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Brij Lal And Others (Decree-Holders) v. Damodar Das (Objector).

Allahabad High Court
Apr 3, 1922
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Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Walsh, J.; Ryves, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellants were originally sued for possession of land and, after partial success at trial but full success on appeal to this Court, the plaintiffs executed their decree and obtained possession. A portion of that decree was transferred to the respondent, who obtained possession of part of the land. The appellants appealed to the Privy Council (the respondent was not a party to that appeal). On 9 February 1914 the Privy Council reversed the decree of this Court and dismissed the suit; it directed that parties should bear their own costs.

On 8 March 1914 the appellants applied to the Subordinate Judge to obtain restitution of possession, relying on a printed copy of the Privy Council judgment. An objection based on the requirement of order XLV, rule 15 (that the High Court must first transmit the Privy Council decree before execution) was overruled by the Subordinate Judge and that ruling was later upheld by this Court in Damodar Das v. Birj Lal.

Two further applications (for recovery of possession and for costs) were made within three years of the Privy Council decree. The present application, filed on 4 September 1918, sought mesne profits for the period the appellants had been kept out of possession under the decree which was subsequently set aside by the Privy Council.

The Subordinate Judge dismissed the mesne-profits application on three grounds: (1) it was time-barred under article 181 of the Limitation Act; (2) the respondent was not a party to the Privy Council decree and therefore not bound by it; and (3) application barred by Order II, rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The third ground was later not pressed on appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an application under section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure is an "execution" proceeding (and, relatedly, which article of the Limitation Act — article 181, 182 or 183 — applies to such an application arising out of a Privy Council decree).
  2. Whether a transferee (the respondent), who was not a party to the Privy Council appeal, could be bound by and subject to an application under section 144 founded on the Privy Council decree (i.e., whether non-party transferees can be proceeded against under section 144).
  3. Whether the application for mesne profits was time-barred under the Limitation Act (specifically whether article 181, 182 or 183 applied).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The application under section 144 should be treated as a proceeding to enforce the Privy Council decree, and therefore the period of limitation applicable is that provided by article 183 of the Limitation Act (applications to enforce judgments, decrees or orders of His Majesty in Council).
  • The respondent, although not a party to the Privy Council appeal, could be the subject of a section 144 application and required to account for mesne profits because he enjoyed possession under the decree later set aside.
  • The decision in Damodar Das v. Birj Lal and the single-judge decision reported in 61 Indian Cases 806 (Execution First Appeal No. 93 of 1920) supported reading article 183 as applicable to enforcement of Privy Council decrees in the context of section 144 applications.

Respondent / Lower Court Position (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The lower court held the application was time-barred under article 181 of the Limitation Act on the ground that an application for restitution was not an application in execution, and article 182 did not apply; it also held article 183 was inapplicable because the present application did not in terms enforce the Privy Council decree.
  • The lower court held that the respondent was not a party to the Privy Council appeal and therefore was not bound by that decree and could not be proceeded against under section 144 in consequence.
  • The lower court additionally applied Order II, rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure to bar the application (this ground was not pressed on appeal).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jiwa Ram v. Nand Ram That proceedings under section 144 of the Code are not execution proceedings. The court agreed with this decision and treated section 144 as not being an execution proceeding (though in the nature of proceedings in execution).
Madhusudan Das v. Birj Lal Held that an application under section 144 could be a proceeding to enforce an order of His Majesty in Council and thus fall within article 183 of the Limitation Act. The court followed the view taken by Mr. Justice Stuart in this case and applied that approach to the present facts, accepting that article 183 can cover an application in substance to enforce a Privy Council decree.
Damodar Das v. Birj Lal Addressed execution of a Privy Council decree in a subordinate court without the procedure of order XLV, rule 15; also held that Damodar Das (though not a party to the Privy Council appeal) was bound to give up possession and that an application under section 144 was proper against him. The court relied on aspects of this decision: (a) to confirm that a Subordinate Judge may act where order XLV, rule 15 has been complied with (and to limit the earlier decision to the procedural context); and (b) to support that a non-party transferee could be subject to section 144 relief.
Ram Singh v. Sham Parshad; Krupasindhu Roy v. Mahanta Balbhadra Das; Asha Bibi & Nuruddin (from Burma) These cases held that applications under section 144 fall within article 181 of the Limitation Act. The court noted these authorities as representing a line of decisions treating s.144 applications as governed by article 181, but contrasted them with other High Court decisions and ultimately favored the view that article 183 applied in the Privy Council context.
Sayad Hamidalli v. Ahmedalli (Bombay High Court) Held that applications under section 144 fall within article 182 of the Limitation Act. The court recorded this decision as representing a differing view on limitation, but did not adopt it for the present case.
Unnamalai Ammal v. Mathan (Madras High Court) Held that applications under section 144 fall within article 182 of the Limitation Act. The court recorded this decision as another authority taking the article 182 view, but did not follow it here.
Execution First Appeal No. 93 of 1920 (reported 61 Indian Cases 806) Single-judge decision: application under section 144 to recover costs, where the Privy Council order had effect of reversing High Court costs order; held that article 183 applied to such enforcement of a Privy Council order. The court regarded this decision (Mr. Justice Stuart's order) as persuasive and followed its reasoning that article 183 is the proper article for enforcement of Privy Council decrees by section 144 applications.
Relevant Statutory Provisions: Article 181, Article 182, Article 183 (Limitation Act); Order II, rule 2 and Order XLV, rule 15 (Code of Civil Procedure) Used to determine which limitation period applies and what procedural steps are required to execute or enforce Privy Council decrees. The court analysed the language differences between article 182 ("execution" of a decree of a Civil Court) and article 183 ("to enforce" a judgment, decree or order of His Majesty in Council) and concluded article 183 was the appropriate article to apply in this context.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The opinion contains two principal judicial expositions (Walsh, J. and Ryves, J.) which converge on the ultimate result. Their reasoning may be summarized in discrete steps without adding material not in the text:

