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Tara Chand (Judgment-Debtor) v. Champi (Decree-Holder).
Factual and Procedural Background
Lala Tara Chand, a judgment-debtor, was made a party defendant to a partition suit while a minor. When brought on the record he was over 18 but under 21 and therefore a ward of the Civil Court. After appointing a pleader he entered contest and preliminary and final decrees were passed against him. He filed two appeals to this Court which were dismissed. Subsequently the plaintiff recovered her costs from Tara Chand in the courts below and in this Court. Tara Chand applied for restitution under Section 144, Code of Civil Procedure, seeking refund of those costs. The learned Judge of the first court refused restitution. The present appeal challenges that refusal. The opinion records that the preliminary and final decrees in the partition suit have been declared by this Court today to be null and void.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the principle of Section 144, Code of Civil Procedure, applies to require restitution of costs where decrees were not varied or reversed on appeal but have been declared null and void in separate proceedings.
- Whether the Court may, under its inherent powers and Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure, exercise discretion to order restitution for the ends of justice in such circumstances.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Section 144 should apply to obtain restitution of costs even though the decrees were not varied or reversed on appeal.
- The same words "varied" and "reversed" appear in Sections 98 and 99 of the Code in relation to appeals, so it is difficult to accept they have a different meaning in Section 144.
- Reliance on a Madras High Court ruling (Tangatur v. Gerram) that the provisions of Section 144 may be extended to cases where a decree is set aside as null and void in a separate suit.
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of specific arguments advanced by the respondent in opposition.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Tangatur v. Gerram (1916) I.L.R. 40 Mad. 299 | The Madras High Court ruling that the provisions of Section 144 may be extended to cases where a decree is set aside as null and void in a separate suit. | Noted as a precedent which may support extension of Section 144; acknowledged but not treated as determinative of entitlement to restitution in this case. |
| Jai Berhma v. Kedar Nath Marwari (1922) I.L.R. 2 Pat. 10; 16 | Support for the proposition that the court's duty/jurisdiction to act rightly and fairly is inherent in its general jurisdiction and not confined to Section 144 alone. | Quoted to show that jurisdiction to order restitution is inherent and can arise under the court's general powers (Section 151) for ends of justice. |
| Bindeshri Prasad v. Badal Singh (1923) I.L.R. 45 All. 369 | Authority of a Full Bench acting in accordance with the principles of acting rightly and fairly under the court's jurisdiction. | Referred to as an example where the Full Bench acted according to those principles; supports the Court's recognition of broad discretionary power. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court examined whether restitution of costs was required in the interests of justice. It acknowledged the appellant's contention that Section 144 should apply despite decrees not having been varied or reversed on appeal, and observed textual similarity with Sections 98 and 99 and a Madras High Court decision (Tangatur). The Court also noted its inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 and the general duty of courts to act rightly and fairly, citing Jai Berhma and a Full Bench decision in Bindeshri Prasad as supporting authorities.
Applying these principles to the facts, the Court concluded that restitution was not warranted. As to the High Court costs, the Court found no equity in refunding them because Tara Chand himself appealed rather than through his next friend, and it was not the respondent's fault that he failed to do so. As to the costs of the first court, the Court held it would be inequitable to relieve Tara Chand: he had concealed his minority, entered into litigation while aware he was a minor (being a ward), conducted his own affairs without intervention of his guardian (his natural mother), and only sued through his guardian when seeking cancellation of the partition decrees. These circumstances, the Court held, did not entitle him to a refund.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED WITH COSTS
Direct effect: Tara Chand is not entitled to restitution of the costs recovered from him; his appeal against the refusal to order restitution is dismissed and he must pay costs. The opinion does not announce any new legal principle beyond the application of established authorities and the Court's exercise of discretion; no broader precedent was created by this decision.
1. This is an appeal by a judgment-debtor, Lala Tara Chand, from the dismissal of his application for restitution under Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He was made a party defendant to a partition suit while he was a minor. He was then over 18 years of age, but under 21; and was, therefore, not a major, being a ward of the Civil Court. On his being brought on the record, he entered into contest after appointing a pleader, and decrees (preliminary and final) were passed against him. He filed two 'appeals to this Court and his appeals were dismissed. Subsequently, the plaintiff of the suit recovered her costs of the first court and this Court. The present application was for refund of the costs. The preliminary and final decrees in the partition suit have been declared by this Court today to, be null and void.
2. The learned Judge of the first court refused to order restitution and hence Tara Chand has appealed. It is argued here that the principle of Section 144 applies, though the decrees themselves were not varied or reversed in appeal. The same words, "varied" and "reversed", are used in sections 98 and 99 of the code with reference to an appeal.-It is, therefore, difficult to believe that they are used in this section with a different meaning. At the same time, we are aware of the ruling of the Madras High Court that the provisions of this section may be extended to cases where a decree is set aside as null and void in a separate suit: Tangatur v. Gerram (1916) I.L.R. 40 Mad. 299. Whether the provisions apply or not, it is clear that this Court has jurisdiction, under the provisions of section 151, to exercise its discretion and make such order as may be necessary for the ends of justice. Their Lordships observed in Jai Berhma v. Kedar Nath Marwari (1922) I.L.R. 2 Pat. 10; 16:
Nor indeed does this duty or jurisdiction arise merely under the said section (i.e. section 144). It is inherent in the general jurisdiction of the court to act rightly and fairly, according to the circumstances, towards all parties involved.
3. A Full Bench of this Court acted in accordance with these principles in Bindeshri Prasad v. Badal Singh (1923) I.L.R. 45 All. 369.
4. The question, therefore, is whether in this present case it will be necessary for the ends of justice to restore the costs paid by Tara Chand. In our opinion it will not be. As regards the costs in the High Court, there can be no equity in refunding those costs. Tara Chand himself did not appeal through his next friend; he appealed himself. It was not the fault of the respondent, Musammat Champi, that he did not appeal through his next friend. As regards the costs of the first court also, we do not think it will be equitable to relieve him of the costs which he was ordered to pay. He himself must have known that he was a minor. He concealed that' ^act and entered into litigation. He was over 18 years at that time and was a minor, because the age of majority was put off by a guardian being appointed to his property and person by the District Court. There is evidence that at that time Tara Chand did all his business himself without intervention of his guardian, who was his natural mother. Tara Chand was adopted out of the family and had ceased to have anything to do with his natural mother. Only when he brought the suit for cancellation of the decrees passed in the partition suit, he sued through his guardian. These are the circumstances which do not entitle him to the refund of the costs recovered from him. We dismiss this appeal with costs.
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