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Abid Ali v. District Judge, Bahraich

Allahabad High Court
Mar 3, 1986
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

Opposite Parties Nos. 4 and 5 (Girish Kumar and Rajesh Kumar) filed an application under Section 21 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (the Buildings Act) seeking release of a shop on the ground of their own requirement. The Prescribed Authority (Munsif, Bahraich — Opposite Party No. 3) rejected that application by order dated 8.2.1985 (Annexure No. 3). The opposite parties then preferred an appeal under Section 22 of the Buildings Act to the District Judge, Bahraich, who transferred the appeal for hearing to the Civil Judge, Bahraich (Opposite Party No. 2). The Civil Judge allowed the appeal and released the shop in favour of Opposite Parties Nos. 4 and 5. The tenant-petitioner (Abid Ali) challenged the Civil Judge's order before this Court by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an appeal under Section 22 of the Buildings Act lies only to the District Judge and can be heard either by the District Judge himself or by an Additional District Judge (i.e., whether the Civil Judge lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal).
  2. Whether the District Judge had competence to transfer the appeal to the Civil Judge — specifically, whether such transfer was permissible under the Buildings Act, the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 (Courts Act), or under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908, read with Section 34 of the Buildings Act and the Rules framed thereunder.
  3. Whether general provisions of the Courts Act or the CPC (including Section 24 CPC and administrative-transfer powers) could override or supplement the specific transfer provisions of Sections 10 and 22 of the Buildings Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • An appeal under Section 22 of the Buildings Act can be heard only by the District Judge or by an Additional District Judge — no other officer or court (including a Civil Judge) is competent to hear such an appeal. This submission relied upon Sections 22 and 10 of the Buildings Act, including the terms of Section 10(1) which allow the District Judge either to dispose of an appeal himself or assign it for disposal to an Additional District Judge.
  • The question of lack of jurisdiction is an inherent jurisdictional defect and may be raised before this Court even though it was not raised before the appellate authority below; the petitioner urged that he should be permitted to raise it in these Article 226 proceedings.

Opposite Parties' Arguments

  • Counsel for Opposite Parties Nos. 4 and 5 contended that the term "District Judge" in Sections 22 and 10 of the Buildings Act should be understood with reference to the Courts Act — i.e., as a Court (not a persona designata) — and therefore the District Judge's powers of transfer must be determined by the general law applicable to Courts and Judges under the Courts Act and the Code of Civil Procedure (for example, Section 24 CPC and Section 22(1) of the Courts Act), which permit transfer to subordinate Civil Judges under administrative control.
  • Reliance was also placed on Section 34 of the Buildings Act and Rule 22 framed under Section 45 (Rules) to argue that certain provisions of the CPC were made applicable to Buildings Act proceedings, and on that basis it was submitted that Section 24 CPC would permit transfer by the District Judge to other Civil Courts (including the Civil Judge who decided the appeal).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Central Talkies Limited, Kanpur v. Dwarka Prasad, 1961 All WR (HC) 238 Whether an officer authorised to discharge functions of the District Magistrate under an Act is a persona designata or not. The case held such an officer was not a persona designata. The court considered it of no assistance to Opposite Parties because the present conclusion stands even if the District Judge is treated as a Court under the Courts Act.
Ganga Ram v. A.S.D.O. Etamadpur, Firozabad, Agra, 1967 All LJ 988 Interpretation under U.P. Panchayat Raj Act whether Sub-Divisional Officer includes Additional Sub-Divisional Officer. The authority was confined to interpreting that Act and held Sub-Divisional Officer included Additional Sub-Divisional Officer. The court observed this authority was not of general application and so of no assistance here.
Dharmendra Prasad Singh v. State of U.P., 1969 All WR (HC) 66 Issue whether taxing Judge or Chief Justice could refer a question under Court Fees Act to a larger Bench under Section 5. The court noted the question there was different and that no similar question arose in the present case.
Kashi Nath Singh v. District Magistrate and Collector, Mirzapur, 1970 All WR (HC) 577 Reiterated Ganga Ram's case regarding interpretation of statutory offices. The Full Bench reiterated the view from Ganga Ram; the court here said that decision did not assist Opposite Parties for the current statutory context.
Samiullah v. Special Additional District Judge, 1984 All WC 577 Whether a Special Judge named or designated by the District Judge was a civil judicial officer competent to hear an election petition under specific Rules. A learned single Judge held the Special Judge (named/designated) was competent and transfer by District Judge was upheld. The present court held this authority was based on interpretation of that Act and not of general application; therefore it did not help Opposite Parties.
M/s. S. Chand & Company vs. VII Addl. District Judge, Lucknow, 1985 (3) Lucknow Civil Decisions 114; Sri Moolchand Motumal Tekwani v. The Additional District Judge II, 1985(3) Lucknow Civil Decisions 244 Whether revision under Section 115 CPC is maintainable against orders passed in proceedings under Section 30 of the Buildings Act; whether the "Munsif" in Section 30 is a persona designata or the lowest court in the hierarchy. Two single Judges held Section 115 CPC was maintainable and that "Munsif" was the lowest Court (not persona designata). The present court observed these were not transfer cases and thus not applicable to the transfer issue before it.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in the following sequence, strictly following the opinion's reasoning:

  1. The court accepted the petitioner's request to raise, for the first time before this Court, a question going to the jurisdiction of the Civil Judge to hear the appeal under Section 22, because it was an inherent jurisdictional objection that “goes to the root” of the appellate authority's competence.
  2. The court examined the text of Section 22 of the Buildings Act: it prescribes appeals from orders under Sections 21 or 24 to the District Judge, and states that "in other respects the provisions of section 10 shall mutatis mutandis apply in relation to such appeal." Thus Section 22 (a) prescribes the forum (District Judge) and time-limit for appeal and (b) imports, mutatis mutandis, Section 10.
  3. The court then reviewed Section 10(1) of the Buildings Act which provides that an aggrieved person may prefer an appeal to the District Judge and that "the District Judge may either dispose it of himself or assign it for disposal to an Additional District Judge under his administrative control, and may recall it from any such officer or transfer it to any other such officer." The court emphasized the statutory language, noting that the District Judge's power to assign or transfer is expressly limited to an Additional District Judge ("such officer").
  4. From this statutory wording the court concluded that Sections 22 and 10 together intend appeals under Section 21 to be heard either by the District Judge himself or by an Additional District Judge; transfer to any other officer (for example, a Civil Judge) is not authorised by these provisions.
  5. The court observed that there is no other provision in the Buildings Act that allows transfer of appeals from the District Judge's Court to other Courts; therefore the transfer in the present case to the Civil Judge was incompetent and without jurisdiction under the Buildings Act.
  6. The court addressed Opposite Parties' reliance on the Courts Act and Section 24 CPC. It rejected the submission that the word "District Judge" in Sections 22 and 10 must be read solely through the lens of the general Courts Act so as to import broader transfer powers (such as transfer to any Civil Judge under administrative control). The court held a general provision in the Courts Act cannot supersede the specific provisions of the Buildings Act (a special enactment).
  7. The court examined Section 34 of the Buildings Act and Rule 22 made under Section 45 (rules). It noted that Section 34 makes only specified provisions of the CPC applicable (as set out in clauses (a) to (f) of Section 34(1)) and that Section 24 CPC (the general transfer provision relied upon) is not among those adopted provisions. Rule 22 similarly enumerates applicable provisions and does not include Section 24 CPC. Therefore, Section 24 CPC could not be read into Buildings Act proceedings by virtue of Section 34 or Rule 22.
  8. The court relied on the legislative design that the Buildings Act is a special Act and that special enactments prevail over general enactments where inconsistent. It referred to Section 38 of the Buildings Act, which expressly provides that the Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent in the Transfer of Property Act or the CPC. On this footing the court concluded that the Code and the Courts Act have no general application to Buildings Act proceedings except insofar as they are specifically adopted by the Buildings Act; this conclusion applied whether "District Judge" in the Buildings Act is treated as a persona designata or as a Court under the Courts Act.
  9. The court reviewed the principal authorities cited by Opposite Parties (summarised in the precedents table). It characterised those decisions as either being confined to interpretation of their respective special statutes or being inapplicable to the precise transfer question under the Buildings Act, and therefore not persuasive for allowing the transfer in this case.
  10. Based on the statutory text and the above reasoning, the court concluded that the District Judge was not competent to transfer the appeal to the Civil Judge and that the Civil Judge's judgment was rendered without jurisdiction.
  11. Having reached that jurisdictional conclusion, the court held it unnecessary to decide other merits-based pleas raised by the petitioner regarding the bona fide requirement under Section 21.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Writ Petition Allowed; the judgment and order dated 21.11.1985 of the Civil Judge, Bahraich (Annexure No. 4) is quashed.