  1. Characterisation of section 144 proceedings:
    • Both judges agreed with this Court's earlier decision in Jiwa Ram v. Nand Ram that proceedings under section 144 are not strictly "execution proceedings" under the Code of Civil Procedure, though they are in the nature of proceedings in execution to give effect to a final decree.
    • Walsh, J. emphasised the breadth of section 144, observing that the word "party" in that section must be read as "party to the application" (not necessarily "party to the suit" or to the original decree), thus permitting relief against transferees who enjoy possession under a decree later set aside.
  2. Whether a non-party transferee can be proceeded against under section 144:
    • Walsh, J. rejected the lower court's view that only parties to the decree may be subject to a section 144 application. He accepted prior decisions in cognate matters arising from the same Privy Council decree (including Damodar Das and Madhusudan Das decisions) that a transferee like Damodar Das could be required to give up possession and be subject to section 144 proceedings.
    • Ryves, J. agreed that the respondents (though not parties to the Privy Council appeal) had been held in earlier proceedings to be bound by that decree and therefore could not re-raise the objection that they were not parties to the Privy Council matter.
  3. Which article of limitation applies:
    • The lower court applied article 181 (treating the application as not being an execution and therefore time-barred under article 181).
    • The judges reviewed conflicting authorities: some decisions (including several from Burma) had treated s.144 applications as within article 181; other High Courts (Bombay, Madras) had held s.144 applications fall under article 182; and Mr. Justice Stuart in a previous single-judge decision had held that where an application sought to enforce a Privy Council decree, article 183 applied.
    • Walsh, J. and Ryves, J. accepted Mr. Justice Stuart's analysis that article 183, which speaks of applications "to enforce" judgments, decrees or orders of His Majesty in Council, is appropriately read more broadly than article 182's reference to "execution" of a Civil Court decree. They concluded that where the substance of the application is to enforce the Privy Council decree (that restored parties to their pre-High Court position), article 183 is the logical and correct article of limitation to apply.
    • Ryves, J. further analysed Damodar Das v. Birj Lal to show that that earlier decision concerned procedural requirements (order XLV, rule 15) about transmission and execution of Privy Council decrees and did not determine the broader question of which article of limitation applies to a section 144 application to enforce a Privy Council decree.
  4. Conclusion on relief:
    • On the basis that section 144 does not demand that an applicant be a party to the original decree and that article 183 governs enforcement of Privy Council decrees by proceedings in substance to enforce them, the Court held the lower court's dismissal on the ground of limitation under article 181 and on non-party status to be incorrect.
    • The Court therefore allowed the appeal and restored the case to the lower court to be dealt with on the merits, granting the appellants the costs of the appeal and directing that costs in the lower court abide the result.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Appeal allowed. The order of the lower court dismissing the appellants' application was set aside and the case was restored to the lower court to be dealt with on the merits. The appellants were awarded the costs of this appeal; costs in the court below were ordered to abide the result.

Implications (as stated or necessarily confined to the opinion)

  • The Court reaffirmed that proceedings under section 144 are not strictly execution proceedings under the Code, though they are in the nature of execution to give effect to a final decree.
  • The Court interpreted "party" in section 144 as "party to the application" (i.e., a transferee in possession under a decree that has been set aside can be proceeded against under section 144 even if not a party to the original appeal in the Privy Council).
  • The Court accepted and applied the reasoning that an application in substance to enforce a Privy Council decree falls within article 183 of the Limitation Act (applications to enforce judgments, decrees or orders of His Majesty in Council) rather than being governed by article 181 or article 182, and followed Mr. Justice Stuart's earlier view on that point.
  • Direct consequence for the parties: the appellants' application for mesne profits will be reconsidered on its merits by the lower court; the respondent's previous time-bar and non-party defenses were rejected for the purposes of this appeal.
  • The opinion follows and applies existing authorities rather than announcing a novel principle; the Court expressly followed prior decisions (notably the Stuart view in Madhusudan Das) in reaching its result.
Appeal allowed.

