petitioner that the transfer in favour of respondent no. 7 by respondent no. 4 was either Farzi or sham, but his only plea was that respondent no. 4 had executed the sale deed with the sole motive to defeat the claim of the petitioner and to circumvent the provision of law.
4. The Deputy Collector allowed the claim of pre-emption accepting both the grounds advanced by the petitioner. Respondent No. 4 then preferred an appeal before the Collector, Madhubanl, against the order of the Deputy Collector, which was dismissed by order dated 10.1.1977 The Addl. Collector took the view that in as much as the sale deed in favour of respondent no. 7 was finally registered on 22.12.1969, i.e, subsequent to the filing of the application for pre-emption, the land in question could not be deemed to have been transferred from the possession of respondent no. 4 to the possession of respondent no. 7 on 18.12.1969, the date of the filing of the application for pre-emption, since it was the date of the final registration and not the date of execution of the document that mattered in a pre-emption case. In support of his view the learned Additional Collector placed reliance upon the case of (1) Ramnath Giri v. Ramsundar Girl (1970 PLJR 8 Rev.) and therefore, the sale deed aforesaid was held to be Invalid in law.
5. Respondent no. 4 then filed a revision before the Board of Revenue and the Board, on reference to the provisions of Section 47 of the Registration Act, came to hold that the sale deed in favour of respondent no. 7 became effective from 18-12.1969. It further held that on the pre-emption application already stayed respondent no. 4 had right to deal with the property. The Board, therefore, allowed the application and set aside the orders of both the courts below. The petitioner has accordingly come to this Court.
6. Mr. Mojibul Haque, appearing in support of this application, raised the following points;
(i) The transaction of sale by respondent no. 4 in favour of respondent no. 7 was inoperative as it was hit by the doctrine of lis pendens; and
(ii) in any event, the case should be remitted back to the first court to esquire into the validity of the said transaction as the same was effected only for the purpose of defeating the claim of the petitioner, meaning thereby that the transaction was fictitious and sham in nature.
7. I now proceed to consider the first point raised by Mr. Haque which is the main point for consideration in this case. Somewhat similar questions have fallen for consideration by this court on earlier occasion also and reference may be made in this connection to the case namely (2) Ramchandra Yadav v. Anutha Yadav (1971 B.L.J.R 994) and (3) Smt. Sudama Devi v. Rajendra Singh (A.I.R 1973 Patna. 199). In Ramchandra's case the second transfer was made on 3-4-1967, a day prior to the filing of the application under Section 16(3), but it was registered on 24-6-1967 and in as much as under Section 47 of the Indian Registration Act the second transferee became the owner of the land right from 3-4-1967 and derived title from the said date, the application against the original transferee under Section 16(3) failed. It was however observed that in such circumstances it was obligatory for the preceptor to implead Chhatti (the subsequent transferee) as a party in his application under Section 16(3) and “to seek such relief as may be available to him in presenee of Chhatti”.
8. In the next case, i.e, Sudama Devi's case, the matter was discussed by Untwalla, J. (as he then was) in some more detail. On reference to the scheme of Section 16(3), particularly Clause (iii), it was observed that in Section 16(3) there was absolutely no provision made for making an order of pre-emption against a subsequent transferee on an application filed for pre-emption against the first transferee, and if the subsequent transferee is in fact and in law, a transferee of the property in respect of which claim for pre-emption had been made, then a question of his being a transferee with notice of the pre-emption application, was not relevant view of what was said in Ramchandra's case, (to which also Untwalia, J. was a party). In that case the learned Judge had pointed out three situations, namely, (i) if the transferee of the property transferred it to a second purchaser by a document executed and registered before the filing of the application, the second transferee got a good title in the property and there was no question of his right being defeated by a subsequent application for pre-emption; (ii) the second sale deed being executed and registered after the filing of the application for pre-emption, the second transfer was cleary hit by the doctrine of lis pendens engrafted under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, and (iii) when a document of sale is executed before, the filing of an application for pre-emption but is registered after its filing.
9. The first two situations being obvious, do not create much difficulty. Difficulty may, however, arise in the third category of the case and it was this difficulty which was resolved in Sudama Devi's case. On considerateion of the entire subject and relevant law relating to the rule of pre-emption, it was ultimately held that when a sale deed is executed prior to the filing of an application for pre-emption, merly because it is registered subsequent to the filing of the application. It cannot be said to have been hit by the doctrine of lis pendsens, as the transferee becomes the owner of the property in view of the provisions of law contained in Section 47 of the Registration Act prior to the date of filing of the, application.