Direct consequences and directions:

  • The appeal filed by Opposite Parties Nos. 4 and 5 shall now be heard either by the District Judge, Bahraich himself, or the District Judge may transfer it to an Additional District Judge subordinate to him; the appeal shall not be transferred to any other Court (specifically, not to the Civil Judge who previously decided it).
  • The petitioner and Opposite Parties Nos. 4 and 5 are directed to appear before the learned District Judge, Bahraich on 11.4.1986 for taking a date for the hearing of the appeal.
  • The cost of the petition is ordered to be easy (i.e., nominal/easily borne).
  • Administrative directions: A certified copy of the judgment shall be issued to parties applying therefor within three weeks of their application (provided application is made within three days of pronouncement). A copy shall also be transmitted to the learned District Judge, Bahraich within one month of pronouncement.

Broader legal implication articulated by the court: The Buildings Act is a special enactment whose specific provisions on appellate forum and transfer (Sections 10 and 22) govern appeals under the Act; general provisions of the Courts Act and the Code of Civil Procedure do not override these specific provisions unless they are expressly made applicable by the Buildings Act (as in Section 34 and the Rules). The court applied the doctrine that where a special enactment conflicts with a general enactment, the special enactment prevails.

Show all summary ...

Order -

This petition arises from the proceedings for release under S.21 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act 1972 Act No. 13 of 1972, for short(the Buildings Act). Opposite parties Nos. 4 & 5 Girish Kumar and Rajesh Kumar filed application against petitioner Abid Ali seeking release of the shop in question on the ground that the same was required by them for their own use. The application was rejected by the Prescribed Authority, Munsif Bahraich, opposite party No. 3 by his order dated 8.2.1985, Annexure No. 3. Opposite Parties Nos. 4 and 5 thereafter preferred appeal under Section 22 before the learned District Judge, Bahraich who transferred it for hearing to the Civil Judge, Bahraich, Opposite Party No. 2. Opposite Party No. 2 allowed the appeal and released the shop in question in favour of Opposite Parties Nos. 4 and 5. Aggrieved by this order of the learned Civil Judge, tenant-petitioner has approached this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution.

2. Apart from challenging the order of the learned Civil Judge on merits petitioner has raised a purely legal ground which pertains to the jurisdiction of the Civil Judge to hear the appeal. The petitioner admits that this question was not raised before the learned Civil Judge but his learned counsel has pres­sed that since the matter relates to inherent lack of jurisdiction he may be per­mitted to raise it before this Court in the present proceedings. In my opinion, the question raised by the learned counsel does go to the root of the jurisdic­tion of the learned Civil Judge to hear and decide the appeal and, therefore, petitioner should be permitted to raise the plea in the present proceedings des­pite the fact that the plea was not raised before the appellate authority below.

3. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner an appeal under Section 22 could be heard either by the District Judge himself or by an Additional District Judge and no other officer was competent to hear and decide such an appeal. For making the submission the learned counsel has placed reliance upon Ss, 22 and 10 of the Buildings Act. Section 22 provides as follows --

“22, Appeal -- Any person aggrieved by an order under Section 21 or Section 24 may within thirty days from the date of the order prefer an appeal against it to the District Judge, and in other respects the provisions of section 10 shall mutatis mutandis apply in relation to such appeal.”

This provision prescribes forum for appeal in respect of proceedings under Section 21 of the Act. Apart from providing the forum it also provides the limitation for filing the appeal against the orders under Section 21. Thereafter, it provides that in respect of other matters Section 10 would be applicable mutatis mutandis. Section 10 provides for appeal against orders passed under Sections 8 and 9. Under this provision also appeal lies to the District Judge. Sub-section (1) of S. 10 reads as follows --

“10. (1). Any person aggrieved by an order of the District Magistrate under S. 8 or S. 9 may, within 30 days from the date of the order, prefer an appeal against it to the District Judge and the District Judge may either dispose it of himself or assign it for dis­posal to an Additional District Judge under his administrative control, and may recall it from any such officer or transfer it to any other such officer.”

This section first provides the appellate forum which is the District Judge, Thereafter it prescribes the manner in which the District Judge may deal with an appeal filed before him. The section lays down that the District Judge may either dispose it of himself or assign it for disposal to an Additional District Judge. It further provides that even after transferring an appeal to an Additio­nal District Judge he can recall it from such Additional District Judge and transfer it to any other 'such' officer. Use of the word 'such' before the word 'Officer' is significant. Use of this word indicates that further transfer can also be only to an Additional District Judge and to no other officer.

4. Apart from Section 10 there is no other provision in the Buildings Act relating to transfer of appeals from the Court of District Judge to other Courts and under this provision transfer is possible only to the Court of Additional District Judge and to no other Court. Therefore, transfer of the appeal in question to the Court of Civil Judge was incompetent and without jurisdiction.

5. The transfer of the appeal by District Judge to the Civil Judge has been supported by learned counsel for the opposite parties Nos. 4 and 5 by reference to the provisions of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act. 1887, for short Courts Act, and Section 24 of the Civil P.C. According to the lear­ned counsel the “District Judge “ mentioned in Ss. 22 and 10 of Courts Act is not a persona designata but it is a Court created under the provisions of the Courts Act, and therefore, powers of the District Judge, including the power to transfer a case filed before him shall have to be determined with reference to the provisions of the said Act. According to the learned counsel, under sub-sec. (1) of Section 22 of this Act it is competent for the District Judge to transfer an appeal to any Civil Judge under his administrative control. Learned coun­sel submits that the Civil Judge who decided the present appeal was a Civil Judge under the administrative control of the District Judge, Bahraich and therefore, transfer of appeal to his Court was fully covered by sub sec. (1) of S. 22. In my opinion no assistance can be derived from the general provision contained in the Courts Act as the same cannot supersede the provisions of a Special enactment like the Buildings Act.

6. The learned counsel has also placed reliance upon S. 34 of the Build­ings Act and R. 22 framed there under Section 34 makes applicable the Civil P. C. 1908 (Act No. V of 1908), for short, 'Code' to proceedings under the Buildings Act. On this basis learned counsel submits that the power of trans­fer was available to the learned District Judge under S. 24 of the Code also. Section 24 of the Code does confer power upon the District Judge to transfer cases from one Court to another, including cases pending before him, but S. 34 of the Buildings Act does not make all the provisions of the Code applicable to proceedings under the Buildings Act. Only the provisions of the Code specified in Cls. (a) to (f) of sub-sec (1) of S. 34 apply to such proceedings. Section 24 of the Code is not included in these clauses. Clause (g) states -- “Any other matter which may be prescribed. “ Section 45 of the Buildings Act con­fers power on the State Government to frame Rules. In exercise of this power State Government has framed U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972, R. 22 whereof makes applicable certain further provisions of the Code to proceedings under the Buildings Act. These provisions are enumerated in Cls. (a) to (f). None of these clauses includes Section 24 of the Code.