Note: This summary is strictly confined to the facts, reasoning and holdings stated in the provided opinion. No information has been added that was not present in the opinion text.

Show all summary ...

Walsh, J.:— This appeal raises two points. It was an application in the court below against a person who had become a transferee of a decree which was subsequently set aside in the Privy Council in favour of the present appellants. The transferee was not a party to the proceeding in the Privy Council, but under the decree which the Privy Council set aside and of which he had become a transferee, he obtained possession of certain property and was, therefore, in the enjoyment of mesne profits in respect of it. The application to the court below, which was in substance a proceeding under section 144, but which adopted all the forms applicable to execution proceedings, asked that the respondent should account for mesne profits during the time for which he had been unlawfully in possession under a decree which had been set aside. The application was dismissed by the court below on the ground that it was time-barred by article 181 of the Limitation Act, and, secondly, on the ground that the respondent was not a party to the decree which gave rise to the application. A further point was raised under order II, rule 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure which obviously has no substance. The case has been extremely well argued on both sides before us and a great number of authorities have been cited on this vexed question. It is not desirable to add more than one is obliged to the tangle which appears to exist with regard to the method of reconciling proceedings under section 144 with other provisions of the law. It so happens that in the case before us the point whittles itself down to a comparatively narrow compass. We agree with the decision of this Court in the case of Jiwa Ram v. Nand Ram that proceedings under section 144 of the Code are not execution proceedings, although they are, of course, in the nature of proceedings in execution to enforce either directly or indirectly the final decree. We do not agree with the lower appellate court that it is necessary that a party to an application under section 144 should have been a party to the decree. Section 144 is very wide in its terms. It includes matters which an execution court or an appellate court could not ordinarily deal with, and the word “party” is not used in that section in the sense “party to the suit”, the expression ordinarily found in other parts of the Code dealing with execution matters, but must mean “party to the application.” It so happens that in this particular case the matters arising out of the final decree of the Privy Council had been already on more than two occasions before this Court, although not always as between the identical parties now before us. We have decided to follow the view taken by this Court in the same or cognate matters arising out of this Privy Council decree. That is to say, firstly, this Court has already held that Damodar Das, although not a party to the Privy Council decree, was bound to give up possession and that an application under section 144 was properly made against him. We agree. That disposes of the second point decided in his favour by the lower court, Mr. Justice Stuart, in a previous matter which came before him by way of first appeal in May of last year (the case is Madhusudan Das v. Birj Lal , held that the application was one justified by the provisions of section 144, and, inasmuch as its only authority was derived from the final decree of the Privy Council, it came within the expression used in article 183 of the Limitation Act, as being an application to enforce an order of His Majesty in Council. The words which we have just quoted are clearly capable of being read so as to cover an application of this kind, which is in substance one to enforce a decree of the Privy Council which restored the parties to the position they were in before the High Court interfered. We think the only logical course to take, whatever academic view one might take as a matter of construction in the interpretation of these somewhat difficult provisions, is to follow the view taken by Mr. Justice Stuart in the case of Madhusudan Das v. Birj Lal . The appeal must be allowed and the case restored to the lower court to deal with on the merits. The applicants will have the costs of this appeal. Costs in the court below will abide the result.