10. In spite of this authoritative decision of this court, I am faced with a somewhat anomalous position in this case and that is that the impugned transfer in favour of respondent no. 7 and the application for pre-emption were both made on the same day, i.e, 18.12.1969 For the reasons discussed in the above authorities and the provisions of law contained in Section 47 of the Registration Act, respondent no. 7 undisputed became the owner of the property on 18.12.1969, the date when the application for pre-emption was made. It is not possible to decide the question of priority of either the execution of the sale deed or the making of the application for pre-emption in point of time and, therefore, I would assume that both the events took place simultaneously and they stand on equal footing. Question now arises as to what would be its effect, in the eye of law; on the legal rights of each of the contenders, namely, as to whether the petitioners right to claim pre-emption would survive and prevail or it will be defeated on account of respondent no. 7 becoming the owner of the property.
11. I do not find any relevancy of the fact of the taking “cognizance” by the Deputy Collector of the application for pre-emption, in view of the explanation added to Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, according to which the pendency of a suit or proceeding is to be deemed to commence from the date of the presentation of the plaint or the institution of the proceeding in a court of compel tent jurisdiction. This anomaly, therefore, leads me to consider the question from an entirely different angle. It was observed in Sudama Devls' case that had the Act in question been not a protected legislation having been Included in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution, the law engrafted in Section 16(3) could have been struck down as being violative of Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. It has further been observed that the law of pre-emption engrafted in Section 16(3) was of a still weaker nature than the customary law of pre-emption. I also feel tempted to rely upon the observation of Subbarao, J. in the case of (4) Bishan Singh v. Khazan Singh (A.I.R 1958 S.C 838) where he said that the vendee may defeat the right by selling the property to a rival pre-emption with preferential or equal right. The following observation of the learned Judge is eloquent;
“The plaintiff is bound to show not only that his right is as good as that of the vendee but that it is superior to that of the vendee…..this superior right must subsist at the time the pre-emption exercises his right and that right is lost if by that time another person with equal or superior right has been substituted in place of the original vendee…….. The vendor and the vendee are, therefore, permitted to avoid accrual of the right of pre-emption by all lawful means…….preferred being the essence of the right, the plaintiff must have a superior right to that of the vendee or the person substituted in his place. The right being a very weak right, it can be defeated by and legitimate methods such as the vendee allowing the claimant of a superior or equal right being substituted in his place.”
12. The above observations which were also referred to by Untwalia, J. in Sudama Devi's case, in my view, provide the key to resolve the problem. I have already said that on the facts, of the present case the application for pre-emption and the transfer by respondent no. 4 may be held to have been simultaneously made. In that event, the pre-emptor and the subsequent transferee standing on equal footings, unless the pre-emptor would show that his right was still superior to that of the vendee (respondent no. 7), he cannot be allowed to succeed because if both the parties have equal rights then the right of the pre-emptor being a much weaker right, must give way to the right acquired by the vendee, who must be given preference over the pre-emptor. I would, therefore, reject the claim of pre-emption on this ground.
13. The second point urged by Mr. Haque can be noticed simply to be rejected, for the simple reason that it has never been the petitioner's case, as already observed earlier, that the transfer by respondent no. 4 to respondent no. 7 was either farzi or sham. All that was contended on this front by the petitioner was that the transaction was entered into only for the purpose of defeating the claim of the pre-emptor. That they may be a position even in the case of a genuine transaction and, as already obseived in a large body of cases that a vendee can take all legitimate steps to defeat the right of pre-emption. The notice of, respondent no. 4 as such cannot be assailed and accordingly no question arises for any further investigation in the matter as to whether the Impugned transfer by respondent no. 4 was vitiated on any account, particularly when the petitioner took no steps to implead respondent no. 4 after being aware of the assignment of the disputed Land in his favour. In Sudama Devi's case the subsequent transfer was Impeached from the very beginning as being sham.
14. For the reasons discussed above and both the points urged in support of this application having been found to be of without any merit, this application must fail. Accordingly it is hereby dismissed, but in the circumstances I shall make no order as to costs.
Application dismissed.
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