7. From the above discussion it would appear that the transfer of the Appeal by the District Judge to the Civil Judge cannot be justified even by reference to the provisions of Civil P.C. and the 'Courts Act'. Further, the Buildings Act is a special Act while the Code and the Courts Act are general enactments. It is settled law that the provisions of Special enactment prevail over the provisions of general enactment. This principle has been specifically adopted in Section 38 of the Buildings Act wherein it has been provided that the provisions of the Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in Transfer of Property Act or in the Civil P.C., 1908. In view of this provision, provisions of the Code will have no general application to proceeding under the Buildings Act. The said provisions will have applica­tion only to the extent they have been specifically adopted. Although the Courts Act has not been specifically mentioned in S. 38, intention of the legis­lature is apparent that the provisions of the buildings act will have precedence over the provisions of any other enactment. This consequence follows whether the 'District Judge' mentioned in Ss. 22 and 10 is treated to be a persona designata or Court contemplated by Courts Act.

8. Learned counsel for the Opposite Parties Nos. 4 and 5 has placed relia­nce on certain authorities. These authorities may be briefly noticed. Central Talkies Limited, Kanpur v. Dwarka Prasad, 1961 All WR (HC) 238 was a case under the provisions of the U. P. Temporary Control of Rent and Evic­tion Act, 1947. The question which arose before their Lordships in this case was, whether a person authorised to discharge the functions of the District Magistrate under the Act was a persona designata or otherwise. It was held by their Lordships that such an officer was not a personl designata. In view of my finding that the conclusion to which I have arrived is arrived even if the District Judge is treated as a Court under the provisions of the Courts Act, this authority is of no assistance to the Opposite Parties.

9. Ganga Ram v. A.S.D.O. Etamadpur, Firozabad, Agra, 1967 All LJ 988 was a case arising under the provisions of U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947. The petition in this Court was directed against an order passed by A.S.D.O. Etamadpur, suspending the Pradhan of Gaon Sabha. The plea raised in the petition by the suspended Pradhah was that the power of suspension could not be exercised by the Additional Sub-Divisional Officer. Section 95 (g) of the Panchayat Raj Act conferred power on the State Government to suspend a Pradhan. Section 96-A authorised the State Government to delegate its power in this behalf to any Officer or authority sub­ordinate to it. It appears that in exercise of power conferred under S. 96 A power had been conferred by the State Government upon Sub-Divisional Offi­cer. The term Sub-Divisional Officer has been defined in S. 2 (ss) of the Act. In this definition Sub Divisional Officer included Additional Sub-Divisional Officer also. On an interpretation of the provisions of the Panchayat Raj Act it was held by the Division Bench of this Court that the Sub-Divisional Officer included Additional Sub-Divisional Officer also. This authority is based on interpretation of the provisions of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act and cannot be said to lay down a law of general application. This authority also is, therefore, of no assistance to the Opposite Parties.

10. The question that arose for determination before the Full Bench of this Court in Dharmendra Prasad Singh v. State of U.P., 1969 All WR (HC) 66 was whether the taxing Judge or and the Chief Justice while hearing reference under the Court fees Act could make a reference under S. 5 of the Act to a larger Bench, No such question arises in the present case.