Ryves, J.:— I agree generally. The facts out of which this case arises are as follows. Some persons sued the appellants for possession of land. They succeeded partially in the trial court, but, on appeal in this Court, succeeded entirely. Thereupon they executed their decree and got possession of the land, and then they transferred a part of the decree to the respondent and put him in possession of a corresponding portion of the land. Thereafter the appellants appealed to His Majesty in Council. The respondent was not made a party to that appeal. On the 9th of February, 1914 the Privy Council passed a decree reversing the decree of this Court and dismissed the suit. It went on to direct that the parties should bear their own costs. On the 8th of March, 1914, the appellants applied to the Subordinate Judge to obtain restitution of possession of the land of which they had been deprived. They based their application on a printed copy of the judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council, which had been supplied to them by their solicitor in England. It was objected by the other side that the application to the Subordinate Judge was premature and that in any case it could not be based on the report of the Privy Council. It was pointed out that under order XLV, rule 15, it was necessary to apply first of all to the High Court to transmit the decree of the Privy Council before us execution could be taken out. The Subordinate Judge over-ruled this objection. On appeal this Court upheld it. The judgment is reported in Damodar Das v. Birj Lal , and I will refer to it later. There were two further applications made to the Subordinate Judge, one for recovery of possession and the other for costs. Both of these were made within three years of the decree of the Privy Council, that is, the 9th of February, 1914. The present application was filed on the 4th of September, 1918, for mesne profits for the period during which the appellants had been kept out of possession of the property. The lower court rejected the application on three grounds. Firstly, that it was barred by article 181 of the schedule to the Limitation Act, on the ground that an application for restitution was not an application in execution of a decree, and, therefore, article 182 did not apply. It also held that article 183 was not applicable, because it was not an application to enforce in terms the decree of the Privy Council. It, therefore, held that the only other article possible was article 181 and that under that article the application was barred by time. It also held that, inasmuch as the respondents were no party to the appeal in the Privy Council, they were not bound by that decree. Thirdly, it applied order II, rule 2 as barring the application. On this ground also it dismissed the application. On appeal before us all the three points have been attacked. The third point has not been pressed. On the second point I think it is sufficient to say that in previous proceedings for restitution and costs in this very litigation arising out of this decree and in connection with the same property, it has been finally held by this Court that the respondents, though no party to the appeal, are bound by the decree. They, therefore, in my opinion, cannot raise that objection again. On the first point I feel considerable difficulty. It has now been held by this Court in the case of Jiwa Ram v. Nand Ram that an application under section 144 of the Code is not a proceeding in execution under the Code of Civil Procedure. It is unnecessary, I think, to refer to any other rulings of other courts. The question, however, remains as to what, assuming that it is not an application for execution, is the article of limitation which would apply. It has been held in the cases of Ram Singh v. Sham Parshad , Krupasindhu Roy v. Mahanta Balbhadra Das and Asha Bibi & Nuruddin from Burma, that applications under section 144 come within the purview of article 181 of the Limitation Act. On the other hand, the Bombay High Court in the case of Sayad Hamidalli v. Ahmedalli and the Madras High Court in the case of Unnamalai Ammal v. Mathan have held that applications under section 144 fall within article 182 of the Limitation Act. I may point out that all these cases refer to applications under section 144 from decrees of the High Court and that, therefore, article 183 was not and could not have been considered. It has been argued that in the case already mentioned, Damodar Das v. Birj Lal (6), this Court has really decided the matter and held that an application of this kind is really a proceeding in execution. In my opinion, however, in order to appreciate that decision it is necessary to examine what were the actual facts before the Court. There an attempt had been made to execute the decree of the Privy Council in the court of the Subordinate Judge on the basis of a copy of their printed judgment only, and without having adopted the procedure laid down in order XLV, rule 15. This Court held that order XLV, rule 15, provides that whosoever desires to obtain execution of any order of His Majesty in Council must first apply under that particular order before he can proceed further, and it goes on to say that the word “execution” in that order is intended to cover execution of any kind, because, as they point out, but for the presence of order XLV, rule 15, there would be nothing to show what steps should be taken to execute a decree, or to give effect to a decree, of His Majesty in Council.

In my opinion that case takes us no further. The only case to which we have been referred in which a Privy Council decree has been the subject of decision, is Execution First Appeal No. 93 of 1920, decided byte, single Judge of this Court, on the 7th of May, 1921, which has been reported in 61, Indian Cases, 806, There, although it appears from the report that Damodar Das was a party, he is not the same individual as is the respondent here. That case is not in any way res judicata, but it is a decision among other parties to the same litigation and gives effect to the same decree of the Privy Council. It was an application to recover certain costs, and although the order of the Privy Council as to costs was that there should be no order as to costs, this had the effect of reversing the order of the High Court which had given the respondent in that case coats, which he had recovered. Mr. Justice Stuart held that the only authority for the recovery of costs which Brij Lal paid to Musammat Indar Kuar was the order of His Majesty in Council. He held, therefore, that although that application was under section 144 of the Code, nevertheless the period of limitation applicable was that provided by article 183. The language of article 183 is different from that of article 182. Article 182 provides for “the execution” of a decree or order of any Civil Court. Article 183 is “to enforce” a judgment, decree or order … of His Majesty in Council. It seems to me that the words “to enforce” there, are wider in meaning than the words “to execute” in article 182 and should be interpreted as equivalent to “to give full effect to”, which is synonymous with “to enforce.” In my opinion, therefore, the order of Mr. Justice Stuart was right and we should follow it. I would, therefore, allow the appeal.

By The Court:—The order of the Court is that the appeal must be allowed and the case restored to the lower court to deal with on the merits. The appellants will have the costs of this appeal. Costs in the court below will abide the result.

Appeal allowed.