11. In Kashi Nath Singh v. District Magistrate and Collector, Mirzapur 1970 All WR (HC) 577 the Full Bench reiterated the view taken in Ganga Ram's case (supra) with certain elaboration. 1984 All WC 577 Samiullah v. Special Additional District Judge was a Case arising under the provisions of U.P. Kshettra Samities (Election of Pramukhs and U.P. Pramukhs and Settlement of Election Disputes) Rules, 1962, Under these Rules an Election Petition was to be preferred before the Judge, Under the definition clause the term 'Judge' meant District Judge and included any other subordinate Civil Judicial Officer named or designated by District Judge in that behalf. The Election Petition in this case was filed before the District Judge, He transferred it to die Special Judge for decision. This transfer was challenged before this Court. A learned single Judge of this Court held that the Special Judge was a Civil Judicial Officer named and designated by the District Judge and was, therefore, competent to hear and decide the Election Petition, With this finding the writ petition was dismissed and the transfer of the Election Petition by District Judge to the Court of Special. Judge was upheld. This authority is based upon the interpretation of the pro­visions of the Act and cannot be utilised for any general purpose. The learned. counsel for the Opposite Party has relied upon it mainly in support of his sub­mission that the District Judge referred to in the Rules was not a persona designata. I have already observed hereinabove that the conclusion to which I have arrived follows even if the District Judge in the present case is held to be not a persona designata but Court under the Courts Act. This authority also-is, therefore, of no assistance to the Opposite Parties.

12. In M/s. S. Chand and Company Vs. VII Addl. District Judge, Lucknow, 1985 (3) Lucknow Civil Decisions 114 and (Sri) Moolchand Motumal Tekwani v. The Additional District Judge II, 1985(3) Lucknow Civil Decisions 244 it was held by two learned single Judges of this Court that Revision under Section 115 of the Civil P.C. was maintainable against order passed in proceedings under S. 30 of the Buildings Act. Section 30 of the Buildings Act authorised a tenant to deposit rent in the Court of Munsif having jurisdic­tion. The question that arose in these two cases was whether Munsif mentioned in sub-sec. (3) of S. 30 was a persona designata or a Court so as to attract the provisions of Section 115 of the Code. Both the learned Judges held that Munsif was not a persona designata but was the lowest Court in the hierarchy of regu­larly constituted Civil Courts and as such S. 115 of the Code was applicable and that S. 38 of the Buildings Act was not a bar to the maintainability of such revision. These were not cases of transfer and, therefore, they have no application to the facts of the present case. As already noticed in respect of transfer of an appeal filed either under S. 10 or under S. 22, specific provision has been made and, therefore, this authority is of no assistance to the learned counsel.

13. In view of the above discussion, in my opinion, the learned District Judge, Bahraich was not competent to transfer the appeal preferred by Opposite Parties Nos. 4 and 5, to the Civil Judge, Bahraich, Opposite Party No. 2. The judgment of the learned Civil Judge is, therefore, without jurisdiction and is liable to be quashed.

14. In view of this finding it is not necessary to consider the other pleas raised by learned counsel for the petitioner on the merits of the findings recorded by learned Civil Judge on the landlord's claim of bona fide requirement under S. 21.

15. The learned counsel for the Opposite Parties Nos. 4 and 5 has pressed that a date may be fixed for the appearance of the parties before the learned District Judge so that there is no loss of time.

16. For the discussion herein, the Writ Petition is allowed and the judg­ment and order dated 21.11.1985 made by learned Civil Judge, Bahraich, Annexure No. 4, is hereby quashed. The appeal shall now be heard either by District Judge, Bahraich himself or he may transfer it to an Additional District Judge subordinate to him but it shall be transferred to no other Court. The cost of this petition shall be easy. The petitioner and Opposite Parties Nos. 4 and 5 shall appear before learned District Judge, Bahraich on 11.4.1986 for taking a date for the hearing of the Appeal.

17. A certified copy of this judgment shall be issued to the parties apply­ing therefor within 3 weeks of their applying, provided application in that behalf is made within 3 days of the pronouncement of this judgment. A copy of this judgment shall be transmitted to the learned District Judge, Bahraich also within one month of the pronouncement of this judgment.

(Petition allowed)

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